Problem solving from textbook examples by Robertson, Sydney Ian
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Problem solving from textbook examples
Thesis
How to cite:
Robertson, Sydney Ian (1994). Problem solving from textbook examples. PhD thesis The Open University.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 1994 The Author
Version: Version of Record
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
'by.. C19(ol I 
to) 0 rZ. rz. 4 -r4.1 e.. 'r CL-4i 
Problem Solving from textbook examples 
0 
Sydney Ian Robertson, M. A.., B. A. 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for Ph. D. in Psychology, 
February, 1994. 
Human Cognition Research Laboratory 
The Open University 
Milton Keynes MK7 6AA 
U. K. 
' I-A 1260660 Aov-kor Awsv%6ý-a 0 ý, rjejqZ joL'". x b o. %o ro, p ý. 4: 3 #A ", '7 04-VO 2J r,, -brvioL-ý lq'r4f4-o 
OPEN 
UN IV E-4S I TY 
27 MAY 1994 
RARY 
Lt 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank the many people who gave their time and expertise to help me with this 
thesis. First, I would like to thank Stuart Watt in H. CRL. for re-writing the SOLO program 
from scratch. His patience, when I returned to him every now and then with a fresh nest of bugs 
for him to deal with, was nothing short of admirable. 
I would also like to extend my gratitude to the staff and pupils of Blairgowrie High School in 
Perthshire and Denbigh High School in Milton Keynes. In particular I owe a debt of thanks to 
William Sutherland, head of the Mathematics department In Blairgowrie, and David Dalby, 
head of Mathematics in Denbigh. Many thanks also to Kathryn, Jon and Linda. 
Finally, I owe a very great deal to Hank I<ahney, my supervisor. Few students can have the 
good fortune to have someone who is prepared to lavish so many ideas, coffee and red ink on 
them. 
ill 
iv 
Declaration 
Parts of this thesis have been published as H-C. R, L. Technical Reports (96 and 97). 
The Interpretation Theory presented in chapter 3 is a development of unpublished work by Hank 
Kahney of the Open University. lie used the proportional analogy framework as the basis of a 
method of protocol analysis. The further development of the interpretation theory presented in 
chapter three is entirely my own work. 
, 
The interpretation theory is currently being used as the basis for a study into curriculum design, 
and to assess a Techniques Editor for novice Prolog programmers by the Department of Artificial 
Intelligence at Edinburgh University. 
p 
vi 
Abstract 
There has been a great deal of research into students' use of examples when solving problems in 
textbooks. Much of this work has been within the framework of analogical problem solving 
(APS). Indeed many researchers believe they can build adequate models of how students learn 
and solve exercise problems by analogy to worked examples. In the first part of this thesis I 
argue that this view of problem solving from examples is inappropriate and often misleading. 
Most students learning a subject for the first time tend to imitate examples. Imitative Problem 
Solving UPS) is a weak form of analogical problem solving. APS accounts assume that a solver 
has a representation of an earlier problem in memory. The difficulties involved are accessing 
that source problem and adapting it to solve the current one. WS does not assume that the source 
is represented in memory, and even when the source example is available (as in textbook 
examples), the student may not understand it well enough to be able to adapt it to new situations. 
The second part af the thesis presents an interpretation theory for analysing both texts and the 
behaviour of solvers using those texts to solve exercise problems. 
The third part applies the interpretation theory to the solution explanation of a simple algebra 
word problem. Where an example problem fails to map directly onto an exercise problem, or 
where inferences have to be made to understand it, the solver win be unable to imitate the 
example and hence will have difficulties in proportion to the mapping inequalities between the 
two problems. That is, the interpretation theory allows us to predict precisely where solvers 
will have difficulty using an example to solve an exercise problem of the same type. 
vii 
The final part presents experimental tests of these predictions. Ihe results confirm that the 
interpretation theory analysis can correctly identify possible areas of difficulty for the student 
due to a) the way an example problem is structured, and b) the nature of the transfer task. 
viii 
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Chapter I- Introduction -A learning episode 
Chapter I INTRODUCTION. -A learning 
episode 
1. Introduction 
The research presented in this thesis is concerned with how people leam'from texts, It 
deals specifically with how novices learn from examples, and how these examples are 
presented in teaching contexts. This chapter presents a learning scenario with two aims. 
The first is to clarify the goals of the thesis, and the second is to frame the issues to be 
considered. The scenario is a problem solving episode which occurred during the training 
of a subject learning a simple AI programming language. The learning episode will be 
referred to throughout the thesis; first, to Identify the Issues that will be dealt with; 
second, to act as a framework for discussing previous research; and third, as a yardstick 
against which tojudge the merits of the research presented here, I shall attempt to show 
that the research reported here can make substantial contributions, at a finer grain of 
analysis than previously attempted, to our understanding of how novices tackle problems 
early in their attempts to learn a new domain of knowledge. Furthermore, the text 
analysis explained in this thesis shows how textbook writers can improve their 
Presentation of material so as to increase the probability that students will understand 
the text at the same time as increasing the rate at which they learn from It, One of the 
main conclusions Is that part of the Vame' for any misunderstandings or misconceptions on 
the part of novices should be shifted from the novices themselves to their teachers. 
Learning and -problem solving 
from examples involve an interaction between the learner, 
the problem, and the domain represented by the text. Ideally, characterizing this 
I 
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interaction requires information about the prior knowledge of the problem solver, a 
detailed analysis of the problem itself and of the text in which the problem is embedded. 
People do not readily learn what they do not understand. One of the main points that 
emerges from the studies reported here is that we should make few assumptions about 
what a learner is supposed to know. This approach partially shifts the burden for 
successful problem solving and learning from the learner to the teaching text. 
A leaming episode 
In this section we shall examine the behaviour of a subject attempting to solve a problem 
in a programming language called SOLO. The subject's behaviour, the problem, and the 
nature of the text will be examined in some detail. First of all we shall look at some 
aspects of SOLO in general before looking at parts of the teaching material which the 
subject had read. The subject is then described before we go on to look at the nature of the 
problem she was asked to solve, and the verbal protocol she gave as she attempted to 
solve it. 
2.1. The domain: The SOLO programming language 
SOLO is an Al programming language designed by Marc Eisenstadt as part of a cognitive 
psychology course at the Open University (Eisenstadt, 1978/1983). Items in the SOLO 
database are in the form of node-relation-node triples and written in the form node--- 
retation->node. An example would be FIDO -- ISA --> DOG. Triples can be added to a 
database using a procedure called NOTE, and removed from the database using a 
procedure called FORGET. For example, typing 'NOTE MARY - KISSES -> JOE' at the 
SOLO prompt would add that triple to the database and SOLO would respond: 
OK... 
MARY 
I KISSES --> JOE 
If the user were then to type 'FORGET MARY - KISSES --> JOE' the triple would be 
removed from the database. 
User-defined procedures are written by typing 'TO' followed by the procedure name and a 
parameter, if necessary, Parameters are enclosed in slashes thus: /X/. Each step in the 
procedure is numbered except for the final line where the user types 'DONE'. DONE lets 
SOLO know that the end of the procedure has been reached. An example of a user-defined 
procedure might be one where SOLO prints out that someone 'IS GREATwhen that 
someone is added as the parameter. In SOLO it would look like this: 
SOLO; TO PRAISE IV 
2 
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I PRINT /X/ "IS GREAT" 
DONE 
Those parts in bold typeface indicate what the user has to type in. The parts in normal 
type are generated by SOLO itself. 
The user can check to see if a triple is in the database by using the CHECK procedure. 
CHECK can be used in two ways: CHECK MARY - KISSES -> JOE would cause SOLO 
to respond 'PRESENT, if the triple MARY - KISSES --> JOE already exists In its 
database or "ABSENT' if it does not. CHECK can also be used along with a wild-card 
represented by a question mark: CHECK MARY - KISSES --> ?. If a triple such as 
MARY -- KISSES -> <some node> is present in the database, SOLO will respond by 
instantlating the value found at the second node of the triple, in this case JOE, to the 
wild-card variable and printing PRESENT: JOE. 
When CHECK is used within a user-defined procedure, control-statements have to be 
added to tell SOLO what to do if the third node of a triple is either present in the 
database or absent, If at step 1 the user types in '1 CHECK /X/ - LIKES -> BEER/ 
SOLO generates two lettered substeps. Here they would be'1A If PRESENT. 'and'IB IF 
ABSENT: ' The user has to specify what SOLO should do in either of these conditions. 
The control-statement EXIT causes SOLO to exit from the procedure at that point; 
CONT=E tells SOLO to go on to the next numbered step. Here is an example of a 
procedure called PRAISE that CHECKs whether someone LIKES BEER and then either 
PRINTs something if the person does Re beer or adds a new triple to the database if no 
match is found: 
SOLO: TO PRAISE IX/ 
... :I CHECK /X1 -- LIKES .. > BEER 
..... 1A IF PRESENT. PRINT IV "IS GREAV# CONTINUE 
..... 113 IF ABSENT: NOTE W -- IS --- > TEETOTAL; EXIT 
:2 PRINT "I REALLY ADMIRE" W 'I'S TASTE" 
: DONE 
If PRAISE BILL is then entered, and the triple BILL - LIKES -> 13EER is present in the 
database, the program would first print BILL IS GREAT. The control statement 
CONTINUE passes control on to the next step, step 2, and SOLO would print "I REALLY 
ADMIRE BILL 'S TASTE". If the triple BILL -- LIKES --> BEER did not exist in the 
database, then at step 1B the procedure would add BILL ... IS -> TEETOTAL to the 
database and then EXIT without going on to step 2. 
3 
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2.2. Recursion in the SOLO manual 
This section examines the structure of the Appendix to the SOLO manual where recursion 
is introduced. The aim is to identify the goals of the writer based on the way recursion is 
presented and explained. 
In the SOLO manual, a procedure known as INFECT is presented a number of times in 
various forms. What the writer is attempting to do is build on a simple procedure that 
adds a triple to the database (NOTE /X/ - HAS --- > FLU) until eventually a recursive 
procedure is constructed that adds that triple to a series of nodes that are linked by the 
same relation. In other words, the INFECT procedure is increasingly elaborated until it 
includes a recursive call to itself in the final version. 
The first INFECT procedure is very simple and has the effect of adding a triple to the 
database (for clarity each version of the INFECT procedure is numbered here, so this 
version is INFECT[1]). 
Suppose we defined a procedure called INFECT as follows, 
TO R*JFECT IXI 
I NOTE /X/ - HAS -> FLU 
DONE 
If SOLO's database contained the following description: 
MARIA 
I 
ISA --- > WOMAN 
I 
and we typed in: 
SOLO: INFECT MARIA 
SOLO would respond as follows: 
4 
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OK 
MARIA 
I 
I -- ISA -> WOMAN 
HAS -> FLU 
Notice that there is no statement of what the INFECT procedure is for. The writer 
assumes that the reader can infer what the program is designed to do. 
A new version of the INFECT procedure (INFECT[21) is then given along with a statement 
that 'if HARRY gets the FLU then JOAN gets it as well. ' This is followed by the new 
defWtion: 
TO NFECT /X/ 
I NOTE /X/ - HAS -> FLU 
2 CHECK /X/ -- KISSES ? 
2-A IF PRESENT: NOTE HAS --> FLU; EXIT 
2B IF ABSENT: EXIT 
DONE 
(The asterisk after NOTE in the above definition Is a variable which is instantiated to 
whatever matches the T in step 2). 
At this point the text invites the reader to say what would happen if INFECT HARRY is 
now typed in. An explanation of how SOLO would respond Is then given which includes a 
diagram: 
person 
ICSSES 
person 
FLU 
A hypothetical database is then presented diagrammatically: 
5 
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JANE 
JOE 
LIZ 
The writer then asks what the above diagram would look like if INFECT LIZ is now 
typed in. The result is: 
JANE 
JOE 
LIZ 
HAS 
The explanation goes on to point out that JANE remains unaffected, whereas we would 
expect such a procedure to INFECT JANE as well. 
The text goes on to say that 'we want (the procedurej to keep on happening/ and that the 
procedure would 'keep on happening' If one substep was altered. The text then gives the 
reader the chance to say what that alteration might be before providing it. In line ZA of 
the latest INFECT procedure (INFECT(31) the NOTE HAS -> FLU has been 
replaced by INFECT *. 
TO INFECT /X/ 
I NOTE /X/ -- HAS--> FLU 
2 CHECK /X/ -- KISSES --- >? 
- EXIT 2A IF PRESENT: INFECT 
2D IF ABSENT. EXIT 
DONE 
INFECT[31 Is then explained and three verbal analogies are introduced: a 'reserve pool, of 
football players waiting on a bench to go into action; the idea that procedures such as 
INFECT and NOTE are regarded as 'experts' at a particular task, and an analogy with 
passing a baton in a relay race, The text then presents a new database: 
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LIZ 
I--- KISSES --- > JOE 
JOE 
I ---KISSES JANE 
JANE 
I KI$SES --- > HENRY 
HENRY 
I ---SMOKES --> CIGARS 
The reader is then asked to imagine how SOLO would respond to INFECT UZ given the 
new database, The answer is given and explained using the 4expert' analogy. The concept 
of recursion is further developed by pointing out two aspects- the concept of the recursive 
call (the procedure 'keeps on happening'); and the concept of the halting condition. In 
SOLO this is usually IF ABSENT: EXIT. - 
The first part of the SOLO Appendix is illustrated in figure 1.11. In the figure each 
example problem statement is represented by A and the solution by B. Exercise and in-text 
questions are represented by C and the solutions by D. The rationale for this nomenclature 
is given in Chapter 3. The arrows show where the text 'takes' the reader. For example at 
row b the reader is asked how SOLO would respond if INFECT HARRY were typed in 
given the definition of INFECT(21 represented by 132 in row a. The answer is then given 
(Di) and the text goes on from that to explain how the most recent definition of INFECT 
would process IIýFECT HARRY, The le' superscript in B20 indicates that the solution is 
being explained. The explanation points the reader to some line diagrams. Diagrams, 
analogies, and such like are shown as B-prime'as in 13'2 in row b. 
In rOW a the Ai represents the fact that there is no explicit statement of the pro , 
blem, to 
which the first INFECT program is a solution. The dotted line at row c shows where the 
lFig"res 1.7,1.2 and 2.3 are presented here to gize a : flavour' of how the interpretation theory presented 
In this thesis can be used to 4nalyse texts. The interested reader May Care to return to them 4fter thefill 
"Planation of the theory in Chapter 3. 
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reader would have to look to find the answer to question C2. In row e the explanation of 
SOLO's response (W) constantly refers to the three analogies given earlier (D'3 in row d). 
A- APPENDIX: MORE ADVANCED FLOW OF CONTROL 
A. 1 Propagating Inferences through the data base 
a) 
E 
-4 BI 
TO INFECT propagate ý, 
]2 M INFEC B2 
/Y/ flu /x/ 12 _ _ 
how would 
S= 
uD : 
2 SOLO's M INFECT 
4 El ý M INFECI ý1 
ý 
b) 
respon 01 
/xj 
-2 
response 1x/ 2 : 
I 
r .......... ........... m .................... ................. . 
C2 
how Wou 
diagram be 3m be 
D ýl u 
Di 2 altered -4ý7 C) altere) d ? diagram 
d) 
C 
ss 
verval ME 
Whatever 
, 
happens keeps 
a' : - ho 0 7'ý W Wou 
you redefine D3 /X/ 3 I 
ý11141E TOINFECT e TOINFECT 
/x/ 3 
r 
q 
nn han 
V 
how would Las D D 1), SO 
7 
s o 
ý 
saýaý verval n"* h ltin sow 4 4 4 a g 
9 
e resoond? re -r 
e pl on condition 
2.3. Iteration in the SOLO manual 
The next few sections of the Appendix go on to discuss iteration and iteration along with recursion. 
They will be discussed only briefly since most of this part of the text is not directly relevant to the 
solution to the problem the subject was given. 
Section A. 2 of the SOLO Appendix goes on to discuss iteration which is explained by presenting an 
example solution called SJUSS (with no statement of what the problem was). The limitations of 
the SUSS procedure are discussed leading on to a new version of SUSS incorporating a new SOLO 
construct FOR EACH CASE OF. The EACH CASE construct is used to find all matches for a 
particular node with more than one identical relation. For example, the following database 
contains several LIKES relations: 
FIDO 
I- ISA --> DOG 
I -- HAS -> FLEAS 
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LIKES --> ROVER 
I -- LIKES --> BEER 
I 
I -- LIKES --- > SLEEPING 
FOR EACH CASE OF FIDO - LIKES . -> ? would identify the three nodes ROVER, BEER and 
SLEEPING that follow the LIKES relation. The iterative SUSS procedure given in the text is: 
SOLO: TO SUSS, /X/ 
... :1 PRINT "HERE ARE THE THINGS" /X/ "LIKES' 
... :2 FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ - LIKES -> ? 
..... 2A: PRINT * "IS ONE OF THEM" 
:3 PRINT "I CAN'T THINK OF ANY MORE" 
: DONE 
Given the current description of FIDO [above] 
If we now typed in 
SOLO: SUSS FIDO 
SOLO would respond 
HERE ARE THE THINGS FIDO LIKES 
ROVER IS ONE OF THEM 
BEER IS ONE OF THEM 
SLEEPING IS ONE OF THEM 
I CAN'T THINK OF ANY MORE 
The text then presents two further examples and invites the reader to work out how SOLO would 
respond. The solutions are given along with an explanation. 
The next section of the SOLO manual, section AA, describes how FOR EACH can be nested within 
other FOR EACH constructs. This is illustrated with a new version of a procedure called 
CRAVETEST which was originally introduced in section 7.4 of the manual. Sections A. 2 and 
A. 3 
are represented in figure 1.2. 
9 
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A. 2 Eliminating the restriction that FIDO LIKES only one thing at a time 
TO SUCE!, !i e 
/X/ 
I. .ýI......................... e To sUss f) Liza ý3 
83 
x 
MB3 ....................... 
g) 13 J SUSS Tos S To now I FOR EACH BM SUSS con. I --> 4 JX/ /X/ 2 
!J U4 
CASEOF 4 /X/ cellf 
howman, twice 
h) Cg 
E 
INT Umes Is P89 Do Do reason -4E activallec zero 
section 
"A A. 3 FOR EACH within FOR EACH 
now e I substep In FOR sectl n 7.4 TOCRAVETEST 
L 
con- EACit FOR EACH Ao Bo / 
g-clýg 
assubstep X/ 
Co 
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Section A. 4 explains that the CHECK node -- relation -> ? construct is obsolete when the FOR 
EACH construct is first used. A new version of an earlier program called BOOZETEST is used to 
illustrate how the FOR EACH construct makes the CHECK construct redundant. 
Section A. 5 explains limitations on the use of variables. A new version of SUSS is used (SUSS[3]) 
to explain why. However, the SUSS program is an example of a violation of the rule restricting 
the use of variables. 
Section A. 6 explains how to edit a program within a substep. The EDIT procedure is explained by 
editing the latest version of a procedure called CRAVETEST which was introduced in an earlier 
part of the book. The final section compares iteration and recursion and shows how they can be 
used in conjunction. It begins with two diagrams representing iteration as 'fanning out' and 
recursion as "propagating'. The diagrams used are: 
iteration: 
node I 
NO 
ce I 
tý6a%ý 
0 t% node 2 
r start relation node 3 
etc 
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recursion: 
relation relation relation relation 
start > node I> node 2> node 3> etc 
The final definition of the INFECT procedure (INFECT(4]) is then given along with a brief 
explanation of how it works: 
TO INFECT /X/ 
1 NOTE /X/ - HAS -> FLU 
2 FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ -- KISSES 
..... 2A: INFECT* 
... : DONE 
The FOR EACH construct allows us to 'fan out' to discover everyone whom /X/ happens to 
kiss, while the recursive use of WECT at sub-step 2A allows us to propagate the 'contagious' 
flu to everyone along a chain of KISSES relations. 
The final part of the Appendix is represented in figure 1.3. The NFECT procedure in raw n relates 
back to the original WFECT program at the beginning of the chapter (A2). 
section 
7.3 A. 4 CHECK node ... relation ? Is now obsolete k 
1-checks th t TODOOZETEST 0 M=ETEzr 
SO MI Mile- Be Ix, 
MA# aý r- Be 
k) 
how would 
DTI S= D? so"O"' 
I 
D-0 flow of rti iii 1: ciri il control 
A. S Scope 
1 
ff 
restriction of TO SUSS D lope SC /X/ a 
A. 6 Editing within a substop 
M) 
(9 editing ED 
within Crr,, T. T 
-- 
Sut5tUL-/ 
A, 7 Iteration versus recursion 
. 
n P O 
.... .... -- 11,11,11,11"..... . 
l 'B 
' l Be TO 
INFEC 
. . Propagat i 19 l b anning out /X/ 
Co 1 SAQ 17 
EIUMLLJhLýUWkaalh9MLQAPP=di& 
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2.4. The subject 
Prior to solving the problem presented in the next section the subject had just finished the 
introductory SOLO manual. She did not know any other computer programming language. 
She had had a great deal of experience in learning from expository texts in the previous 
few years (e. g., tax law) involving complex problem solving tasks. It is therefore likely 
that she came to the SOLO training manual with certain expectations about how such 
texts should be structured. Indeed, there are several places in her study of the text where 
she said she would have preferred the text to give her the chance to 'think creatively'. 
She gives an example of this when she says: 
it would have been possible to put in some sort of sentence... question to encourage me 
to think about it. Like, say, something like, can you think of a problem that arises 
given what you've been told so far? 
That is, she wanted to be allowed to reflect more on the text, or simulate example 
programs before having them explained, These comments are perhaps surprising given the 
large number of in-text questions In the manual asking the reader to predict how SOLO 
would respond to a particular piece of code. 
During her learning of SOLO she showed further evidence of learning strategies in which 
she attempted to interpret the material she read (see Appendices A. 3.1 and A. 3-2). For 
example, on seeing the diagrams discussed above (pages 5 and 6) the subject made the 
following statement: 
I'm suddenly being thrown a diagonal line LIZ KISSES JOE KISSES JANE, I don't 
why they've been drawn diagonally, and I don't know if that has any significance 
particularly. But what it seems to be saying is, if we type in INFECT LIZ, then, 
because LIZ KISSES JOE, JOE will end up having flu, but It doesn't seem to take 
another step to have JANE having flu as well because JOE KISSES her. 
The subject has therefore noted on studying the diagrams that JANE is not affected by the 
procedure, She has pre-empted the discussion in the text which goes on to point out that 
JANE should be INFECTed as well JOE. The subject notes: 
reads paragraph I on page 80 
Yes, in other words only one node can complete the asterisk variable thing, so we 
really need a loop of some sort so it keeps on coming back. and'adding on and not exiting 
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until it's been through everybody that's been kissed by whatever person has been 
infected in the chain. 
Again the subject pre-empts the discussion, and, in the process, generates the hypothesis 
that a 'loop' is needed. On reading the final recursive definition of RqFECT[3] on page 80, 
she comments: 'In other words it loops. ' She seems already to have generated her own 
model of recursion similar to the 'loop' model discussed by Kahney (1982). 
When the text goes on to explain recursion with the three analogies of a 'reserve pool of 
football players, 'passing the baton in a relay race' and 'experts', the subject points out 
that she does not find them useful: 
I don't find the big paragraph right in the middle of page 80 any help at all., 
Mainly, I should think, because it doesn't seem strange that a procedure can activate 
itself. And the whole of that big paragraph starts off, 'If it seems somewhat strange 
that a procedure can activate itself'. It doesn't seem any stranger than the 
explanation that's given. Generally speaking I haven't found any of the analogies 
anywhere in this book any use at all, including the 'passing of a baton from one runner 
to the other in a relay race' for flow of control. 
The first three excerpts above from her study of the training manual show that she 
attempted to draw inferences and generate hypotheses from the material as she read it. 
This kind of text processing is referred to as 'self-explanations' by Chi, Bassok, Lewis, 
Relmann & Glaser (1989) and Chi & Bassok (1989) or the 'reflective' understanding 
discussed by Hiebert & Lefevre (1986). -These researchers would therefore classify her as 
a 'good student'. 
2.5. The problem 
When she had completed her study of the SOLO manual, the subject was presented with 
the following problem: 
Imagine a rambling four-storey house with a basement. A SOLO database describing 
part of the house looks like this. 
ATTic 
I OVER --- > 13EDkOOMI 
BEDROOMI 
I 
13 
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ISA --> ROOM 
OVER -> LANDING 
LANDING 
I 
I- ISA --> PLATFORM 
I 
I- OVER CUPBOARD 
CUPBOARD 
I 
I- OVER LOUNGE 
LOUNGE 
ISA --> ROOM 
I OVER -> KITCHEN 
KITCHEN 
I 
I ISA -> ROOM 
I 
I OVER -> BASEMENT 
13ASEMENT 
I 
I- HAS --: > CONCRETEFLOOR, 
Now ima&e that, after a severe frost, the water tank in the attic bursts. 
Write a SOLO program called FLOOD to represent the fact that if the water tank in 
the attic bursts then the attic and anything below it get flooded. 
Once the program has run, the items in the database should contain the following 
description: 
ATrIC 
I 
I -- OVER BEDROOM1 
I 
I- IS -> FLOODED 
BEDROOMI 
I 
I ISA --> ROOM 
I 
I OVER -> LANDING 
I 
I IS -> FLOODED 
LANDING 
I- ISA --> PLATFORM 
I 
I- OVER -> CUPBOARD 
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I 
I -- IS --> FLOODED 
etc. 
The problem is isomorphic to the recursive INFECT problem on page 80 of the SOLO 
manual. An example database for the INFECT problem had the following form: 
LIZ 
ICSSES --> JOE 
JOE 
I --- KISSES --- > JANE 
JANE 
I 
--KISSES --> HENRY 
HENRY 
I 
SMOKES --- > CIGARS 
The INFECT and FLOOD problems are isomorphic in that both involve a chain of nodes 
linked by the same relation name. In the INFECT problem, the chain relation looks like 
this: 
KISSES KISSES KISSES LIZ ;; ýý JOE 00, jtuNrl -- 
010, HENRY 
with each node linked by the KISSES relation. In the FLOOD problem, the chain relation 
looks like this: 
OVER OVER OVER OVER AMC = BEDROOMI LANDING ; PP, CLT130ARD 
MS-- 
LOUNGE >- KrrCHEN MSEMENT 
with each node Iked by the OVER relation. The difference between the two lies in their surface 
structures'. That is, the relation and node namesare different. Furthermore, the 'cover stories' for 
the two problems are not the same. The INFECT story involves the spread of 'flu through kissing 
and the FLOOD problem involves a burst water tank in an attic. On the surface, both problems are 
entirely different. Only in terms of their underlying structure are they similar. 
The relevant solution to the INFECT problem was: 
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TO INFECT IXI 
1 NOTE /X/ - HAS -> FLU 
2 CHECK /X/ - KISSES -> ? 
2A IF PRESENT: INFECT *, EXIT 
2B IF A13SENT: EXIT 
DONE 
The solution to the FLOOD problem was- 
TO FLOOD /X/ 
I NOTE /X/ - IS -> FLOODED 
2 CHECK IXI - OVER -> ? 
2A IF PRESENT: FLOOD *, EXIT 
2B IF ABSENT: EXIT 
DONE 
7he two solutions above have an identical structure. The value names in bold type in the 
R*TCr program can be replaced with the corresponding values In the FLOOD program 
thus (=* means 'maps onto'): 
INFECT =-* FLOOD 
HAS IS 
FLU FLOODED 
KISSES =ý OVER 
The FLOOD procedure will therefore work through the chain of OVER relations just as 
the INFECT program worted through the chain of KISSES relations. The side effect of 
the INFECT program is to NOTE that whatever node /X/ is instantiated to HAS FLU. 
The side effect of the FLOOD program is to NOTE that the particular part of the building 
represented by the variable /X/ IS FLOODED. When the program works through to the 
end of the chain and no more triples can be found by the CHECK at line 2, the program 
exits at line 2B. 
2.6. Analysis of the protocol 
The problem solving protocol that follows has been divided into a number of problem 
solving 'phases' that describe different aspects of the subject's behaviour. The phases are 
1) 'problem understanding, 2) 'elaboration'.. 3) "search'. 4) 'comparison', 5) 'imitation', and 
6) 'evaluation'. 
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2.6.1. Problem understanding phases 
In the problem understanding phases, the subject is exploring the problem space trying to 
find a representation of the problem that will allow her to solve it. Understanding 
involves generating inferences from the text of the problem before attempting to write the 
code that will translate the problem representation into the form of the solution. 
2.6.2. Elaboration phases 
During this phase the subject explores some of the inferences she has generated in some 
detail. It includes an examination of how some of these inferences can be related to her 
knowledge of SOLO and the possible subgoals her program should contain. 
2.6-3. Search phases 
The search phase occurs when the subject reaches an impasse; that is, her problem solving 
is blocked and the subject searches through the SOLO textbook looking for an example or 
the explanation of a concept that might help in solving the problem. 
2.6.4, Comparison phases 
In the comparison phase, the subject has found a plausibly relevant example and compares 
it to the statement of the target problem, Here the subject is looking for similarities and 
differences between the example problem and the current one, 
2.6.5. Imitation phases 
An imitation phase occurs when the subject tries to use the example to help solve the 
current problem. To do this she copies the example problem by substituting different 
values from the target problem into the source. 
2.6.6. Evaluation phases 
In the evaluation phase, the subject is trying to assess the 'goodness' of her solution or 
Partial solution to the problem., Evaluating a solution often means going back to the 
textbook to see if the solution fulfils some criterion the subject assumes to be necessary 
before the program will work 
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Some phases can be subsumed under others. Elaboration, for example, is an aspect of 
problem understanding. In understanding the problem the subject generates inferences and 
tries to see where these inferences lead in terms of the SOLO program. Similarly, when 
evaluating a solution the subject may compare it to other example solutions. 
Problem understanding phase (1) 
First the subject reads and then rereads the problem. 
SI (Subject): Reads problem 
E (Experimenter): And if you look back over the problem question could you say 
which bits you're looking at. 
S1- Yeah. Well, I'm going to read the whole lot over again, 
Reads database out loud. 
Next the subject classifies the problem. 
SI: This is recursion rather than iteration. If that helps at all. 
E: Why do you say that? 
$I - Well, because it's not the fan-shaped thing, it's the line-shaped thing on page 
91 of the book, 
(SI gives this page numberfrom memory - she does not refer to the book) 
E" What are you looking at? 
si: rm looking at this again. I'm looking at the second page (of problem). Wen, 
the first thing that I'm going to have to do is define a FLOOD procedure 
The important aspect of this episode is how she manages to classify the problem. it 
appears that the subject already has some kind of representation of the structure of 
recursion problems in SOLO. This representation is based on a diagram of recursion as a 
chain relation, The subject refers to this without looking it up in the book Furthermore, 
the subject infers from the structure of the problem's database that recursion should be 
used. The database can be construed as a succession of nodes (parts of a house) one over the 
other which become flooded as water passes through them. On page 91 of the textbook, 
the diagrammatic representations of databases that support Iteration and recursion do not 
refer to a specific database. The diagrams are abstract. For example the 'line-shaped 
thing' the subject refers to is given on page 91 as: 
t relation h, I relation m, node2 relation relation a- etc star pw node PP- pp node3 W- 
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An example would be: 
LIZ KISSES 00, JOE KISSES JANE KISSES Ii- HENRY 
It seems that the subject therefore already understands the relation between such a 
representation and the form of the database. Classifying the problem is a first step to 
solving it, but not a guarantee that the subject necessarily understands recursion (although 
on her original reading of the text the subject showed evidence of having generated some 
form of 'loop' model of recursion). Although she may have an abstract Idea of the concept 
of recursion, this does not guarantee that she can write a specific recursive procedure to 
solve the problem. 
2.6.2. Maborating the problem 
In the next few episodes the subject switches her attention to working out what she can 
legitimately incorporate into the program based on the problem statement, There Is 
information in the text of the problem that is not included as part of the database. For 
example, the problem statement mentions that there Is a severe frost and that the water 
tank bursts. These problem features are not necessary to the program the subject is required 
to write, In the extract that follows, the subject feels that one of these aspects should be 
represented in the program she has to write, despite the fact that the problem -requires 
her simply to write a program that generates ATTIC IS FLOODED, BEDROOMI IS 
FLOODED, etc. as a side-effect. The problem statement mentions that the water tank in 
the attic bursts but there is no mention of a water tank in the database. The subject 
therefore infers that, since the problem states that the water tank bursts, that fact should 
form part of the FLOOD procedure. 
Em, and the thing that's sort of causing me immediate thoughts is: does my FLOOD 
procedure attually have to mention the fact that the water tank in the attic bursts, 
and I suppose It does. 
She has therefore'elaborated on the problem statement so that her problem model 
includes a representation of the water tank bursting. 
In the next section the subject seems to be aware that her representation of the problem is 
not sufficiently constrained. She talks of the 'depth' the program should have, by which 
she means how much extra information it should have, The phrasing of the problem 
statement has led her to conclude, that she should represent the fact that there is a water 
tank and that It bursts. Although the problem asks the solver to 'imagine that the water 
tank in the attic bursts, it also says: 'Write a SOLO program called FLOOD to represent 
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the fact that if the water tank in the attic bursts then the attic and anything below it gets 
flooded' (italics added). The word 'if' creates an inconsistency: the subject has to either 
write a program consistent with 'imagine that the water tank bursts' or one which is 
consistent with 'if the water tank bursts'. The question was therefore badly phrased. 
I'm not quite sure exactly how much depth the program needs me to have. I mean does 
it need me to have somewhere in the database the fact that there is a tank in the 
attic, for instance? 
In the next section the subject processes the problem again from the point of view of her 
'elaborated' problem representation. That is, she looks at it under the assumption that it 
should include some representation of the water tank bursting. This representation leads 
to an impasse, however, since the subject wants to encode the fact that, if the water tank in 
the attic bursts, then anything below it gets flooded, but the fact that the water tank is in 
the attic is not In the database. 
Well, my problem is that, at the moment, the database doesn't contain the fact that 
there is a water tank in the-attic, and therefore it's difficult to have... I mean, I was 
thinking, you see, of starting something like CHECK WATER TANK IN ATTIC 
BURSTS. Well, I mean, obviously it wouldn't say that, but, I mean, something that 
would check that sort of thing. But since the database at the moment doesn't have 
the fact that there Is a water tank in the attic, then, em, that makes it a wee bit 
difficult, doesn't it? 
2.6.3. Search phase 
At this point the subject has reached a 'block! or impasse. In order to get out of it she looks 
back at the book. Her search, at first, Is 'general', that is, she looks back through the 
textbook for help without looking for information on a specific concept. This is 
characterized as a 'search'phase. Her search quickly becomes more focused so that she 
ends up reading the book from the point of view of understanding the concept of recursion. 
SI: oK, I'm going to look back at my little book to see if it can give me any ideas. 
E. Which page are you looking at? 
Sl: I'm not looking at any particular page, I'm looking at page 90 but not for any_ 
particular reason because there's nothing on it that's of any particular use at the 
moment, Maybe it would help if I sort of worked backwards. Maybe It would help if 
I read the bit about recursion. 7bat seems sensible, doesn't it? 
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2.6.4. Comparison phase 
Here the subject finds an example of recursion (INFECT[3]) and reads it through with a 
view to understanding the concept of recursion. She contrasts this with the problem 
representation she had formed of the exercise problem solution and decides that her 
'elaborated' problem representation is unnecessary. She explicitly contrasts what SOLO 
'needs to know' with what a person would infer from the problem. That is, the SOLO 
model of the problem is different from her mental model of the situation described in the 
text of problem. 
OK I don't have to have the fact... I'm looking on page 80, em... which has given a 
new definition of the INFECT procedure so that it keeps on recurring through it. So I 
probably... Right, OK It was just to make... you see, em- I just thought it would be 
a bit clearer, not from the SOLO point of view, but simply clearer from the point of 
view of someone looking at it if the water tank was in it, but that doesn't really 
matter an awful lot, does it? 
SO it's going to start off with, em, stepl NOTE ATTIC IS FLOODED without actually 
going a step behind that to explain why the attic is flooded in the first place. I think 
that's the only way I can start really, isn't it? 
2.6.5. Imitation phase (1) 
Having established the class of problems to which the test problem belongs, and having 
found an example of one on page 80 of the training manual, the subject imitates it by simply 
exchanging the values in the example solution with those in the target problem. The 
program she has written is successful. 
Em, and I'm still looking at page 80 because... why not? OK. Then it's going to be 
now... now I can see already that I'm gong to be putting in CHECK ATrIC is... OK. So 
it's not going to be NOTE ATTIC it's going to be NOTE /X/, I n-dght as wen get to 
there. Em, right, NOTE /X/ IS FLOODED 
CHECK /X/ OVER? 
2a IF PRESENT... IF PRESENT FLOOD 
writes 
Now this little thing I'm jotting down is simply copying what's OA page 80 for the new 
INFECT procedure then I'm going to have to read it and discover that I've got to, sort 
Of... well anyway... 
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writes 
Right so far what I've written down is 
TO FLOOD /X/ 
1 NOTE IXI 15 FLOODED 
2 CHECK /X/ OVER? 
. 2a IF PRESENT- FLOOD *, EXIT 
2B IF ABSENT. EXIT 
DONE 
The subject has mapped across the foHowing: 
TO KFECT /X/ 
TO FLOOD /X/ 
map 
I NOTE /X/ - HAS -> FLU ii 
map 
I NOTE /X/ - IS -> FLOODED 
2 CHECK /X/ - KISSES --> ? iii 
map 
2 CHECK IXI - OVER --> ? 
IF PRESENT- INFECT EXIT 
i 
map 
If PRESENT: FLOOD EXIT 
IF ABSENT- EXIT 
i 
map 
IF ABSENT, EXTr 
2.6.6. Evaluation phase 
So far the subject has written the problem down on paper and has not yet entered the 
database or her program onto the computer. Had she done so and tried FLOOD AMC the 
program would have generated the correct response. As It is, the subject now enters an 
-'evaluation' phase in which she attempts to ascertain If the solution would work, 
particularly in terms of how the recursive call would work- 
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Now I just simply can't remember from the last time I did this whether that will 
take us right through everything, or whether that will simply take us through one 
case of it; so I'm just going to read my book a wee bit further on. 
2.6.7. Search phase (2) 
To check on the solution the subject once again looks through the training manual. 
Sl: This is page 82. And I'm looking on to the iteration, but that doesn't matter. 
I've decided that doesn't matter because we're not doing a fan thing here we're doing 
a line thing, but I may be wrong. In fact I may be seriously wrong. 
reads p92. 
2.6.81 Imitation phase (2) 
In this episode, the subject maps part of the training problem solution (INFECTRI) onto 
the exercise problem. Note that the subject makes'a $matching error' when she fails to 
change INFECT * to FLOOD *. This kind of error occurs when a problem is imitated but a 
value from the source problem (the training problem) is not adapted to the target problem 
(the exercise problem). Although this error is more in the nature of a slip of the tongue 
than an error, it does point up the extent to which the subject is imitating the source 
problem. 
In fact, I'm now looking at page 92 and I suspect that what I want is something rather 
more like the INFECT thing on there w hich Is NOTE /X/ IS FLOODED and then 
have a FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ OVER ? INFECT 11, Right that's probably what I 
need, isn't it? 
FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ - KISSES --- >? 
map 
FOR EACIJ CASE OF /X/ - OVER ->? 
INFECT 
i 
INFECT * 
matching error 
The subject in this episode has correctly inferred that a version of the exercise problem 
based on this example would also work. 
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2.6.9. Problem understanding phase (2) 
In the next section the subject again rereads the problem and attempts to understand 
another aspect of it. In this case it is whether the attic gets flooded along with the rest of 
the building. In her first solution the attic did get flooded. Indeed, she changed NOTE 
ATTIC - IS -> FLOODED to NOTE /X/ - IS -> FLOODED earlier on, so this aspect 
of the problem did not cause any difficulty at that time. However, the wording of the 
question has led to confusion on the part of the subject, even though the problem states that 
when the program has run, ATTIC - IS -> FLOODED is one of the outcomes, 
I'm sort of looking... I'm... I'm just basically, as you've gathered, copying the 
examples in the book, and the one on page 92, em... is... 
E: What are you looking at now? 
Sl: I'm looking at the first page of the problem just to see exactly what the 
question's asking. 
reads: "If the water tank in the attic bursts then everything below it gets flooded. " 
The attic itself doesn't have to get flooded? Is that correct? Or does the attic too get 
flooded? Well, I mean, it... It implies that the rooms below it get flooded but the 
attic doesn't necessarily. 
E: You can assume the attic gets flooded as well. 
S I: Right, OK I'm going to try my first problem and see what happens, This is 
because I really haven't a clue. 
The subject is not confident that she has adequately understood the problem yet and 
decides to try the first solution. By this time, the subject has mapped two source problems 
with different structures onto the target problem. They are: 
TO INFECT /X/ 
I NOTE /X/ --- HAS -> FLU 
2 CHECK /X/ -- KISSES -> ? 
2A IF PRESENT* MECT *; EXIT 
20 IF ABSENT: EXIT 
DONE 
and 
TO INFECr /X/ 
I NOTE /X/ - HAS -> FLU 
2 FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ - KISSES -> ? 
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2A: INFECT 
DONE 
Both source problems would work as models. Whether or not the subject knows this is 
unclear, 
2.6,10. Imitation phase (3) 
The subject has now typed in the database and the first line of the solution. She once 
again looks at the example on page 80. This time she compares it to the solution she has 
already written and decides that it will work. 
Em, NOTE /X/ IS FLOODED. Back, Back to... what page was I on, page 52 or 
something? Page 80, I'm on page 80. 
reads 
Yeah, okay I think the first example is probably going to work, isn't it? 
The subject types in the program she has written and then FLOOD AIMC. The program 
works. 
Figure 1.4 shows the path the subject made in the textbook. The parts of the Appendix 
which the subject ignores are blacked out. The large C box represents the test question (the 
FLOOD problem). The D box represents the target solution. In the first part of her search 
phase she finds INFECT[31 almost immediately (the dark line marked '1'), She then uses 
that solution to generate a solution to the FLOOD problem (line number 2). However, she 
is still unsure if the solution will work so she turns to page 82 which has an explanation of 
the WFECT[31 procedure (line number 3) but she spends very little time on that page and 
skips over the sections on Iteration until she comes to the final INFECT[4] procedure, From 
there she goes back to the problem statement (line number 5) and types in the database and 
her original solution. Notice that the only parts she looks at in any detail are the two 
INFECT solutions, INFECT[31 and INFECT[41. Apart from a very brief look at page 82, she 
does not read any of the textual explanations of the examples. 
Although the text had spent five pages on an explanation of how to write a recursive 
procedure, the subject was still unable to generate a solution Immediately even though the 
solution was isomorphic to the NFECT procedure, The subject therefore had a mental 
representation of recursion but could not remember an example in enough detail from her 
original reading of the text to write a recursive procedure that would solve the problem. 
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A second subject, whose protocol appears in Appendix A. 3.6, did not recognize the FLOOD 
problem as an example of recursion. The subject looked through the manual for examples of 
how CHECK could be used and for examples using subprocedures. Eventually he came 
across the final INFECT procedure (involving iteration and recursion) as he searched 
through the book. The explanation there referred back to the earlier INFECT procedure. 
The subject therefore went back to that earlier procedure and used it as a model. This 
subject showed no evidence of having learned the concept of recursion nor the procedure for 
writing one from a study of the manual. 
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The issues 
Each of the phases of the problem solving scenario above throws up a number of issues. 
Each issue in turn has important implications for our understanding of the processes 
involved in problem solving and how the expository text can help or hinder those 
processes, The issues include: how the subject represented the problem, how she managed 
to classify it; what similarities she saw between the test problem and the INFECT[31 
example; how she used the example to solve the problem; how she used the text itself, and 
why the text failed to equip her with the knowledge necessary to solve the problem 
without her having to search through the textbook. These issues are explored briefly here 
and in more depth in subsequent chapters. 
3.1. Problem representation 
In the first problem understanding phase, the subject simply read the statement of the 
problem and then reread parts of it. To solve problems from examples requires some kind of 
representation of the test problem, as well as of the examples and the concepts in the 
subject domain. The first issue therefore is how we can characterize the kind of 
representation of the problem statement the solver generates from reading it, The second 
concerns what assumptions we can make about how well solvers understand the domain 
from reading a text and the examples it provides, 
One further related issue is the kind of elaborations solvers make of the problem. This 
depends on their prior knowledge. General world knowledge will allow them to generate 
a number of inferences based on the situation described in the text. Domain-specific 
knowledge allows them to generate inferences about how the situation described in the 
problem relates to concepts in the domain and any known procedure for solving this type of 
problem. The ability to generate domain-general and domain-specific inferences will 
determine how well a problem is understood, 
When categorizing the problem the subject refers to two diagrams which she called the 
'line-shaped thing' and the "fan-shaped thing, These are pictorial representations of the 
types of database on which iteration and recursion can work. Diagrams such as these form 
a $ridgebetween the presumed prior knowledge of the subject and some new concept 
which the text is trying to convey. For example, the concept of a chain of relations was 
illustrated by a line of different nodes linked by the same relation. In this way, the 
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diagram allows the reader to 'see, 2 what a chain of relations means. Such re- 
representations of a new concept form an 'intermediate representation' between the 
reader's prior knowledge and the new concept. 
The verbal analogies used in the textbook to help explain novel concepts were not useful to 
this particular subject, For example, she says- 
Pages 40 and 41.1 hate this automated telephone directory example. I don't think It 
makes anything clear at all. I can understand the automated telephone directory 
analogy only because I understand throughout the whole book what I'm required to 
do, and therefore I can understand the example. But it works that way round, and not 
the other way round which is presumably the intention. 
However, expository analogies of this kind are often used in textbooks to allow the reader 
to extract the commonalities between the analogy and the novel concepts they are 
intended to illustrate. As such they also form a type of intermeýlate representation of new 
constructs. However, and most importantly, they can only work If the analogy Is with 
concepts the reader already knows and understands, The telephone directory analogy 
seems to have failed in its usefulness with this particular subject. Her understanding of 
SOLO's relational database allowed her to understand the analogy of the automated 
telephone directory, which was the opposite effect from what the writer intended. 
Another important Issue is therefore the role such intermediate representations, both 
diagrams (including pictures, graphs, tables and the like) and verbal analogies, play in 
helping people understand expository texts. 
3.2. Problem similarity 
Having read the problem the subject successfully classifies it. What aspects of the 
problem (or her representation of it) allowed her to'do so? Classifying the problem In 
terms of the underlying principle did not allow her to solve it Immediately. She had to 
find some procedure for solving It. The procedure was instantiated in the examples she 
found, 
2The 'qu4SiVi$U41 nature of the phenomenology of comprehension' is discus$cd by Dennett (1991) 
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There are a number of issues Involved in understanding what makes two problems similar. 
An important distinction to make in this regard is between surface similarity and 
structural similarity. Two problems are superficially similar if they have the same 
'cover story'. They are structurally similar if they involve the same underlying principle 
or solution procedure, The only example used in the SOLO textbook to explain recursion 
involved people infecting others with flu if they kissed them. The test problem given to 
the subject involved a water tank flooding all the floors beneath it. On the surface the 
two problems are different. 7he underlying procedure for solving them is identical, 
however. 
A common goal of teaching texts is to explain how to solve problems that are superficially 
dissimilar but structurally similar. Although several pages were devoted to explaining 
how to write a specific program that WECTs a series of people with flu, the text did not 
succeed in explaining how to solve other problems of the same type. That is, it failed to 
equip the reader with a procedure for solving other similar problems, 
There are other aspects of problem similarity which merit discussion. For instance, in 
what ways do novices and experts see problem 'similarity? What effects do variations 
between problems have on the people's ability to solve them? Is there some way of 
measuring these variations? When an example solution is used to help solve a test 
problem, how are the two 'mapped' - that is, what are the relations between the example 
and the exercise problem? The paradigm used In studying how analogues are seen as 
similar and how they are subsequently used has been that of analogical problem solving 
(APS). Much of Chapter 2 revolves around a discussion of whether APS is a useful 
paradigm to use in attempting to understand the processes involved in within-domain 
problem solving. 
3.3. The role of hints 
The subject in the above scenario found an example without being given any explicit hint to 
do so. One of the main difficulties in analogical problem solving is retrieving a relevant 
source example from memory that will help solve the current one. When solvers have 
formed some kind of representation of a target problem, they have to use that 
representation to access a plausibly relevant representation of some earlier problem from 
memory. When subjects are unable to solve the current problem, their representation of it 
is likely to be incomplete in some way, If it is incomplete, then it is because the underlying 
structure is not fully known or understood. For example, in the FLOOD problem the subject 
understands the problem statement. She does not understand immediately how to 
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translate her representation of the problem statement into SOLO code. That is, she does 
not know how the surface features of the problem relate to the underlying structure. 
It is unlikely that a solver with an incomplete representation of either the target or the 
source will be able to access an earlier problem on the basis of structural similarities. For 
the novice, superficial similarities provide the main cues to retrieval of a plausibly 
relevant source analogue. When there are no surface similarities, a hint is often needed 
before subjects can retrieve a useful analogue. In the case of the subject described here, she 
found a relevant analogue by searching through the text for an example of recursion. She 
did not access the INFECT example through being given an explicit hint or because she 
had a representation of it in memory. A hint would have made her search unnecessary and 
speeded up the solution process. 
3.4. The role of examples 
When the subject found a plausibly relevant source example in the textbook, all she had to 
do was to replace the particular values in the source program with the values in the target 
problem. That is, TO INFECT was replaced by TO FLOOD, KISSES was replaced by 
OVER, INFECT * was replaced by FLOOD *. The subject was able to identify these 
correspondences. This is not always the case. Some subjects in an experiment by Kahney 
(1982) were unable to identify the correspondences between the INFECT[3] program and an 
isOmOrph (the SHOOTUP program in which a gun is fired from above at various objects 
piled up on a table). 
Just as subjects may find difficulties in finding correspondences between problems which 
are dissimilar in their surface features, so they may find even more difficulty if the 
underlying procedure has to be adapted in some way. When the example is isomorphic 
the subject simply has to identify the correspondences between the two problems and 
replace them. However, if the structure varies, then finding correspondences is no longer 
sufficient. Adapting the example requires the subject to understand it at, a deeper level 
than that of the surface features. 
By substituting values across from a target to a source, solvers become aware that certain 
aspects Of a problem or procedure can vary. Making variables out of specific values allows 
the solver to go beyond the specific context of the problems and abstract out the salient 
structural properties, When this happens, the solver has begun to induce the problem's 
underlying schema and can apply it to further problems of the same type, When the 
subject had completed the FLOOD problem, she was presented with Kahney's (1982) 
31 
Chapter I- -Introduction -A learning episode 
SHOOTUP problem. She solved it without difficulty and without reference to the 
textbook. In other words she had learned how to solve simple recursion problems in SOLO. 
3.5. The role of the text 
At various times the subject refers to the difficulties she has in understanding the problem. 
What happens when novices are faced with difficulties they are unable to resolve 
immediately? How do they use textbooks to get round these 'impasses'? In the 'search 
phases' the subject searches through the book for help in overcoming her difficulties. This 
search might involve a search through the book for anything that looks like it might be 
relevant, or guided by the need to clarify a specific concept. Whatever type of search the 
subject engages in, it is important to know what aspects of the text determine how well 
this search will succeed. Both subjects in the SOLO experiment looked at example 
solutions. Very rarely did they look at the surrounding text. 
In the above scenario the subject finds the MECT[31 example and copies it. In generating 
her first solution she does not refer to the text around the example. Only when she finds 
she is unsure whether her program will work does she glance at the text for more 
information about recursion. Naturally there will be Individual differences in the 
strategies people have in using textbooks, and in their acquaintance with different types 
of expository text. An important issue is therefore whether expository texts have or 
should have a canonical form, and how well a particular text conforms to it. 
Textbook writers have to make a number of assumptions about what a reader has learned 
at different points throughout the book Although the subject had recently learned about 
recursion and could recognize the problem type, she was still unable to remember in detail 
how it worked. The subject was asked to solve three test problems in SOLO. The first 
(given above) involved recursion. The second involved iteration but also required the 
subject to integrate information from much earlier in the textbook. There was no isomorph 
to the second test problem in the textbook. This problem proved extremely difficult for 
both subjects, even though the information required to solve it had been given at various 
places throughout the book. 
The third problem the subject was given involved both iteration and recursion (see 
Appendix A. 3.3,4). The subject solved It immediately. Somehow the subject learned 
something during her two previous problem solving experiences. The final issue is how 
teaching texts enhance learning and the role examples play in achieving that end. 
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The struct'Ure of the thesis 
The points raised in the scenario presented here are explored in more depth in Chapter 2. 
The use novices make of examples has been the field of study of researchers in analogical 
problem solving (APS). However, solving problems by analogy means going beyond the 
surface features of problems and understanding in what way analogues are related in terms 
of their underlying structure. Successful use of an analogy means recognizing that two 
problems share the same relational structure and being able to apply that structure to the 
current problem. APS is contrasted with imitative problem solving (IPS) which does not 
require a solver to recognize the relational structure. Many of the difficulties that have 
been identified in the APS literature can be explained parsimoniously if we assume that 
solvers do not always know what the underlying structure of analogues is. 
IPS has important ramifications for the design of teaching texts. In order to examine the 
use novices make of examples in texts, Chapter 3 presents an interpretation theory for text, 
task and protocol analysis. It allows the structure of texts to be analyzed at different 
grain sizes; from the sequence of examples, explanations, intermediate representations, 
and SO On that texts provide, down to the fine structure of individual example problems. 
The use Of the interpretation theory to give a coarse-grained view of a text is then 
presented. The analysis (of a LISP computer programming book) identifies, even at a 
coarse grain, where the reader may have to make inferences to understand the 
explanations provided, particularly the explanation of the relation between a problem 
statement and its solution, 
13Y anllYzing individual problems at a finer grain, we can see what mappings an example 
solution provides between a problem's givens and the form of the solution, An analysis at 
this level also indicates where there are gaps in the explanation of a solution procedure. 
When such gaps occur, solvers will have difficulty understanding the solution structure. 
The Mapping between two analogues can also be analyzed in considerable detail. The 
analysis can indicate where inferences have to be made and where the mapping has to be 
adapted to the novel problem. Where adaptations have to be made to an example, the 
analysis reveals just how 'distant' the target problem is from the source. The theory 
therefore provides a metric of transfer between problems. Chapter 4 demonstrates how 
S"nPle word problems and the explanations they include of the solution procedure can be 
analyzecl to reveal how effective they are likely to be. 
From such a fine-grained comparison of individual problems we can make predictions 
about exactly where in a problem novices are likely to have difficulty, Especially when 
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the example has to be adapted in some way to solve a novel problem, In Chapter 5 these 
predictions are tested in a series of experiments using the same problems as those analyzed 
in Chapter 4. The experiments also show how explanations of word problems can be 
improved and how the subjects' assessment of their own understanding of the explanations 
can be made more accurate. 
The final chapter recapitulates the main arguments of the thesis, 7bey are that the 
structure of the text, and in particular the example problems it provides, determines to a 
large extent the behaviour of the student who uses the text to solve new related problems. 
Where solvers appear to be using the complex relational structure exemplified in a 
training problem to solve an exercise problem, it is often the case that they are in fact 
unaware of the structure and are simply adapting the surface features of the example. 
They are not therefore solving problems by analogy to the structure of the example but are 
imitating it. 
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Chapter 2 ANALOGICAL PROBLEM 
SOLVING AND IMITATION 
1. Introduction 
In the scenario introduced In Chapter I there was an Interaction between the problem, the 
solver's prior domain-specific and domain-general knowledge, and the textbook. The 
solver went through a number of phases in her problem solving and I pointed out some of 
the aspects of her problem solving behaviour which needed further explanation. In 
formal domains, such as the SOLO programming language, new concepts are often - 
introduced and explained by the use of examples and students are expected to use them to 
solve further problems of the same type. It has long been recognized that examples are 
'potent teachers' (Ross, 1989a) and that skill acquisition depends on the way examples are 
presented in textbooks. Much of the research into this field has been aimed at 
understanding how we solve new problems by analogy to previous examples. In other 
words analogical problem solving (APS) has been the general framework into which this 
kind of research has fitted. The goal of this chapter is to examine to what extent this 
research effort helps us understand the processes involved in using examples to learn how 
to solve new problems. I will argue that novices mostly solve problems by imitation, 
which Is a weak form of APS. Section 2 provides definitions for both APS and Imitative 
Problem Solving (IFS), and the distinction Is thereafter used to assess the result's of 
research in this field. 
Having react the problem, the subject immediately classified It as belonging to a 
particular problem category (recursion). She must therefore have had some understanding 
35 
Chapter 2- Analogical Problem Solving and Imitation 
of the concept of recursion. That is, her representation of the problem must have been such 
that it matched an internal representation of recursive problems in SOLO already in her 
memory. She also spent some time trying to understand the question in such a way that it 
would lead to a useful solution plan. In other words she was trying to understand the 
situation described in the text in a way that would help her form a representation of the 
problem in SOLO. The nature of problem representations and conceptual understanding is 
discussed in section 3 of this chapter. 
How one retrieves a representation of an earlier problem based on a representation of the 
current one depends on how the original problem was encoded and what cues are available 
in one's representation of the current problem. One of the main difficulties in APS is 
retrieving an appropriate analogue, The subject In Chapter I did not recall a relevant 
analogue at all. She retrieved a suitable model by searching through the textbook guided 
by her original categorization of the problem. She must therefore have seen some kind of 
similarity between the target and the retrieved base problem. Section 4 examines the 
complex nature of problem similarity. 
In the imitation phase the subject adapted the source to fit the target problem. Mapping 
and adapting an analogue are further sources of difficulty in APS. The solver has to 
identify those elements in the source that correspond to elements in the target, The more 
dissimilar these elements are, the more difficult this mapping will be. Furthermore, if 
there are variations in the underlying solution procedure solvers will have difficulty 
adapting it, The question of what features of a problem are perceived as similar to an 
earlier problem reflects a concern with two aspects of examples: those features of a 
category of problems that can vary - the surface features; and those features that are 
invariant - the structural features. The interplay between surface and structure, 'and how 
solvers access and use examples are discussed In section 5. 
The subject had previously learned the programming language SOLO from a textbook that 
introduced a number of unfamiliar concepts, which were presented in a variety of ways, 
There were textual explanations, diagrams, pictures and analogies, as well as concrete 
examples of how the new concepts were used in SOLO programs,, There Is virtually an 
infinite number of ways in which such expository texts can be organized. The text 
organization and the specific examples used will have a strong effect on how well a 
student will be capable of solving later exercise problems. for example, although the 
subject classified the problem correctly, she was unable to solve the problem immediately. 
One reason for this is that she did not classify the problem according to the solution 
procedure used to solve such problems in SOLO but rather she identified the problem 
according to an abstract representation of recursive problems given In the text as a 
36 
Chapter 2- Analogical Problem Solving and Imitation 
diagram. Diagrams are often used to make perceptually explicit the interrelations 
between features of a concept or problem. They are a way of re-representing concepts to 
allow the student to abstract out the common structure between the original concept and its 
re-representation. Such 'Intermediate representations' are a half-way house between the 
novel concept and the learner's prior knowledge. Some of the difficulties facing textbook 
writers in the way they organize material and introduce new concepts are the subject of 
section 6. 
The subject's schema or partial schema for recursion was created from her previous reading 
of the textbook. It was subsequently activated by her reading of the problem. A schema 
for a category of problems is a fairly abstract representation. Training examples in a 
textbook are very specific. Where did this schema come from? One might be Inclined to 
wonder how novices can possibly learn anything from imitating an example. Imitation 
has, however, a strong pedigree, It is much used by children in their play. It is also a 
sensible thing to do. If you have a goal and you have a model that achieves a similar 
goal, it makes sense to use the model, whether you are fully aware of the logical 
justification of the form the model takes or not. We have an innate sense of causality. We 
know that events must have causes (whether we can find the right ones is Irrelevant to 
this argument). Similarly, we know that the form of a problem structure (such as a SOLO 
program) must have something to do with its function (what the program is designed to 
do). With experience of a problem type we are able to abstract out the commonalities 
between problems and generalize to new ones, This Inductive reasoning ability is discussed 
in section 7. 
Several models of analogical problem solving are discussed throughout this chapter, 
Many of these have been built into Al models of learning and problem solving by analogy, 
One of these, the PUPS program from Anderson, Boyle, Corbett, & Lewis (1990), is 
discussed in section 8.1 will argue that such programs are often very good models of human 
analogical problem solving competence but that they are poor models of human analogical 
problem solving performance. 7he reason for this Is that they are built on theories of APS 
which assume too much on the part of the solver. 
In conclusion, I argue that textbook writers and APS theorists alike make too many 
assumptions about how novices use examples in expository texts. 'They may not remember 
Or understand the structure of complex problems, and often cannot solve them without a 
great deal of effort. Writers should not, therefore, expect transfer of learning from one 
example to a new problem unless they provide a great deal of information to help the 
novice to do so, The burden of responsibility for learning is thus shifted from the novice to 
the text the novice uses. 
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Analogical Problem Solving and Imitative Problem Solving 
Very often the simplest way of solving a problem is to think of a similar one we have 
solved In the past and use that solution. In expository texts writers make much use of 
analogies to explain new concepts, and they are often quite effective in helping students 
understand them. The flow of water, for instance, is traditionally used to explain the flow 
of current in electricity. Indeed, 'flow' and "current' applied to electricity derive from that 
analogy. Rutherford made the structure of the atom more comprehensible by drawing an 
analogy to the structure of the solar system, When analogies are used in a pedagogical 
context, their aim is often to allow the student to abstract out the shared underlying 
structure between the analogy and the new concept or procedure the student has to learn. 
Writers hope that it can thereafter be used to solve pew problems involving that shared 
structure, Similarly, In a particular subject area, students may be expected to solve 
exercise problems based on examples that are analogous in that they involve the same 
solution procedure, When an example is presented as an analogy to help a student solve a 
target problem, it Is in the belief that the student can abstract out the underlying structure 
of the example and apply it to the new problem. 
There is a fundamental flaw with the latter view of the role of examples in problem 
solving. An expert might be able to see two superficially dissimilar problems as 
analogous, but a novice is much less likely to see them as such (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 
1981). just as there Is a distinction between lin uistic competence and linguistic 
performance, so there is a distinction between the fact that two problems are analogous 
and what novices do when given an analogous solution to help them solve a problem. 
Novices may be aware that the structure of an analogue will help them solve a new 
problem with the same structure (Gentner & Landers, 1985); that is, people have a certain 
analogical problem solving competence. However, I will argue that novices often do not 
solve problems by analogy for the simple reason that they do not know in what way they 
are analogous. Instead, they attempt to imitate the example In the belief that the 
example is analogous to the current problem. In other words their analogical problem 
solving performance should be distinguished from their competence. 
2.1. Analogical Problem Solving and Imitative Problem Solving 
compared 
There are many definitions of analogy. Most of them emphasize the mapping of a 
systematic or hierarchical structure from an old (source or base) problem to a current 
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(target) problem. The base problem is stored in long4erm memory (LTM) and the 
difficulty in employing APS is a function of: 
a) the likelihood of finding the base problem when It is needed, given the nature of 
the new problem, and 
b) the solver's ability in transforming old solutions to facilitate solving the new 
problem. 
APS therefore involves the manipulation of a mental representation that a solver has of a 
previous problem (Anderson & Thompson, 1989; Carbonell, 1983; Gentner & Stevens, 1983; 
Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986; Holyoak & 
Thagard, 1989; Johnson-Laird, 1989; Kintsch, 1986). Imitative problem solving (IPS) is a 
weak form of APS In which the solver, faced with a new problem, looks back to an earlier 
problem example in a textbook, and tries to map the surface features of the source onto the 
target. No assumptions are made, in this case, about what the solver understands. 
Before going on to look in more detail at the difficulties solvers have in retrieving and 
adapting a source problem, we have to be clear about what Is involved In both APS and 
IPS, and why the argument that novices solve problems by analogy is at worst circular, or 
at best makes unwarranted assumptions about what the solver is expected to know, 
Holyoak, has listed several steps Involved in APS. Each step depends on the previous 
one. 7hey are: 
1. forming a representation of the source problem and the target problem; 
2. accessing 'a plausibly relevant analogue in memory' (Holyoak and Thagard, 
1989a). This depends on the form of representation the solver has of the problems. if 
solvers are to access a previously encountered problem from memory, then the 
representation they form of the target must match that of the source. This point begs 
the question of what constitutes problem similarity; 
3. mapping across corresponding elements in the source and target. Correspondences 
are features which appear to play the same role in the source and target, Narrow 
sections of pipe restricting the flow of water have to be seen as corresponding to 
IHolyoak lists different step s 4t different times, The 5 presented here are derived from different'sources 
(Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989, Holyoak, 1984; Holyoak, 1985, Holyoak & Koh, 7987; Holyoak & Viagard, 
19894,7989b) 
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resistors in an electric circuit before an analogy between the flow of water and the 
flow of electricity in complex systems can be understood; 
4. adapting the mapping, constrained by the shared underlying structure of the 
problems, to generate a solution in the target. INs step is also known as analogical 
inference or transfer. Knowing what happens to water when it passes through two 
narrow sections of pipe one after the other should allow students to infer what will 
happen when electricity has to pass through two resistors arranged in serial; 
5. learning. This takes the form of schema abstraction from comparing examples 
(either implicitly or explicitly). With experience in solving a type of problem, 
students abstract out the underlying structure and can thereafter apply it to new 
versions of the problem type without having to refer to a previous solution. 
Mapping and adapting are not regarded as being strictly sequential. Mapping'can be 
conducted in a hierarchical manner, the process may be Iterated at different levels of 
abstraction' (Holyoak, 1985). Analogical problem solving assumes that the solver has a 
representation of the source in LTM, and that the underlying structure of the problem is 
understood well enough so that the solver can map it across and generate Inferences in the 
target. Imitation, on the other hand, does not make these assumptions. It is a problem 
solving process which involves: 
1. forming a representation of the target problem. To the extent that novices are 
unlikely to have a 'complete problem model' (Holland et al. 1986) this ý 
representation will be impoverished in some way. Similarly, novices may not have a 
'complete' representation of a candidate source problem; 
2. accessing an earlier example, either by being given a hint to do so or through some 
other form of reminding, such as some perceived similarity between it and the target, 
This similarity is likely to be In terms of the problems' surface features, since 
imitation makes no assumptions about how well a source problem is represented. 
When solving an exercise problem in a textbook, the solver Is likely to access an 
earlier problem by referring back to the examples given in the same chapter, 
Alternatively, as In the case of the subject In Chapter 1, the solver may access 
examples through some perceived similarity between It and an aspect of the test 
problem, 
3. mapping values across that either, 
a) appear to fill the same roles in both problems, as in APS, or 
b) are perceptually similar, whether they fill the same roles or not. In a story 
about a squirrel, bluebird and zebra, children tended to map the zebra to a horse in an 
earlier story because they were similar sorts of things even though the animals 
played different roles In both (Gentner & Toupin, 1986); 
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4. inferring operators that will reduce the difference between the source and the 
target problems. The solver is trying to do the same things with the new values as 
was done in the source. They are therefore employing a form of means-ends analysis. 
There is no assumption that the solver understands the underlying relational 
structure of the source. If, in an example problem a 11/2 hour difference is expressed 
as 3/2, a solver may adapt a problem involving a difference of 2 hours by changing it 
to 4/2, even though there Is no need to do so. The solver is not acting with an 
understanding of the overall relational structure. Instead, the solution procedure is 
carried out in a step-by-step fashion. 
5. learning by induction. The solver begins to infer a relation between the form of a 
category of problems (e. g. the syntactic structure of recursive programs in SOLO) and 
their function (what the programs are designed to do). This, as in many models of 
APS, comes about through exemplar comparison and use. 
By assurnin that IPS is the preferred method of problem solving by novices (and often .1ý9 
experts), we can'begin to understand better some of the difficulties that have been 
documented in the APS literature. At the same time IPS avoids many of the assumptions 
built into the APS account. 
2.2. Difficulties in analogical problem solving 
Research in APS has taken a number of forms. A common framework is to present an 
example problem and then a distractor task or a delay followed by a test problem of the 
same type as the example, Alternatively, a variety of examples is presented followed by 
a test problem to assess the effect of different problem presentations on problem solving, 
From this research we have come to identify a number of the difficulties involved in APS. 
These Include difficulties in: - 
I) retrieving a relevant source example without a hint (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 1983); 
2) retrieving a relevant source example, unless the salient structural features of 
problems are pointed out (Bassok, 1990; Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Holyoak & Koh, 
1987); 
3) abstracting out the underlying schema, unless several examples are presented 
(Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 1983)., 
4) solving a test problem even when the similarity of the concepts in an analogous 
problem is pointed out (Novick & Holyoak, 1991); 
5) understanding the relationship between training problems and other problems of 
the same type (Conway & Kahney, 1987; Reed, Ernst, & Banerjl, 1974); 
6) adapting a solution to apply it to a 'distant' variant of an example problem 
(Holyoak & Koh, 1987, Novick & Holyoak, 1991; Reed, Dempster, & Ettinger, 1985); 
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7) understanding the range of applicability of a new concept, unless a large number of 
example problems are provided (Cooper & Sweller, 1987, Sweller, 1988; Sweller & 
Cooper, 1985; Sweller, Mawer, & Ward, 1983); 
8) using an intermediate representation, such as a diagram or expository analogy 
(Gentner & Gentner, 1983; Issing, Hannemann, & Haack, 1989; Reed & Ettinger, 1987). 
9) generating inferences, since expository texts do not support inferences in the way 
that narrative texts do (Britton, Van Dusen, Glynn, & Hemphill, 1990, Britton, Van 
Dusen, Gulgoz, & Glynn, 1989). 
Some of this research effort has been taken seriously by textbook writers who have 
attempted to make their explanations more accessible to their readers. At the Open 
University, for example, the SOLO manual was designed for students from a wide variety 
of backgrounds and tried to take account of many of these difficulties (see Eisenstadt, 
1983). It included exercise problems with hints to look at earlier examples or 
explanations, a number of intermediate representations to explain novel constructs, such as 
recursion and iteration, and test problems which were 'close' variants of the examples 
provided. Despite this effort students still had difficulty using the manual to solve 
problems. 
2.3. Top-down accounts of analogizing and the circularity problem 
Many of the theories of APS involve a concept-driven account of problem solving. 
Structural views of analogy see APS as mapping a system of relations from a base to a 
target. This can only occur when the solver has enough knowledge of the relational 
structure of the base domain to extract it and apply it to the target, At worst, there is a 
danger that the arguments used In explaining APS may become circular, This is. 
particularly the case when structural models are used to explain how a source is retrieved 
from memory, 
The 'strong' view of analogical access is that a suitable analogue is accessed in LTM 
through a higher-order relational structure shared with the target (Schank, 1982), An 
example of higherýorder relations might be a shared causal or explanatory structure, 
There is little evidence that people can retrieve analogues on this basis (Gentner & 
Landers, 1985; Gentner & Rattermann, 1991; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 1983; Reed, Ackinclose, 
& Voss, 1990; Reed, Dempster, & Ettinger, 1985; Schumacher & Gentner, 1988). 
Furthermore, the strong view of analogical access seems rather pointless, If a solver is 
given a test problem and realizes that its structure is similar to that of an earlier problem 
in LTM, then the solver must already be aware of the underlying explanatory structure. If 
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the solver is aware of the underlying structure there does not seem to be any need to access 
an analogue; the higher-order relation (the explanatory structure) can be applied directly 
to the givens In the target to generate the solution. Using an underlying structure to access 
an analogue is therefore unnecessary, In the problem solving episode with wMch we 
began, the subject does Indeed access the earlier problem through an abstract principle 
(recursion). However, the way she goes about retrieving a source example does not fit in 
with the strong view of analogical access since the subject could not remember an earlier 
problem In detail, she found one by searching through a manual; the principle of recursion 
itself may not have been fully understood; and she did not appear to know how the 
principle and the form of the solution In SOLO were linked, 
'Weaker' structural views of analogical problem solving are more common but have their 
own conceptual problems. If solvers do not immediately recognize the structure of a test 
problem, then they may have to be reminded in some way of a relevant source problem 
(the nature of these ren-tindings is the subject of later sections). If we now suppose that the 
solver is given a hint to use a particular example, then the solver is presumed to be able to 
access the underlying structure of the earlier problem and apply it to the new one. This is 
the principle-cueing view, in which an analogy is a vehicle for a known solution schema. 
Examples of this view can be found in the experiments of Gick and Holyoak (1980; 1983) 
who used two problems known as the Fortress Problem and the Radiation Problem (from 
Duncker, 1945). In the Fortress problem, a tyrant rules a country from a fortress in the 
centre. Roads radiate out from this fortress with villages along the way, A general 
arrives with an army large enough to overthrow the tyrant and take the fortress, - 
However, the roads are mined in such a way that a large army will cause the mines to 
explode. Small groups, however, can travel along the roads without setting off the mines. 
That Is how the tyrant maintains his supply routes. In order to protect his army and the 
villages along the roads, the General divides up his army Into small groups and positions 
them at the head of the roads. On his signal the groups all converge on the fortress 
simultaneously and the fortress is captured. 
In the Radiation problem a surgeon has to operate on a patient with a tumour, He has a 
ray machine which can destroy the tumour but will also destroy the healthy tissue 
surrounding It. His solution is to reduce the intensity of the rays and position several 
machines around the patient with the rays focused on the tumour. The surgeon, therefore, 
uses a 'divide and converge' solution, as did the General In the Fortress problem. 
Using various experimental manipulations, Gick & Holyoak attempted to establish the 
conditions under which transfer would occur or fall to occur, 7he two problems provide 
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examples of similar structural features which can be abstracted out - the so-called 
'convergence' solution. Understanding them necessitates a representation of the problems 
at a level of abstraction which can be applied to both. Very few of the subjects (about 
20%) who had been shown the Fortress problem were able to solve the Radiation problem. 
When they were given a hint to use the earlier problem the number of correct solutions 
went up to around 90%. The hint was non-specific: the subjects were told that the earlier 
problem would help but not how it would help. 
According to the principle-cueing view, the hint allows the solver to access the solution 
schema and apply It to the Radiation problem. Solvers do not therefore have to engage in 
analogical reasoning. They are presumed to know the solution structure already. The hint 
simply tells them which schema to use, all they have to do is apply it to the new 
problem. The function of the analogue is therefore to provide the schema, otherwise it Is 
irrelevant. The principle-cueing view sees problem solving from examples as a 'top-down' 
process. 
The main difficulty with extrapolating from the results of the experiments of Gick & 
Holyoak is that the base domain is usually well understood. People understand the 
relations between the givens in the Fortress problem and the motivations of the 
protagonists. 7be difficulty comes in adapting it to the new problem. In novel domains 
which present examples as models for further problem solving we can make no such 
assumption about how well the student understands the example. Indeed we cannot assume 
that the solvers engage In analogical problem solving at all, since there is no guarantee 
that they understand the structure of the example. 
An IPS account of how solvers adapt the Fortress problem to solve the Radiation problem 
assumes that people will tend to look back at the earlier problem and map (what appear 
to be) corresponding problem elements, For example, solvers may reaUe that the general 
and the surgeon occupy the same role, that the army and the rays fulfil the same function, 
and that the fortress and tumour are the 'targets' of both problems. The next stage is to try 
to apply the same operators in the target as in the source. The general divided his army; 
so the solver has to work out how the surgeon can divide his rays. The general sent out 
groups to the heads of the roads radiating out from the fortress; so the solver has to work 
out how the rays can be similarly arranged; and so on. This is a bottom-up process In 
which the solver takes each step at a time and builds up a solution. It does not assume 
beforehand that the underlying solution schema is known or can be abstracted out and 
applied. Rather, If the solver succeeds In Imitating the earlier solution, the schema Is 
generated as a by-product of the solution process. 
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2.4. Summary 
Solving a problem by analogy assumes that the solver understands the underlying structure 
of the analogue. If the structure is understood well enough, then it can be adapted to solve 
another problem of the same type. Many of the studies of APS have shown that this form 
of transfer Is rare. Subjects can often solve problems which are isomorphic to a source only 
if they are given a hint to use the source, and if they can identify the correspondences 
between the source and the target. in homomorphic problems (or 'distant' variants of an 
example problem) the solution often has to be adapted even when the surface features are 
the same. The evidence suggests that the likelihood that a solver can adapt a source to 
any great extent is remote. 
These difficulties point to the fact that example problems In a new domain are often not 
well understood, If solvers succeed in solving versions of a problem that are very similar 
(close variants of the problem) and fail to solve ones which have to be modified (distant 
variantsý, however slightly, then they must be using a process'that allows them to adapt 
a source without understanding it. This process is imitation. It allows solvers to solve 
problems which are 'literally similar' (Gentner, 2989), but win lead to errors or failure 
when the source has to be adapted to a more distant variant. 
The difficulties In APS therefore hinge on how well base and target problems are 
represented in the minds of solvers - and how "similar' those representations are to one 
another. 
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The problem of representation 
In the problem solving episode In chapter 1, the subject began by trying to understand what 
the problem 'meant'. There were several aspects to this. First of an she read the problem 
twice. She then spent some time trying to find the constraints on the problem based on her 
understanding of the text- she did not know if there was any need to represent the fact that 
there was a water tank in the attic, nor whether she should start with something that 
CHECKs if the water tank bursts. A third aspect of her problem representation involved 
her knowledge of SOLO. She knew many of SOLO's concepts and had had practice at 
writing SOLO procedures and function definitions. She was also aware that her initial 
understanding of the problem was insufficient to solve it. At this point she looked back for 
an example because she did not have an adequate representation of the task she was 
required to do. On the other hand, she did know that the solution involved recursion. 
How can we characterize these types of representation? 
Encoding the text of a problem 
The subject generated a number of inferences from the problem statement. These included 
inferences about relevant bits of SOLO procedures for converting information in the 
problem into a SOLO program. For example, she generated the Inference that 'the water 
tank bursts' should form part of the SOLO program and that this would be structured 
something like 'CHECK WATERTANK INATTIC BURSTS'. 
Various representations can be derived from a textual presentation of a problem. First of 
all there are the individual words that compose the text. Understanding these comes 
through our semantic knowledge of the items in our mental lexicon. From the individual 
words and the context of the sentence, our overall understanding of the text of a problem is 
constructed, For problem solving to be successful, the solver has to generate all the 
necessary inferences In order to build a useful problem model. This, in turn, means that 
novices have to have enough domain-relevant knowledge to do so. Knowing what the text 
of a question means does not therefore entail an understanding of the problem. In this 
regard Kintsch (1986) has noted: 'all too often we seem to "understand" the text all right 
but remain at a loss about what to do [to solve a new problem]. ' 
Kintsch (e. g. 1986; Nathan, Kintsch, & Young, 1992; Van DIjk & Kintsch, 1983) has argued 
that word problents require the solver to generate a number of different representations, 
Solvers first form a propositional representation of the text of such problems called a 
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textbase. From that they develop a representation of the situation described in the text. 
This is a mental model which he terms a situation model. The situation model Is an 
elaborated one which includes Inferences about the situation described in the problem 
statement. An example taken from colinear distance problems involves a vehicle that 
leaves from a particular point some time after another vehicle and eventually overtakes 
it. According to Nathan, Kintsch & Young (1992), 'the situation model reveals that they 
will have [travelled] equal distances at that point' (p. 333). They also add that, 
'because of the added demands of inference making, readers will make Inferences only 
when they seem necessary. Poor problem solvers will tend to omit them from their 
representations, and so they will omit the associated equations (supporting relations) 
from their solutions to story problems. Problem solvers who reason situationally will 
tend to include these Inference-based equations' (p. 335). 
A further representational form proposed by Kintsch and his co-workers is the problem 
model which includes formal knowledge, for example, about the arithmetic structure 
derived from the text, or the operating, procedure constructed from information in the text2. 
The ability to make inferences from texts in order to derive a useful problem model 
depends on the relevant prior knowledge of the learner. 
The subject's protocol reveals that she had not yet settled on a fixed model of the situation 
represented In the text. She eventually used the example to constrain her understanding of 
the situation - that is, that the program doesn't have to represent the fact that there is a 
water tank In the attic. The example allowed her to reconstrue the current problem before 
going on to translate this new representation into SOLO code. 
Kintsch (1986) argues that the text determines what problem model is constructed and how 
It is constructed. In particular the problem model Is Important for learning and the 
textbase model is important for remembering text. In a study of problem solving and 
retrieval of earlier problems, he found that recall of word problems that had already 
been solved was detern-tined both by the properties of the textbase and the model 
constructed to solve a problem. it was the problem model which provided recall of earlier 
problems and not a reproduction of the textbase. Learning, according to Kintsch, depended 
Nathan, Kintsch & Young (1992) explicitly distinguish between the situation model and the problgm 
model. In Kintsch's earlierformulations (e. g, Kintsch, 1986), the problem model is described as a type of 
situ4tion model. 
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on the problem model constructed from examples, and remembering depended on the 
coherence of the text. For example, common terms repeated in succeeding sentences leads to 
greater coherence and greater recall (Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978). He argued that it was 
easier (at least for children) to form an appropriate problem model if there is a concrete, 
familiar structure, However, other studies (e. g. Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Novick, 1990) 
have shown that this is not the whole story. Problem solving transfer by adults and 
children from 4bstract representations can take place. 
The distinction between a propositional representation of a text and the elaborated 
situation model was examined by Tardieu, Ehrlich, & Gyselinck (1992). They argued that 
novices and experts in a particular domain would not differ in the propositional 
representation they derived from a text but that there would be differences between the 
two groups in the situation model3. Tardieu et al. found that experts performed better on 
inference questions than novices but there was no difference between the groups on their 
ability to paraphrase the text (i. e. they both generated much the same textbase). 
These hierarchical forms of representation have two implications for how novices 
understand textbook explanations and examples, First, since they are unfamiliar with the 
domain, they tend to have only a propositional representation of the surface features of 
the examples. Using examples to solve further problems means matching propositions and 
is unlikely to be guided by an understanding of the deeper relational structure. Second, 
novices may not know enough to make the necessary inferences. It follows from this that 
expository texts should remove the need for novices to do so, and the explanations they 
provide should be as comprehensive as possible. 
3.2. Other definitions of problem representation 
Before looking through the textbook for an example to help her, the subject had already 
categorized the problem as an example of recursion, This is the abstract principle 
underlying the solution. When she first categorized the problem as such, she did not seem 
to know how to convert it immediately into a working program. Her representation of the 
problem was, therefore, incomplete and fragmentary. She was able to relate aspects of 
the problem to the more abstract concept of recursion, but could not relate that to the form 
the solution should take. 
3Here the Situation model and the problem Model are synonymous, 
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The failure of students to generate an adequate problem representation is well documented. 
Glaser (1984) provides a definition of problem representation which begins. 'We define a 
problem representation as a cognitive structure corresponding to a problem that is 
constructed by a solver oh the basis of domain-related knowledge and Its organization. ' 
What this definition emphasizes is that a problem is a construct. It Is not something in 
the outside world but something inside someone's head. He continues: 
At the initial stage of problem analysis, the problem solver attempts to 'understand' 
the problem by construing an initial problem representation. The quality, 
completeness, and coherence of this internal representation determine the efficiency 
and accuracy of further thinking. And these characteristics of the problem 
representation are determined by the knowledge available to the problem solver and 
the way the knowledge Is organized. 
Since novices are unlikely to have a complete problem model of a complex problem, their 
representations will be Impoverished in some way, Their problem model is likely to be 
fragmentary and fuzzy'and the elements of it are unlikely to be integrated into a structural 
whole, so variations in its 'quality, completeness and coherence' will have a distinct 
effect on problem solving. 
Other researchers have also described the quality that early representations are likely to 
have. Barsalou (1989) states that the Information brought to bear by a student attempting 
to solve an exercise problem will include 'abstracted properties of earlier problem solving 
episodes, exemplars, fragments of exemplars, and fragments of intuitive theories'. Ross 
(1984) also maintains that problem solving is governed by information constructed from 
elements of the current problem which remind the solver of earlier similar problems 
which in turn help the solver reconstrue the current one. Chi, et al. (1989) and Nathan, et 
ai, (1992) argue that individuals differ in the 'completeness' with which they encode 
problem instructions and that this gives rise to individual differences in skill learning. 
Problem representation is therefore not a straightforward all-or-nothing process but a 
dynamic, reconstructive, and possibly haphazard affair. 
Such fragmentary representations are not conducive to a concept-driven problem solving 
process. To solve a problem by analogy requires the solver to recognize the underlying 
similarity between two superficially dissimilar problems. It Involves a one-to-one 
systematic mapping of a hierarchical system of relations that holds In one domain onto 
another (Gentner, 1989; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986; Holyoak & 
Thagard, 1989a; 1989b). For this to happen, the solver must already have an adequate 
representation of the earlier problem that incorporates an understanding of a problem's 
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underlying relational structure. The evidence for the kinds of representations novices can 
generate suggests that they lack this type of knowledge. 
3.3. Types of knowledge representation: Declarative and procedural 
knowledge 
Solving a problem not only depends on the situation model derived from a text, but also on 
a solver's pre-existing knowledge base. For a successful solution (when no example is 
provided), the representation of the problem has to include domain-relevant knowledge, 
From their reading of expository texts and their previous problem solving experience, 
students will have learned some new concepts and learned to do certain things within the 
domain. For instance, the subject gave some indication that she understood the principle of 
recursion. What she was less sure of was how to incorporate what she knew of it into a 
working SOLO program. She had had practice at using NOTE and CHECK procedures and 
could use them in relevant contexts (see Appendix 3). She therefore knew some facts and 
concepts in SOLO, and knew some procedures for manipulating the SOLO database, These 
kinds of knowledge are often referred to as declarative knowledge, or knowing that, and 
procedural knowledge, or knowing how. 
Declarative knowledge can be of three types (Ohlsson & Rees, 1991): 
a) Factual knowledge consisting of assertions about specific objects or events such as 
'Rome is the capital of Italy'. 
b) Episodic knowledge, in fact a subset of (a), consisting of assertions about a specific 
spatio-temporal context: 'I saw Jim yesterday'. 
C) General principles or abstract knowledge consisting of assertions about universals. 
Principles are propositions with quantifiable variables, The following arithmetic 
principle can be applied to an infinite number of cases: 
A set of numbers always yields the same sum, regardless of the order in 
which they are added. 
Recursion Is another example of this type of declarative knowledge. 
Procedural knowledge specifies the actions that are to be taken under certain conditions. It 
often refers to the ability to perform skilled actions. The distinction between declarative 
and procedural knowledge can be understood in terms of someone learning for the first time 
how to drive a car, The learner driver may have a great deal of declarative knowledge 
about the sequences of actions involved when changing gear, but this does not mean that he 
or she will be able to execute that sequence smoothly when called upon to drive a car for 
the first time. Procedural knowledge comes about through practice at performing the 
actions of driving. 
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In many theories of problem solving and skill acquisition declarative knowledge is a 
necessary precursor to procedural knowledge (Anderson, 1983; Byrnes, 1992). 
More formal distinctions can be made between them in terms of goals. The semantic and 
episodic knowledge In declarative memory is goal-independent in that it can be used in a 
variety of circumstances. Procedural knowledge, on the other hand, can only be understood 
in terms of the goals one Is trying to achieve. It involves the knowledge of what to do 
given a certain set of circumstances, Furthermore, declarative knowledge can be true or 
false: 'We are coming out of the recession', 'Italy Is the capital of the Ukraine, Tloyd- 
George knew my father; procedural knowledge is simply more or less effective in 
achieving one's goals, such as: 
IF the goal is to get to the city centre by 5.00 p. m. 
THEN look up the bus timetable; 
walk to the bus stop; 
get on the bus; 
buY a ticket, 
etc. 
The goal of teaching is to equip learners with new conceptual knowledge and a new set of 
procedures for action incorporating that conceptual knowledge. The richer the set of 
relations that link concepts, the 'deeper' will be the learners' understanding of these 
concepts. Procedures, too, involve understanding. One can follow a set of instructions, as 
the ordinary soldiers did on D-Day, while being unaware of the overall plan; or, like the 
generals, one can have a privileged view of the meaning of the procedures - what they 
will accomplish and how they will accomplish it. 
3.4. Understanding concepts 
In the scenario in part 1, the subject 'understood' that the problem was an example of 
recursion Involving a chain relation: 
ATTTC OVER BEDROOMI M11 LANDING M-M CUPBOARD etc 
Despite this she could not immediately write a procedure to solve the problem, Instead 
she accessed an earlier example and copied it altering the values to those In the target 
problem. She knew that the two examples were In some way similar. Had she typed in 
this program and then TLOOD A17IC' she would have found that the answer was correct, 
and thereby given the impression that she understood recursion. As It was, she wrote the 
solution by hand and then Indicated that she was unsure if the solution would go through 
the whole database. In what ways can her 'understanding' be characterized? 
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Definitions of understanding abound. All of them emphasize the notion of 'flexibility. 
Understanding implies the ability to adapt a conceptual representation to a novel 
situation. Eylon & Reif (1984) regard understanding as 'the processing of the original 
problem presentation to construct a meaningful internal representation that can be 
manipulated by the solver in order to produce the desired result. ' Mebert & LeFevre 
(1986) use the term to describe 'the state of knowledge when new f ... 
I information is 
connected appropriately to existing knowledge' (which they acknowledge Is more like 
Piaget's notion of assimilation), Mayer (1989) defines it as: 'the ability to use learned 
information in problem solving tasks that are different from what was explicitly taught', 
which in turn is related to Wertheimer's (1959) distinction between understanding and rote 
learning. Wertheimer referred to understanding as the 'meaningful apprehension of 
relations'; a form of understanding which is useful in new situations, Rote learning is 
where a leamer follows a memorized procedure. Skemp (1978) also distinguishes between 
'instrumental' understanding - the rote performance of procedures - and 'relational' 
understanding - the performance of procedures with 'understanding'. 
The subject had not yet got to the level where her 'apprehension of relations' was 
meaningful. How then could she reach this level? Newell & Simon (1972) suggest a 4- 
part theory of how a procedure or algorithm Is acquired: 
1) The algorithm Is followed by step-by-step reference to a 'recipe' stored in 'external 
memory'. The'external memorymay be a textbook explanation of a procedure, such as an 
equation for physics problems, a rule written on the blackboard, or the INFECT procedure 
in the SOLO training manual. However the rule, procedure or algorithm is presented, the 
learner has to look back to it in order to apply it to a current problem since it is not yet 
memorized. 
2) The 'recipe' is memorized (stored internally) but still has to be executed by step-by-step 
interpretation. The learner now has the necessary declarative knowledge of the 
procedure, and problem solving involves interpreting this declarative knowledge (cf. 
Anderson, 1983). 
3) The memorized recipe is mechanized and is therefore executed directly and without 
Interpretation. That Is, the declarative knowledge has become proceduralized and 
compiled. Problem solving now Involves executing the relevant procedures. 
4) Independently of the previous sequence, understanding is acquired of the logical 
justification of the algorithm - of why It works. With experience of examples such as 
INFECT and FLOOD, the learner comes to understand why the form of these procedures in 
SOLO reflects the underlying principle of recursion. Another way of putting this is to say 
that the learner develops a theory of causation In a particular domain through a (domain- 
general) understanding of wissality (Pazzard, 1991). 
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Understanding, according to this model, appears as a by-product of the procedure being 
memorized and mechanized. Problem solving can still take place before the 'recipe' is 
memorized and before the underlying structure is understood. Since the subject does not 
know the procedure for simple recursion problems, she is still at step 1. 
The black box and the glass box 
Conceptual knowledge often refers to a 'knowledge rich in relationships' (Hiebert, 1986). 
The richer the web of relationships, the better the understanding that derives from it; 
that is, the better able the person is to adapt that knowledge to new sf tuations. 
Procedural knowledge need not access conceptual knowledge. Procedures can be learned by 
rote and applied to similar new situations. In this case they will fail If the situation 
contains features which differ from the context In which the procedure was learned. For 
example, someone with little knowledge of cooking can nevertheless succeed in producing 
someýhing edible by following a recipe. However, if a recipe requires a particular spice 
and that spice jar Is empty, then the procedure will fail since the novice cook Is unlikely to 
know what other spice'might do in Its place. A cook with a richer knowledge of spices 
would be able to adapt the recipe by substituting a different spice for the missing one. 
The distinction between understanding the function of a procedure and merely copying it 
has been characterized as the 'black box versus glass box' distinction (DuBoulay, O'Shea, 
& Monk, 1989). For example, someone can easily drive a car without knowing what is 
going on under the bonnet but If something goes wrong with the car then the person who has 
some knowledge of internal combustion engines will be more likely to be able to fix it and 
carry on the journey than the driver who lacks this knowledge. To the driver who has an 
understanding of the interrelation between the parts of a car, the operation of the car is 
therefore 'transparent'. To the driver who has no such understanding the car's operation is 
'opaque'. 
Not everyone accepts that there is a rigid distinction between the declarative and 
procedural knowledge (Laird, Newell & Rosenbloom, 1987, Newell, 1990; Silver, 1986), 
especially with regard to conceptual and procedural understanding. Using the same 
examples, Silver (1986) points out that procedural fluency (driving a car) does not have to 
rest on conceptual fluency (e. g. knowledge of internal combustion). He argues that 
conceptual knowledge Is neither necessary nor sufficient for procedural knowledge but 
rather that both are Interrelated. 
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3.4.2. Procedural and Teleological understanding 
A learner who has reached stage 3 in Newell & Simon's list and who possesses procedural 
understanding has learned a set of rules for achieving a goal or subgoal. Applying the 
procedure accurately to a novel problem will normally lead to a correct solution, 
Nevertheless, lacking the knowledge of the design behind the procedure, a solver is 
unlikely to be able to adapt It to unusual problems, and may also be prey to the effects of 
negative transfer (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Kessler & Anderson, 1989). 
Teleological understanding is one where the learner understands not only a correct 
procedure but also the design behind that procedure, This form of understanding is that 
possessed by experts. If the design behind a procedure is known then learners can use It to 
reconstruct parts they may have forgotten. It allows a learner to adapt procedures to fit 
novel problems and can be used as the basis for intelligent analogies (Van Lehn, 1990). 
This form of understanding can be seen as the ideal for which a learner is striving. 
It Is because of the flexible nature of teleological understanding that many researchers 
believe that teaching is more effective when the explanations of novel constructs contain 
an explanation of the underlying structure, In other words procedural knowledge should be 
rooted in conceptual knowledge (Hiebert, 1986, Byrnes, 1992). This is the same argument 
advanced for the inclusion of schemas (Eylon & Reif, 1984; Smith & Goodman, 1984) or 
system models (Robertson, 1990) in instruction. 
3.4.3. A taxonomy of procedural types 
Two of the phases that the subject in the SOLO problem-solving exercise engaged in were 
search and imitation. The first involved a search for information she lacked. This type of 
search can either be random (solvers might search through the book for anything that 
looks like It might help) or focused (solvers may look for examples of a concept which 
they have Incompletely understood). In the Imitation phase they apply a procedure, 
which is embodied In an example, whether they know what the underlying procedure is or 
not. 
VanLehn (1990) provides a taxonomy of procedural knowledge types. 
1) Unprogrammed behaviour, which includes heuristic search such as trial and error, 
means-ends analysis, generating and testing hypotheses; 
2) Programmed behaviour, which can be further divided into subtypes: 
a) the learner knows a procedure and understands it, 
b) the learner knows a procedure but must follow a written recipe, and 
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c) the learner knows a procedure but does not understand it. VanLehn argues that knowing 
a procedure but not understanding It is the norm in his various studies into children's 
learning and errors (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn, 1982; VanLehn, 1986; VanLehn, 
1989). 
7he search the subject engaged in is akin to VanLehn's unprogrammed behaviour. The 
subject searched through the training manual because she was unsure what to do next - that 
is, she could not resort to programmed behaviour. When her search was successful she 
switched to some form of programmed behaviour, where, having found a relevant 
procedure (the INFECT program) she followed the recipe it embodied. 
The notion of imitation incorporates both unprogrammed behaviour and the programmed 
behaviour outlined in 2b and 2c. The subject in chapter I and the children In some of the 
studies by VanLehn had not yet learned a procedure by rote. In many of the cases studied 
in the laboratory only one or two example problems are given which illustrate a 
procedure. The subject has to map the features of the source problem onto the target and 
apply the procedure as* it Is instantiated In the source problem by extrapolating It to the 
target. When the current problem is a distant variant of an earlier example, the solver 
tries to follow the recipe in external memory (the example solution), but reaches an 
'impasse' when the recipe has to be modified in any way. At this point the solver has to 
fall back on unprogrammed behaviour, We cannot therefore assume that the learner 
knows or understands the Procedure Instantiated in the example well enough to 
extrapolate it to the target. 
3.5. Summary - Which comes first: Procedural or Declarative 
knowledge? 
There are several reasons why novices may fail to make elaborative Inferences from a 
reading of a proglem. firstly, their representations of the text are often fragmentary and 
incomplete, since they may not know what aspects of the text are important or relevant to 
the solution. Secondly, they require practice at solving problems before they develop the 
necessary Inference rules. In other words their declarative knowledge of the domain (or 
conceptual knowledge) Is not in a form that can support inferences. 
Many models of learning such as ACT*o SOAR, Sierra, PI, etc,, emphasize the deriving of 
knowledge from experience. That is, procedures are created from experience of instances of 
problem solving, During this phase learners might show procedural skill but little 
conceptual understanding, An example would be learning to write recursive functions in 
LISP from a purely 'syntactic'point of view (Hasemer & Domingue, 1989); one can learn to 
write recursive functions successfully without at first a full understanding of how recursion 
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works, Even when concepts are not fully understood they can nevertheless be'powerful 
thinking tools' (Boden, 1972). Procedures In mathematics still allow problems to be solved 
even though the problem or procedure is not fully understood, VanLehn (1990), amongst 
others, has shown that having a procedure which successfully solves a problem involving 
a concept does not mean that the student has a proper understanding of the concept (Brown 
& Burton, 1978; Brown & VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn, 1986; VanLehn, 1990; Young & O'Shea, 
1981). 
The alternative is learning a procedure from a principled understanding of a concept. For 
example, it is possible to have a good understanding of the concept of recursion without 
knowing how it is instantiated in a SOLO function. So even though a concept is understood 
by a student this does not mean that the student has acquired the necessary procedures to 
implement that concept (Ohlsson & Rees, 1991). This was the case with the subject who, 
having found the first recursive INFECT procedure, interpreted it in the light of her 
understanding of recursion, 
Byrnes (1992) proposes a 'dynamic-interaction' model to account for the interface between 
conceptual and procedural understanding. His model assumes that concepts and procedures 
are stored in separate memory systems. The interface between the two types of knowledge 
involves the activation of procedures that are indexed to concepts. The procedures, 
however, do not define concepts. Silver (1986), in contrast, believes that the two are more 
fundamentally interrelated and that there is little point in distinguishing between them. 
just as there is a conceptual basis for procedures there Is also a procedural basis for 
concepts. For example, the concept 'equilateral triangle'may Include procedures for 
distinguishing between examples and non-examples of such triangles. Concepts can 
therefore be defined by the operations that apply to them. 
If conceptual knowledge Is 'rich in relationships' then concepts are, by definition, learned 
with meaning. Procedures, on the other hand, may or may not be learned with meaning, 
according to Newell and Simon. This leads to a paradox, If conceptual understanding 
comes first then procedures are surely also learned with meaning, since those procedures 
make reference to known concepts. It, however, procedures are acquired first then 
conceptual understanding comes after the procedures have been learned. In other words It 
Is possible for procedural knowledge to precede declarative knowledge. 
If solvers Imitate a procedure illustrated in an example, then their understanding of the 
procedure and the concepts embodied In It can be generated as a consequence of the process 
of using that procedure. 
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The problem of access 
Accessing an earlier example involves finding a match between whatever representation 
the solver has of the target and a potential source. In APS accounts, the source is presumed 
to be in LTM. Retrieving an analogue occurs through some form of hint, or through a match 
between the problems, surface featuresor structural features. In the IPS account, the subject 
can be reminded of a potential source through some form of hint, by being presented with a 
relevant analogue, or after a search through training material. Nevertheless, the solver 
still has to recognize some kind of similarity between the target and any potential source. 
This section deals with problem similarity and what is necessary for successful retrieval. 
Surface and structural similarity 
Problem similarity depends on two aspects of problems: those features of a problem 
category which can vary - the surface features - and those features which are invariant - 
the structural features. Changes in the surface features do not affect the solution 
procedure, whereas changing the structural features does. These features have been shown 
to have differential effects on the access and use of analogues. 
The strong view of analogical access involves accessing an analogue through some 
similarity in their underlying structure, A 'weaker' view of analogical access involves 
being reminded of a plausibly relevant analogue through some other kind of similarity, 
usually a superficial one. Remindings, can occur If those similarities are salient (Holyoak 
and Koh, 1987), or 'transparent' - that is, if they are similar kinds of things (Gentner & 
Toupin, 1986). The salience depends on the solver being able to infer that particular 
surface features are likely to provide a link to some underlying causal relationship which 
holds In both the'source and target. 
A weaker form still involves accessing a source problem by being given a hint to use one, or 
by finding an earlier problem 'by chance' while looking through a training manual. 
Retrieving a potential source can also come about through a variety of reasons, none of 
which has anything to do with recognizing similarities in either structural or surface 
features. An example may be chosen because it is in the some section of the textbook as the 
exercise problem, The subject in the protocol categorized the problem as recursive without 
reference to the manual and then found, by searching through It, a source that was also an 
example of recursion, 
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4.2. Recall of a relevant source 
After reading and trying to understand the problem, the subject inChapter I searched 
through the manual for something that would help her solve it. When solvers have 
formed an initial description or mental model of a target problem, they must either a) be 
able to access a plausibly relevant representation of some earlier problem from memory, or 
b) match the description with one already presented. The subject was unable to solve the 
current problem immediately, so her representation of the target problem was incomplete; 
that is, she was not aware of its underlying structure. She was aware that it was a 
recursive problem, but that representation was at too abstract a level for her to solve the 
problem - she could not remember how the principle was instantiated in a procedure. 
When solvers have an incomplete representation of a problem, they cannot access an 
earlier one on the basis of structural similarities. Instead, superficial similarities provide 
the main cues to retrieval of a plausibly relevant source analogue (Brown & Kane, 1988; 
Ferguson-Hessler & Jong, 1990; Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Holyoak, Junn, & Billman, 1984; 
Holyoak & Koh, 1987, Novick, 1988; Stein, Way, Benningfield, & Hedgecough, 1986). 
The subject in the SOLO experiment found an example problem, not because of either its 
surface or its structural similarity, but because it was the first example of recursion she 
happened to come across in the textbook. 
Memory for earlier problems: Norman & Bobrow (1979) 
The reasons why superficial features of a problem are Important in early problem solving 
have to do, in part, with how Information is encoded and stored in memory. in studies of 
recall, the likelihood that information learned earlier will be accessed increases as the 
similarity or degree of overlap between It and the Information available at the time of 
the test. The same processes operate In problem-solving where the likelihood of accessing 
a relevant source analoguý Increases as the similarity between the encoding of the source 
problem increases (Barclay, Bransford, Franks, McCarrell, & Nitsch, 1974; Tulving & 
Thomson, 1973; Holyoak and Koh, 1987). Accessing an earlier similar problem therefore 
depends on the representation or description that is derived from the current one, as well 
as how the earlier problem is encoded (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). The description one 
forms of an entity, according to Norman & Bobrow (1979), is defined as 'a collection of 
perspectives, each of which Is a way of viewing that entity In terms of a previously known 
prototype. ' Older records can serve as prototypes for new ones. The new record Is an 
inst4nce of the prototype and can inherit some of its properties. Prototypes are not the 
same as abstract schemas since they can be episodic in nature. 
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Information about goals - exactly what it is that Is to be achieved - and feature 
information, that is: syntactic, semantic or structural information, are used to construct a 
specification of a problem (essentially a description of the target along with verification 
criteria), ThIs information constitutes a memory probe, A source example also consists of a 
description of a number of episode fragments, ones which contain partial goal Information 
as well as partial information about actions that are performed during this part of the 
episode. Feature information might include such things as text content, story line and 
possibly even irrelevant surface information such as the font in which a text Is printed. 
Spencer & Weisberg (1986), for example, found that context heavily Influenced the 
likelihood of transfer in the Fortress and Radiation problems and argued that whatever 
schema a subject had derived from the source problem must also contain context specific- 
information. 
Armed with a description derived from the current problen", the memory base is searched 
for the best matching description, On recall, information Is sought (or descriptions are 
elaborated) from the envirom-nent, the nature of the retrieval specification, and the 
information retrieved fiom memory, The retrieval process, then, involves a cycle of: 
a) Forming a retrieval specification; which includes a description of the target as 
well as verification criteria, 
b) A matching process; which refers to how good the description is. If It is highly 
specific then this may lead to direct access of the earlier problem. Otherwise there is 
likely to be some kind of spreading activation to access a suitable earlier problem. Success 
depends partly on how well the description discriminates between other possible memory 
records. 
C) Evaluation; retrieved information Is evaluated against the verification criteria 
included in the retrieval specification. 
For Holyoak ancLfor Ross the process of analogical transfer Is reconstructive. Ross's view 
of analogical transfer Is outlined in his 1984 paper. Once a description of the current 
situation is partially matched with a description of a memory fragment, the rest of the 
memory fragment Is 'pieced togetherguided by goal, action and feature information. 7hat 
Information provides constraints on the order in which the episodic fragments could have 
occurred. Lacking the high-level knowledge of an expert the novice has only the current 
target problem to guide this reconstruction. The target problem fulfils two functions. - It is 
an instantiation of the problem structure even though the learner may as yet have no 
knowledge of its abstract structural aspects; it Is also a memory probe which is used 
(according to Ross & Sofka, 1986, and Ross, 1989b) to recall and guide the reconstruction of 
a previous example. Once a plausible source analogue is identified, the actions that were 
applied In the earlier task are applied to the current target task by analogy. 
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Similarly, Holyoak talks of the mental model of a retrieved source analogue model as 
being 'unpacked'. Since Holyoak views models as being hierarchically ordered, this 
unpacking proceeds from the top down. The mapping and transfer processes are iterative 
until either a new target model is constructed or the analogy breaks down. 
4.2.2. Memory for analogues 
In within-domain analogies one might expect that an analogue would be easier to access 
than, say, the Fortress problem would be when a subject is presented with the Radiation 
problem. There is very little surface similarity between these problems. In Gick & 
Holyoak's experiments, there was either an interpolated task or a delay between 
presentation of the source and target. In teaching texts, on the other hand, the examples 
and the test problems are often superficially very similar, they are usually in the same 
section of the textbook and so are easy to access, and often follow on immediately after one 
another. Nevertheless, despite the similarity of within-domain problems, students can 
have a great deal of difficulty in adapting an example solution to solve an exercise 
problem. 
Reed, Dempster & Ettinger (1985) presented subjects with an algebra word problem about 
two cars travelling along the same road at different speeds. In one experiment, they 
presented one group of subjects with an algebra word problem containing an explanation of 
the solution and then gave them an 'equivalent' problem (a close variant with a very 
similar cover story) to solve, that Is, the test problem was Identical to the example except 
that some of the values were changed. A control group was shown an 'unrelated' practice 
problem which was entirely different from the target problem. Neither group was 
allowed to consult the example problem. The results showed no significant difference 
between the groups for success in solving the test problems. Either the subjects could not 
remember the earlier problem or they could not understand It. 
In a second experiment, Reed et al. repeated the procedure used in the first experiment but 
this time the solution explanation was 'Improved'. The explanation also Included a table 
as a way of re-representing the underlying equation. This time there was a great 
improvement in the subjects' ability to solve an isomorphic problem from memory. This 
suggests that the main difficulty the subjects had in the first experiment was 
understanding the earlier solution. The new version of the problem, although longer, 
allowed subjects to understand and therefore remember it better. However, another group 
of subjects had been given a distant variant of the example problem. Their results were 
worse than those of the subjects who were given the unrelated practice problem. This 
suggests that they did not understand the original problem, since presumably they could 
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remember it as well as the group who were given the close variant. The fragments of the 
earlier problem that they could remember were not enough to allow them to reconstruct the 
solution plan, In fact, it led to negative transfer. 
Reed et al. could not induce transfer to the distant variant despite their efforts to make 
the explanation of the problem more comprehensive (such as removing Inferences and 
suggesting the use of a table as an intermediate representation of the problem). Subjects 
were still unable to transfer their learning on the training problem to the test problem. 
This is not all that surprising since Reed et al. trained their subjects to solve a problem 
that was different from the one they were expected to solve. Even though the underlying 
equation was the same in both the training and distant variant, the solution procedure was 
different. 
It appears that, when students are given example solutions to complex problems, 
particularly in formal domains such as mathematics and physics, they are unlikely to 
remember or fully understand them, They often cannot access an example from memory, 
and even if they do, they maybe unable to understand the underlying structure well 
enough to use It in the 'top-down fashion' proposed by Holyoak. Since they can, however, 
solve isomorphic problems, whose surface features are very similar, they must be using 
some method of problem solving that does not require them to understand the structure. 
4.3. Problem similarity 
Two problems can be termed similar for a variety of reasons. They can be similar in that 
they have similar objects. For example, both may deal with IBM salesmen choosing 
which mechanic to work on their car. Despite the similarity In tile content of the 
problems, the underlying solution structure may be entirely different. The two problems 
may be probability problems involving different formulae for their solution. 
Nevertheless, solvers may deem them to be similar due to their surface features. On the 
other hand, even though the surface features may be entirely different, the underlying 
solution principle may be the same, as in Gick and Holyoak's Radiation and fortress 
problems, or the INFECT and FLOOD procedures In SOLO. The former is an example of a 
between-domain analogy, and the latter Is a within-domain analogy. 
justifiable and non justifiable analogies 
In witliln-domaln analogies the kind of analogizing which takes place may be different 
from that which occurs in between-domain analogies. The closer two analogues are to one 
another in terms of their superficial features, the easier It Is to map those features from 
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one to the other, However, even if people can map the superficial features this does not 
mean that they can map the underlying explanatory structure. 
Dejong (1989) classifies analogies Into two types -justified and unjustified analogies. 
Justified analogies are those which allow the solver to abstract out some form of 
generalization about the class of problems to which the problem and its analogue belong. 
This abstraction or schema can thereafter be used to solve problems of the same type. For 
example, having been shown a solution for the Fortress problem and using it to solve the 
Radiation problem, solvers are supposed to derive a 'known abstraction' (what Gick and 
Holyoak 1983, called a 'convergence' schema) which can be applied to later problems of 
the same type. Such problems are 'justified' because the mappings are 'a manifestation of 
an underlying common abstraction' which may be used to solve later problems. 
Unjustified analogies are those which do not have a common abstraction. The example 
Dejong gives is a metaphor from Gentner: 'the sweet fruit of patience'. The hearer or 
reader must infer a temporary mapping between 'sweet fruit' and 'patience' that is specific 
to this metaphor, Anderson (1989; Anderson & Thompson, 1989) provides an example of 
problem solving from an earlier example where the solver has to make an analogy with 
thefunction of the source example. He gives two recursive LISP functions factorial, which 
calculates the product of the integers to a given number n, and summorial which calculates 
their sum, Factorial is the source used to determine the solution of the later summorial 
function in the target. Dejong argues that in this case there is no common abstraction 
which can be later used to solve a like problem, for that reason the analogy Is 
'unjustified'. 
At the other end of the spectrum there are researchers who are looking at our 
understanding of metaphors such as 'experience is the comb nature gives us when we are 
bald' and the creative use pf analogies Gohnson-Laird, 1989), Gentner (1989) refers to 
analogies as being either in context or in isolation. By an analogy in context Gentner is 
referring to analogical problem solving proper, where the solution structure in one domain 
can be extrapolated and used in another, as in Gick and Holyoak's variations of the 
Radiation problem, Analogies in isolation refer to analogies one finds In metaphors, 
4.3.2. The relation between surface and structural similarity 
Problem similarity therefore forms a continuum from near variants to distant variants. 
Gick & Holyoak (1983) and Holyoak & Koh (1987) provided subjects with a range of 
problems which varied in gradations In terms of their surface similarity and the salience 
of surface features to the underlying structural similarity. In the experiments by Reed and 
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his co-workers (e. g. Reed, Ackinclose & Voss, 1990; Reed & Bolstad, 1991; Reed, Dempster 
& Ettinger, 1985) the surface features of problems were often very similar but the 
underlying structure varied. 
People naturally expect a causal relation between surface and structural similarity. The 
relations between them can be fairly simple. The 'redness' of a tomato (a surface feature), 
for example, has a causal relation with the underlying feature of'ripeness'. This 
knowledge can come about either from experience with tomatoes or from an analogy with 
the relation between redness and ripeness in apples. If novices are presented with an 
example In which the same surface features occur then they might reasonably infer that 
the example will involve the same underlying relation and that this relation can be 
applied in the current problem. 
Sweller (1980) defined similarity In terms of 'shared representational predicates' which 
are the lower-order predicates in Gentner's systematicity theory. These representational 
predicates are accessible surface properties. fie makes the point that shared surface 
features are a useful heuristic for accessing earlier problems. It Is reasonable that two 
problems that look the same on the surface also share an underlying structure. Accessing a 
problem through shared surface features, he argues, is a good constraint to impose on the 
predicates that compose mental representations. 
The relation between surface and structure Is also pertinent in concept formation. Medin & 
Ortony (1989) argue that similarity judgements are based on our representations of objects 
(and of problems) not on actual entities themselves. The descriptive properties of objects, 
or their surface features, are usually related to deeper, less accessible properties, It 
therefore makes sense to attend to the surface properties of objects since they are a good 
heuristic for accessing the underlying structure. 
Holyoak & Koh (1987) propose that both structural features, which play a causal role In 
determining possible solutions, and salient surface features influence the selection of an 
analogue. However, this proposal cannot be easily reconciled with the results of the 
experiments by Reed, Ackinclose and Voss (1990). They found that subjects did not select 
more inclusive source problems (ones which have more subgoals than the test problem but 
include all those necessary for the test problem's solution) despite the fact that such 
problems must share more structural features with a target problem than less Inclusive 
problems. One would expect subjects to choose the more inclusive problem, at least in 
problem sets where there is a close correspondence between surface and structural features; 
that Is, where the surface features are salient. While such a selection leads to more 
successful problem solving,, it is not the strategy which they appear to adopt. Experts, on 
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the other hand, were more likely to select an Isomorphic problem over a less inclusive 
problem but not more likely to select a more inclusive over a less inclusive one. 
4.3.3. Salience as a form of similarity 
For a feature to be salient it has to 'stand out' in some way. Holyoak and Koh (1987) 
varied the correspondences between so-called dconvergence' problems such that a broken 
light bulb filament that requires a laser to repair it led to greater transfer to a problem 
where X-rays are used to destroy a turnour than to one involving am-des attacking a castle 
because the former were seen as more salient. Salience also includes the idea of temporal 
processing, which means that aspects available earlier in the reading of a problem may 
have a greater effect on which earlier problem will be accessed. In distant variants of a 
problem type, there will naturally be few shared salient features and competing 
associations may be activated that block retrieval of remote analogues, 
Vosniadou (1989) argues that salient similarity is a way of linking both surface and 
structural similarity since such'a feature, by the fact that it Is salient, provides a direct 
link to the underlying structure. Both surface or perceptual similarity and structural or 
conceptual similarity can provide a means of accessing an earlier problem, An example of 
access through conceptual similarity was when the subject used the concept of recursion as 
the basis for searching for an example. 
Stein, Way, Benningfield and Hedgecough (1986) invoke the notion of 'key concepts' from 
work by Weisberg, DiCamillo, & Phillips (1978). In a series of experiments in which 
access and use of an earlier problem were distinguished, they found that there was 
evidence of spontaneous transfer if key concepts were embedded In statements which had a 
surface structure similar to that in the target problem, and those statements emphasised 
the 'relevant properties' 9f the concept. Barclay, Bransford, Franks, McCarrell, & Nitsch 
(1974) found that retrieval cues which were not present in the source (e. g., 'something 
heavy') could facilitate access to concepts (e. g., 'piano') if the acquisition (the source) 
context allowed learners to focus on relevant properties of the key concept (e. g., 'the man 
lifted the piano'). No access to key concepts was found if learners were caused to focus on 
Irrelevant properties (e. g., 'the man tuned the piano'), 
Stein et al. compared a number of conditions where a clue statement was given with a 
problem. To find the relationship between recall of concepts and subjects' ability to access 
and use them in solving a target problem, a free-recall test was included In their 
experiments (experiment 3). The results are given In Table 2.1 below, 
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Mean percentage of Problems solved as a Function of Clue Recall and Clue Statement 
Condition 
Clue Recall SS/RC DS/RC SS/IC DS/IC 
Yes 78.2 
In&rmed C 
76.9 
onditioM 
9.6 14,7 
No 55.8 51.9 20.5 6.5 
Yes 39.7 
Uj3informed 
38,5 
ConditjoM 
2.5 0 
No 53.2 32.0 2.5 1.9 
ýSs - Similar Surface Structure between clue and problem 
DS - Dissin-tilar Surface Structure 
RC - Relevant Context: the context in which the clue was presented was relevant to 
the problem solution 
IC - Irrelevant Context: the acquisition context was irrelevant to the solution 
As can be seen from the table, spontaneous transfer of information in problem solving tasks 
Is a function of a) characteristics of the source context, whether the source context was 
relevant to the target or not; and b) the surface structure of the problem statement which 
influences the accessibility of that information in the first place. In the Informed 
Conditions subjects were told that a concept they had been presented with earlier would be 
helpful in solving the current problem. This hint was not given to the Uninformed subjects. 
Their findings suggest that 'the accessibility of relevant clue information during problem- 
solving tasks Is primarily Influenced by similarity in surface structure (i. e., the use of 
Identical content words) in the clue and problem statements' (p. 439). 
4.3.4. Analogy as a continumn 
The problem that was given to the subject was analogous to the INFECT problem in the 
training manual. She failed to access it based on the surface features of the problems. She 
found it by categorizing the problem correctly and using the categorization to guide her 
search. The INFECT example as an analogy to the FLOOD problem Is both 'justified' and 
'in context' since both are examples of how the underlying principle of recursion can be used 
in a SOLO program. The variations on the colinear distance problems used by Reed, 
Dempster & Ettinger (1985) are also analogous according to their shared underlying 
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equation, and their surface elements were identical. Looking at what some researchers 
have written about the notion of analogy suggests that it forms a continuum from the 
concrete to the abstract. Anderson & Thompson (1989) give analogy a very broad 
definition. Gentner (e. g. 1989) is much more strict in her definition. Because of the wide 
applicability of the concept Dejong (1989) refers to It as the 'curse of an alluring name. ' 
According to Dedre Gentner, an analogy is not simply saying that one thing is like another. 
'Puppies are like kittens' or 'milk Is like water' are not analogies, They are In Gentner's 
terms 'literally similar' since they share the same attributes, such as 'small' in the first 
case and 'liquid' in the second, as well as the same relations. Gentner (e. g. 1989; 
Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1989; Gentner & Toupin, 1986) and Vosniadou (1989) 
argue that 'real' analogies involve a causal relation. In the analogy 'puppies are to dogs 
as cats are to kittens/ there is a relation between 'puppies' and 'dogs' which also applies 
between 'kittens' and 'cats/ and this relation can readily be explained. An analogy 
properly so called involves mapping an explanatory structure from a base domain (puppies 
and dogs) to a target (kittens and cats), 
Nevertheless, two problems can be literally similar and still share an explanatory 
structure. A problem requiring the solver to find the time taken by a car to travel a certain 
distance at a certain speed is literally similar to one involving finding the time taken by a 
bus travelling a different distance at a different speed. The explanatory structure is the 
equation relating the elements of the problem statements and the solutions. The same 
equation is used in both problems. 
Vosaladou (1989) argues that 'analogical reasoning can be employed between items that 
belong anywhere in the continuum from literal similarity to non literal similarity' (p, 
415). At the concrete end there are examples of within-domain analogies involving two 
problems which are highly similar In both their surface features and in their underlying 
structure. For example, Anderson, Conrad, & Corbett (1989) claim that people solve the 
problem in LISP of finding the first element in a list, such as (a b 0, by analogy to an 
example which shows how to find the first element of the list (p qr s). The solution to the 
source problems was (car'(p qr s)) and so the solution to the target problem also uses car to 
produce (car'(a b 0). Dejong (1989) and Gentner (1989) have doubted whether this can be 
called an analogy at all. The problem can be solved by mapping the surface features and 
does not require that the solver is aware of the explanatory structure. 
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4.3.5. Gentner's structure-mapping theory 
When an example is being used as an analogy, the objects (the salient surface features) in 
one domain are assumed to be'put in correspondence' with the objects in another to obtain 
the'maximum structural match. ' Analogizing, according to Gentner (1983), involves 
mapping a relational structure that holds in one domain onto another. This is known as 
the principle of systematicity, which states that people prefer to map hierarchical 
systems of relations In which the higher-order relations constrain the lower-order ones. 
The structure-mapping theory Is Implemented as the Structure Mapping Engine 
(Falkenhainer, Forbus & Gentner, 1989) and uses a predicate calculus of various orders to 
represent the structure of an analogy. 
At the lowest order, order 0, are the objects of the analogy, such as 'army'. 'fortress', 
'roads', 'general. ' A predicate has the order I plus the maximum of the order of its 
arguments, So, where x and y are objects, GREATER THAN (x, y) would be first order and 
CAUSE [GREATER THAN (x, y), BREAK (y)) would be second order, CAUSE, IMPLIES, 
and DEPENDS ON are typical higher-order relations. 'On this definition, the order of 
an item indicates the depth of structure below it. Arguments with many layers of 
justifications will give rise to representation structures of higher order' (Gentner, 1989, p. 
208). 
Mapping an explanatory structure allows one to make inferences in the new domain or 
problem, since the relations which apply in the source can be applied in the target. A 
structure such as- CAUSE [STRIKE (ORANGE, TREE), FLATTEN (ORANGE)] can be used 
in a Tom and Jerry cartoon to decide what happeru when Tom smashes into a tree - CAUSE 
(STRIKE (TOIM, TREE), ?I- to generate the inference CAUSE (STMKE (TOrvf, 
l 
TREE), 
FLAMN (TOM)], 
Gentner (FalkenhaLner, et al., 1989; Gentner, 1989) provides a taxonomy of similarities 
between problems in which analogy is distinct from other types of simuarity. For her, 
analogizing involves a one-to-one systematic mapping of the structure of the base domain 
onto the target. The surface features - the object descriptions - are not mapped onto the 
target since they play no role In the relational structure of the analogy. The problems 
dealt with by Gick & Holyoak (1980; 1983) are therefore analogous under this definition, 
Figure 2.1 shows different types of similarity and where they might lie on a continuum. 
Literal shnilarity, Literal similarity Is almost -always found in within-domain 
comparisons. When problems are literally similar then not only Is the hierarchical 
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relational structure mapped over, but the object descriptions are mapped as well. In the 
example 'milk is like water' many of the attributes of water can also be applied to milk. 
There is a fuzzy boundary between what is technically analogy with its normaLly 
exclusively shared relational structure, and literal similarity which also includes object 
descriptions. 
U) 
In C 
C 
Litera 
Analogy SimiIari 
Ab tractio I.;.: 
Metaphor 
Mere 
Anomaly Appearanc 
Attributes Shared 10 
Similarity spaces classes of similarity based on the kinds of predicates shared. From 
G. 
'n't', ', '. ',. Ll989,42-ZM 
- 
Mere-appearance matcli. With mere appearance match only the lower order 
predicates match. The relational structure is ignored. Gentner gives the example: 'the 
glass tabletop gleamed like water' in which only the physical description is shared 
between the base and target. She claims that novices are prone to mere appearance 
matches. 
Abstraction mapping. Where the base contains elements which are variables or abstract 
principles then mapping involves applying a known abstraction to the target as in 'heat is 
a through vari able'. Abstraction mapping assumes prior knowledge on the part of the 
reader since, as in the above example, the abstraction can be used to categorize a problem 
or instantiate a procedure or rule. There are no concrete properties of objects in the base 
domain. Abstraction mapping also forms a continuum with analogy. As the object nodes in 
the base domain move towards the abstract variable-like end of the continuum then it 
becomes a relational abstraction. 
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The shaded area in figure 2.1 indicates where Imitation fits into this scheme. Novices use 
mere appearance matches to access and use earlier examples. The shading includes literal 
similarity, in which there are shared relations as well as attributes. In such cases the 
earlier problem is an Isomorphic within-domain analogue. That is, the two problems are 
I close' variants of one another, Novices are often able to solve isomorphic problems In the 
same domain when only the values of certain attributes are varied; for example, when 30 
mph in one problem becomes 40 mph in another. 
4.4. Summary 
Retrieval of a source has been found to be very difficult 
a) without a hint, 
b) unless the superficial features remind the solver of an earlier problem; 
c) some aspect of the problem guides the solver's search for a suitable example to imitate. 
The evidence suggests that surface features have a strong effect on the access of an earlier 
problem. Some of these features may be salient in that they relate to shared structural 
features. However, retrieval can be effected through irrelevant surface features such as 
the font used or other contextual elements. 
Much work has been done on the transfer of solutions In between-domain analogies 
(Bassok, 1990; Carbonell, 1983; Gick, 1985; Gick & Holyoak, 1980,1983). Gentner's studies 
(Collins & Gentner, 1990; Gentner & Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Landers, 1985; Gentner & 
Toupin, 1986), as well as those of Holyoak, have often dealt mainly with between-domain 
analogies, as in her studies of Rutherford's analogy between the structure of the atom and 
the structure of the solar system, or ahalogies with the flow of electricity. In these cases 
the base domain Is either relatively well known or easily understood. Between-domain 
analogies tend to have few surface features in common. Accessing a relevant source is 
therefore very dtfficult without a hint. 
In studying within-domain analogizing researchers have looked at how people retrieve 
and use an earlier example of the same type of problem (Anderson, Farrell & Sauers, 1984; 
Cooper, 1983; Green & Gilhooly, 1990b; Novick & Holyoak, 1991; Reed, 1989; Reed, 
Ackinclose & Voss, 1990; Reed & Bols-tad, 1991; Reed, Dempster & Ettinger, 1985; Reed, 
Ernst & Banerjl, 1974; Ross, 1984; 1987,1989a; 1989b; Ross & Sofka, 1986; Sweller & Cooper, 
1985). Within-domain analogies differ from between-domain analogies in that the whole 
domain (including both base and target problems) is new to the novice and the solution 
structure underlying both tends to be more complex than in the between-domain analogies 
that form much of the basis for APS accounts. Because of the novices' unfamiliarity with 
the underlying structure of example problems, recalling the relevant example is very 
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difficult (Reed, et al., 1985). Most studies of within-domain problem solving examine how 
examples are used rather than how they are retrieved. In teaching contexts, students often 
retrieve a useful source after a search through a textbook, or by being given a model to use. 
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5. The problem of mapping 
Mapping, in most accounts of APS, refers both to finding correspondences between a source 
and a target, and analogical Inference. The latter involves adapting a structured system of 
relations. Mapping in the IPS account is limited to mapping values that appear to fill the 
same roles in both problems. There are some important corollaries that follow from these 
views. From the APS point of view, if the solver is aware of the underlying structure of 
two or more analogues, adapting it to fit the new problem will not pose too many 
difficulties. On the other hand, if solvers are using Imitation, they will find It very hard 
to adapt the mapping. Indeed, much of the literature on analogical transfer has 
demonstrated how hard transfer Is to induce. To understand why transfer seems so 
difficult, we have to look at the roles surface (or semantic) features and structural (or 
- syntactic) features play in adapting an analogue. 
In this section, two views of mapping and adapting an analogue are contrasted. The first, 
the principle-cueing view, will be discussed mainly with reference to the work of 
Holyoak. Many others share a 'structural' view of analogy, and many AI models such as 
PL ACME, ACT*, SME, PUPS and SOAR, also espouse this view of analogical mapping. 
The second view, the 'example-analogy' view, is represented by the work of Ross, whose 
views on APS are similar to the IFS account. 
5.1. Mapping the surface and structural features of problems 
Holyoak (1984) Identifies 4 types of mapping relations: 
1) Identities; these are elements which are the same in both analogues. These 
Identities are e4uivalent to the schema that is 'implicit' in the source and might include 
such generalized rules as 'using a force to overcome a target'. 
2) Indeterminate correspondences; which are those elements that the problem solver 
has not yet mapped. 
3) - Structure-preserving differences, These refer to the surface features of problems 
which, even when changed, do not affect the solution. Examples would bearmles'and 
'rays', and 'fortress' and 'tumour. Although entirely different, such surface features do not 
affect the underlying solution principle. 
4) Structure-violating differences; These differences do affect the underlying solution 
structure. The Fortress and Tumour problems use a solution Involving 'division' and 
'convergence'. However, whereas arn-des can be divided Into smaller groups, a ray 
machine cannot, nor Is It Immediately obvious how the rays can be divided. The solution 
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to the tumour problem means getting hold of several machines and reducing the intensity 
of the rays. The operators involved in the Fortress problem have to be modified in the 
Radiation problem. 
Structure violating differences necessitate the refinement of the selection of a source 
analogue. Structure-preserving differences, on the other hand, although they lead to 
surface dissimilarities, do not require the initial selection plan to be refined. When the 
solution structure is preserved despite surface dissimilarities, structure-preserving 
differences allow the construction of corresponding operators between target and source. 
Structure-violating differences prevent such operators from being applied and cause the 
analogy to break down. 
S. I. I. The PI model of analogical problem solving 
Holland et al. (1986) provide a rule-based system of inductive inference as a model for 
problem solving and other higl-klevel cognitive processes. A representation of a problem is 
a mental model made up of two rule types - diachronic and synchronic - describing changes 
of state and categorizations of elements in the world respectively. 
Representations in PI are declarative structures called concepts which include factual- - 
information Massie Is a dog') as well as general rule information ('Dogs have fur) which 
is an example of a general concept. Whereas ACT* (Anderson, 1983) segregates 
declarative and procedural knowledge, PI stores both under 'concepts', so that the general 
properties of a concept are stored with Information about individual instances. Since 
factual knowledge and procedural knowledge are stored together in clusters or schema- 
like units, PI differs also from SOAR in which all knowledge is procedural and in which 
there are no higher-order control structures corresponding to PI's schemas. 
ArWogical problem solving in PI assumes that a mental model of a source problem has to 
be retrieved in order for an analogous problem to be solved. Such a mental model has to 
contain structural Information about the problem in terms of Its initial state (the statement 
of the problem), the goal state, the operators whereby the initial state is transformed into 
the goal state, and the constraints wWch are Imposed on the problem search space, TbIs 
mental 'copy' of the world Is termed a homomorphism from the mathematical structures 
known as morphisms in which the environment can be characterized as being in certain 
states and each state is related to its successor by a transition function. 
Mental models are production rule-based representations, Input in the form of 'messages'ls 
matched against the conditions of production rules, Messages are proposition-like 
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structures corresponding to the 'facts' of ACT*. They can either be Information arriving 
through receptor systems or retrieved from declarative memory, one important example of 
which would be the specification of the current goal of the system. A limited number of 
rules may then operate in parallel and candidate rules place 'bids' to determine which 
Will be executed, the success of which is detern-tined in turn by the strength (a measure of 
the past usefulness of the rule), specificity (the more salient a rule the larger the 'bid') 
and support (a measure of the support from other matching messages). 
Rules are activated in parallel and constitute what Holyoak & Thagard (1989a) term an 
'aura' of associations. A candidate analogue is retrieved if there are multiple sources of 
support for it. When a threshold of summation is reached, the retrieved representation 
becomes available for further processing. That is, if there are many shared features 
between target and source, these multiple sources will summate and this summation ensures 
that only plausible source analogues will be activated. 
According to Holland et al. (1986), mapping begins when the learner Identifies the 
transition function for the source analogue connecting its initial state to a subsequent state, 
Tbereby the learner identifies the actions required to produce a solution from the Initial 
statement of the problem. However, the mapping process is also a hierarchical one in 
which objects in the source and target can be matched, or in which abstract categories or 
structures may be matched. for instance, in Holyoak and Koh's (1987) experiments some 
subjects were able to match objects such as 'rays' or 'laser beams'or'sound waves'across, 
from one problem to another. The solution is then constructed from the underlying schema 
in the source. Alternatively they may have had a ready-made abstract schema for 
convergence problems which they can map directly onto source and target. 
5.1.2. Clitfcisms of PI 
PI has been criticized from several perspectives. The first criticism by Gentner (1989) and 
Johnson-Laird (1989) is aimed at the notion of analogy which PI incorporates. PI was not 
intended to operate upon analogies other than the 'justified analogies' In problem solving. 
It does not deal with expository analogies, This limits its applicability and causes, 
Gentner to wonder if Holyoak believes that there is more than one analogical process. 
Holyoak & Thagard (1989) present an example of the workings of PI by applying it to the 
Fortress and Radiation problems. However, Dejong argues that the representation they 
present of the problems biases them in favour of easier mapping. Furthermore, since 
Holyoak espouses the principle-cueing view of analogical problem solving, then the 
underlying solution principle is already known. If it Is already known, Dejong argues, 
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there is little need for analogical reasoning to be used to solve the problem. This perhaps 
overstates the case. Holyoak (e. g. 1985) talks of partial mappings and an iterative 
process of mapping and adapting an analogue. But if Holyoak wishes to argue that 
subjects can have a ready-made schema, then in this case there is no need to retrieve an 
analogue: the subjects already know how to solve the problem. 
Other criticisms by Palmer (1989) are aimed at its range of applicability and its 
specificity. As it stands, PI is designed to deal only with relatively simple problems. If 
the database were to be enlarged then 'potential mappings may swamp the system'. Its 
production rules are also highly specific. Palmer goes on: 'Do we really need to suppose 
that people have a rule like "If x is an army and y is a road between x and some z, then x 
can move to z"? ' He also points out that, since knowledge representation is so specific, 
problem solving would be disrupted If there were even n-dnor changes to the rules causing 
them to fail. In many of the studies of problem solving in formal domains, such as the 
mathematics problems in those of Reed et al (1985), or in computer programming 
(Anderson, Farrell & Sauers, 1985), it is doubtful whether the subjects could Identify the 
transition function, or abstract out the underlying schema from a source. 
Holland et al. 's PI program represents an 'Ideal' model of analogizing. It readily solves 
the analogous problems presented to It, and indeed, some people may solve those problems 
by accessing a structure in much the same way. It therefore models the type of analogizing 
that humans are capable of, but it may not be the most usual method that humans use. 
Other Al models of APS, such as those described by Anderson (Anderson, Conrad, & 
Corbett, 1989; Anderson, Farrell, & Sauers, 1984; Anderson & Thompson, 1989), are also 
powerful analogical models. Whether human beings are as powerful as the models is a 
moot point. 
Mappinj in Imitative problem solving 
The degree of manipulation of a problem representation solved through Imitation Is 
limited to assigning values to variable roles, These variable roles are established by 
comparing problems. The comparison process Identifies perceptually similar and salient 
features such as the rates of travel in the experiments of Reed, et al. (1985), or the object 
correspondences in those of Gentner & Toupin (1986). To solve a problem by Imitation the 
solver makes two inferences. The first Is that the perceptually similar features occupy the 
same role In both problems. The second Inference arises from the successful assignment of 
different values to the same role, If two values can occupy the same role they can 
therefore be vartabilized. 
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It is rare that a source problem will have elements which are Identical to those in a 
target. The solver therefore needs some way of establishing that the values given in a 
source can map onto those in a target. Reed & Bolstad (1991) state that 'if the values of 
matching concepts have the same structure, then this structure Is copied for the test 
problern. ' What this means is that, if, say, an algebra problem involving times and rates 
of vehicles were used as a source, then a structure such as 30 mph, would be copied into the 
target where the problem statement might give the rate of a vehicle as 40 mph with the 
40 replacing the 30 in the earlier example. These 'surface structures' occupy the same role 
in the underlying solution structure of the two problems. They are highly salient in that 
they suggest a causal link to the underlying solution structure. 'Copy' in the sense used by 
Reed and Bolstad would be the same as imitation. We cannot, however, 'assume that 
solvers have any understanding of the concepts involved or the relation between them if 
they are simply imitating an example, 
5.2. Constraints on the access and use of analogues 
Gentner's systernaticity principle assumes that the causal relations between a problem's 
elements constrain a solution. Causal constraints are important only if the solver 
understands or Is aware of those causal relationships. In complex problem solving in a new 
domain such relationships are not well understood. It takes some experience with the new 
domain to develop knowledge of the causal relations within it. They can be learned 
because we apply our general knowledge of causality to the new domain (Pazzani, 1991). 
Indeed, even infants are 'predisposed to seek causal explanations' (Brown, 1989). 
5.2.1. Semantic and structural constraints 
Structural accounts of analogy demonstrate how syntactic constraints can operate to 
produce analogrcal transfer. Semantic constraints also affect transfer and come about 
through similarities in the surface features. The objects in problems can vary in the degree 
to which they are alike. 'Laser beams, "X-rays' and 'sound waves' can be seen as very 
simllar types of things and therefore have,, 'high transparency. ' 'Arn-des' and 'rays' are 
dissimilar objects, and have low transparency, Accessing a previous problem has been 
found to depend -strongly on the amount of semantic similarity between objects In different - 
problems (Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Ross, 1987). 
Holyoak and Koh also emphasized the differential effects of semantic and syntactic 
similarity on retrieval and mapping. They varied the correspondences between so-called 
$convergence' problems such that a broken light bulb filament that requires a laser to 
repair It led to greater transfer to X-rays used to destroy a tumour than arm4es attacking a 
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castle because they were seen as more semantically similar. Semantic similarity, they 
claim, is important for retrieval of a candidate analogue whereas syntactic similarity is 
more important for mapping, 
Gentner and Toupin (1986) presented children with stories in which the transparency of 
object correspondences and the systematicity of the original story were varied. 
Transparency was varied by changing the characters that appeared in the stories or by 
changing their roles in the story (leading to 'cross-mapping'). Systematicity was varied 
by adding a sentence to the beginning to provide a setting and a final sentence to the story 
in the form of a moral summary of the tale (the systematic condition). The non-systematic 
condition had neither a moral nor a setting. 
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The children were given 6ertain roles to play and asked to act out a story sin-dlar to the one 
they had just heard. Both systematicity and the transparency of the object mappings were 
important factors in analogical transfer (figure 2.2). Younger children, however, relied on 
the transparency of the objects whereas the older ones were more affected by the 
systematicity of the base domain. Gentner and Toupin argue that the shared system of 
relations (the systematicity) between the problems helps guide the mappings of the 
lower-order relations. 
Another wayof looking at these results Is to take the view that the children were 
attempting to Imitate the previous story. Where they understood the story's underlying 
rationale they were able to adapt their characters to fit the story's structure. The rest of 
the time they simply imitated the sequence of actions taken by the semantically similar 
76- 
Chapter 2- Analogical Problem Solving and Imitation 
counterparts in the earlier story. Again we find that analogies can be applied only when 
the subjects have a complete understanding of the underlying relational structure. Most of 
the younger children simply did not have an adequate understanding of the earlier story 
to be able to apply the rationale behind it. 
These results do not confine themselves to children. Gentner and Schumacher (1987, 
Schumacher & Gentner, 1988) found the same results with adults in a different domain, 
Their subjects had to learn a procedure for operating a computer simulated device and then 
use it to learn a new device. Once again the systematicity and transparency were 
manipulated. The systematicity was varied by either providing a causal model of the 
device or simply a set of operating procedures. The transparency referred to the type of 
device components. The results showed that systematicity constrained learning and 
transfer to the target device. Transparency also had strong effects on transfer, The speed 
of learning the new device was greater when corresponding pairs of components were 
similar than when they were dissimilar. The same pattern of results was found by Ross 
(1987,2989a). 
Bassok (1990) found transfer between highly content-specific domains in studies of transfer 
between physics and algebra problems. She found spontaneous transfer when the objects 
and variables In the base (e. g., speed and typing rate) and target could be put into 
correspondence due to their similarity, just as Ross (1987,1989) had found. That is, the 
objects were seen as more transparent or salient. However, there was little spontaneous 
transfer when those variables represented different types of quantities (e. g, speed and 
salary) despite the fact that the problems were Isomorphic. When there was 
correspondence between the variables and quantities, the subjects could apply learned 
procedures. When there was low correspondence between the quantities, the subjects often 
required a hint for retrieval and the mapping became 'effortful'. just as Ross had done, 
Bassok found &t different types of surface similarity affect both access and use of 4 
source problem where those surface features can be used to Interpret variables, 
5.2.2. Making the underlying structure more explicit 
Brown & Kane (1988) attempted to find out if children could transfer their learning on the 
basis of surface features (a perceptual basis), or on the basis of an underlying principle. 
They found that children could be taught to look for the relational similarity between 
examples then apply that to other variants of the problem type. Children were able to 
access relevant source problems despite Intervening tasks, Brown and Kane point out that, 
'where learning can be organized round a guiding principle, transfer is determined by the 
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extent that the subject is privy to that principle, through either discovery or Instruction' 
(p, 495). 
A causal model provides learners with a means of understanding the interrelations 
between a set of objects and predicates, The higher-order relations constrain the mappings 
between the lower-order relations and literal objects. Figure 2.3a represents an example 
problem statement (the A box) and the solution (the B box). Linking the two there is a 
relational structure represented by the line from A to B. If that relational structure is 
known, it becomes possible to apply it to a new problem in order to generate the solution. 
RELATION GIVEN 
FAB 
RELATION INFERRED 
If no causal model is given, as In Gentner and Schumacher's study, where a set of operating 
procedures was given instead, then the relation between the problem statement (the A 
term in figure 2.3b) and the solution has to be inferred (hence the dotted line linking A and 
B in figure 2.3b). By the same token the mappings between the base and target will be 
underconstrained. With complex problems in particular we would expect to see the 
mappings disrupted without a systematic causal model to guide them (e. g. Reed & 
Bolstad, 1991; Ross, 1987). The only resource open to the solver in such a case is to attempt 
to copy the actions performed in the original model and infer the mappings. 
5.3. Using an analogue for principle-cueing 
There are different views as to the roles that surface and structural similarity play. Ross 
(1984; 1987; 1989b) discusses two possible scenarios In APS: the principle-citeing view and 
the ex=ple-analogy view. In the principle-cueing view, learners may be reminded of an 
earlier example by some feature or combination of features of the current one. This 
reminding triggers or cues the abstract information or principle involved kn the earlier 
problem which Is relevant to the current one. This abstract or relational Information can 
then be used to make sense of a new situation or solve a new problem with the same 
structure. However, principle-cueing by definition presupposes that the analogizer 
understands the principle In the first place, For novices studying a new subject that may 
not always be the case. 
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There are many examples of successful use of a principle presented In a 'bridging' analogy, 
Successful problem solving has been shown to occur when subjects are given access to an 
analogue which they can use. Gentner & Gentner (1983), for example, presented subjects 
with two analogies to the flow of electricity through resistors. In one, the analogy was 
with water flowing through narrow sections of pipe. In the other, electricity was likened 
to people passing through turnstiles in a busy station. The analogy with people passing 
through the turnstiles led to a better understanding of electricity flow through particular 
arrangements of resistors than did the narrow pipe analogy. 
Issing, Hannemann & Haack (1989) performed an experiment in which they examined the 
effects of different types of representation on transfer. The representations were pictorial 
analogies of the functioning of a transistor. They presented subjects with an expository 
text alone, the text plus a sluice analogy, the text plus a human analogy, and finally the 
text plus an electronics diagram of the transistor. Unlike the human analogy in the 
Gentner studies, it was the sluice analogy (involving the flow of water) which led to 
better understanding of the function of the transistor. The human analogy was less 
effective and the diagram and text alone were the least effective4. 
These results can be explained by assuming that the solvers can go back to the particular 
expository analogy they were given and apply the principles involved to the novel 
situation. They also show that writers have to be very careful about which type of 
analogy they choose. In some circumstances, such as understanding the flow of electricity 
through a resistor, electricity is best conceived of as the movement of people. To 
understand the function of a transistor the flow of electricity Is best likened to the flow of 
water. Variations on the particular shared relational structure or underlying principle 
can have a strong effect on later problem solving. 
4SOmewhat contrarily, ISSing et 41, argue that analogies depicting human-like situations are regarded as 
arti , 
flcial and take on 'more a motivating than cognitivefinction. ' This, they say, explains why the human 
analogy f4ils to be as effective as theflow of water. This is a bizarre conclusion given that they are taking 
into account Centner's view of structure-mapping. The expository text presented to subjects talks about 
the : Pow of current. ' People, however, don't flow, water does. So the water analogy shares more higher- 
order relations than the human analogy, and this would accountfor the stronger effect of the sluice analoSy, 
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Most of the subjects in Gick and Holyoak's studies were at first unable to solve the 
Radiation problem even though they had previously been given the solution to the 
Fortress problem. When they were given a hint to use the earlier problem most were able 
to solve the new one. The hint did not include information about what to do, merely that 
the earlier problem would help. It was up to the subjects to work out what aspects of the 
source would help generate a solution in the target. 
According to most models of APS, the subjects in these experiments must have had a 
representation of the earlier problem at a level of abstraction sufficient to be able to apply 
it to another problem with different surface features. In Gick & Holyoak's studies, the 
hint allowed their subjects to access the 'divide and converge' schema which they had 
generated from the solution to the Fortress problem. Their initial difficulty was accessing 
a suitable source problem. In the electricity flow experiments, the subject is likewise 
presumed to access the representation of the earlier example in LTM, extract the 
underlying principle, and apply it to the current problem. 
Holland et al. (1986) refer to analogues as having an 'implicit' schema which is 
reconstructed during the solution process. In figure 2.4, A represents a problem statement 
and B the solution. The relation or set of relations between A and B is represented by the 
line linking them. If the problem is an instance of a category of problems then the solution 
procedure used to get from A to B can be applied to other problems of the same type. There 
is therefore a schema implicit in the solution. This is shown as the shaded S box in the 
figure. 
Figurg, ). 4. The relation between a problem and its solution' olving an implicit schema. 
When a Source problem is accessed (A and B in figure 2.5) then the principle underlying the 
solution to the source is accessed (the S on the line linking A and B) and applied to the 
target (C) to generate the solution (D). 
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In cases such as these, subjects are reminded of the analogy and the remindings serve to 
categorize the current problem. The abstract principle which the earlier problem or 
analogy exemplified is presumably already understood by the learner and the specific 
instantiation of the principle in the earlier problem is no longer required to solve the 
target. The original source problem was nevertheless important in that it allowed the 
learner to understand the principle in question and how it is used. 
The principle-cueing view implies that the learner already has an adequate 
conceptualization of the solution procedure acquired from the source problem. Solving 
another problem from an example involves abstracting out the principle or procedure frorn 
the example and applying it to the target. This smacks of abstraction mapping except 
that the abstraction is 'hidden' or implicit within the example and has to be extracted 
before it is applied. Much of the literature on expert-novice differences has concentrated 
on how the correct perception of a problem can cue access to the 'problem schema' (Chi, 
Glaser, & Rees, 1982; Larkin, 1978). This problem schema in turn Suggests a 
straightforward, 'stereotypical solution method. Novices, however, are often unable to 
identify the problem schema or categorize problems accordingly. 
In complex within-domain analogies, it would be unwarranted to assume that the novices 
have it schema, implicit or otherwise, for a problem. There may be a schema implicit in 
the problern but there is no guarantee that it is represented in the mind of the solver. 
5.4. Using an example as an analogy 
The view that the role of superficial features is simply to access a previous problem has 
been challenged by Ross in a series of experiments. According to the example-analogy 
view: 
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'the principle is understood only in terms of the earlier example. That is the 
principle and example are bound together. Thus even if learners were given the 
principle or formula, they would use the details of the earlier problem in figuring out 
how to apply that principle to the current problem' (Ross, 1987, p. 629). 
This is the case with the subject in chapter 1. She was aware of the principle but needed 
the example to see how the principle was instantiated within it, and then used the 
details - such as details of the syntax - to apply the same principle to the target. 
Much of Ross' work was concerned with the effects of superficial similarities in Problem 
access and use. In Ross (1987) the superficial similarity between example and test 
problems was varied in terms of the story line and the object correspondences. The 
correspondences between objects and variables were either similar, reversed (where the 
objects played different roles in the solution), or unrelated to the study problem. Table 2.2 
summarizes the conditions used. The problems were probability problems with various 
story lines such as IBM mechanics choosing what company car to work on. In the 
same/same condition there were only minor superficial changes to the problem. The 
underlying solution structure remained the same. In the same/reversed condition it was the 
IBM salespeople who chose which mechanics should work on their cars. The 
same/unrelated condition involved computers and offices in an IBM building. The 
unrelated/ unrelated condition involved ticket sales for a high school athletic team whose 
objects (teams and teachers) were unrelated to the example problem, 
Condition 
S 
Story line 
tudy-test relation 
Objects Correspondence 
same/same same same same 
same/reversed same same reversed 
same/unrelated same unrelated unrelated 
unrelated /unrelated unrelated unrelated unrelated 
Even when subjects were provided with the relevant formula, so that the task was one of 
instantlating the formula with the figures In the problem, the ability of the subjects to use 
the formula still depended on the superficial similarity of the problems. The similarity 
between objects in the problems with the same story line was used to instantiate the 
formulae, so that the objects were assigned to the same variable roles as in the example. 
Thus, In the same/same condition (e. g. where mechanics chose the cars), performance was 
higher than for the unrelated group. If the object correspondences were reversed, the 
samelreversed condition, then performance was lower than in the unrelated condition. 
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Where the underlying principles were confusable, the superficial similarity of problems 
with the same underlying structure led to the best performance. 
When trying to make an analogy between two problems without an adequate 
representation of the problem structure, the usual means of instantiating variables 
through an understanding of what they represent is very difficult. All novices can rely on 
are superficial similarities. Even when learners are provided with a formula at test, they 
Will still make use of an earlier example in which the principle Is incorporated in order to 
solve the current problem. Ross's results are therefore at odds with those one would expect 
from a principle-cueing view in which the example plays no role other than as an 
instantiation of a schema which is either already known or readily induced. 
Whereas surface similarity, in the principle-cueing view, is necessary for accessing an 
example, it is the example's structural features which are used to solve the target. 
However, Ross (1989a) also found that, in problems with unrelated story lines but 
corresponding objects, the object correspondences had a large effect on use but none on access. 
At the same time similar story lines had a large effect on access. This indicates that 
different forms of similarity differentially affect access and use of a source problem. 
The example-analogy view treats a training example as including a kind of recipe which 
the learner has to follow. It does not assume that the underlying principle can be 
automatically extracted. When the novice has to solve an exercise problem, the details of 
the training problem are used extensively to ascertain how a procedure should be 
employed. For example, the subject solving the SOLO problem keeps to the syntax of the 
example solution, and simply replaces the values In the source with the corresponding ones 
from the target. Solving a target problem can therefore be achieved by imitating the 
sequences of actions that were carried out in the source. Any schema generated from 
solving probler; s using an example develops as a by-prodtict of the process of 
generalization. In figure 2.6 the relation between A and B Is partially generalized to C 
and D. In creating this partial generalization a partial schema (shaded S box in figure 
2-6) Is created as a by-product. This is rep; esented as a dotted arrow from the 
generalization line from the source to the target problems. 
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5.5. Adapting complex problems in unfamiliar domains 
If we take analogy as involving the mapping of the structural features of one problem onto 
another, then a number of interesting points emerge. The main finding of concern here is 
that people can readily solve versions of a problem that are very similar to each other 
(close variants), but tend to be unable to solve versions which differ (distant variants). In 
other words, people have difficulty adapting an example problem in order to solve a new 
one. One view, which goes back to Thorndike's theory of 'identical elements' (e. g. 
n-torriclike & Woodworth, 1901), is that we cannot expect transfer when there are no 
similar surface elements, even if two problems share the same underlying features. Since 
novices can solve close variants of the same problem they must be using some process which 
does not require an understanding of the underlying structure. They are imitating the 
example. 
A common feature of APS experiments, where successful transfer was found, is that the 
subjects generally 'understood' the base domain. In the experiments on electricity flow new 
concepts were introduced by presenting an analogy that was within the experience of the 
subjects. The underlying relational structures, for example the movement of people 
through turnstiles and the rate at which they could pass, were relatively simple ones. 
When between-domain analogies are drawn in expository texts, they are often used as a 
form of explanation to help the reader re-represent some new concept. Such analogies 
constitute an intermediate representation. This is not the kind of problem solving that 
goes on when the novice has only a hazy notion of a new domain, such as science and 
mathematics. If novices are expected to solve problems based on examples, then they 
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have to understand them well enough to be able to access and apply the underlying 
solution structure. Novices, however, rarely understand examples that well. 
As was pointed out in section 3.4, definitions of understanding emphasize the notion of 
'flexibility' - the ability to manipulate or adapt a representation of new Information or of 
an earlier problem in order to solve a new one. This Is the kind of understanding that is 
assumed in APS where the solver is presumed to have a representation of the source 
problem in LTM, but since solvers find it very hard to adapt solutions to solve novel 
problems that are different from what was taught, they cannot be said to understand the 
examples. 
In complex problems, transfer is very hard to Induce, unless a number of examples are 
presented, the shared schema is emphasized, and salient structural features are 
highlighted (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Cooper & Sweller, 1987, Holyoak & I<oh, 
1987, Larkin, 1989; Novick, 1988; Novick & Holyoak,, 1991; Reed, et al., 1990). Transfer 
can also be induced when the underlying principle Is explicitly taught (Perry, 1991) or 
when the subject is encouraged to 'explain' the relation between the surface and structural 
features (Brown & Kane, 1988). However, even with some form of hint to use an earlier 
problem, and with a solution or formula available, students are often unable to adapt the 
earlier problem to solve the current one (Reed, et al., 1983; Reed & Bolstad, 1991; Ross, 
1984; 1987,1989a). 
Reed & Ettinger (1987) attempted to induce transfer by training subjects in the use of tables, 
There was some transfer when completed tables were given to subjects, who then had only 
to map the values in the table to the relevant equation. Subjects, however, were still 
unable to fill in the correct values In the tables despite practice in doing so. In other 
words, they could not solve distant variants of the problem using the explanations they 
were given. One of the main reasons was that the explanations still left the subjects with 
a large number of Inferences to make (Robertson & Kahney, 1993). 
The relation between example and test problems was exan-dned by Novick & HolYoak 
(1991). Using algebra word problems they looked at the effects of giving subjects specific 
numerical mappings for transfer problems. For example, in the 'number mapping hint' 
condition, subjects were presented with hints such as: 'the 12,8, and 3 in the band problem 
are like the 10,4, and 5 In the garden problem. ' Transfer success was much more likely to 
occur with number mappings than if the subjects were given'concept mappings'such as: 
#your goal in this problem is to arrange the band members Into rows or columns so that each 
row (or each column) has the same number of people In it, with no-one left over. That's 
Eke the goal you had in the garden problem of grouping plants into different types so that 
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there were the same number of plants of each type, with no extra spaces left in the 
garden. ' They found that the numerical mappings were a necessary (but not sufficient) 
prerequisite for transfer. The difficulty came when subjects had to adapt the procedure to 
solve a transfer problem. 
To appreciate fully the processes going on in problem solving from examples, we have to 
take account of the problem solver's prior knowledge. Problems in formal domains often 
require the solver to adapt them in some way. Where problems are literally similar then 
imitation can lead to a successful solution. However, the more a target problem varies 
from a source, the more the student has to rely on general domain-specific procedures to 
adapt the source to fit the target. For this reason Novick and Holyoak found that 
adapting an example (of an algebra word problem) was correlated with mathematical 
expertise but not with analogical reasoning ability. Similarly, in a discussion of 
analogical reasoning in children, Goswami (1992) reviews a large number of studies which 
fail to take account of the fact that analogical reasoning assumes a degree of prior 
relational knowledge of the relevant domain on the part of the child. 
Furthermore, complex problems Involve a large number of interrelated concepts. In the 
SOLO example, the subject is expected to know about what NOTE does, how CHECK 
operates, the flow of control represented by EMT, the differences between the three types 
of variables '/X/', '*', andT, what IF PRESENT and IF ABSENT refer to, details of the 
syntax, and how all of these Interact. As Reed et al. (1985) found out in their first 
experiment, it is asking a lot to expect novices, faced with complex problems for the first 
time, to remember examples in detail. It is more unreasonable to expect them to adapt 
them without a great deal of help. 
5.6. Summary 
Solving problems by analogy assumes that the solver already has a good degree of domain 
knowledge, can extract the underlying structure of a source problem, and understand it well 
enough to manipulate it. With regard to novices studying a new subject, these assumptions 
are unwarranted. Novices do not have a good degree of domain knowledge, or they would 
not be novices. Principle-cueing assumes that the surface features of problems are the 
means by which a relevant example Is found. Once found, the solution schema Implicit in 
the source can be used to solve the target (depending on how well the novice can adapt it), 
Novices, however, may not be able to extract the underlying principle from an example, 
When an example is retrieved, novices may still not understand the principle behind the 
procedure. Even If they are explicitly presented with the underlying principle or schema, 
it does not necessarily follow that they understand It or that they can adapt it to a new 
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problem, As Ross discovered, even when novices appear to understand the principle or 
formula, they are still strongly influenced by the surface features of the problems. When 
they are presented with a formula at test, they use the details of the example to solve the 
target problem because of a lack of -understanding 
of what the variables in the formula 
represent. 
So even if novices can use a procedure accurately, it does not follow that they have a 
complete understanding of the problem (Perry, 1991; VanLehn, 1989, VanLehn, 1990), or 
any Idea what the underlying schema is. They may have such an understanding but this 
cannot be ascertained simply from the their performance on a similar problem. With only 
a weak or partial understanding of the procedure or the underlying principle, successfully 
solving a problem from an example must involve a different process from the one suggested 
by the principle-cueing view. 
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6. Problems facing textbook writers 
If we are learning sometl-dng new, such as a science or a programming language, we may 
have very little or no prior knowledge of the concepts involved, such as head-tail 
recursion, entropy, or quantum mechanics. Indeed, Resnick (1989) has argued that some 
basic scientific concepts are in 'fundamental epistemological conflict with many 
commonplace everyday conceptions. ' For example, technology students find it easy to 
understand that a book exerts a downward force on the surface of a table but find it hard to 
understand that the table surface exerts an equal upward force to maintain the book in the 
same position. The materials scientist Gordon (1976) put it rather pithily when he wrote 
that, when trying to explain such concepts, we have to take account of the 'pit of anti- 
knowledge from which materials science has had to extricate itself. ' Similarly, natural 
language understanding can cause confusion in learning some computer programming 
languages (Bonar & Soloway, 1985). For those reasons, when students have to learn new 
concepts or are presented with complex examples, past solutions may not be well 
understood. 
Despite our uncertainty concerning the processes that go on when students use training 
problems to solve exercise problems, textbooks with their training examples still provide 
the backbone of the teaching and learning that go on in schools, colleges and universities. 
It is therefore important we get them right. Work by researchers such as Cooper and 
Sweller (19M, Reed and Bolstad (1991), Reed et al. (1985), Robertson & Kahney (1993), 
Sweller (1988) has shown that writers have to be very careful about the structure of the 
problems they provide; and work by Britton, Van, Gulgoi, & Glynn (1989), Britton, Van 
Dusen, Glynn, & Hemphill (1990), Hlebert & Lefevre (1986), Kieras, 1985, Kintsch (1986), 
Kintsch & Greeno, (1985) bas shown that the textual presentation has a strong effect on 
what will be learned and how well it will be learned. 
The writers of textbooks are therefore faced with a dilemma when it comes to how they 
illustrate the concepts and procedures they wish to convey, Unfortunately the writer can 
have only a very general idea of the prior knowledge that potential readers will bring 
with them. Naturally the text will be designed for a specific audience, but even then that 
audience possesses a wide variety of knowledge, understanding and learning strategies 
which they will bring to bear on the text laid before them, The subject In the SOLO study 
had a particular strategy which she employed during her original reading of the text. As 
she read she consistently tried to find potential problems that might arise and tried to 
Identify gaps in her understanding, 
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Authors have to make assumptions about how Well the readers will grasp new concepts. 
When they are appealing to the readers' prior general knowledge about the world, they 
assume that the readers can make the necessary text-external inferences. They also have 
to make assumptions about how much their readers will be able to remember from previous 
sections. In other words readers will often be called upon to make text-reinstatement 
inferences. Finally, authors have to predict to some extent how well they will be able to 
apply these new concepts once they have learned them. 'The SOLO subject had a 
representation of recursion which was abstract enough to allow her to recognize recursive 
problems but not specific enough to remember from her original reading of the text how to 
write a recursive procedure to solve the problem immediately. 
The subject successfully solved problems which were Isomorphic to examples in the 
manual. However, she found much more difficulty in solving a problem which required 
her to adapt examples in the book So even if writers can target successfully a specific 
readership they are still left with the problem of how to present the material in such a 
way that it will be easily assimilated, (that is, new material has to be integrated within 
existing knowledge structures) and readily transferred (the new material can be applied in 
a different context). In other words the outcome of learning should be 'the ability to use 
learned Information in problem solving tasks that are different from what was explicitly 
taught' (Mayer, 1989). 
So how do writers promote such understanding in their readers? They have only A certain 
number of pages in which to present a novel concept. If a large number of problems are 
provided which are similar to each other (the 'near variants' in figure 2.7) then 
eventually the procedure employed in their solution will become automated. However, 
that might be at the expense of presenting a range of problems (the distant variants in 
figure 2.7) which would Illustrate the range of applicability of the concept (Cooper & 
Sweller, 1987). it would be helpful, therefore, to know just what sort of understanding a 
novice gains when using a training problem to help solve an exercise problem in a novel 
domaim 
Training material can present concrete examples of how a procedure should be used or It can 
be couched In general or abstract terms. It can present a step-by-step 'recipe' for solving a 
type of problem or it can try to give an abstract or a hierarchical (goal-subgoal) outline of 
the solution procedure. The former makes the solution to similar problems fairly 
straightforward - one simply follows the recipe used in the earlier problem, the latter 
indicates how a procedure can be applied to a wide variety of problems but at the possible 
cost of making the procedure difficult to follow. 
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CATEGORY 
OF 
PROBLEMS 
Examplel II Example2l I Example3 
near variants 
Example4 II Example5 
distant variants 
Figure 2.8 represents a category of problems in which the set of problems are related in 
terms of their solution procedure exemplified in examPlel. With more distant variants Of 
the problem solvers have to adapt the procedure to a greater extent to find the solution, 
CATEGORY 
OF 
PROBLEMS 
Examplel II Example2l I Example3 
relation/ 
solution procedure 
I Solutionl I 
Example4 II Example5 
One of the questions writers have to address Is just how sirrdlar example and exercise 
problems should be to facil. 1tate learning and what kind of conceptual understanding we 
should try to instil in the readers. 
Furthermore, writers have to provide explicit information about the relationship between 
training problems and other problems of the same type - usually presented as exercise 
problems (Conway & Kahney, 1987; Reed, et al., 1974). Since examples provide 
Information about a category of problems, the more Information about the features of that 
category which are given to thereader the better. In figure 2.8 the arrow from examplel 
to the Category box represents those features of the problem which make It a problem of 
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that type. If solvers can recognize a new exemplar of that type of problem then they 
should readily be able to apply the relevant solution procedure. Applying the procedure 
will tend to be more successful with close variants than with distant ones. 
Do experts have access to their procedural knowledge? 
Textbook writers tend to be experts in their field. Because of this, much of their domain. 
knowledge is 'compiled'. Experts can readily generate inferences that novices cannot 
make. Skill in textbook writing comes from recognizing those inferences and making the 
knowledge that generates them accessible to their readership. 
In this regard, a rather contentious distinction is often made between declarative and 
procedural knowledge in terms of their accessibility to conscious introspection. Unlike 
declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge Is often regarded as not being accessible to 
consciousness (Anderson, 1983; Newell, 1990; Sanderson, 1989). For example, Adelson 
(1984) states: 
... knowledge contained in a procedure cannot be inspected directly; what the 
knowledge is can only be inferred by noting what the procedure does, Having 
developed these procedures, the information (sic) comes to be represented In a way 
that hides the details of the processing to be done. (p. 495) 
However, much procedural knowledge can be accessed and declarative knowledge 
extracted from it. This is what teachers, coaches, tutors, instructors and textbook writers 
do all the time, A squash coach, for example, has to break down a complex sequence of 
movements lasting a fraction of asecond into Its component parts and typically moves 
through this sequence In slow motion at the same time verbalizing information about 
racquet angles and relative positions of various parts of the body. Just how much of this 
declarative knowledge Is inferred from procedural knowledge is a moot point. 
If a sequence of actions can be compiled or chunked in this way so that it becomes difficult 
to access individual pieces of knowledge, then It also makes it harder for textbook writers 
to access their own knowledge and remove the inferences from It so that It can be fully 
explained to novices. Textbook writers may therefore make unwarranted assumptions 
about what a reader knows or can understand-without being aware that they are doing so. 
In the case of novices, Adelson claim that their knowledge can 'be Inferred by noting what 
the procedure does. ' This may not always be so. It Is possible for someone to develop a 
'syntactic' model for dealing with recursive problems without understanding the 
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underlying principle of recursion. As has already been argued, novices are capable of 
imitating and even learning procedures without understanding them. We cannot therefore 
infer their knowledge from their procedures. 
6.2. The role of examples in textbooks 
In chapter I the subject looked at a number of example problem solutions but looked at the 
textual explanations only once, This tendency of solvers to look at examples and ignore 
intervening text is well-documented (Anderson, Farrell, & Sauers, 1984; Anderson, Pirolli, 
& Farrell, 1988; Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Ddtienne, 1991; Kintsch, 
1986, LeFevre & Dixon, 1986, LeFevre, 1987, Mathews, Buss, Stanley, Blanchard-Fields et 
al., 1989; Pirolli, 1991; Firoll! & Anderson, 1985; Reed & Bolstad, 1991; Ross, 1987; Ross & 
Kennedy, 1990; Sweller & Cooper, 1985; Ward & Sweller, 1990; Winston, 1980b). Only if 
all else fails will some students attempt to re-read the instructions (Cold, 1992). For 
example, Pirolli (1991) states, 'When a learner Is faced with novel goals, the preferred 
method of problem solving Involves the use of example solutions as analogies for the 
target solution. ' VanLehn (1990) goes further: 'examples, exercises and other concrete 
examples of problem solving are the most salient parts of instruction. The verbal and 
textual explanations that often accompany such concrete episodes of problem solving have 
a secondary, indirect effect on learning. ' 
LeFevre & Dixon (1986) found that students learning a procedural task prefer to use 
examples as a source of information and that written instructions tend to be Ignored. 
VanLehn (1986; 1990) has built a theory of children's errors on the evidence he has 
gleaned that people prefer to use examples rather than written explanations, Piroll! 
(1991) and Plrolli & Anderson (1985) also found that novice programmers relied heavily 
on examples rather than Instructions to help solve LISP recursion problems. Carroll, 
Smith-Kerker, Ford, & Mazur-Rimetz (1987-1988) redesigned computer training manuals 
partly to take account of the fact that learners are put off by the 'verbiage' in traditional 
training manuals. The list could go on. 
One reason Is that students have expectations about how textbooks are laid out. In formal 
domains, such as mathematics, science and computer programn-drig, textbooks have a 
particular stereotypical layout (Beck & McKeown, 1989; Kleras, 1985; Sweller & Cooper, 
1985). With experience of such textbooks, students come to develop a schema for that type 
of text. Such a schema Includes the default assumptions that solutions follow statements 
of the problem rather than vice versa, and that a particular section of a textbook will give 
them enough Information to solve exercise problems at the end of that section. However, it 
Is often the case that textbooks are not structured that way. 
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6.3. Understanding new concepts: Intermediate representations as an 
aid to problem understanding 
Many concepts in a new domain do not lie within people's normal previous experience. For 
example, the SOLO subject had only just been introduced to the concept of recursion (at 
least in relation to AI programs). For this reason It is often useful to provide some 
intermediate means of relating the new concepts to something that the learner does know. 
People understand new concepts better if they are 'anchored' to existing knowledge 
schemas. It the text succeeds in providing this anchor then readers will more readily 
understand and remember new material. One way to explain concepts in textbooks Is 
therefore to try to relate them to the assumed prior knowledge of the reader. 
There are several ways open to writers to achieve this. Throughout the SOLO textbook 
various means are employed to explain the novel constructs that are introduced, Recursion 
was explained textually in the 1978 edition of the SOLO textbook and was supplemented 
with diagrams in the 1983 version (Eisenstadt, 1978/1983). Flow of control In SOLO was 
likened to passing the baton in a relay-race. The subject, however, clainUnot to have 
found the analogies used in the SOLO manual particularly useful, Nevertheless, it was 
the Intermediate representations of the 'line-shaped thing' and the 'fan-shaped thing, 
that allowed her to categorize the problern. 
Simon (1984) showed that subjects given analogies understood complex relations between 
concepts better than those receiving none, The particular form of the analogy has a strong 
effect on the learners' understanding of the new theoretical domain (Daudet & Denhj&e, 
1991; Brown & Clement, 1989, Gentner & Gentner, 1983). One way of presenting a structural 
analogy with a novel construct Is to give a pictorial representation of the new material. 
According to Resnick (1989) by providing a different representation of the textual 
material, writea can 'bootstrap' learners' constructions of novel concepts. 'Objectifying 
theoretical constructs/ that is, making the abstract more concrete, can be done in texts by 
presenting the learner with some form of physical display. In that way the theoretical 
construct can be 'seen'. Thus the fan-shaped and line-shaped representations of iteration 
and recursion allowed the subject to classify such problems correctly. 
Bridging analogies 
'Intermediate bridging analogies' (Brown & Clement, 1989), diagrams, graph$ and tables 
are all used to provide an Intermediate representation of the material presented in 
textbooks. Where learners find it difficult to Induce the structure of novel abstract 
constructs, or relate the constructs to the concrete examples in texts (A in figure 2.9), they 
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are likely to find It easier to understand the relation if an intermediate bridging 
representation is used. In figure 2.9, A represents the relation between a theoretical 
construct and the concrete example; B represents the relation between the construct and 
some intermediate representation; and B' represents the relation between the 
intermediate representation (the representation construct) and the concrete example. 
These intermediate representations are an important part of the explanation of new 
theoretical material in textbooks and act as a form of 'scaffolding' to help bridge the gap 
between the learnersprior knowledge and the new construct. 
A 
IB 13' 
tj wo, etical representation 
construct construct example 
There have been a number of experiments to test the effects of intermediate 
representations as an aid in problem solving, Such representations may Involve some kind 
of visual representation (Beveridge & Parkins, 1987; Gick, 1985; Gick & Holyoak' 1983; 
Lewis, 1989) or an analogy whose purpose is to clarify a concept (Brown & Clement, 1989), 
or some other way of representing problems such as tables (Reed & Eftger,, 1987). The 
studies by Gentner and Gentner (1983) and Issing et al. (1989) show that writers have to be 
very careful about which type of analogy they choose, In some circumstances, such as 
understanding the flow of electricity through a resistor, electricity is best conceived of as 
the movement of people. To understand the function of a transistor, the flow of electricity 
is best likened to the flow of water. The effectiveness of the analogy depends on the 
number of higher-orderielations that constrain it, 
Both Gick (1983) and Beveridge & Parkins (1987) examined the effects of visual analogues 
on problem solving and found that visual representations can act as effective retrieval 
cues. Beveridge & Parkins; used both diagrams and coloured strips as cues and the results 
suggested that the coloured strips of different intensities, representing summative effects 
analogous to the concepts in the problems presented, was the most effective. Presenting a 
problem along with a visual representation seems to facilitate recall of a solution. 
Similarly Gick used a large arrow representing a large force and several smaller arrows 
arranged in a circle to represent the division of a large force and Its convergence on a 
target. The diagram was presented along with an explanation of the solution to the 
Fortress problem. When the diagram was reproduced in the target problem, It facilitated 
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spontaneous transfer. The same was true for subjects who were presented with diagrams 
alone before solving the transfer problem. 
The reasons why pictorial or diagrammatic representations are so effective are discussed 
by Larkin & Simon (1987). Texts present information in a linear sequence. Understanding 
this sentential representation Incurs a great deal of computational cost in terms of search. 
The larger the data-structure contained within the sentential representation, the greater 
the search time. In a diagrarnmatic representation the information is Indexed by its 2-D 
location which means that diagrams can make relations perceptually explicit which 
were not so in the sentential representation. Diagrams allow a large number of automatic 
perceptual Inferences, avoid the need to match symbolic labels (matching a variable in 
one part of a sentential representation to a related variable elsewhere), and obviate the 
need to search for problem solving inferences. 
6.3.2. Providing a schema In texts 
The appendix to the SOLO manual builds up to a description of a recursive INFECT 
procedure, It tries to show how such a procedure can be called to act on a series of nodes 
linked by the same relation. The text uses a number of analogies to explain how recursion 
works. It ends by giving a more abstract description of recursion to help the reader 
understand the general principle behind it. By referring to the 'line-shaped thing, when 
she identified the problem as recursive, the'subject was accessing an abstract 
representation of the problem type provided by the text, Thus, despite differences in the 
surface features of the problems she was able to access and use an example in order to solve 
her problem. 
Although providing a general principle, concept or schema at the outset can obviate the 
need for solvers lo use detailed correspondences from the features of an earlier example 
(Gick and Holyoak, 1980; 1983; OhWon and Rees, 1991) It Is often the case that such 
abstract principles cannot be learned directly (Anderson, Farrell and Sauers, 1984; LeFevre 
and Dixon, 1986; VanLehn, 1990). The usefulness of providing a schema depends on the 
task facing the learner. 
Chen & Daehler (1989) exan-dned the relation between the type of story representation 
(specific or abstract schema) and positive and negative analogical transfer In children. 
Where an abstract schema was provided, the subjects were able to transfer analogous 
solutions spontaneously even when the base and target problems shared few surface 
similarities. Indeed the abstract representation of the source analogue was a strong 
determinant of positive transfer. When the target problem Involved a solution principle 
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different from the source, negative transfer resulted. However, although schema training 
had a strong effect on positive transfer another important aspect was the ability to 
determine when it should be applied. 
The use of intermediate representations can also be justified from a consideratiorf of other 
aspects of analogical problem solving. By a comparing examples from two disparate 
domains, one from the domain being studied and one from another well-understood domain, 
subjects are often able to abstract out the underlying structure or schema from the known 
domain and apply it to the new one. Some of the benefits of providing an explanatory 
schema have been listed by Smith & Goodman (1984). They apply equally well to the 
benefits of diagrams and other pictorial representations such as graphs and tables and can 
be related to the information processing model of Larkin and Simon (1987). These are, 
a) Schemas provide an explanatory framework or 'scaffolding. They improve 
understanding since the pre-existing connections between the framework slots can be 
mapped to the new domain directly. In Larkin and Simon's terms the diagram and text 
should be 'informationally equivalent' so that information in one representation is also 
inferable in the other. 
b) Schemas contain information that can be added to fill in gaps in knowledge and 
help form connections between steps. In diagrams this includes the ability to generate 
perceptual Inferences. 
C) Schema-based Instructions reduce the time required to understand the relation 
between steps. In diagrams there is less need for search. 
d) Schemas boost memory for specific information. According to Larkin and Simon, in 
diagrams perception permits the reader to focus on perceptual cues and so retrieve problem 
relevant Inference operators from memory. 
e) Schemas boost performance where they depend on understanding the relations 
between steps. Similarli diagrams have computational benefits, since the Information In 
them is better indexed and is supported by perceptual inferences. 
f) Schemas should lead to a hierarchical organization of material which should, In 
turn, lead to 'chunking' and hence to improved recall (Eylon & Reif, 1984), The 
information in diagrams is perceptually grouped - related bits of information are adjacent 
to each other. 
6.4. Limits to effectiveness of intermediate representations 
Writers still have to be very careful that the textual representation of a new construct and 
the intermediate representation they provide are structurally equivalent, The Inferences 
that readers can make in the known base domain should also be made in the target. If this 
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Is not the case then learners will have difficulty transferring the Induced structure to 
novel problems of the same type. 
There is also the question of the function of the intermediate representation. Levin (1989) 
classifies the functions of 'pictures-in-text' into five categories: 
1) decoration, where pictures are designed to make a text more attractive but are not 
related to the content; 
2) representation, where pictures make the text more concrete, as in children's books; 
3) organization, where pictures enhance the structure of a text; 
4) interpretation, where pictures are supposed to make a text more comprehensible; 
5) transformation, where pictures are presented to make a text more memorable. 
Levin then relates these functions to different prose-learning outcomes by appealing to the 
notion of transfer-appropriate processing (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977). Learners 
have to take account of the goals of the learning context and adapt their learning 
strategies accordingly.. In the context of using pictures In text, Levin argues that writers 
should use different pictorial representations depending on whether they want to 
encourage the learner to understand the material, remember the material, or to apply the 
material. For example, in the studies by Beveridge & Parkins (1987) and Gick (1983) the 
function of the intermediate representation was to aid retrieval. 
An example of an abstract pictorial representation can be found on page 35 of Winston & 
Horn (1981) where a flow diagram Is presented to show how LISP evaluates a particular 
piece of code (figure 2.10). Its function is therefore Interpretative in Levin's sense. 
Although Its function is to help the reader understand how the code is evaluated, the 
subject DR in a study by Anderson, et al. (1984) tries at one point to apply the structure of 
the diagram to an exercise problems and is momentarily confused. This is because the 
function SETQ It used in the diagram to explain how the code Is evaluated but it is not used 
in the original example itself. 
Although intermediate representations cap be useful pedagogical devices, textbook 
writers have to be aware of their limitations 
6.5. Individual differences 
Authors also have to bear in mind the individual differences exhibited by their readers. 
These differences come about through differences in study processes andstrategies, cis well 
as through variations in prior knowledge. In this regard, the role of imitation as a 
problem solving strategy has been overlooked, Although the notion of imitation is not new 
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it has remained implicit in many studies of APS, but its importance has been 
underestimated. Some researchers see it as the resort of 'poor solvers' others see it as a 
useful strategy that should be taught to all. 
See something like 
(F-TO-C SUPERHOT) 
or 
(F-TO-C 100-0) 
Record current value 
of TEMP if ar 
(SETO TEMP 100.0) 
Use EVAL on body Of 
F-TO-C 
Restore TEMP's value 
to whatever was 
recorded here ------ --- 
Return valu 
here .... 
6.5.1. Variations In study processes 
Procedures that can help in problem solving can be either specific to a domain or 
applicable In many domains, The relative merits and demerits of equipping students with 
different strategies has received much attention (Catrambone, 1990; Cheng & Holyoak, 
1985; Ddtienne, 1991; Green, 1989; Green & Gilhooly, 1990b, LeFevre & Dixon, 1986; 
LeFevre, 1987), Strategic knowledge Is essentially a blend of declarative and procedural 
knowledge. It is not domain specific knowledge about how to solve a particular problem 
but provides a general method for finding out how to solve a problem. In other words It 
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helps organize the problem solving process and provides a general plan of action 
(Ferguson-Hessler & Jong, 1990; Green & Gilhooly, 1990a; 1990b). 
Ferguson-Hessler & Jong (1990) looked at the number of study processes that students used 
in reading a physics text and the type of knowledge involved in those processes, They 
found that the range of study processes was the same for both poor and skilled performers 
but that the difference lay in the predominance of the types of knowledge used. Poor 
solvers tended to use 'surface processing' by which is meant that they paid more attention 
to declarative knowledge to solve problems, An example of surface processing was 
'reading the text'. That is, the information was processed piece by piece from the shared 
surface features of problems. This contrasted with the good performers"holistic, view of 
the problems in terms of their deeper structure. An example of deep processing was 
'making procedures and assumptions explicit! This is similar to Chi et al. 's (1989) notion 
of 'self-explanations'. This type of processing meant that good performers could 
restructure knowledge to apply it to new variants of a problem because they had good 
problem schemas, and concentrated more than poor solvers on procedural and situational 
knowledge. Lacking a good problem model, the 'poor solvers'relied on imitation as a 
method of finding a solution. 
In chapter I the subject gave a couple of examples of going beyond surface processing of the 
text. She attempted to predict what the text was about to tell her. She mentions this 
explicitly in her study of the text on pages 83 and 84: 
Subject reads textbook aloud: 
'Given the restriction to one use of the relation LIKES per node, then only-one node 
could possibly match the wild-card symbol (? ) at step 2, and this node became the 
value of the variable *. ' 
So obviously we're going to need some sort of recursion to deal with multiple LIKES on 
page 83. 
Here she is 'explaining' the text by generating a hypothesis. She then goes on: 
The main problem with this is that I'm not really being encouraged to think terribly 
creatively. 13 1 ecause on page 84 it's telling me... em, a new, a new SUSS thing which... 
Involves a bit of recursion. And, If I were concentrating on this properly and having to 
actually think creatively, I would have thought it out for myself and Identified on 
about page 82, If not about 50 pages earlier, that something like this was going to be 
necessary. 
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She expects the text to conform to the strategy she has learned for dealing with expository 
texts. That is, she wants the text to oblige her to think 'more creatively'. 
Chi, et al. believe tha t 'copying' is the resort of the 'poor performer'. They classified the 
use their subjects made of the examples provided into 'reading', 'copy and map', and 
'compare and check'. They found that 'poor' students used examples to copy elements from 
it when solving an exercise problem twice as often as thegood'students. Mapping 
involved making only a slight alteration to a copied element in the source problem. An 
example from a geometry problem solving protocol was: 
Okay so choosing the axes from the diagram (in the source), it would be better to tilt it 30 
degrees, (in the target) [coded as mapping to the target]. 
Imitation was therefore seen by Chi et al. as a strategy used by 'poor' solvers. Other 
studies, however, have taken a diametrically opposed view. 
Green & Gilhooly (1990b) found increased performance in subjects who were exhorted to 
$copy' a training example, since this appeared to be one successful strategy employed by 
good students. They examined individual differences among students learning a statistical 
computing program known as MIMTAB. From an analysis of their subjects' protocols, they 
noted that subjects often selected and copied an example. However, the subjects did not 
always evaluate the match between the source problem and the target and instead simply 
copied over the surface features of one onto the other. Both fast and slow learners 'copied' 
earlier examples when trying to solve a problem but varied in the extent to which they 
were able to modify the source In order to solve the target. When they exhorted their 
students to adopt a 'copy procedure' when solving a problem there was an increase in the 
number of successful solutions, 
Green and Gilhooly's exhortation to 'copy' the example does not refer to how that 
example is used. However, their description of the behaviour of their subjects suggests 
that they were imitating the examples, The subjects were influenced by the perceptually 
similar features of the source and target problems and inferred that they occupied the 
same roles in both. failure to solve the problem In their studies was attributed to a failure 
to evaluate the match between the corresponding features. 
It may well be that the 'poor' students in Chi et al. 's study would not have solved the 
problem at all if they hadn't used the 'copy' strategy, The results of Green and Gilhooly 
suggests that the strategy Is still a useful one to fall back on. 
100 
Chapter 2 -Analogical Problem Solving and Imitation 
Novick & Holyoak (1991) make the point that successful problem solving from an example 
is not necessarily indicative of analogical transfer: 'a student might construct the equation 
for an algebra word problem but then fall back on general procedures for solving equations 
that were learned outside the context of word problems. If these procedures were not well- 
learned, analogical use of the source to construct the equation for the target will not ensure 
correct solution of the target'(p. 411). Where those procedures are well-learned, they can 
be used to solve the problem (Bassok & Holyoak, 1989). 
There is an interplay between the type of problem solving used and a person's prior 
domain-relevant knowledge. When problems are Isomorphic, imitation will normally 
lead to a successful solution. However, the more a target problem varies from a source, the 
more the student has to rely on general domain-specific procedures to adapt the source to 
fit the target. for this reason Novick and Holyoak found that adapting an example (of an 
algebra word problem) was correlated with mathematical expertise but not with 
, analogical reasoning. 
There are thus limits to the effectiveness of imitation as a strategy. It remains the case 
though that novices have Ipso facto a limited number of domain-specific procedures at 
their disposal. This makes It likely that Imitation will be used by both poor and good 
students. In-dtating an example remains a simple way of solving a problem even for good 
students, Ln her original study of the training manual (see Appendix 3a and 3b) the subject 
fulfilled most criteria for a 'good' student. She could see the underlying similarity 
between problems with different surface features, but this did not prevent her from 
imitating the example she found (although she did Indicate that she wanted to ensure she 
knew 'how it worked'). 
6.5.2. Novices and experts 
Consistent with the findings of the novice-expert literature, the subject found It difficult 
to adapt her knowledge of SOLO to solve a novel problem. At the same time she was not 
hindered In her problem solving by the surface features of the problems, For example, she 
showed no difficulty In classifying the problem in terms of Its structure. Some aspects of 
her problem-solving behaviour were at least partly schema-driven. 
In trying to turn novices into experts much emphasis has been placed on how to provide the 
novices with the skills and knowledge that the expert has. That Is, models of experts 
have been used to develop techniques for teaching novices. Studies of expert-novice 
differences include those of Chase & Simon (1973a; 1973b) who looked at the differences 
between the knowledge of chess masters, Intermediate players, and beginners. They found 
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that the masters had a greater store of relational patterns of chess pieces, or 'chunks'. The 
difference between beginners and masters was in how knowledge is organized. In studies of 
solving physics problems Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser (1981) found that experts understood 
problems in terms of the underlying physical principles (such as Newton's laws of motion) 
whereas novices concentrated more on the specific objects mentioned in the problem 
statement. Furthermore, experts' knowledge is found to be more 'flexible' than that of 
novices in that it can be readily adapted to novel situations. Flexibility comes about 
through problem solving experience and the learning of recognizable patterns. 
Glaser (1984) provides a summary of the research findings into novice-expert differences 
when he says; 'Our research suggests that the knowledge of novices is organized around 
the literal objects explicitly given in a problem statement. Experts' knowledge on the 
other hand Is organized around principles and abstractions that subsume these objects' (p. 
98). 
Johnson-Laird (1989) says much the same thing when he states that a novice's mental 
model represents objects and processes that occur in real time; an expert, however, can 
construct a model that represents highly abstract relations and properties. What this 
means Is that the novice represents problems in terms of their surface features, Step-by- 
step processes operate on them to transform them into the form of the solutiort, Novices' 
mental models are not as elaborated as those of experts since they are unable to generate as 
many inferences as experts. 
Novick (1988) proposed a framework for conceptualizing analogical problem solving to 
account for the conflicting findings in the literature in which analogical transfer is hard to 
demonstrate despite the fact that we can readily use a reminded example to solve a 
current problem, The framework was tested using a number of arithmetic word problems 
presented to college students, Her framework made predictions about differences in 
transfer behaviour between experts and novices, She predicted and found that where 
problems shared the same underlying features but differed in their superficial features 
then there was more Likely to be spontaneous positive transfer in experts but not in novices. 
When two problems shared the same surface features but their underlying structural 
features differed, she found stronger spontaneous negative transfer effects among novices 
than among experts. 
The knowledge-based approach exemplified above has emphasized knowledge 
differences between experts and novices, However, the fact that experts know more than 
novices does not help us understand how real novices solve problems, Instead, It might be 
more enlightening to examine differences In processing knowledge. Larkin, McDermott, 
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Simon, & Simon, (1980) looked at the problem solving strategies of experts and novices and 
argued that experts 'work forward' whereas novices 'work backward'. That is, experts 
generate hypotheses using the information in the problem; their problem solving 
behaviour is schema-driven. Novices work backward from the goal and their behaviour 
is search-driven. But if the same problems are given to novices and experts to compare 
their solution processes then It is hardly surprising that experts perform far better on a 
variety of measures such as time to solution or chunk sizes. When problems become hard 
enough for only experts to solve (the kind of problems they normally have to deal with) 
experts, too, use a search-driven pattern of behaviour. 
6.5.3. Understanding and intelligence 
It may be that poor students fail to solve problems and to make necessary Inferences due to 
a lack of what the psychometricists have called 'intelligence'. Nevertheless, it would be 
unfair to suppose that someone attempting tosolve a, problem without all the relevant 
knowledge Is not intelligent. Only when the solver possesses all the relevant knowledge 
to solve a particular problem can one ascertain that the solver is acting with intelligence 
or not. If the solver can form a problem model then that person can be said to 'understand' 
the problem. In this sense both Kintsch (1986) and OhIsson and Rees (1991) would agree 
when the latter state that 'a problem solver acts with understanding when a problem 
solution is developed in the context of relevant knowledge. ' 
Textbooks attempt to provide a #context of relevant knowledge'. If understanding arises 
within that context then a solver is not only acting with understanding but also with 
intelligence since the latter can be defined as the extent to which one uses all one's 
knowledge to achieve one's goals. Understanding, in the sense given by OhIsson and Rees, 
and Intelligence as It Is described by Newell (1990) are virtually synonymous. Here, for 
example, is Neývell's definition of an Intelligent system: 
I. If a system uses all of the knowledge it has, It must be perfectly intelligent. 
There is nothing that anything called Intelligence can do to produce more effective 
performance, If all the knowledge that a system has is brought to bear In the service 
of its goals, the behaviour must correspond to what perfect Intelligence produces, 
2, If a system does not have some knowledge, failure to use it cannot be a failure of 
intelligence. Intelligence can work only with the knowledge the system has, 
3. If a system has some knowledge and falls to use It, then there is certainly a 
failure of some internal ability. Something within the system did not permit It to 
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make use of the knowledge In the service of its own goals, that is, in its own interests. 
This failure can be identified with a lack of intelligence. 
(Newell, 1990, p. 90). 
In a novel domain it is therefore important to provide all the knowledge necessary to solve 
problems in that domain. This, of course, Is not to guarantee that they will be solved, 
merely that it makes it more likely. For this reason it is unreasonable to oblige novices to 
make too many inferences in a novel domain since making inferences assumes some prior 
knowledge which the novice may not have. 
6.6. Summary 
Textbook writers have to make assumptions about the readers' ability to make both text- 
reinstatement inferences and text-external inferences. The former depends on how much 
the reader can remember from earlier parts of the text. The latter involves assumptions 
about the reader's prior knowledge, In most cases the readers' ability to make these 
inferences is an empirical ques tion. Nevertheless, authors can make it easier for the 
reader to understand new concepts and procedures by reducing as far as possible the number 
of inferences the readers have to make. This, in turn, depends on the writer's ability to 
access his or her declarative knowledge. 
Writers also have to be aware of the readers pre-existing schemas for how textbooks are 
constructed. This means that they have to be cognisant of the fact that readers tend to 
ignore the intervening text and concentrate on the example solutions when trying to solve 
exercise problems. 7he structure of the example solutions and the explanations surrounding 
them are therefore of great importance. 
Many methods are opento authors for explaining new concepts. These include diagrams, 
graphs, analogies, and so on, that allow the readers to re-represent the concepts in terms 
that they understand. Most forms of intermediate representation make It easier for 
novices to assimilate new concepts, They help the reader to access the shared underlying 
structure of problems and new concepts, and can act as a guiding principle to aid problem 
solving. When an explanatory schema Is presented along with an example, novices are 
more likely to be able to adapt the example to solve distant variants of a problem type. 
Finally there are bound to be individual differences In the readers' ability to understand 
new material. Even so, hints to use particular examples when solving exercise problems 
should help both poor and good solvers by removing the need to search through training 
material for a relevant source to Imitate. 
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Leaming from examples 
Having successfully solved the FLOOD problem using the INFECT solution, and having 
attempted a second problem involving iteration, the subject in the SOLO study was able to 
solve a third problem involving both without any difficulty (see Appendix A. 3.3.4), She 
was also able to generate another lsomorphic recursion program, the BULLETHOLE 
problem (Kahney, 1982), easily and without further reference to the training manual. She 
had, it seems, induced the structure of simple recursion problems in SOLO. 
In problem-solving, as in other areas involving concept or category representation, people 
generate inferences about how a concept, such as recursion, is instantiated in particular 
examples. Learners can then induce inference rules or theories which make clear in what 
conditions or situations a particular action must be taken, These inference rules are at first 
situation-specific but after solving several examples a learner will come to generalize 
across examples (Anderson, 1983; Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann & Glaser, 1989), 
At first sight It may seem unclear bow one can learn anything from a process of Imitation, 
That Is, if we are unaware of the structure of a problem type, how can we learn about it by 
simply copying the procedure which an example solution embodies? To some extent this 
point has already been addressed in the discussion of the learning model proposed by 
Newell and Simon (1972). Understanding of the logical justification for a procedure arises 
independently of the mechanization of the procedure. However, we also have to explain 
how we derive a solution schema at a level of abstraction which can eventually be 
applied to distant variants of a problem type. The principle-cueing view of schema 
abstraction assumes that we can readily Induce a problem schema, such that the examples 
from which It výas derived play no further role In subsequent problem solving, However, 
other views see abstraction as much more piecemeal, with schemas retaining much 
context-specific Information. Context specificity is predicted from an IPS viewpoint, since 
it regards problem solving as being heavily influenced by the surface features of problems. 
It therefore takes time to learn solution schemas at different levels of abstraction. 
Generalization and learning 
'(Deduction) Is Impossible unless a man knows the primary Immediate premises ... We 
must get to know the primary premises by Induction, for the method by which even sense- 
perception Implants the universal Is inductive... ' (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Book IL 
chapter 19, c. 330 BC. ). 
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From an empiricist viewpoint our knowledge of the world is constructed from our 
experience of individual episodes. Similarly, our concepts are usually derived from our 
experience of individual cases. In order to derive general knowledge and beliefs which are 
sufficient to make reliable predictions about events, we have to make use of inductive 
inference. Given a number of specific problem solving episodes we somehow construct 
general procedures for dealing with this category of problems in the future. The general 
knowledge derived from our Inductions then form the premises of our deductions about the 
world. 
7.1.1. Induction and transfer in the principle-cueing view 
According to the principle-cueing view, when solvers access a source problem which 
exemplifies a principle or concept, they go on to use that Principle or concept to solve the 
current problem with no more need for the earlier problem. When a relation or set of 
relations that holds in one domain can be extrapolated and applied to another, then this 
generalization process abstracts out the common underlying properties of the two 
analogues. These abstracted properties constitute a schema for further problems of this 
type. Gick and Holyoak (1983) provide a table illustrating the correspondences between 
the fortress and Radiation problem with its underlying schema, reproduced In table 2.3. 
Fortress problem 
Initial state 
Goal 
Resources 
Operators 
Solution plan 
Outcome 
Radiation problem 
Initial state 
Goal 
Resources 
Operators 
Constraints 
Solution plan 
Outcome 
Use army to capture fortress 
Sufficiently large army 
Divide army, move army, attack with army 
Send small groups along multiple roads simultaneously 
Fortress captured by army 
Use rays to destroy tumour 
Sufficiently powerful rays 
Reduce ray intensity, move ray source, administer rays 
Unable to administer high-intensity rays from one direction 
safely 
Administer low-intensity rays from multiple directions 
simultaneously 
Turnour destro 
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Convergence schema 
Initial state 
Goal Use force to overcome a cetitral target 
Resources Sufficiently great force 
Operators Reduce force intensity, 1110V0 S0LLrCV Of force, apply force 
Constraints Unable to apply force along one path safely 
Solution plan Apply weak force along multiple paths simultaneously 
Outcome Central target overcome by force 
Table 2.3. Correspondences between two convergence problems and their schema. From Gick and 
Holyoak. (19831 
In figure 2.11, Al and A2 are two problem statements (the Fortress and Radiation 
problems, say), B1 and B2 are their respective solutions. The line linking the A terms and 
B terms represents the relation (the solution structure) between them. The solution 
structure for the Fortress problem corresponds to the solution plan in Table 2.3, for example. 
The act of forming a generalization between two problems (represented by the line linking 
Al and B1, and A2 and B2) leads to the creation of a schema, in this case the 'convergence' 
schema (represented by the white S in figure 2.11). According to Gick and Holyoak (1983) 
two analogues were enough to induce a schema, although Catrambone and Holyoak (1989) 
found that presenting three similar problems was more effective in inducing one. 
Relation 
involving 
an Implicit 
schema S 
a 
A 
11c5B 
Schema Induced by 
generalization process 
A21 I B2 
Mapping 
Catrambone & Holyoak presented subjects with several analogues to a superficially 
dissimilar target problem. Subjects were asked to compare the analogues prior to solving 
the target problem. Even without a hint, a significant degree of transfer was obtained. By 
comparing 'convergence' problems (represented in figure 2.11 and 2.12 by Ai and A2), 
subjects were presumed to be able to abstract out the implicit schema in the problem (the 
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shaded S box) so that the schema now becomes 'explicit' and can be applied directly (the 
white S box in both figures). 
The induced schema is then assumed to be used to solve further problems of this type. So, 
when a further test problem is presented (the C box in figure 2.12), subjects can thereafter 
access the solution schema directly without any need to access the previous examples. 
Schema induced by generalization 
process and applied to target problem 
SI I 
Generalization 
S 
All IBil IA21 IB21 I Cl ID 
Mapping 
figujtjjýl " mia induced from vo example analojWes and 
However, these effects all but disappeared when the examples were presented in 
different contexts. Only when the structural features of the problem were highlighted in 
the analogues (by rewording the questions and asking the subjects questions which focused 
on those features) did prehint transfer reappear. Prehint transfer was further enhanced 
by providing three analogues as opposed to two. 
For Holyoak learning can be said to have occurred when a schema has been induced which 
is capable of representing a particular problem type. When presented with a novel 
problem, the learner can categorize it as an instance of a class of problems because of the 
schema induced from earlier examples. (Experts are thus better able to retrieve and use 
analogies from other domains since they are better able to focus on causally relevant 
features of the target to use as retrieval cues. ) 
This form of generalization assumes that schema induction is a straightforward process 
and that the subjects have all the information they need to build the relevant schema. If 
learners are unaware of the structural aspects of a problem, or if they are not given a hint, 
then each problem solving episode will be isolated from the others. Furthermore, in Gick 
and Holyoak's examples the schema is relatively 'transparent'; there are only a few 
salient objects (e, g., army, fortress; rays, tumour) and effectively two main operators 
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('divide' and 'converge'). Although abstraction of structural information can occur from 
exposure to only one example, most of the time it does not, Many problems facing novices 
are much more complex than the 'convergence' problems and it takes some time to learn the 
solution schema (Cooper & Sweller, 1987). 
Schema acquisition In the example-analogy view 
An alternative acount of schema acquisition is given in the example-analogy view in 
which a schema is created as a by-prodtict of generalization, In this view, the 
generalizations that novices are likely to make are limited and contain much context. 
specific as well as problem-specific information. This is not to say that people are not 
capable of abstracting out deep structural principles from exposure to only one example of a 
problem type. Clearly some are. However, the abstract principles and the surface 
features can co-exist. According to the principle of conservative indtictign (Medin & Ross, 
1989), we retain much specific information about exemplars. However, that does not 
prevent us from generating theories about the range of applicability of, a concept 
(Barsalou, 1989; Brown, 1989; Collins & Gentner, 1990; Medin & Ross, 1989; Rips, 1989). 
Learning, according to Ross (1984; 1989b), comes about when the information gained in the 
application of an analogy is generalized over. It Is in the actual process of applying an 
analogy that a generalization occurs. Partial generalizations may form the beginnings of 
problem schemas, With repeated exposure to analogous problems the information gained 
becomes partially decontextualized, and generalized goal, action and feature Information 
is extracted. Thus, knowledge about a problem type is incrementally refined. Learners 
have therefore at their command schemas at various levels of abstraction from high 
levels, which may at times be difficult to access, to low levels, which make access easier 
and may provide information about how a principle at a higher levels may be used. On 
this view, the sýbject described in Chapter I was able to access and use the INFECT 
example to reconstrue her representation of the FLOOD problem and generate a solution. 
From another point of view, in a series of experiments on categorizing, Whittlesea (1987) 
concluded that the abstraction of general information from a series of instances Is a by. 
product of the demands of particular tasks and that performance is under the control of 
memory for specific experiences rather than of general knowledge. Abstraction Is 
therefore a passive process which arises by not attending to particular properties in the 
tasks. The same process occurs in studies of implicit learning. According to Mathews, et al, 
(1989), passive abstraction means that conscious thinking is not necessary to extract the 
regularities needed for performance on complex tasks. 
109 
Chapter 2- Analogical Problem Solving and Imitation 
The picture that emerges from these views of generalization is represented in figure 2.13. 
In this model the schema is seen as arising as a by-product of the generalization of the 
problem solution from one problem to another. Aspects of earlier problems (Al, A2, A3 in 
figure 2.13) are accessed. The relation between the problem statements (the A boxes) and 
the solution (the B boxes) is abstracted out and generalized over and applied to another 
problem of the same type. For example, the line linking Al and BI represents the relation 
between the problem statement and solution. This underlying relation is abstracted out 
and applied to the A2 problem to generate the solution, B2. However, this generalization 
is only partial, hence the dotted line linking Al and BI to A2 and B2. Any schema induced 
from this contains much episodic information, hence the dark S box in the figure. Later 
problems may remind the solver of aspects of specific examples as well as of some 
abstracted out elements in the solution schema, hence the access arrows to both the A and S 
boxes. 
The schema abstraction process is therefore different from that described in figure 2.12 
where the schema is formed as part of the generalization process. The schemas (S boxes in 
figure 2.13) become increasingly transparent representing the fact that knowledge becomes 
incrementally refined with exposure to problems of this type. The solver still has access 
both to specific problems and to schemas at different levels of abstraction. 
Schemas contain much 
episodic information at first 
which becomes increasingly 
clecontextualized with 
exposure to exaniple-, 
: ok 
............... J .......... 
ýSlrtTaT iene lz 
Ail IBil IIA21 IB21 I JA3 
Access 
........... 
B31 ICI ID 
fi-Ure 2.13. Generalization ind schema formation according to the example-anal __ 
. 
7.1.3. Abstraction and conservative induction 
Medin & Ross (1989) make 3 claims with regard to concept formation which are equally 
applicable to learning problem categories. The first refers to case-based reasoning. They 
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argue that reasoning is often based on specific instances. If we classify a novel animal as a 
mammal then it is not by reference to some abstract concept such as'mammalhood. 
Instead the features of the novel animal may remind us of some other mammal which is 
already known to us. A lynx, for example, may remind us of a cat. 
In contrast, learning models such as ACT*, SOAR and those of Carbonell (1983) and 
Holyoak (1985) assume an automatic abstraction process which is independent of the 
specific examples on which it operates. Medin and Ross, however, claim that abstraction 
is not necessarily an autonomous process, but appears instead to derive naturally from 
exemplar comparison and use. This Is a view shared by Dellarosa-CummIns; (1992). 
Medin & Ross's third claim is that induction preserves a great deal of information about 
the specific examples from which the induction is derived. Spencer & Weisberg (1989) 
and Catrambone & Holyoak (1989) found evidence for redundant and irrelevant specific 
'Information In whatever schema subjects had derived from the examples presented. This 
is what Medin and Ross mean when they say that induction is conservative. 
... we argue that specificity may make access to and application of relevant 
knowledge easier, may permit more graceful updating of knowledge, may protect the 
cognitive system from incorrect and inappropriate inferences, and may provide just 
the sort of context sensitivity that much of our knowledge should, in fact, have. (pp, 
190-191). 
If this is the case then we would expect context to exert a strong influence over the ability 
to generalize and transfer solutions from one problem to another. It also means that solvers 
will keep very closely to the 'recipe' included in an example problem. Conservative 
induction explains why imitation is a useful and often necessary problem solving strategy, 
which nevertheless leads to the induction of solution schemas. 
7.2. Implicit and explicit learning 
When a subject Is presented with a number of exemplars of a problem type, the implicit 
schema relating the problems eventually comes to be learned. Evidence for a type of 
unconscious learning has come from studies of implicit learning, 'Implicit knowledge 
results from the Induction of an abstract representation of the structure that the stimulus 
environment displays, and this knowledge Is acquired in the absence of conscious reflective 
strategies to learn' (Reber, 1989, p. 219). This type of learning can arise even though the 
relations between features of the task environment are quite complex. 
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One early study of implicit learning processes came from Posner & Keele (1968). They 
presented subjects with a series of dot patterns which were graded distortions of a number 
of 'prototypical' patterns of dots, These dot patterns ranged in how far they varied from 
their respective prototypes. Where they varied widely, the subjects took longer to learn 
the prototype but produced greater transfer than those who learned the prototype from 
patterns which varied little from the prototype. In a follow-up experiment (Posner & 
Keele, 1970) it was shown that the concept or schema learned by the subjects was recalled 
far better than already presented specific instances of distortions from the prototype. 
From the examples provided, subjects induced an abstract representation of the prototype 
which could be used to classify new instances. A summed features view of categories would 
have created a blob rather than a useful prototype (Reber, 1989). 
Other studies have also found that concept formation appears to result as a by-product of 
experience with individual instances. Fried & Holyoak (1984), for instance, found that 
categories could be learned without the subjects' being told the category label of each 
instance. Even In the absence of instructions to learn the category and without feedback 
about errors, they still succeeded in learning the category. From their study they 
developed a category-density model of classification from Individual instances which 
incorporates three assumptions-, 
I That highly salient features of presented Instances are encoded Initially. These 
instances are regarded as a sample from which we can estimate how widespread are the 
properties of potential exemplars. Only later are subjects able to search for less salient 
features that are more diagnostic of category membership. 
2 With experience of category exemplars and the distribution of exemplar 
properties, new exemplars can be classed along the lines of Bayesian probability (see also 
Anderson, 1990). 
3 People assume that categories have a central tendency and a certain degree of 
variability. Presented i; stances are then used to revise any original assumptions about 
such variability around a mean. This in turn affects how the next presented item is 
evaluated. 
The Ideal outcome -of category learning is a representation of the 'dimensions of variations 
among category exemplars' (Richardson & McCarthy, 1990). The ideal outcome of 
teaching concepts using examples In textbooks Is to point out the range of applicability of a 
concept or procedure - the variablilty of a concept or procedure from a prototype or central 
tendency. Only then can one have a mental representation which is 'flexible'. Learning 
about the adaptability and applicability of a concept or procedure may come about 
chiefly through experience with Individual Instances. However, we can learn how to 
classify instances by simply being told a concept (OhIsson &-Rees, 1991), Trying to apply a 
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concept In a domain in which one is a novice is effortful. When students are told a concept, 
they often have to be continually reminded to use it in specific cases. When a concept is 
formed from the experience gained by using it, students are more likely to know when It can 
be applied to new instances. 
7.3. Summary 
Problem category induction is an automatic process that arises from exemplar comparison 
and use. Understanding of the logical justification of a procedure comes about 
automatically from the process of generalization. Induction is conservative in that much 
specific Information is retained from earlier examples. With continued experience of a 
class of problems, learners derive a schema which becomes increasingly decontextualized 
and incrementally refined. In this way, novices learn the range of applicability of new 
concepts and procedures, and no longer have to rely on specific examples. Nevertheless, 
the principle of conservative Induction ensures that we retain information about specific 
examples which can sometimes be used when needed. Indeed, Ddtienne (1991) has shown 
that experts use both schemas and specific prototypical examples in solving new problems. 
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Al models of analogical problem solving 
Since analogy is regarded as a powerful and ubiquitous learning and problem solving 
mechanism, several Al models of analogy have been developed such as PUPS (Anderson, 
Boyle, Corbett, & Lewis, 1990), ACME (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989), PI (Holland, et al., 
1986), and SME (Falkenhainer, et al., 1989). AI models of APS are often very successful in 
that they solve problems by analogy to examples in much the same way that humans are 
capable of. That is, they are often good models of human analogical competence. The aim 
of this section is to explain why they are not necessarily good models of human analogical 
performance. They may model what humans are capable of, but they don't necessarily do 
what humans do. 
Some Al models of APS have been criticized for representing the world in such a way that 
the model will operate successfully upon that form of representation. This criticism was 
levelled at the PI program by Dejong (1989) and Palmer (1989) (see section 5.2.1). Gentner's 
Structure Mapping Engine has been similarly criticized. It relies on a hierarchical 
propositional representation of the system of relations between problem elements, 
However, the particular predicate structure chosen to represent a specific situation 
'represents choices made by the theorist, who makes the Important decisions about 
syntactic parsing' (Goswami, 1992). Palmer (1989) gives examples of a higher-order 
relation such as GREATER-TTiAN [TEMPERATUREI (objectl), TEMPERATURE2 (object2)] 
and CAUSE [PUSH (objectl, object2), COLLIDE (objectl, object2)). He argues that they 
could equally well be represented as lower-order ones, such as: HOTTER-71-1AN (objecti, 
object2) and CAUSE-TO-COLLIDE-BY-PUSMNG (objectl, object2). 
Mapping in PUPS 
According to Anderson, simulating analogies in ACT* had proved 'awkward' (Anderson, 
Farrell & Sauers, 1984; Anderson, Plrolll & Farrell, 1988; Pirolli & Anderson, 1985). For 
this reason, WhIs more recent computational model of human knowledge representation 
known as the PenUltimate Production System (PUPS: Anderson, 1989; Anderson, Boyle, 
Corbett, & Lewis, 1990, Anderson & Thompson, 1989), knowledge Is represented as schema. 
like structures which contain three obligatory 'slots': 
an ISA slot specifying the category of which the structure is an instance; 
a FUNCTION slot specifying what function the structure fulfils; 
a FORM slot specifying the form of a structure. 
Such representations also Include optional slots specifying other prerequisites, such as the 
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particular context in which the representation takes place. The representation of a LISP 
function would take the following form (from Anderson and Thompson, 1989): 
structure I 
ISA, function-call 
FUNCTION: (add 2 3) 
FORM: (list +2 3) 
CONTEXT: LISP 
MEDIUM: CRT-screen 
PRECONDITION: CONTEXT: LISP 
This Is a declarative statement which states that the structure isa function can whose 
function Is to add 2 and 3. Itsform is a list containing a'+' followed by a '2' and a '3'. 
Together these form the three obligatory slots. There are also three further optional slots 
asserting that the context is LISP and that It Is being entered through the medium of a 
cathode-ray tube screen. The final precondition means that the context (LISP) is necessary 
for the form to achieve the function. 
The form and the prerequisites together imply the function. This Is a form of inductive 
Werence or 'implicational semantics' and means that the above example can be 
represented by the Implication: 
IF the goal Is to achieve the function (add 2 3) 
and the context is LISP 
THEN use the form (list +2 3) 
PUPS Is used primarily to simulate within-domain analogies and does not deal with 
metaphor or thi types of analogy studied by Gentner, for instance. PUPS structures encode 
the relations between the function (what it does) and the form (how It does It) of a 
problem; that Is, it specifies the solution structure. 
Learhang in PUPS involves Inspecting the trace of an analogy, and building productions 
directly reproducing the effects of that analogy. Thereby the implications originally 
induced to perform the analogy are stored. This occurs with first the successful analogy 
leading to marked improvement In speed and accuracy in further examples. 'Our view is 
that this knowledge compilation occurs simultaneously with the first successful analogy. 
Subsequent occasions where the knowledge Is required show the benefit of the'comPlIed 
production' (Anderson & Thompson, 1989, p. 284). Knowledge compilation builds new 
productions which directly produce the effect of the analogy without further reference to 
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the example; that is, it encodes how items are structurally related. It therefore builds a 
schema for a problem type. 
Anderson & Thompson (1989) illustrate analogical problem solving in LISP using the PUPS 
architecture, Let us suppose that we have two LISP structures the first of which is a target 
structure (structurex) representing a problem requiring solution, and the second of which is 
a source example (structurey) retrieved from LTM. The context is LISP and the function 
(the goal) Is to extract the first element of a list: 
structurex 
isa. function-call 
function ; (extract-first(a b 0) 
form: ??? 
structurey 
isa: function-call 
function: (extract-first (p qr s)) 
form (list car I(p qr s)) 
According to Anderson & Thompson, the required analogy is therefore of the form, 
function(structurey) - form(structurey) :: function(structurex) : ??? 
or more specifically: 
(extract-first(p qr s)) : (list car '(p qr s)) :: (extract-first(a b 0) : ??? 
The required solution inýolves putting (list car '(a b 0) In the form slot of structurex. To do 
this the following mapping is created: 
list -> list 
car -> car 
I-.. > , 
(p qr s) -> (a b 
for a mapping to take place the first elements in the two function slots must correspond. If 
that Is successful all other elements (the Indeterminate correspondences) in the function 
slots are put into correspondence ((p qr s) and (a b 0), It is a necessary and sufficient 
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condition for an analogy to be successful that mappings be found for all terms in the 
function slot. 
However, it is not clear that this example as presented by Anderson & Thompson 
constitutes an analogy, In Gentner's terms the two problems are 'literally similar. ' They 
both have shared attributes and relations. Only the value of one attribute Is altered from 
pqrs to abc. Anderson & Thompson have therefore described imitative problem solving, 
Although their brief description of this particular example of APS In PUPS constitutes a 
description of imitation, what PUPS actually does is quite different. PUPS solves 
problems by mapping a structure from a source to a target. To see how it performs its 
analogical mapping we will look at a similar example involving car. 
Anderson, Boyle, Corbett, & Lewis (1990) provide an example of solving a similar problem 
by analogy in PUPS. An example is given ('exampl el "below) to demonstrate how to 
extract the first element of the Ust, '(fast computers are nice). The solution is to use car in 
the structure (car'(fast computers are nice)) which would give fast as its answer, To 
d understand' the example PUPS has information about the relations between elements of 
the solution structure. 
car 
ISA. - function 
FUNCTION, (function-in car-s-tructure) 
FORM: (text car) 
car-structure 
ISA: lisp-code 
FUNCTION: (calculate-first arg) 
FORM: (list car arg) 
examplel 
ISA: ' lisp-code 
FUNCTION: (illustrate car) 
(calculate-first lis) 
FORM: (list car Its) 
Ils 
ISA: list 
FUNCTION: (argument-in examplel) 
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(hold (fast computers are nice)) 
FORM. (text '(fast computers are nice)) 
fast 
ISA: atom 
FUNCTION: (value-of example) 
(first 11s) 
FORM: (text fast) 
When PUPS is presented with an exercise problem to solve in which the goal is to return 
the first element of a list (A BQ then the structure of the problem is represented in the 
following way: 
goall 
ISA: lisp-code 
FUNCTION: (calculate-first. lls2) 
FORM: ? 
l1s2 
ISA. llst 
FUNCTION: (hold (A B 
FORM. ? 
Here the form of the final code is unknown and the student, or the PUPS program, has to 
find a form that will satisfy the functional requirements, In much of his experiments on 
LISP learning (e. g. Anderson, Farrell and Sauers, 1983), Anderson has used the Winston 
and Horn (1981) textbook and it is the one used in this case. examplel above involving car 
Hs is used as the source ixample and Is presumed to be available to the student as well as 
to the PUPS program. If examplel is the source example and goall is the target, then 
PUPS generates the following analogy: 
function(examplel) - form(examplel):: function(goall): 
Anderson et al. go on, 
In solving Us analogy, Us from examplel Is mapped to lls2 from goall and the 
specification (LIST CAR Ils2) Is created for the goall form slot. A similar analogy 
between lis and HsZ leads to the description (LIST'(A B Q) for the form slot of M2. 
This constitutes a solution to the problem. (p. 15). 
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The analogical mechanism described here Is somewhat complex. The relations between 
the function, the form, car, car-structure, lis, lisl, lls2, and so on are all specified. 
Analogical problem solving therefore involves mapping a relational structure from one 
analogue to another. 
Suppose that a student does not have a complete understanding of the syntax used with 
car, as Is the case with the student whose verbal protocol appears in Anderson, Farrell, & 
Sauers (1984). Could such a student successfully solve the problem? PUPS assumes an a 
priori understanding of the set of relations between the function and its form in the 
example, or at least that the relations between the function and the form are not a source 
of difficulty, A student who understands the relations between function and form can 
presumably apply those relations to the target problem (figure 2.14): 
apply 
II 
relations relations 
IIIi 
function(structure-. y, i .,,,,,... cture. y) :: funcuontstructure-4 
However, there is no need to suppose that analogical reasoning of this kind Is required. A 
student n-dght simply be In-dtating the form of the earlier example by altering a simple 
value. All the student needs to know Is that the function of structurey and the function of 
structurex are the same (they both involve extracting the first element of a list. figure 
2.15). 
if the functions are the same 
.II 
function(structure. y) : ionn(structure-y) :: function(structure-x) 
That is, function(structurey) Is like function(structurex). If the functions are similar then 
the forms are similar since they fill the same role, so form(structurey) must be like 
form(structurex) (in the same way that 40 mph and 30 mph are the same). All the solver 
requires to do is to Wer that the two values, (fast computers are nice) and (a b 0, Play the 
same roles In both the example and the target problems, so (a b0 can be 'plugged in' to the 
structure given in the source solution. The problem can be solved without necessarily any 
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understanding of the relationship between the function of the LISP code and the form it 
takes; the only assumption required is that some relation probably exists (figure 2.16). 
if the functions are the same 
function(structure-y) : form(structure-y) :: function(structure. x) : 
then the forms are the same 
rndeed there is nothing in the PUPS structure to disambiguate the two possible processes, 
that is: imitation on the one hand and analogical problem solving on the other. 
8.2. Summary 
Anderson & Thompson (1989) have included the following production rule in PUPS: 
if there is a target structure needing a form serving a particular function 
AND there is a model structure containing a form that serves that function 
THEN try to map the model form to the target form 
The rule contains the advice to 'map the model form' (the problem's surface features) onto 
another in order to generate a target form which will serve a particular function (achieve 
the desired goal). There is no requirement (whether intended by Anderson or not) that 
there should be any iinderstanding of the relation between the form and Its function, nor 
that the function is entirely understood. According to VanLehn (1990), understanding is not 
represented in either ACT* or PUPS (although it can be seen as an emergent property of 
the representation). The difficulty inherent in this type of problem solving Is simply one 
of mapping corresponding values. This form of problem solving does not involve analogy as 
it has been defined earlier. It does not require a representation of the problems as a 
'problem model. ' Although Anderson says that the example Is retrieved from LTM, the 
production rule does not have that condition attached. Indeed one might argue that, if 
people can rýmember the example in that much detail then they already have enough 
information to solve the target problem without reference to the example - that is, they 
already know what car does. There Is no adaptation required of the example other than 
changing a value. 
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Anderson and his co-workers have therefore described a process of APS which does not 
require the solver to understand the base problem. Their description of the process of using 
an earlier problem is therefore similar to imitation. Their model, on the other hand, 
relates all the elements of the LISP structure in terms of their type, function and the form 
each takes. It is a very knowledgeable model - more so, indeed, than any solver needs to 
be. 
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Conclusion 
Human behaviour is an adaptation to the environment. In order to understand why using 
examples and analogies is pre-eminent in human learning, we need to understand why 
using them is an optimal adaptive strategy. Generally speaking, the ability to repeat a 
sequence of behaviours which was successful in achieving one's goals is a useful strategy to 
employ, and will continue to be successful as long as the environment remains the same. 
Similarly, copying successful behaviour seen in others is an equally useful strategy. By 
extension, it is reasonable to suppose that imitating an example presented in a textbook 
would normally result in a successful solution if the target problem is seen as similar, and 
the environment (the context) remains the same. 
Imitation, therefore, can be understood as a 'rational' adaptive strategy to the 
envirorunent. Rational, in this 
, 
sense, does not mean that humans always employ logically 
correct reasoning. It refers rather to the notion that they will employ an optimal 
adaptive strategy that is useful In helping achieve their goals (Anderson, 1990; 1991a; 
1991b). One of the steps in Anderson's theory of rationality involves achieving a goal by 
some method that involves the 'least computation. ' To the extent that it is possible that 
two problems are likely to be conceptually similar if they are perceptually similar, the 
computation Involved is mapping the perceptually similar features from one to the other. 
It is a great deal more computationally demanding to solve a problem by attempting to 
build a complete problem model than to imitate an earlier one. 
7be law of rationality makes minimal assumptions about computational limitations. 
Given a source problem to work from, representing a complex target problem in a new 
domain is facilitated If h4s enough to represent only the surface features in such a way 
that they correspond to the features of the source. One has also to make the assumption 
that the perceived similarity in surface features Is predictive of similar underlying 
features. 
7he basic thesis of a rational approach to using examples has Important implications for 
how an earlier problem is used, that Is, that people attempt to derive locally optimal 
solutions to problems, since computational limitations and limits to our knowledge prevent 
globally optimal solutions - it Is not possible to have an 'ideal problem model' containing 
all the elements necessary and sufficient to realize a solution plan (Holland et al., 1986) - 
hence the need for the various heuristics people use In problem solving such as means-end 
analysis, hill-climbing, and 'if-something-worked-once-try-it-agaiW whether they know 
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exactly how it worked or not. It is in this sense that imitation is a rational strategy for 
Problem solving. 
Many studies have highlighted the difficulties subjects find in analogical transfer. At 
the same time analogy can be a powerful tool for helping novices understand new concepts - 
indeed, analogies are often spontaneously generated by novices to interpret what they 
read (Clement, 1988; 1989). This appears to be a paradox. However, the paradox 
disappears if one takes into account the assumed prior knowledge of the novices. When 
the base domain is well-known and accessible from LTM, then analogies can be drawn from 
it. Expository analogies work since they appeal to the presumed prior experience of the 
novice, Analogical reasoning does not work when the novice has little knowledge of the 
base domain. 
With close variants of a source problem imitation will usually be successful (assuming the 
solver has accessed the relevant source). When solvers attempt distant variants by 
irrdtation it usually fails, because aspec 
' 
ts of the earlier problem are missing. Solvers can 
adapt it only if they have a enough domain-specific prior knowledge, which has 
equipped them with a number of Werence rules that they can apply, or If the example 
gives explicit instructions on how it might be adapted. The literature on analogical 
transfer shows how rarely this happens. 
It takes time for students studying a subject for the first time to develop the 'teleological 
UAderstanding' that lies behind the procedures they often have to learn (VanLehn, 1990). 
It has been shown that students have difficulty generating inferences in textbooks since 
expository texts do not support inferences in the way narrative texts do (Britton, et al., 
1990; Britton, et al., 1989). For these reasons students are unlikely to have a 
representation of an example problem in LTM which they can use or adapt. 
The distinction between solving problems by analogy and Imitation is not simply one of 
Semantics, It has important repercussions for the design of expository texts. Such texts 
Will be Ineffective if they make too many assumptions about what Inferences students can 
derive from examples. Not only should texts provide explanations of the relation between 
2t problem's statement and Its solution, but they should also explain how examples can 
relate to possible variants. 
Analogical problem solving is therefore the wrong paradigm In which to understand the 
Processes that people use in solving problems from examples in knowledge-rich domains, 
If we make minimal assumptions about what a solver knows when faced with a test 
123 
Lý 
Chapter 2- Analogical Problem Solving and hnitation 
problem, we might see more clearly how people develop expertise in these areas, and how 
the exposition of new information can be improved to enhance learning and transfer. 
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Chapter 3 DESIGN OF THE 
INTERPRETATION THEORY 
1. Introduction: Requirements for an interpretation theory 
In this chapter, I present an interpretation theory that can be used for analysing training 
and exercise problems as they are presented In textbooks, as well as for analysing the 
behaviour of students as they attempt to solve those exercise problems. By using a 
representational scheme that can be adapted to both the text and the behaviour of the 
solver, we may be in a better position to ascertain the effectiveness of an expository text 
and to ascertain the processes the solver uses to solve new problems in a formal domain, 
The theory is based on largely unpublished work done by Hank Kahney of the Open 
University, 
To be effective, an Interpretation theory should be built around a model of the learner and 
a model of the text. In sections 1.1 and 1.2 1 shall describe those aspects of a learner and a 
text that have to be borne In mind when constructing an Interpretation theory for text and 
protocol analysis. 
I. I. Constraints provided by the model of the learner 
Assumptions about what processes learners employ when using a text to solve an exercise 
problem constrain any Interpretation of texts, tasks and protocols. Novices vary in the 
strategies and knowledge they bring with them to a new domain. However, in order to 
apply generally, an Interpretation theory should make minimal assumptions about 
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novices'prior domain-specific knowledge, and about how they use the information 
presented in expository texts. From the evidence derived from the problem solving 
literature we can describe some of the characteristics of novices in the following ways: 
1) Readers tend not to re-read texts when looking back over them to solve an exercise 
problem. They tend instead to focus on the examples provided. These can be concrete 
examples or re-representations of concepts that appear salient, such as diagrams or flow- 
charts. 
2) Faced with an exercise problem, solvers tend to search for a previous example or 
examples, which they can in-dtate if it appears similar enough to the current one, The 
examples they find will be greatly determined by the surface features of those examples; 
solvers try as far as possible to find an example problem that appears to have some 
similarity to the current problem. They then attempt to apply the procedure instantiated 
in the example to the exercise problem. To do so they have to identify elements in the 
source problem that appear to fill the same roles as features in the target. They can then 
perform the actions that were employed In the earlier example on those mapped elements 
(assun-dng they can identify or infer those actions). 
3) Expository texts do not support inferences in the way that narrative texts do. 
Indeed, novices are particularly bad at generating inferences in a new domain (Britton, 
Van, Gulgoz, & Glynn, 1989; Britton, Van Dusen, Glynn, & Hemphill, 1990). 
4) With experience of expository texts, students come to develop a schema for that 
type of text. Such a schema includes the default assumptions that a solution follows a 
statement of the problem rather than vice versa, and that a particular section of a 
textbook will give them enough information to solve problems based on the concepts 
introduced in that section., 
5) Learners 
-vary 
in what they remember or understand when solving problems based 
on textbook expositions, Even If they can remember a particular principle in Newtonian 
mechanics, or the rules for deriving the past participles of French verbs, solvers may not be 
able to apply that principle or rule. This may be because they either do not notice Its 
relevance to a current situation, or because they have not formed Inference rules from the 
principles that will help them solve the current problem or others of the same type. 
6) Solvers also vary in the degree to which they can generate 'self-explanations' of 
new material. To do so they have to have an adequate understanding of the relations ' 
between elements In the problem statement and the goals and subgoals In a solution. 71-ds 
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requires the solver to develop some kind of theory of causation. A theory of causation is 
domain-specific and comes about through applying an already existing (domain- 
independent) theory of causality to aspects of the new domain (Pazzani, 1991). However, 
simply to say that better solvers are better able to generate self-explanations (Chi, 
Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Chi & Bassok, 1989) does not tell us how they 
come to do so. 
In some circumstances, for example in learning programming languages such as LJSP or 
PROLOG, there is often little similarity between the surface features of problems. Solvers 
are therefore obliged to rely on their understanding of the structural similarities between 
them. To understand the structure, solvers have to rely on the adequacy of the explanation 
provided in the text. Ihe adequacy of the explanation is a measure of how well the text 
explains the relation between the examples provided and other problems of the same 
type, 
'1.2. Text structure - what has to be represented in an interpretation 
theory 
Texts introduce new concepts in various ways, They may present a verbal explanation, 
analogies, pictorial representations, or concrete examples. Concrete examples illustrate 
how a concept is instantiated in a procedure, such as the role of the concept rate In amount. 
time-rate problems. As students progress through textbooks or training manuals the writer 
has to rely on the reader having learned concepts introduced earlier in the book, so that, 
when new concepts form part of an example or form a subprocedure, the writer has to 
assume that the reader understands the rest of the procedure (which Is not explained in 
the current section of the book). The reader is then often obliged to make reinstatement 
inferences (Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978) or engage in a reinstatement search to understand 
concepts that were introduced in an earlier part of the textbook. 
To make explanations clearer, texts may present concepts and examples at different levels 
of abstraction; from concrete examples to abstract or pictorial representations or analogies. 
7be writer assumes that the solver Is able to abstract out the structure of the intermediate 
representation and map it onto the example problem. Intermediate representations only 
achieve their intended effect If the reader understands them well enough to make this 
mapping. 
The set of operations applying sequentially to elements In the problem statement 
constitutes a procedure that applies to a class of problems, although there can be 
variations in the procedure between problems. The more variations there are between 
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problems, the more 'distant' they are. A large degree of variation leads to a hierarchy of 
problem types. Figure 3.1 shows such a hierarchy for algebra 'rate' problems. 
Rate problems 
speed capacity currency interest 
speed petrol usage nge rate APR= x 
miles/hour miles/gallon fraw/pound percent 
me 
distance/speed distance 
speed x time 
I vehicle 2 vehicles 
0', 
100 
0** same distance & same distance & same direction different direction 
find time find speed find time find speed 
taken taken 
The four rate problems (speed, capacity, currency, Interest) involve the same underlying 
equation (a =bx c) but different surface features. At the bottom of the hierarchy are 
distance = speed x time problems involving two vehicles. Close variants would be two 
problems in which the time is unknown and has to be found. More distant variants would 
Involve an example in which the time Is unknown, and a test problem in which the speed 
is unknown. More distant still would be problems from a different part of the hierarchy; 
an example problem in which vehicles travel In the same direction is a distant variant of 
a problem in which the vehicles travel in opposite directions. 
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Texts also, at times, provide explanations of what a problem statement or a solution 
means. This would occur where, for example, the SOLO programming manual explains 
how a solution program is evaluated. On page 38 of the SOLO manual there is an example 
showing how to define new procedures. The procedure is 'TO CRUMBLE' containing three 
PRINT statements. The manual then goes on to explain what happens when this 
procedure is activated, Explanations of the relation between elements in a problem 
statement and a solution, and explanations of what a solution means are highly 
interconnected. Nevertheless, texts often show how a solution is evaluated without 
providing a)'411 explanation of the relation between statement and solution. 
1.3. How the interpretation theory can represent texts and the 
behaviour of solvers 
The goal of the interpretation theory is to describe. 
a) the relation or set of relations between a statement of a problem and its solution, This 
includes, where necessary, a breakdown of a problem Into its goal-subgoal structure; 
b) the relations that exist between a series of problems; that is, information about what 
makes a series of problems representative of a category, 
c) the relations between example problems and exercise problems, 
If the theory can adequately describe the examples and the relations between them, then 
it can also pinpoint where those relations do not exist. In other words, where there are no 
explicit relations given, the reader is obliged to make Inferences. Similarly, when an 
exercise problem contains subgoals that do not figure in the Immediately preceding section, 
the solver may be required to make reinstatement inferences. Tbrough an examination of 
the relation between exercise and example problems, an interpretation theory can 
illustrate the 'path' that an ideal solver has to take through the text when solving a 
problem. This pýth should allow us to see where the path Is 'blocked'- that is, where 
there is no previous corresponding element or operator In the text - and therefore where 
the solver has to make Inferences. In so doing the theory can highlight the usefulness of 
the text In helping the solver. 
furthermore, by analysing the path the text traces with the path a solver actually 
follows, we can see how the two compare. If the solver does not follow the Implicit path 
in the text, then we can get some measure of the 'Impenetrability' of the text, that is, the 
degree to which the text is not sufficiently explicit. The theory should a Uow us to 
determine what assumptions are built Into the text about what the solver Is expected to 
know, and should also be capable of illustrating what aspects of a text or problem the 
solver is trying to map and what concepts he or she Is trying to understand. 
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The basis of the interpretation theory 
There already exists a methodology for analysing how solvers establish relations between 
analogues In the literature on proportional analogies. The interpretation theory described 
in section 2 uses the proportional analogy framework as a basis for examining the 
mappings that are given in a text and those that the solver makes. 
1.4.1. The proportional analogy framework 
The analogical mapping technique described here is based on the theories of problem 
solving (by, for example, Spearman, 1923 and Sternberg, 1977) on proportional analogies of 
the type A: B-: C: ? D. For example, the following problem: 
Lawyer : client : doctor : WHAT? 
should be understood as: 
Lawyer is to client as doctor is to- ? WHAT? 
The task for the solver is to infer some relation between lawyer and client which can then 
be applied to doctor to yield adanswer, for example patient. 
Using this framework, it is possible to analyse the structure of texts in terms of the 
training examples they provide and the test problems learners are expected to solve. It 
fulfils the requirements of an interpretation theory outlined above in that it Is capable of 
illustrating the mapping processes which 'perfect' students would use if they refer back to 
previous examples in a text In order to solve an exercise problem; and it can be used to 
portray the actual mapping processes of any particular solver. It can show how much 
information is given in the text immediately preceding a test problem. 
The technique can also be used to analyse the structure of complex problems. Such problems 
can be broken down to represent the goal-subgoal structure of the problem as wen as any 
constraints which are specifically mentioned in a problem statement. Breaking a problem 
down in this way allows us to see how a problem is structured and what kind of 
conceptualization of the problem is required, As a result the theory provides a metric of 
transfer. That is, from an examination of the inferences a student has to make to use a 
source to solve a target problem, we can derive some measure of the 'distance' of one 
problem from another. Close variants of example problems require the solver to make few 
additional inferences; they can be solved simply by imitating the procedure provided in 
the source, which involves replacing the surface features that fill the same roles in both 
problems. Distant variants, on the other hand, will require the solver to make inferences 
or to manipulate their representation of an earlier problem to solve the target. 
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Since the technique can be used to look at the relation between target and source problems 
as a whole as well as the relation between the subgoal structure of a target and earlier 
source problem, the analysis can provide a representation of problem solving from 
examples at different 'grain' sizes. An overview of a section of a textbook in a specific 
domain can show how the section is structured in terms of the examples provided. At a 
finer grain, the paths necessary to solve a test problem presented in the textbook can be 
drawn, indicating where a novice would have to look when using earlier examples to solve 
a current problem, 
Proportional analogies 
Proportional analogies of the form A. B:. C: D are known as 4-term analogies. The A and 
B terms are known as the domain and the C and D terms are known as the range. the 
number of terms can be increased or decreased. The analogies described by Sternberg (e. g. 
Sternberg, 1977) were three-term analogies such as red, stop:: green! ? WHAT, - 
It is also possible to complete two-term analogies where there Is no choice offered, for 
example: 
?: kitten :: dog: MHAT 
Here the A and D terms are missing. By looking for a relation between 'kitten' and 'dog, a 
solver might establish that the relation is one of relative size. 'Kitten' is small and 'dog, 
is large in comparison. However, this is still insufficient to solve the analogy. The 
analogizer has to infer further that 'kitten, and 'dog' belong to different categories; 
'kitten' can be classed as a type of 'cat' and 'dog' is itself a category name. Furthermore, 
the relation of 'relative size' has to apply in one direction in the domain and in the 
opposite direction in the range. That Is, the relation has to go from small to large in the 
domain to generate 'cat' and from large to small in the range to generate 'puppy', 
This kind of analogizing, although possible, is obviously more difficult than If the A term 
were available for study. Nevertheless, this Is the situation that some solvers sometimes 
put themselves In when they look back to an example solution (equivalent to the B term) 
and use it to solve an exercise problem (equivalent to the C term) and Ignore the earlier 
problem statement (the A term). 
2.1. Sternberg's Componential Theory of Analogical Reasoning 
In Sternberg's componential theory of analogical reasoning: 'an analogy exists when there 
is a higher-order relation of equivalence or near-equivalence between two lower-order 
relations (A Is to B and C is to DY (p. 134). Sternberg proposes a number otprocesses that 
occur when a solver attempts to form an analogy. Some of these are: 
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I. encoding 
Encoding an item involves the activation of a set of semantic features associated with a 
concept. 7bese features might include superordinate, subordinate, property and others. 
2. attribute comparison 
A comparison process operates between the A and B terms whereby the solver infers some 
relation between them. 
3. mapping 
Mapping is another attribute comparison process, this time involving the search for 
correspondences between the A and C terms. 
4. application 
This involves applying a rule which can apply the relationship inferred between the A 
and B terms to the mapped features of the C term. 
The A and B terms are first encoded. A relation (X In figure 3.2) is inferred if the solver 
finds related attributes among the features of the two terms. 
The next stage Is to find the correspondences between the A and C terms (figure 3.3)- 
: FC 
mappIng 
The higher-order relation can only be applied once the relevant attributes and values in 
the A and B terms have been identified and once there has been a mapping between the A 
and C terms to discover the relationships between them. Application of the relation 
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between the terms of the domain can then be applied by generating a rule (Y) which 
applies the Inference relationships between the A and B terms to corresponding values in 
the C term, thereby forming an ideal solution D. These processes are summed up in figure 
3.4. 
encoding,, 
mapping 
preparation )olAl IBI ICII? 
a )o response 
Inference application 
higher-order relation 
(Y) 
2.2. Variations on Sternberg's theory 
2.2.1 Heller's model - 
Helier (1979) proposed a variation on Sternberg's model In which the sequence of the 
component processes differs from that of Sternberg. 7be model (which concentrates 
principally on verbal analogies) takes account of the variation solvers bring with them in 
terms of their prior knowledge and reasoning strategies as well as variations in the 
constraints and characteristics of the particular tasks they are required to do. It also 
emphasizes the interaction between these. In analogical reasoning tasks, where the 
solver Is given a choice of solutions (Dl, D2, etc. ), the solver may Infer a relation between 
the A and B terms (the 'relationship Identification process'), then Infer a relation between 
C and D1, or C and D2 and compare this with the relation between the A and B terms (the 
'relational comparison process). Where there is a choice of solutions the solver has to 
'align' two or more C-D relations with the A-B relation In order to decide on'a solution 
(the 'relative match comparison process). Thus her Conceptual Model -replaceS' 
Sternberg's mapping process with a comparison process (figure 3.5). 
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encoding,. 
preparation ýw 
" 
),, response 
I inference 2 Inference 
comparlson 
Fleure 3.5. Heller's macimutal mo I of analogical reasoning (figilre adapted fLQM Kabney 
12M 
Heller also argues that, when solvers fail to infer the relation between the A and 13 terms, 
good solvers may look at the C and D terms and infer a relation between them and look 
back at the A and B terms to see if that helps them find a relation between these. 
Alternatively, they may hypothesize some relation between the A and B terms, wl-dch is 
later revised in the light of the relation inferred between the C and D terms. In fact, there 
is no reason why a solver might not engage in a number of possible comparison processes 
between the A and B terms, the A and C terms, the U and D terms, the C and D terms, and 
so on. In this Interactive Model, the solver may make any number of such inferences and 
comparisons in order to find a justifiable solution, Some of Heuer's subjects also made 
comparisons which violated the structure of these problems. for example, they made 
irrelevant inferences and comparisons between the A and D terms, the B and C terms, the 
A-B-C terms and so on (see Kahney, 1993, for a fuller discussion of Heller's model. ) 
2.2.2. Grudin's model 
Grudin (1980) pointed out that the mapping from A to C may In some cases be more useful 
than that from A to 13 in Inferring a relation which can be applied to the 13-term to 
generate a solution. For example, In the analogy diamond : elm :: gem : tree It was found 
that inferring the relation between the A and C terms and applying that relation to the B 
term to derive the D term was more likely to produce a solution than inferring the relation 
between the A and B terms when the D-term was missing. A relation can be readily 
inferred between diamond and gem but not between diamond and elm. In this case the 
relationship would be hyponymic (relating subordinate and superordinate categories). 
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Grudin states that, in Sternberg's model, the A: R relation is applied to the C term despite 
the mapping of the A and C terms. Ihis can be seen in figure 3.6 which compares what he 
calls the 'standard theory' with Sternberg's and his own. 
Standard theory 
(Spearman's model) 
appl 
Infa rF Ri 
A l' IBI a "IC 
b Sternberg's model 
3 apply 
Inferl Ri 
P R2 
Grudln's alternatIve model 
2 apply 
Ri 
: I? D 
Rl 
: I? D 
Figure 3.6. ComparisaLl of SpearMan's. Stemberg's and Grudin's modgi of proportional 
anaIntrie-M rp. i. qnnint, thaRod nn rrudin. 1990). 'c,; fvrnhpmv'q rnndel ffichicipq a mannino rime-pqQ 
which Is abaent bm tba oLber twg models. 'R'dCnntCg an Inferred rglafion. 
Sternberg, in his exploration of reversible analogies, suggested that a subject first tries to 
infer an A-B relation and a mapping from A to C. Only If this falls does the subject infer 
an A-C relation and map A-B, but It is still the A-B relation which Is applied. Grudin, 
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however, argues that there is not always a need for a mapping process. When subjects fail 
to infer a relation between the A and B terms, they try to infer one between the A and C 
terms (step I in figure 3.6 c). That relation is then applied to the B term directly (step 2). 
Given, as Grudin points out, the flexibility exhibited by people solving problems, and the 
range of difficulty of analogy problems of this type, we might reasonably expect a range of 
problem solving processes, so that Sternberg's, Heiler's and Grudin's models can be seen as 
complementary. 
2.3. Strategies in analogical reasoning tasks 
Although Sternberg's model may be considered the 'paradigm! of analogical reasoning 
strategies, solvers may successfully use a variety of strategies in solving proportional 
analogies (particularly verbal analogies). Some are more likely to lead to success than 
others. Table 3.1 lists a number of possible processes. The left-hand side shows the 
relations that have to be Inferred (A? B, how ever, refers to an as yet unknown relation 
between the A and B terms). The right-hand side of the table describes the process that 
applies to the inferred relations.. Thus a solver might infer a relation between A and B, 
and C and D and either compare the Inferred relations or use the C-D relation to 
reformulate the A-B relation. 
I Table 3.1 
Analogical reasoning strategies 
infer relation 
A-B 
A-B & A-C 
A-B & C-D 
AM & C-D 
A-D & C-D 
C-DI & C-D2 
LA-C 
process 
apply the inferred relation to C to generate D 
constrain/reformulate A-D relation by finding the 
correspondences between the A and C terms and apply to C 
to generate D 
compare the two relations 
use C-D relation to generate A-B relation 
use C-D relation to reformulate A-B relation 
use relations between C and 2 alternative solutions to 
establish possible A-13 relations and compare 
apply to B to generate D 
Although Table 3.1 shows a number of possible analogical reasoning strategies they are 
not exhaustive. Other strategies can be used but they may not necessarily lead to 
successful solutions. Indeed there are many possible relations, interrelations and mappings 
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that can be made but which violate the constraints of the particular task (see Helier, 
1979, p. 51, for a list). 
3. Adapting proportional analogies to describe the structure 
of texts and problems 
In order to identify and discriminate between example problem statements and their 
solutions, and test problem statements and solutions, the interpretation theory uses the 
proportional analogy framework. The A term represents a textbook example (source) 
problem statement, the B term is the example solution, the C term Is the test (target) 
problem statement and the ?D term Is the solution the solver is attempting to discover 
(figure 3.7). 
problem I solution 1 problem 2 solution 2 
An example would be: 
Fortress . Fortress Radiation * Radiation Problem , Solution Problem 9 Solution 
Used as a tool for text analysis, this framework allows us to break down a section of a 
scientific textbook into Its constituent Parts represented by the four term analogy, and 
shows how these parts are related to each other. As a tool for task analysis, It provides a 
means of analysing a complex exemplar problem in terms of the relationships between the 
problem givens and the goals and the subgoals required for Its solution. Representing test 
problems by C arfd D terms provides a means whereby the solution pathways which have 
to be taken to solve them can be clearly mapped out, That is, links can be made between a 
test problem and those parts of a source example that relate directly to the solution of the 
test problem. This In turn allows us to see what inferences, analogies or adaptations a 
solver Is required to make, given the structure of the text and the goal-subgoal structure of 
the examples provided, and therefore what aspects of a problem are presumed by the 
writer of the textbook to be already represented in a solver's memory. 
A solver will seek a potentially relevant source example which is noticed or retrieved 
through some perceived similarity to the current target problem statement. In the I terms of 
proportional analogy this would yield figure 3.8 where the target C term, either by hint 
or some other form of reminding, recalls the source A term. 
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In situations where 'ideal' students are learning by reference to an example, and where 
they cannot remember a specific relevant example, one might reasonably expect that they 
would they would try to find one in the textbook and go on to discover the relation or 
transition function between the initial state (A term) and the solution (B term) of the 
source problem (figure 3.9) at a level of abstraction sufficient to allow that relation to be 
applied to the C term. 
Relatlon 
Elements in the A term are mapped onto the C term and the higher-order mapping 
relation established between the A and B terms is applied to the mapped elements In the 
C term to yield the D term. These processes are represented in figure 3.101 which 
represents the Ideal to which expository texts should aspire. It also represents the 
behaviour of the ideal student: 
I Not only does figure 3.10 represent some of the component processes assumed to be involved in solving 
problems using a previous example, but it also represents the student's schema of how examples provided 
in a text can be used to solve a current problem, In a text one would expect a problem to be Stated and then 
the solution to be presented along with an explanation of how one relates to the other. A solver would 
expect that relation to apply to elements in the target problem. However, it often happens that the ordering 
of worked examples does not follow such 4 canonical form. 
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3.1. Distinctions between the interpretation theory and proportional 
analogy 
According to Sternberg's analysis of proportional analogy, encoding of single terms 
involves a search through a semantic net for attributes that can link the A and B terms. 
Encoding in problem solving Is a more complex process involving text processing of the 
problem statement. In this case the literature on text understanding becomes more 
appropriate in understanding how a problem statement, or textbase, Is encoded (Kintsch, 
1986; Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978; Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Indeed, Kintsch (1988) argues 
that, in simple arithmetic word problems, the generation of inferences from the text alone 
may generate a solution to the stated problem without the solver having to engage in any 
actual problem solving activity. In more complex problems the encoding of the textbase is 
the necessary first step In generating some kind of problem model. 
According to Egan & Greeno (1974) analogical reasoning, series completion, problem 
solving and concept formation all require a search for relations among elements resulting In 
new interconnections between the nodes of a network structure. In solving problems from 
examples the discovery of a relation between terms does not necessarily involve a search 
through a semantic network for attributes that relate concepts. Rather, writers provide 
examples in order to establish the awareness In readers that a relation between concepts 
exists. The nature of such a relation often comes about by inductive processes on the part of 
learners that allow them to associate two disparate concepts (depending on the extent to 
which the example problem has been elaborated). Such Inductive processes may include, 
for example, applying a theory of causality in trying to understand such relations. 
However, the learner may not always understand the relation. 
Where the A and B terms refer to a problem statement and solution in a textbook, 
' 
the 
relation between the problem givens and the solution Is already stated or explained (more 
or less well). In worked examples, then, the relation between a problem statement and Its 
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solution should be provided and the task for the solver is to apply that relation to a novel 
problem. In such cases, once the correspondences between an exercise problem and a 
training problem have been established, it is primarily the higher-order mappings which 
have to be made. That is, the solver has to extract the rule or procedure instantiated in 
the example problem and apply It to the new problem. This process is one of 
generalization. It is this generalization process that allows the solver to abstract out the 
relevant solution schema, and to begin to Induce Its range of applicability. 
Evaluation of the response in problem solving, a process that Stemberg believes takes 
place with proportional analogies with multiple-choice responses, depends on the type of 
problem given, Some types of problem give the goal state in the statement of the problem 
(e. g. Duncker's Radiation problem). In this case the goal is either achieved or it isn't. In 
algebra word problems the goal state is unknown or is only vaguely specified and 
evaluation may be difficult. In computer programming problems a solution is often 
evaluated by the computer itself where a solution program either functions as it is 
supposed to according to the problem or it fails to do so or generates an error message. 
The fonn of the interpretation theory 
In this section the interpretation theory is presented in detail. To show how the relations 
between the four terrrus of the proportional analogy framework can be applied to 
analogical problem solving, I will examine first of all one of the paradigms of the 
analogical problem solving literature, the studies of Gick and Holyoak (1980; 1983). 
The Fortress and Radiation problems 
In their studies of analogical transfer Gick and Holyoak used two isomorphic iU- 
structured problems known as the Fortress Problem and the Radiation Problem (from 
Duncker, 1945). Using valrious experimental manipulations, Gick and Holyoak attempted 
to establish the conditions under which transfer would occur or fail to occur. The relations 
between the surface features and the underlying structure of the two stories will be 
examined to see where they are similar and where they are different. (The texts are 
taken from Gick and Holyoak, 1983. ) 
7be Fortress Problem 
A small country wag ruled from 4 strong fortress by a dictator, The fortress was situated in 
the middle of the country, surrounded by farms and villages. Many roads led to the 
fortress through the countryside. A rebel general vowed to capture the fortress. The 
general knew that an attack by his entire army would capture the fortress, He gathered 
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his army at the head of one of the roads, ready to launch a full-scale direct attack. 
However, the general then learned that the dictator had planted mines on each of the 
roads. The mines were set so that small bodies of men could pass over them safely, since 
the dictator needed to move his troops and workers to and from the fortress. However, any 
large force would detonate the mines. Not only would this blow up the road, but it would 
also destroy many neighbouring villages. It therefore seemed impossible to capture the 
fortress. 
However, the general devised a simple plan. He'divided his army into small groups and 
dispatched each group to the head of a different road. When all was ready he gave the 
signal and each group, marched down a different road. Each group continued down its road 
to the fortress so that the entire army arrived together at the same time. In this way, the 
general captured the fortress and overthrew the dictator. 
The Radiation Problem 
Suppose you are a doctor faced with a patient- who has a malignant tumour in his stomach. 
It is impossible to operate on the patient, but unless the tumour is destroyed the patient 
will die. There is a kind of ray that can be used to destroy the tumour. If the rays reach 
_ 
fficiently high intensity, the tumour will be destroyed. the tumour all at once at a su 
Unfortunately at this intensity the healthy tissue that the rays pass through will also be 
destroyed. At lower intensities the rays are harmless to healthy tissue, but they will not 
affect the tumour either. What type of procedure might be used to destroy the tumour 
with the rays, and at the same time avoid destroying the healthy tissue? 
In Gick and Holyoak's Fortress problem the solution involves a division of a large force (an 
army) and its convergence on a target (the fortress) as represented in figure 3.11, However, 
each of these main relations (divide and converge) themselves involve a number of 
operations and transitions which also need to be imported into, and often transformed In, 
the new domain. These unspecified operations and transitions are represented by the 
'black boxes' in figure 3.11. 
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divide 
FiL, ure 3.11. Divide, and co, 3ygrge, rglations in Gick and Holyoak's Fortress problem. 
When solvers use the Fortress problem to solve the Radiation problem elements in the A 
term are mapped onto the C term and the higher-order mapping relations established 
between the A and B terms are applied to the mapped elements In the C term to yield the 
D term. Applying the earlier solution, according to Gick and Holyoak, involves 
representing the causal relations between the A and B terms of the source problem at an 
appropriate level of abstraction, In this case 'divide' and 'converge'. Solving a specific 
problem means finding the speciflc operations and transitions represented by the black 
boxes in figure 3.11, In the Fortress problem, the general is acting under the constraint of 
protecting his army, whereas the surgeon in the Radiation problem does not have to 
protect his ray-machine. The singular entity (army) can be divided up into several 
entities (small groups) but a ray-machine cannot. Instead, the surgeon has to find lots more 
machines. In the Fortress problem, the groups have to be moved and positioned at the 
head of the roads leading ! rom the fortress. There are no fixed pathways leading to the 
tumour in the Radiation problem. The groups attack the fortress by simultaneously 
conver&g on it along the roads, but capturing (a fortress) Is not the same as destroying (a 
tumour). Figure 3.12 elaborates on figure 3.11 by including these relations. 
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(army/villages) 
divide (army, groups) 
move (groups) 
tion Woups, head-of 
Al 
fortress 
simultaneous (converge(groups, fortress)) 
The rebel general is operating under two main constraints when devising a solution plan: 
protect(army) and protect(farms & villages). The predicates in figure 3.12 represent the 
operators (divide, move, position, etc, ) that should be applied to the 'objects' (AL A2, etc. 
in figure 3,13) in the Fortress problem in order to generate a solution. Figure 3.14 lists the 
objects in the Radiation problem. 
A1 small 
country 
fortress 
dictat 
I 
farms and 
,s A4 villages 
roads !j 
general FH- !Ii 
mines 
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Part of the difficulty in solving the Radiation problem from the Fortress problem is 
making the necessary mappings between the two problems and then making the necessary 
manipulations to the representation the solver has of the Fortress problem so that the 
target can be solved. The mappings are not straightforward. In the Fortress problem the 
general has to protect the army and the villages. In the Radiation problem the surgeon 
has to protect the healthy tissue. 'General' can be mapped directly onto 'doctor' (A6 Maps 
directly onto Ci in figure 3.15). However, there are two possible mappings for 'healthy 
tissue': 'army' and 'villages' (A4 and A7 both map onto C6 in figure 3.15: the double arrows 
in the figures represent those mappings). 
ter't , 
farms and 
vill o 9t0 ages 
Y 
,a 
ED 
general <00 
Prot, Prot, % 
army a rmy army 
doctor 
4 
Prot, 
Ot healthy C6 
E 
Elgrure 3.15. b"ppin: 9 betweenl ealthy tissUe'in th 
Issu sue Issue t L 
e radiation problein and cormapnding 
e1r. ments in the fj2dress problem w hich occupy a sim ilar role Me. they are constrained by the 
highe"rder predicate 'protectL 
As part of the solution to the Fortress problem, the general divides his army into smaller 
units, How this operator can be applied to the Radiation problem, however, is not 
straightforward (figure 3.16); how can a ray be divided? 
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general clivicle,,, [fA77 army groups 
I divide4 7] 
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Figure3.16. Mappings bgtween 'general' and 'dactor, aLld 'affny' and 'r 
The intensity of the rays could be reduced, but the solver is not told, and may not have the 
knowledge to infer, that this is a possibility. The doctor in the Radiation problem also 
has to find more ray-machines to bring the intensity back up to an adequate level, The 
general, on the other hand, does not call for more armies. The operator 'divide' has to be 
changed in the radiation problem to two operators 'reduce' and 'add' (figure 3.17), 
dIvIda ýIjQmw, 
generaý IIA71 army 
El 
doctor 
reduc Sa I 
-ILI rays 
oq 
more ray more ra 
machines 
Ei] 
groups 
weak 
rays 
Both the groups and the machines have to be moved so groups should map to ray machines 
(the double arrow from 131 to D1 in figure 3.18, representing partial solutions to the 
example and exercise problems). Whereas the groups are moved to the heads of roads, 
there Is no equivalent in the Radiation problem to 'roads', Instead the ray machines are 
positioned around the patient (the operators in figure 3.18 are shown in ovals). in the 
fortress problem the groups then converge simultaneously on the fortress, but it is the rays, 
not the machines In the Radiation problem, that converge an the tumour. 
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The general has two aims: one is to capture the fortress and the other is to overthrow the 
dictator. The surgeon has to get at the turnour and destroy it. 'Capturing' and 
'overthrowing' are not necessarily the same thing as 'destroying. ' 7be solver has 
therefore to map and adapt aspects of the Fortress problem in order to solve the Radiation 
problem, but both 'capturing the fortress' and 'overthrowing the dictator' could map onto 
'destroying the tumour', 
Adapting the Fortress problem to solve the Radiation problem is not simply a question Of 
altering values and applying the same operators as were employed In the earlier problem. 
Further adaptations are required, and the solver has to Infer what those adaptations are. 
It Is mainly because of thd"requirement to manipulate and adapt the earlier problem that 
about 10% of Gick and Holyoak's subjects were unable to solve the Radiation problem even 
with a hint to use the Fortress problem, 
4.2. Text analysis 
Because of the way textbooks are designed, students are likely to have certain assumptions 
about how example problems are normally presented, that is, they are liable to expect 
that examples are presented as a problem statement followed by a solution, In that order. 
Ibis schema is used to guide a student's search through the training material if they need 
to find Information later. However, the presentation of worked examples in textbooks 
does not always follow such a canonical form. Instead, there are many variations, such as: 
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Problem Statement + Problem Solution 
Problem Solution + Problem Statement 
Problem Solution with no Problem Statement 
Problem Statement with no Problem Solution 
The variations in sequence increase when explanations or other forms of problem 
representation such as graphs, diagrams, tables, etc, are added to the text. 
To illustrate elements of the interpretation theory as it can be applied to texts, I will be 
looking at examples from two LISP programming textbooks by, Hasemer & Domingue 
(1989) and Winston & Horn (1989), and an Artificial Intelligence course book by Eisenstadt 
(1978/1983) which formed part of a Cognitive Psychology course at the Open University, 
The latter was especially designed to be 'user-friendly' in the way the examples were 
presented. 
- The interpretation theory describes texts in terms of 4 number of concepts: 
9 example problem statement, 
example problem solution, 
explanations 
adequacy and comprehensiveness of explanations 
intermediate representations 
'ghost'terms, 
the problem givens; 
blocks and impasses 
templates 
subgoals 
nested subgoals 
solution Eonstraints 
Inferences 
concepts 
operators 
When used for protocol analysis, the theory also Identifies: 
# Experimenter Interventions 
Experimenter generated examples 
'understanding' processes - 
These are represented In the Interpretation theory diagrams as shown in the summary 
figure 3.19 and described in detail thereafter. 
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Problem statement and solution 
The purpose of a science textbook is to provide the learner with a framework for 
understanding a particular domain. The text must attempt to show how the givens in the 
problem statement (the A term) can be translated into the correct form that the solution 
must take (the B term) by employing the rules or principles given in the rest of the training 
material. In figure 3.20 a link between the A and B terms is represented by a line from one 
term to the other. Although figure 3.20 provides an indication of a link, the nature of that 
link is not specified. (Ibe types of link that can exist between terms are specified in more 
detail in later sections. ) 
problem problem 
statement solution 
It is usual for the problem statement to precede the solution, However, where the reader 
is invited to look at a piece of code and the problem statement Is given after It, the order is 
reversed. On page 64 of Hasemer and Domingue there is this example-, 
'A simple If expression might look like this: 
(if (null q) (setf qq t) 
(setf qq nil)) 
This should be read as "If the list q Is empty then set (setf qq 0, else (setf qq nil). "' 
In such a case the B term (the solution) Is given in the text before the A term (the 
statement). Notice also that in this case there is no explicit link between the solution and 
the problem statement. It does not, for example, explain the link between (null q) and 'the 
list q is empty'; that the order of terms represents 'if... then... else... '; what (setf qq t) 
means; and so on. 
This state of affairs is represented in figure 3.21. 
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_I 
The reader is therefore left to infer relations between the problem givens and the form of 
the code. The nature of inferences is an important consideration in the design of 
instructional material. Things have to be spelled out in more detail at the beginning when 
the reader is presumed to know very little about the new domain. The extent to which 
things have to be spelled out is an empirical question, as is the question of how much any 
spelling-out can be relaxed in later sections. 
The example problem represented in figure 3.20 violates the reader's schema for how a 
text is organized: if, when solving a later exercise problem, readers access that example 
solution, they would expect to find a statement of the problem before the solution and 
consequently would go backwards in the text to find out what the problem is. Unless the 
text is well signposted, they may find a problem statement for a different problem and try 
to relate that to the current solution and thus become even more confused. 
4.2.2. Explanations 
Textbooks explain things In various ways. They can, for example, explain how a 
particular type of problem should be tackled. This constitutes an explanation of the 
problem from a general point of view. They can also explain how the solution Is generated 
from the problem givens: this is an explanation of the solution and is much more specific. 
Explanations are indicated by the letter 'e' in the term box. Where the problem is 
Ae 
explained the 'e' subscriptappears In the A term box thus: 
E 
and where the solution is 
explained it appears in the B term box: 
K 
The following example comes from Eisenstadt (1978): 
A; Here is an example of a procedure called BOOZETEST, 
which finds out whether a person 
Be: (actually the node to which BOOZETEST is applied) 
A. - drinks a beverage which contains alcohol. 
EXAMPLE PROBLEM 
STATEMENT + 
EXPLANATION OF 
SOLUTION 
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I 
Be: To do this it first uses pattern-matching to find out what 
beverage (if any) the person consumes. Then if it finds such a 
beverage, it tries to find out whether that beverage contains 
alcohol. Notice particularly how the variable * is used In 
step 2 to keep track of the node retrieved as a result of the 
pattem-matching in step 1. 
B: SOLO: TO BOOZETEST /X/ 
... :I CHECK /X/ - DRINKS -> 
? 
....... IA IF PRESENT: CONTINUE 
....... IB IF ABSENT: PRINT "NO 
INFORMATION"; EXIT 
:2 CHECK *- CONTAINS -> ALCOHOL 
....... 2A IF PRESENT: CONTINUE 
....... 213 IF ABSENT., PRINT "NON-ALCOHOLIC"; EXIT 
:3 PRINT "AHA, " /X/ "IS A REAL BOOZER" 
: DONE 
Be: The control-statements in BOOZETEST are used Ina manner 
analogous to the way they were used in WEAKASSESS and 
STRICTASSESS, presented in section 6.4. Substeps IA and 2A 
specify CONTTNUE, because that is the main pathway 
through a successful sequence of CHECKs, down to the 
message which gets printed out at step 3. 
EXPLANATION 
OF SOLUTION 
SOLUTION 
EXPLANATION 
OF SOLUTION 
The text above can be represented as in figure 3.22 where A represents the problem, B the 
solution, and Be represents the explanation of the solution. The link between the A term 
and B term represents the fact that the relation between the problem givens and the 
solution Is explkined. The links between the A and B terms and the Be term represent the 
fact that aspects of how SOLO evaluates the code are explained both In the problem 
statement as well as after the solution. The arrow to STRICTASSESS shows that the text 
is directing the reader to another part of the text. 
151 
Chapter 3- Design of the interpretation theory 
I STRICTASSESS I 
Al IBI lBe 
4.2.3. The adequacy versus comprehensiveness of explanations 
Writers of textbooks have to make their explanations complete or comprehensive enough 
for their readers to understand. 7he early chapters of a textbook in a new domain have to 
be particularly comprehensive in their treatment of novel concepts since few assumptions 
can be made about a reader's prior knowledge. In later chapters the explanation can be 
less comprehensive but must be adequate for the reader to understand them, which means 
that the writers must make some assumptions about what has been understood from 
previous chapters. The balance between a comprehensive (and possibly tedious) 
explanation and an adequate (and possibly dense) explanation is a fine one. Part of the 
difficulty facing writers of textbooks Is that they are ipso facto experts, and so have a 
great deal of compiled or schematic knowledge about their domain of expertise (Adelson, 
1981; Anderson, 1983; Ehrlich and Soloway, 1984; Novick, 1988; Owen and Sweller, 1989), 
Experts have to reconstruct the declarative knowledge from which their procedural 
knowledge was built in order for novices to understand all the steps in a particular 
procedure. 
In the example from Eisenstadt (1978) in section 4.2.2, part of which Is reproduced here, 
there Is an assumption that the reader understands what a 'control-statement' Is and how 
it was used in the previous examples (WEAKASSESS and STRICTASSESS). However, if 
the readers have any doubt about what a control-statement is, they are referred back to 
the section where these examples were introduced. 
The control-statements in 130OZETEST are used in a EXPLANATION 
manner analogous to the way they were used in OF SOLUTTON 
WEAKASSESS and STRICTASSESS, presented In section 6.4. 
Where an explanation Is provided which Is incomplete in that it makes assumptions about 
the knowledge of the learner, it is represented In our theory with a'-' above the 'e' 
subscript In the D term, Where an explanation is complete, that Is where the reader does 
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not have to make any inferences, it Is represented by aY above the V. These are 
Illustrated in figure 3.23. 
4.2.4. Intermediate representations 
Learners can be helped to understand a new concept when they are given another way of 
representing the problem and Its solution. For instance, an example problem statement 
may be followed by an intermediate representation of the problem. Thus, in Duncker's 
Radiation Problem, If a solver were asked to imagine the spokes of a wheel as an aid in 
solution, this would be counted as an intermediate problem representation. This 
representation Is presumed to enable the solver to abstract out important features of the 
problem which can thereafter be used to solve a number of Gick and Holyoak's 
'convergence'problems. 
Where the writer Is trying to help the reader understand the nature of a problem by some 
form of Intermediate representation this Is indicated by a prime symbol, as in Aý. Where 
It Is the explanation of the solution that Is being facilitated, it is represented by B, In 
figure 3.24. 
[A A' 
1B E31 
Eisenstadt (1983a) provides 4 series of diagrams to Illustrate flow of control In SOLO as 
part of the explanation of how the following 'INFECT' procedure works: 
SOLO. TO INFECT/X/ 
:1 NOTE/X/ - HAS --> FLU 
:2 CHECK/X/ -- KISSES --> ? 
..... 2A If PRESENT: INFECT *, EXIT 
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213 IF ABSENT., EXIT 
DONE 
Figure 3.25 shows one of the diagrams used: 
INF)ýý 
1 
2 INFR5ýý 
21,1 AA__ 2 INFECTJANE @1 
2B2 
2A 
A EXIT 
FiLrure3.25. A'snal25hot'of the operation of the R*JFECT12r fdure (Eisenstadt. 1983a). 
An explanation of the problem (Ae) followed by an explanation of the solution (Be) which 
then refers the reader to the intermediate representation 03% can be shown in the 
framework as in figure 3.26: 
B A. 
problem solution solution 
explained explained Illustrated 
4.2.5. 'Chosr tenns 
Sometimes a solution Is presented with no explicit statement of the problem Itself, Section 
4.2 of Hasemer and Domingue present 8 examples only half of which have statements of 
what the problem is. Another example can be found on page 106, which says, 'Look 
carefully at this function. ' This Is followed by a piece of LISP code and an explanation of 
how It works, The reader Is left to Infer what It Is supposed to do. Very occasionally the 
problem solution Is not made explicit 'The answer to this question is found in the same 
way as the previous one. ' Wherever the reader Is left to infer or Imagine what the 
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missing term should be, this is referred to as a 'ghost' term and is presented in a shadow 
format (figure 3.27). Both Lisp textbooks often miss out statements of the problems 
presented. Textbook writers have to be very sure that readers can readily infer what the 
problem is. First, if they later access this solution while trying to solve an exercise 
problem, they might expect to find a statement of the problem before the solution and 
search backwards in the text to find out what the problem is. Second, the reader is 
prevented from making any mappings since there is nothing to map. 
Fý 
b) AI rir&i 
Ei pre 3.27. re-enfinz'gbost* terrns. 
4.2.6, The problem givens 
Problem statements are made up of a number of problem givens. These are the features of a 
problem which are necessary to the solution. An algebra problem involving speeds, times 
and distances may include such information as: carl travels at 30 mph, car2 travels at 40 
mph, carl leaves at 10.00 a. m. and car2 leaves at 11.30 a. m. Each of these givens is 
substituted for the variables of an equation which, when solved, will produce the answer 
to the problem, In the interpretation theory, problem givens are shown as being 'nested' 
within the A term. In figure 3.28 Ai represents the speed of carl, A2 that of car2, and A3 
and A4 are the departure times. 
EiLrure3.28. 'Nested' problemzimens. 
4.2.7. Blocks and Impasses 
Situations can arise in a text where the givens In a source problem cannot be mapped to the 
target, perhaps because they have been stated in a different form, Alternatively, the 
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solution to an earlier problem is not relevant to the current one and yet the solver Is 
attempting to use it. The framework indicates these mappings as being 'blocked' (figure 
329; see also subsection 4.2.11). 
ýýI] A 
JA2 A blocked 
1 
blocked A74 [A-3 
I-I 
The same representation is used when analysing verbal protocols, There are times when a 
solver reaches an impasse and does not know what to do or where to look for help. In such 
cases also the blocked line Is used to represent an impasse. 
4.2.8. Templates 
Example problems are sometimes given In the form of a 'template,. Such partially 
instantiated solutions are designed to show what the layout of particular programming 
structures should look like. In the interpretation theory, templates refer to any structure 
which demonstrates the syntactic form a solution should take. An example of a template 
can be found on page 66 of Hasemer and Domingue where the following expression occurs: 
(cond ((null lis) (<do somethinp)) <action> ... <action>) 
(t (<do somethinp))) 
In our framework these templates are represented with at superscript as in figure 3.30. 
It It 
4.2.9. Subgoals 
In many domains such as mathematics, physics and programming, solving a problem means 
attaining a number of subgoals on the way to the overall goal. In complex problems where 
several subgoals (which may in turn contain embedded subgoals) have to be attained, all 
subgoals are represented as being 'nested' within the B term (or the D term if the exercise 
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problem is being analysed), On page 66 of Hasemer and Domingue there is a worked 
example which prints the value of the variable item, then sets the value of qq to the cdr 
of item (that Is, the value of item minus its first term) and prints that. Since this is the 
first example solution in this section it is numbered BI. 
Uprint item) (setf qq (cdr item)) (print qq)) 
There are three subgoals to be achieved each of which Is Identified by a letter- 
Bla, (print Item) 
Blb: (setf qq (cdr Item)) 
BIC: (print qq) 
Bib also contains an embedded subgoal (cdr item) which we can label Bjbi. We can now 
represent subgoal Bib as in figure 3.31. 
JB1 
BT 
4.2.10, Nested subSoals 
On page 67 of Hasemer and Domingue there is an explanation of how to write a function 
definition which leads up to a piece of LISP code defining a function (namedfoo) which, 
when called, will do exactly what the earlier program, represented by 131 In section 4.2.9, 
did. Since this is the second example provided this can be represented by 132 but, in order 
to indicate that the second example contains the first one nested within It, it Will be 
shown as in figure 3.32a. 
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(a) IBH 
(b) Bi IiiI 
13201 rB2 
In the text on page 66 of Hasemer and Domingue, example Bi is presented with no 
indication of the problem statement. The example is followed by an explanation of a 
function definition, shown as 132e, followed by the specific example solution, B2, which 
includes Di. In figure 3.32b we can represent the path taken by the text In the section 
dealing with function definitions. The writers assume that the readers have understood 
the LISP code represented by Rt (the earlier example with its own nested subgoals). 
The final function definition on page 67 is shown in figure 3.33. 
(defun foo (item) 
(print Item) B2 (setf qq (cdr item)) 
[El 
(print qq)) 
Writing a function definition Involves writing the macro defun followed by a function 
name (foo) and a parameter list (item). The next three lines give the three actions which 
the function carries out. Figure 3.34 shows that the first subgoal is to write the function 
name and parameter list and the second Is to specify what the function does. 
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a (defun foo (item) JB2 
b (print Item) (setf qq (cdr Item)) 
(print qq)) 
B2b also contains a number of subgoals labelled T, 'ii', and 'iU' in figure 3.35. B2biicontains 
a further subgoal, that of generating the cdr of item. Figure 3.35 demonstrates how 
subgoals, at different levels can be visuaUed in this example solution. 
a 
B2 
lb 
2 
t 
00 
'o 
of 
0 0* '00 * 
*0 
*0 0 
00 0000 
.0 
10 
0 0,0 
*000 
single subgoal achieved trivially 
0 
10*0 0000* *0 12 
." 
112 
(cdr Item) 
Constraints 
Some problems include explicit constraints or restrictions on a solution path. Versions of 
the Radiation priblem Include the constraint that a ray may not pass down the 
oesophagus and that surgery may not be used to open up the stomach to get at the tumour. 
Constraints are represented as a 'photographic negative' with the black and white fore- 
and background reversed. Since constraints prevent a possible solution, the paths from the 
constraints are shown as being blocked (see subsection 4.7). In figure 3.36 two constraints for 
the Radiation problem are represented. Most problems have implicit constraints, and It is 
part of the problem solving process to find out what these constraints are. In the problem 
solving episode in Chapter 1, for example, the subject was unsure whether It was necessary 
to represent the fact that there was a water tank in the attic. As far as she was concerned 
the problem was underconstralned, and part of her problem solving involved discovering 
what the constraints were. Only when constraints are explicitly stated are they 
represented as In figure 3.36. 
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You may not pass a ray 
down the oesophagus 
You cannot use surgery 
to open up the stomach 
4.2.12. Iderences 
In later chapters of textbooks writers assume a certain amount of knowledge on the part of 
the student. This means that the student is often required to make inferences when 
presented with example problems. An example of this is the Distance = Rate x Time 
problem presented by Reed, Dempster & Ettinger (1985) In which two vehicles leave the 
same place at different times (10-00 a. m. and 11.30 p. m. ) and travel at different speeds. 
The second vehicle eventually overtakes the first. Since both vehicles travel the same 
distance, the appropriate equation to use is Rate,, hjkj x Time,, hick, = Rate,, hicle2 x 
Time,,, hi, kz. 
In figure 3.37, Al and A2 represent 11.30 and 1.30 respectively. In the equation which 
underlies the solution, the time taken by vehicle I Is shown in the explanation as (t + 312) 
There is no indication of where the '3/2' comes from. The solver is left to make the 
Inference that the times mentioned in A' and A2 somehow relate to the '3 / 2' given in the 
solution. When the solver has to Infer which problem givens are relevant to the solution, 
this is represented by the dotted lines shown in the figure. The number 13 /2' Is arrived at 
by applying the subtraction operator to the givens, and then converting that to a fraction. 
Thus, there are two operations that are not explained In the example. The 'black boxes' in 
figure 3.37 are used to show that there is no Indication of what the relevant operators are . 
"SU"NSUSSUUU"" 
" p..... I 
"II 
III 
I"II A2] L....... J B2 I 
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4.2.13. Concepts 
Worked examples provide illustrations of how concepts can be manipulated to provide a 
solution. Examples of this are the use of recursion in LISP functions or how the concepts of 
Distance and Time can be manipulated to find Speed. It is, therefore, sometimes useful to 
analyse problem statements in terms of the concepts which they embody. By doing so we 
can represent how the problem relates to the concepts which it is attempting to illustrate. 
In linear algebra word problems discussed in the next section, the distance a vehicle 
travels Is related to the rate at which it travels and the time it takes. If the time a 
vehicle leaves is mentioned first in the problem statement, this can be represented as A' in 
figure 3.38. If Its rate Is then given, this would be represented as A2. The V indicates that 
these problem givens are concepts (the specific concepts are shown in the rectangles). 
conc ept: 
concept: 
rate 
J 
4.2.14. Operators 
The initial state of a problem can be transformed Into a new state by applying operator's to 
the problem's givens. The new state may be the goal state (the solution) or a subgoal along 
the solution path. For example, applying a multiplication operator to the figures for Time 
and Speed in a DAstance-Speed-Time problem would yield distance travelled. In the 
interpretation theory, the operator is represented as an oval superimposed on the link 
between problem givens and solution. The specific operator applied Is written within the 
oval. In figure 3.39, if the multiplication operator is applied to the two concepts Acl and 
AC2, this would yield the distance (130). Similarly if the concepts were replaced by 
specific figures such as 30mph for rate and 3 hours for time then the result would be 90 
miles. 
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multipilcatio 
oncept: 12 Iconcept: c IIAC 
rate 
AC 
Ime 
It 
distance 
Up until now the discussion has been mainly about text analysis. The same framework can 
be used in analysing students' problem solving behaviour. The remaining codings apply 
specifically to the analysis of verbal protocols. 
4.2.17. Understanding processes 
In Chapter 1, the subject found a candidate example problem which she used in order to 
understand how recursion was instantiated in an example. Part of the verbal protocol is 
reproduced below. 
a) 
I'm looking on page 80, em, 
which has given a new definition of the understanding training problern solution 
NHCT procedure 
so that it keeps on recurring through it. 
Here she shows evidence of simulating the behaviour of the example solution. At other 
times she simulates the behaviour of her own (partial) solutions. 
On other occasions she 6pe'nds some time trying to understand the problem statement, That 
is, she tries to understand what constraints on solutions apply. 
b) 
Well, my problem is that, at the moment, the database doesn't contain the fact that 
there is a water tank In the attic, and therefore it's difficult to have... I mean, I was 
thinking, you see, of starting something like 'CHECK WATERTANK IN ATTIC 
BURSTS. ' Well, I mean, obviously it wouldn't say that, but, I mean, something that 
would check that sort of thing. But since the database at the moment doesn't actually 
have the fact that there Is a water tank In the attic, then, em... that makes It a wee 
bit difficult, doesn't It? 
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During problem solving episodes students may read through a problem statement or 
Solution, or attempt to simulate the behaviour of a solution program, as in a) and b) above. 
Such episodes are classified as 'Problem Understanding' and in protocol analysis they are 
represented as in figure 3.40a and 3.40b, The circular arrow represents the fact that the 
subject has found an example problem solution (B2) and is re-reading it or simulating its 
behaviour if it is a computer program. The figure in the circle indicates that this is the 
18th problem solving 'episode'. Similarly, in figure 3.40b, the subject is trying to 
understand the exercise problem statement (C), and this is the 4th such problem solving 
episode. 
B2 
4.2.15. Experimenter Interventions - The Lifebelt 
In experiments, an experimenter might Intervene to help the subject rather than just to 
prompt the solver to reveal what he or she Is thinking. In such cases the experimenter Is 
actually teaching the subject. The student in a sense is being thrown a lifeline rather than 
being left to find-the answer from the text or from memory. The following example is 
taken from a protocol presented in Anderson, Farrell & Sauers (1984). In this episode, the 
subject (13) Is having difficulty understanding an example solution. To help her, the ' 
experimenter (E) reminds her of an earlier example she had seen in a previous chapter of 
the Winston & Hom (1981) textbook, and is asking her to compare the two problems. 
E, Just like with an exercise before, remember we had to get PEAR out of [? ) Get B out of 
LIST1. Yes, it's equivalent to that one. 
D: Ok, so... at this point, LISTI has the value of 0 R, 
Experimenter Interventions of this kind are represented by the lifebelt Illustrated In 
figure 3.41, 
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EXPERIMENTER I Bi 
B2 
FigUre3.4l. 
-Ibe'Lifebelt'. 
The e=erimenter leads the subject to make some kind of ma2pjnz 
between exampleg. 
In this example the experimenter Intervenes to illustrate some concept instantiated in 
example 132 which is also in 131. The subject Is being led to map the two solutions or parts 
of the two solutions with a view. to understanding the concept. 
4.2.16. Experimenter generated examples 
To help the subject understand a concept the experimenter may intervene to create new 
examples to illustrate the concept. Here is a further example from Anderson et al, 's 
protocol in which the experimenter presents a new 'top-level' example problem for the 
subject to think about. 
E: Ok, let me try [? ] this way, Suppose we had typed in open paren. CAR of QUOTE 
paren LISTI closed paren closed paren [(CAR '(LISTI))], what do you expect to get as an 
answer to that? 
B: Paren LISTI. 
Such experimenter generated examples are represented as In figure 3.42. The 
parallelogram Is used to distinguish such examples from those in the textbook itself. 
1h7 
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S. Applying the framework to a training manual: Ananalysis 
of Winston and Hom (1981) pp. 33-36. 
To Illustrate the use of the interpretation theory for a relatively coarse grained analysis 
of training problems, the following examples are taken from Winston and Horn (1981). 
Chapter 3 of the book (pages 33-36) deals with 'definitions, predicates, conditionals and 
scoping' in USP. The first description of a function definition is given on page 33. It takes 
the form of a template showing the syntax of function definitions in general. 
(DEFUN <function name> 
(<parameter 1> <parameter 2> ... <parameter n>) 
(<process description>) 
The reader is reminded that the angle brackets 'delineate descriptions of things' and 
provides some examples of those things. 7bere are three parts of the function definition 
which the reader has to understand. the first part contains the function name, which the 
programmer has to provide; the second part Is a parameter list, which provides arguments 
for the third part: the process description. This last part Is what the function actually 
does. Each part of the template is explained in the text which follows the template. 
Figure 3.43 represents the fact that the template (8t) is followed by an explanation of it 
(Bte). The Bte term represents a section of text in which the relationship between the 
syntax and the form of the template is explained. This relationship is represented by the 
solid line from the template Bt to the explanation 13te. 
J-ý 
No explicit links are thereafter made in the text between the examples provided and the 
template at the beginning of the section. Due to the nature of DEFUN, there Is no one 
procedure which applies to all the examples provided, other than that of establishing a 
definition name and giving a list of parameters for the function to work on. 
Example 1: 
The template and its explanation are followed by an example problem (labelled Al) and 
a possible solution to the problem (a piece of LISP code labelled Bi below): 
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At: '-define a function that converts temperature given in degrees Fahrenheit to 
degrees Celsius. ' 
BI: (DEFUN F-TO-C (TEMP) 
(QUOTIENT (DIFFERENCE TEMP 32) 1.8)) 
The LISP code is followed by a partial explanation of how the program works (Bie). This 
explanation deals with how the argument is evaluated becoming the temporary value of 
the function's parameter. It does not say how the second line in the above code is 
evaluated (hence the minus sign above the V In the Bie term in figure 3-44). There are 
only partial mappings between elements in the problem statement and the final solution. 
Some are explicitly given and others have to be Inferred- 
parameter TLN4P degrees Fahrenheit (inferred) 
value returned 37.77 degrees Celsius (inferred) 
No further mention is made of 'c onverts', 'temperatures', 'degrees Fahrenheit' and 'degrees 
Celsius'. There is no explanation of how to construct the second line of the code: 
(QUOTIENT (DIFFERENCE 100 32) 1.8). Since there are only partial mappings between 
the terms (Ai, Bf and Bie), a dotted line is used to link the terms in figure 3.44 showing 
that the reader has to make a number of inferences to understand the relations. The black 
box indicates that there Is no explanation about how to generate the second line of code. 
B'lj Bi 
Half-way through the explanation the reader Is asked to refer to the figure on page 35 
reproduced as figure 3.45. 
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See something like 
(F-TO-C SUPERHOT) 
or 
(F-TO-C 100-0) 
Record current value 
of TEMP if any 
(SETO TEMP 100.0) 
T 
Use EVAL on body of 
F-TO-C N. 10mm 
4 
Restore TEMP's value 
to whatever was 
recorded here ...... ..... 
Return value oul 1 l... 
. here .... 
ý. 
This diagram is meant to illustrate what is happening as the program is being evaluated 
(represented by the arrow from Bie and B'i in figure 3.44). The new, intermediate 
representation Is designed to allow readers to re-represent the problem In order to help 
them understand how it works. However, this new representation of how the program 
works Is not entirely analogous to the working of the actual program. In the diagram 
represented by B%, the third box contains the LISP code: (SETQ TEMP 100.0), which is 
intended to show that the parameter TEMP is assigned the value 100.0 before the body of 
the code Is evaluated. Yet the LISP form SETQ Is not used in the code Itself. The code 
works only analogously to SETQ. 
Example 2: 
The second example problem statement Is also followed immediately by the solution and 
explanation: 
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A2: '[define] a function which exchanges the first and second elements of a two- 
element list. ' 
B2: (DEFUN EXCHANGE (PAIR) 
(LIST (CADR PAIR) (CAR PAIR))) geverse elements 
The explanation provided for this example is more complete than the previous one in that 
the mappings between elements in the problem statement and the form of the solution are 
given. The reader is asked to assume that the value of the variable SINNERS is the two- 
element list (ADAM EVE). The explanation goes on to explain what happens when 
(EXCHANGE SINNERS) is evaluated. In doing so it provides the following mappings: 
SINNERS =*PAIR 
(CADR PAIR) =*EVE =*2nd element of two-element list 
(CAR PAIR) =*ADAM =*Ist element of two-element list 
Once these have been explained the book then says that 'the following is evident: 
(EXCHANGE SINNERS) 
(EVE ADAM)' 
However, the book does not explain the effect of CADR, CAR or LIST in this example. It 
assumes the reader already understands them since they were presented in the preceding 
chapter, hence the black box in figure 3.46. For tl-ds reason the 132e term in figure 3.46 has a 
minus sign above it. 
A2 B2 B2 
Figjjrg 3.46. Represej3tatioI3 of the third example 'EXCIIANGE' from page 36 otWinston and 
Ham 
Example 3: 
AX Define a function to compute the percentage by which the second argument given In 
the function is greater than the first. 
B3: (DEFUN INCREASE (X Y) 
QUOTTENT (TTMES 100.0 (DIFFERENCE Y X)) X)) 
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(INCREASE 10.0 15-0) 
50.0 
(INCREASE jo. o 15.0) is used as an example to show the mapping between the first and 
second arguments (10.0 and 15.0) and the X and Y of the solution (B3). No explanation Is 
provided of QUOTIENT, TIMES or DIF-FERENCE, nor why Y precedes X in the second line, 
nor of the position of X at the end of the second line. The relation between statement and 
solution is therefore only partially explained. The relation between the following 
elements from the problem statement and the solution are given: 
10.0 
15.0 
Since there is no explanation of the operations required to derive the body of the code, the 
reader Is left to infer the interrelations between QUOTIENT, TIMES and DIFFERENCE 
and the form the syntax takes. Because of the paucity of explanation and the number of 
Inferences left for the reader to make, figure 3.47 shows a dotted line and black box 
between the A term and the B term, 
I 
_______ 
1A31 1B31 
Example 4: 
In this example ibe problem Is the same as the first example on page 34. The form of the 
solution is different from the previous F-TO-C example, however. The explanation given 
after the solution concerns side-effects. There is no explanation about how to construct the 
code given the problem statement. 
AC (problem is not stated, Reader has to refer back to previous example (AI)) 
134: (DEFUN F-TO-C (TEMP) 
(SETQ TEMP (DIFFERENCE TEMP 32)) 
QUOTTENT TE MP 1-8)) 
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B4e: There Is only a partial explanation of the code; TEMP Is used as both input parameter 
and temporary anchor for the difference between the input and 32. How the same variable 
can play two different roles is not explained. 
Figure 3.48 shows that there is no relation provided between the problem statement and 
the solution (there is no line linking the A term and the B term), and the partial 
explanation of the B term Is represented by the dotted line. 
Al 
refers back to 
previous exampLle 4%4 
iron WSW aa ass% 
figure 3.49 summarizes the analysis of this section of the textbook. We can see at a glance 
what inferences the reader Is required to make (the dotted lines) and therefore where the 
reader may have difficulty later. It is also apparent that there are no explicit links 
between the individual problems. That is, the writers do not explicitly relate one problem 
to another. They do not explain in what way, for example, F-TO-C relates to the 
EXCHANGE example. For this reason no lines are drawn tinking one example to another. 
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DEFUN template and explanation 
(DEFUN 4unction name; -- 
rý 
(. cparameter 1> cparameter Z, ... <Parameter 3r. ) RE 
<process decdption>) 
Example I 
'... define a function that converts 
temperatures given In degrees (DEFUN F-TO-C (rEMP) 
Fahrenheit to degrees Celsius. ' (OUOTIENT (DIFFERENCE TEMP 32) J, e)) 
too 
A 
F 
Example 2 
'This new function exchanges the 
first and second elements of a 
two-element list' 
A2 E32 E 
Example 3 
'Its purpose Is to compute percentage. 
More specifically, the value returned 
Is to be the percentage by which the 
second argument given to the function 
Is greater than the first. ' 
B]4 
(DEFUN EXCHMIGE (PAIR) 
(UST (CADS PAIR) (CAR PAIR))) 
PEFUN INCREASE (X Y) 
(QUOTIENT (TIMES 100.0 
(DIFFERENCE Y X)) X)) 
(DEFUN F-TO-C (TEMP) 
(SETO TEMP (DIFFERENCE TEMP 32)) 
(CUOTIENTTEMP 1.8)) 
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Chapter 4 TEXT AND TASK ANALYSIS 
USING THE INTERPRETATION THEORY 
1. Interpretation theory applied to laboratory studies 
In this chapter, the interpretation theory will be used to examine in depth the structure of 
a simple word problem that is described and the solution explained in Reed, Dempster & 
Ettinger (1985). The theory will also be used to analyse and predict the effects of thoseý 
aspects of a problem explanation where inferences are required to solve another problem of 
the same type or a variant of the source problem. 
1.1. The effect of having to make inferences 
Britton, Van Dusen, Glynn, & Hemphill (1990) examined the effect of different types of 
inferencing in the study of instructional texts by 'n4ve, unmotivated, passive readers'. 
Figure 4.1 represents a problem as a tree structure in which there are a number of nodes 
linked to other related nodes, These nodes represent points at which inferences are made 
and hence at which further information becomes available. If the hypothetical solver is 
able to make the two inferences enclosed in the squares In figure 4.1 then the rest of the 
tree structure becomes available and a solution can be found. If, as in figure 4.2, solvers 
cannot make the necessary inferences at those points, then they will be unable to relate one 
part of the text to another. 
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Inferences 
; sed 
'11*ý 
\ N%., 
There are many kinds of inference involved in text comprehension. In word problems 
readers have to construct i situation model of what the story represents. This model 
contains inferences that are derived from a reader's knowledge of the world. For example, 
if two cars leave the same place at different times, travel the same route, and the second 
car eventually overtakes the first, then readers might be expected to infer that both cars 
travel the same distance. Such text-external inferences require the reader to have some 
prior knowledge from outside the text. In the case of textbooks, writers also have to judge 
what the reader might be expected to remember from earlier parts of the textbook - that 
is, what text-reinstatement inferences readers are able to make - when they come to do a 
problem In later sections, The algebra problems examined in this section are very short 
and do not involve text reinstatement inferences. 
Where the two 
Inferences In 
figure 4.1 are 
missed, 
- Vo 
the rest of the 
problem or text 
structure 
becomes 
-A. "- A'-, unavailable. 
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Algebra word problems 
A common type of algebra word problems is one where a vehicle travels from A to B at a 
certain speed and in a certain time ('linear distance' problems). A subtype of that class of 
problems involves 2 vehicles travelling the same route and leaving at different times 
Ccolinear distance' problems). In both, the solver is required to generate the correct 
equation and map the values in the problem statement onto the variables in the equation, 
and then solve it for any unknown variable. In the next subsection I shau describe linear 
problems and in the following subsections colinear problems wW be discussed. 
Linear word problems 
Distance problems employ variations on the basic equa don 'distance = rate x time'. Since 
this type of problem has three variables - distance, rate, and time - three different 
equations can be constructed: 
type I distance = rate x time 
type 2 rate = distance + time 
type 3 time = distance * rate 
This class of equations has the same simple overall structure. The only difference between 
them is in the nature of the arithmetic operator needed to solve the problems - either 
multiplication (problem type 1) or division (problem types 2 and 3). They also involve 
problem statements which are easy to map onto the equations. In mathematics textbooks 
they are usually represented in a triangle where D is Distance, S is Speed and T is Time. 
The D can be found by multiplying S and T and the S and the T can be found by dividing D 
by T and S respectively: 
AS D ýT 
Here are examples for each type of equatioil: 
Type 1: 
'A car travels at a speed of 45mph for 4 hrs. How far does it travel? ' 
Distance - rato x time 
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'45mph' maps onto 'rate' and '4 hrs' maps onto 'time'. Applying the multiplication 
operator to them gives the solution. 
Type 2. 
'A car travels 180 miles in 
Rate = distance 
4 hrs. How fast does it travelT 
time 
'180 miles' maps onto distance and '4 hrs' onto time. Dividing yields the speed, 
Type 3: 
'A car travels 180 miles at 45 mph. For how long does it travel? ' 
Time = distance -4- rate 
One point to note is that there is nothing explicit in the problem statement to indicate 
which operator to apply. 
In colinear word problems prior knowledge is required about the concepts of rate, time, distance, the 
equality of the distances travelled, the differences in departure times, the mathematical operators 
that relate distance to rate and time, and those required to solve an alegbraic equation, When the 
simpler linear problems are first introduced in textbooks, they often take the following form: 
Miss Matthews has to drive 450km from Newcastle to London for a conference. She thl ks 
she can average 65 krnIh. How long will she take? 
65 km I hour Time Distance Formula Spged D 
450 km x hours 
A 
ST 
JU Tw D 
6.92 hours 6.92 hours is 
w6 hours 55 minutes w6 hours 55 m1nutes (0.92 x 60 - 55-2)1 
This example is taken from Howat, Mullan, Nisbet & Brown (1987) page 27. Similar types 
of explanation can be found in Holderness (1987) and Rayner (1990). In the example on the 
left of the figure there is no explicit explanation of the relation between the problem 
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givens, 65 krn and 450 kin, and the figures on their immediate right; nor is there a stated 
relation between them and the concepts In the centre of the figure; nor between either of 
those and the triangle and formula given; nor what the figures In brackets have to do with 
anything. The explanation given in figure 4.3 is represented in figure 4.4. In row a, time is 
related to distance and speed but none of these is explicitly related to the problem 
statement. 
The reader has to infer that 450km and 65km/h should map onto distance and speed (rows 
b and c) in the equation - hence the dotted lines from the problem givens Al and A2 to the 
subgoals, BI and B2. There is no explanation why the equation is in the form it is (row d). 
The reader has to infer that the speeds and distances in BI and B2 should map onto the 
equation in row d. There is no explanation of what operations to perform to get the figure 
6.92 hours (row e). There is no explanation why . 92 is multiplied by 60 (B5e in row f), nor 
how this relates to the solution (135 in row 0. In row g, the 5 subgoals (B' to 135) are shown 
as 'nested' within the B term. 
The student Is then asked to solve 8 problems based on this example. Unless the student 
has some expertise in mathematics, these problems may prove rather difficult since the 
example does not contain any explanations. Indeed, figure 4.3 contains a bewildering 
collection of unrelated numbers and equations that make sense only if the reader already 
understands what the example is trying to explain. 
This example highlights the fact that some textbooks in widespread use should and can be 
readily improved. 
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structure of 
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H&Ure 4.4. Analysis of the exaMple problem gn speeds In Howat et al. (1987). 
2.2. Colinear word problems 
In colinear problems, 2 vehicles travel at different speeds over the same distance. They 
therefore involve a variant of the first type of basic Distance = Rate x Time problems. 
Since the distance travelled by each vehicle Is the same, the Rate x Thne for each vehicle 
e) 
f) 
g) 
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must also be the same. The relevant equation then becomes Ratethiki x Time,, hile, 
Rate, 
ehicW X Time,, hicle2, 
In colinear problems the textbook writer or researcher can decide which variable is 
unknown. In the following example Timejjlez is unknown. 
TruckI leaves point A at 45mph. 
Truck2 leaves point A at 55mph 
Truck2 leaves point A2 hours after TruckI. 
How long does it take Truck2 to catch up with Truckl? 
There are several ways to solve this problem: 
a) A solver might calculate where each truck is at each succeeding hour until both trucks 
are at the same distan6e from point A. TruckI will travel 45 miles in I hour, 90 miles in 
two hours, 135 miles In three hours, and so on. 2 hours after truckl leaves, truck2 travels 55 
miles in each succeeding hour. Working it out like this, both trucks will meet after 9 
hours, having travelled 495 miles. 
b) A solver might reason that, since truckl has travelled 90 miles in the first 2 hours, 
truck2 has to make up this 90 miles travelling 10mph faster. Since it will gain 10 miles 
each hour, it wiH take the truck 9 hours to catch up. 
c) A solver can use the algebraic equation Ratehidel X TiWvehidel = Ratewcw x 
Timev,! hjc, g2. 
211. The algebraic solution 
Unlike the linear problems, where there are three variables, one of which is unknown, 
colinear problems have 4 variables but only two of them, in this case the rates, can be 
instantiated from the values given in the problem. The algebraic solution depends on the 
solver realizing that both vehicles travel the same distance, and that the first vehicle 
travels for the same length of time as the second vehicle plus the length of time It was on 
the road before the second one left. So the time for vehiclel can be stated in terms of the 
time taken by vehicle2. 
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Time,, hi,,., = 
Time, 61,1.2 
where d is the difference in departure times, The complete equation for solving the type of 
problem where time is the unknown looks like this: 
Ratevehiclet X (Timevehicle2 *d)= Ratevehicle2 x Timev, hicle2. 
The equation for the problem in section 2.2.1 becomes- 
45 x (Tijre,, hlcl, 2 + 2) , 55 X 
Tinlevehicle2 
From this point on the solution depends on the solver's ability to select the relevant 
arithmetic operators in order to solve the equation. They are: 
ste, 2_1. Multiplication of terms in brackets. 
. 1.2 45 x Tlme,, ehlclo2 + 90 = 55 x 
Time,, ehic 
Step-2. Put terms of same type on same side of equation -subtraction. 
90 = 55 x Time,, hicl. 2 - 45 x Timewhid. 2 
Step-3. Subtraction of terms on right-hand side; 
90 = 10 Time,, hl, 1.2 
Step A. Simplify (by division). 
Divide both sides by 10 to find the 'Time, hicid; 
9 s2 Time,, hl, 1.2 
Stev-5. Replace units, 
Since time is given in hours and minutes, then: 
Time taken by vehicle2 Is 9 hours 
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Colinear problems in which the rate is unknown can have either a similar or more 
complicated algebraic structure than those in which time is the unknown- In the more 
complicated structure, only one value in the problem statement can be directly mapped 
onto the equation, as in the following example. 
Carl leaves point A.; 
2 hours later car2 leaves point A travelling IOmph faster than carl and overtakes it 
after 6 hours; 
[At what rate must the second car travel to overtake the first? 
In this case there is not only a difference in departure times but also a difference in rates 
between the two cars. The difference in rates has to be added to the equation along with 
the difference in times. In this case this means that R4te,,,,, = Rate .. 2-10 has tobe 
substituted for Rate,,,,, in the equation. The full equation now looks like this. 
(Rate,. hl, 1.2 -D) x (Tlme.,. hj,,. 2 + d) = Rate,. hl, 1.2 x 
Time,, hi, 1,2. 
where D is the difference in rates and d is the difference in times. 
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3. Task analysis of the Reed, Dempster & Ettinger (1985) 
practice distance problem 
Reed, Dempster & Ettinger (1985) used variations on the above colinear distance problems 
in their studies of transfer. The subjects in their experiments were novices and had never 
solved algebra word problems before, although they had been taught some complicated 
algebraic manipulations. However, one of the difficulties in analyzing tasks in the detail 
presented here is finding that state of ignorance which allows us to identify where 
inferences are built into a text and therefore where novices are likely to encounter 
problems. For this reason no inference is considered trivial, 
To spell out in some detail the operations required to solve one of Reed et al. 's problems, 
the interpretation theory will be applied first of all to a task analysis of the 'practice 
distance problem'. 
The task a'nalysis - 
Below is a statement of the practice problem given to the subjects in Reed et al. 's first 
three experiments. 
A car travelling at a speed of 30 miles per hour (mph) left a certain place at 10.00 a. m, 
At 11.30 a. m. another car departed from the same place at 40 mph and travelled the 
same route. In how many hours will the second car overtake the first car? 
In order to present a task analysis of this problem we will extract the salient features: 
Carl travels at a rate. of 30mph 
Car2 travels at a rate of 40mph 
Carl leaves point A at 10.00 a. m. 
Car2 leaves point A at 11.30 a. m. 
Both cars travel from point A to point B 
Both cars reach point B at the same time 
Time taken by car2 to reach point B is ? 
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PROBLEM GIVENS 
All IA2 
A 
A'61IAslIA4 
JA 11 
speed carl: 
30 m/h 
carl leaves: IA21 
10.00 aM 
J3 car2 leaves. 
11.30 am 
4] speed car2: 40 m/h 
cars travel Sjsame distance 
CONCEPT'S 
IgI goal: f Ind A6 
time of car2 
concept: 3 
concept: 
concept: 2 equallty of A' AC tim Ac 
Cg: 
rate 
)(9 
e 
FARistances 
travelled 
On the way to an overall solution, a number of subgoals have to be attained. These 
subgoals or partial solutions are then often used to achieve further subgoals. The Analysis 
presented below is therefore divided into a number of steps each of which is in three parts. 
On the left-hand side of the page there Is a natural language explanation of the subgoal to 
be achieved at e; ch step and the operator involved. On the right-hand side there is a list 
showing the problem elements that have to be manipulated. These elements are either 
the problem givens or the results derived from a previous step in the solution (indicated by 
GIVEN and DERIVED respectively), These are followed by a statement of the subgoal of 
the particular step, the operator to be applied, and the residt of that operation, The 
third part of each step is the interpretation theory representation of the givens (or the 
derived results frorn a previous step), the operator, and the result. 
The A terms which appear in the remaining figures in this section refer to the givens and 
concepts in figure 4.5. The 13 terms are those which are derived from the problem givens; 
that is, they are the't'esults of a previous step In the solution. 
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The first step identifies the general problem category in terms of the concepts involved: 
those of distance, rate and thne; and how they are related. 
1 The problem is a distance-rate-time 
problem in which two vehicles travel 
the same distance. If you know the rate 
and time of a vehicle then you can find 
the Distance it travelled by multiplying 
Rate and Time 
A 161 concept: 
j LLA concept: 
rate 
ýc 
time 
cOncept: E31c distance 
7be second step identifies the problem as a member of a subordinate category of distance- 
rate-time problems in which there are two vehicles, 
2 In this problem there are two vehicles 
so the equation for each vehicle would 
be: 
distance - ratevehiciei x tirnevehidel 
and 
distance - ratevehicle2 x timevehicle2 
GIVEN: concept: rate 
GIVEN. concept: time 
SUBGOAL: find concept: distance 
OPERATOR MUltipliC4tion 
RESULT concept: distance 
ultiplicat 
GIVEN: ratevehiciei 
GIVEN: timevehictei 
GIVEN: ratevehicie2 
GIVEN: timevehiciez 
SUBGOAL. find diSt4nCevehiclel 
OPERATOR multiplication 
RESULT diSt4nUvehicle2 
SUBGOAL: find distancevehick2 
OPERATOR multiplication 
RESULT distancevehicle2 
u It IoI Ica t 
: concept: -i concept: concept: I (LA j2c Ac] ratOVehictel tirnevehicisi 
UBý 
distanCevehiCial 
ultiplicatio 
concept: concept: I concept: A"'I lAcl tinleehicl. 2 j 
([Oc 
di stance vehiCIG2 
cl 
ratevehicIS2 
I 
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Step 3 shows how the relevant equation can now be derived from the fact that both 
vehicles travel the same distance. 
3 Since the two vehicles travel the same 
distance, the distance travelled by one 
vehicle is equal to the distance 
travelled by the other. If the distances 
are equal, the rate x time for each 
vel-dcle must be equal too, so the 
equation when there are two vehicles 
travelling the same distance is: 
ratevehiclel x timevehiclel 
ratevehide2 X timevewcW 
DERIVED: distancevewelei 
DERIVED: distancevehicle2 
SUBGOAL: set distances equal to each 
other 
OPERATOR substitution 
RESULT 
ratevehictei x timevehiciti= 
r4tevehicle2 X timevehicle2 
ubstitutl 
both cars travel -- 3 
same distance 
IIWIIB ratevehiciai x timevehictel= LWjratevehiclo2 
X thevehicle2 
The first three steps above represent a general procedure for deriving the particular 
equation for this type of distance problem. The steps from 4 onwards show how the givens 
in this specific example map onto that equation. 
4 We can represent whatever we want GIVEN: problem goal 
to find by a variable, such as t for the SUBGOAL: express goal as variable 
time, OPERATOR -> generate variable name 
RESULT .>t 
nerate variable na 
W goal: It 61 find tIMecar2l 
1161 
Figure4.2. 'Genegate variable Dame'operator. 
Steps 5 and 6 involve finding any differences (in times) between the two vehicles and 
stating the time of one vehicle in terms of the other. 
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5 The slower vehicle leaves earlier and 
takes longer than the faster one. 
Calculate the difference between 
the time taken by the faster 
vehicle and the slower one: 
11.30 - 10.00 = 11/2 hours 
GIVEN: departure time carl 
GIVEN: departure time car2 
SUBGOAL: difference between times 
OPERATOR subtraction 
RESULT 1112 hours 
6 
'llo, oo a. m. ]IIA3 111.30 a. m. 
The slower car takes the same length 
of time as the faster one plus the 
difference in times between -them. 
subtractio 
1 12 hours 
DERIVED: time taken by car2 (t) 
DERIVED: difference in times taken 
SUBGOAL. time taken'by earl in terms 
of time taken by car2 
OPERATOR -> addition 
RESULT ->t+ 1112 
addition 
13 7t 
E 
7 7he variable slots in the equation can 
now be filled in with the values taken 
either from the problem statement or 
from the results of previous steps. 
The problem gives the rates of travel 
and the times taken have been derived 
in steps 4,5 and 6. 
means 'maps onto#) 
GIVEN, ratecarl 30 m/h 
GIVEN: rateow 40 m/h 
DERIVED: timecan ý+ 11/2 
DERIVED: timecar2 t 
SUBGOAL: replace terms of equalion 
with values 
OPERATOR -> mapping 
RESULT -> 30, vt+1112=40xt 
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mapping 
L 
'j L0 L13 Aý -1ý x t+ LA =L! 40xt 
speeds times 
Figure 4.22. Mapping CpCr tor a1212lied to va1jje2 J13 table. 
8 If any of the terrns have addition or DERIVED: t+1 Ib 
subtraction signs then put brackets SUBGOAL: put brackets round, terms 
round thern. involving addition or subtraction 
OPERATOR -> add brackets 
RESULT .> (t + 1112) 
add bracke 
7p7 
Ef I (t +11 12 =30x(t+l 
1/2 
40xt 
Figure 4.13. 'Add brickgWoperator applied to elements. 
Step 9 involves applying a number of arithmetic operators to both sides of the equation. 
These are given in row c In the summary figure 4.14. 
9 Solve for the unknown variable (t). DERIVED. 30 x (t + 11/2) = 40 xt 
SUBGOAL: find valtie of t 
In the study of these algebra word problems, the focus is on the solver's ability to generate the 
required equation. That is, researchers are interested in seeing if the solver can get as far as step 
8 above, and what difficulties face the solver on the way. The ability of the solver to solve the 
equation once it has been generated is another question. 
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10 multip general j 
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problem ([: 
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c= di t 
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c rate time s ance 
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CO both cars travel 3 4 ratevehiciei x timevehicisi= Bra rate 
hi l X tI I same distance ve c e2 MGYeh cI92 
a net rat 
=ev 
ar lai 
=b: iiIe111,1=name steps in 
generating 
goal: ý D t equation 
find tlmec, ar2 
subtraction b) 
gfll 
1 30 10. 
_I 
1.30 a m) a-rn 
5 B I, / 
0,:::: addition " 
B 
E 
Is 
I 
B 'I t 
e"mappIng 
30x t+f/2 Ef = 40xt 
add brackets 
7 
B Ef t+ 11/2 
30x(t+l 1/2 
An 2 y 
rithm tic r; uItII: i IiI a e 
subtraction divislon operators 
30t+45 I d ý I c) 
= 40t 45 = 10 4.6 t t 
188 
Chapter 4- Text and task analysis 
4. The interpretation theory applied to laboratory 
experiments 
This section will present a coarse-grained view of the experiments conducted by Reed et al. 
It is intended to illustrate the experimental design they used and how this design is likely 
to help or hinder the solver. In section 5, one of the practice problems will be looked at in 
detail followed by some of the test problems. We might then be able to see what aspects 
of the text structure might lead solvers to fail to solve the test problems when they refer to 
the practice problems. 
4.1. The colinear problems studied by Reed, et al. (1985) 
Reed, Dempster and Ettinger (1985) describe 4 experiments in which one example problem 
and solution is presented and the student is thereafter expected to solve a transfer 
problem, or a problem whose solution procedure was unrelated to the practice problem, in 
Reed et al. 's terminology the transfer problems were called 'equivalent' or 'similar. just 
how 'equivalent' and how 'similar' the problems really were will be the subject of later 
sections. In the mean time we will look at the experiments in general and at some of the 
algebra word problems in particular with a view to discovering just what the solution 
explanations that were provided failed to explain. 
Reed et al. classified the colinear problems as 'distance' problems which were related by 
the equation Distance = Rate x Time. The test problems were either a) 'unrelated' to the 
practice problems, that is, they did not use the same equation for their solution nor did 
they have the same surface features; or b) 'related, in that the problems required the 
same equation for their solution. The cover story for the related practice problem Involved 
two cars travelling in the same direction at different speeds. An equivalent test problem 
was a close variant of the practice problem. Both involved cars leaving at different times 
and travelling at different speeds where the time taken by the vehicles Is unknown, The 
similar test problem was a distant variant. The cover story for the distant variant 
involved trucks in place of cars and the requirement to find two rates rather than the time 
taken by one vehicle (this means that students, trained on a problem in which they have 
to find the Time, are obliged to find the answer to a different problem), The cover story for 
the unrelated practice problem involved batting averages for a baseball team in terms of 
the slugger and pitcher. 
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Two forms of solution explanation were provided in the experiments: an 'unelaborated' 
solution provided only some of the mappings between the example problem and solution 
leaving the subjects to make a large number of inferences. The 'elaborated' explanation 
provided more detailed mappings as well as an intermediate representation of the 
problem (a table). 
4.2. The first 3 experiments 
In the experiments the subjects had 6 minutes to solve each practice problem. They were 
then given the solutions and allowed to study them for two minutes. They were told that 
the solutions would help them solve later problems. In experiment 1, the practice 
problems and solutions were then removed and the subjects were asked to solve the test 
problems. In the second experiment, one group of subjects was allowed to consult the 
solutions to the earlier related problems and one group was not. In experiment 3, 
elaborated solutions to the practice problems were presented. Once again, one group was 
allowed to consult the practice problem, one group had the related problem removed 
before solving the test problem, and one group was given an unrelated practice problem to 
solve, which was also then removed. 
Figure 4.15 shows the relation between the current problem and the related practice 
problem. The relation between the A term and the B term is governed by the equation 
Ratel x Timel = Rate2 x Time2 and relates all the distance problems presented in the 
experiments, However, in this condition neither the equation nor the explanation is 
available, so the student has to rely on memory, hence the shading covering the A and 13 
terms, which represents the fact that we cannot be sure If the student has a representation 
of the source (A-. B) in LTM. " 
li t 
it 
I All N ?D I 
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There are three possible causes for failure tosolve the problem which can be derived from 
figure 4.15. First, the solver may not remember the givens in the source, and hence may 
have difficulties finding correspondences between the relevant elements of the earlier 
problem and the target; second, the solver may not remember the relation between the 
givens in the source and the solution derived from them; third, the solver may not know 
how to apply the relation between the source A and B terms even if it is remembered since 
the higher-order relation is unknown, that is, information in the source problem may be 
lacking about how to transfer the solution from one problem to another. 
4.2.2. qn1ving tha_related problem yzhen the practice prob P able for 
Figure 4.16 shows the situation when the related practice problem Is available for study. 
The givens in the source (the A term) should be mapped onto the target (C); the relation 
between the source A term and 13 term Is explained (Be) and the whole problem and 
solution is available for study. It is the job of the solver to generalize the relation between 
A and B (the solution procedure) and apply it to the mapped elements in the target C term 
in order to generate the solution (D term). Nevertheless the solution depends on the 
adequacy of the mapping relations from source to target. In order to understand why raore 
than half of the subjects still failed to generate a correct solution, a more detailed 
analysis is called for. This will be the subject of section S. 
application 
1C1: J? D 
Ing mapp I 
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In all three experiments the unrelated practice problem' was not available for study when 
subjects were solving subsequent problems. The problem was unrelated to later problems in 
terms of its surface features as well as the underlying structure (the equation necessary to 
generate a solution). Subjects in all conditions were told that the earlier problem would 
help them solve later ones. This being the case, subjects would have tried to use the 
unrelated problem as a source, hence the access line in figure 4.17 from the C term to the A 
term, which they may take to be a relevant source problem. Even if the unrelated problem 
were available for study they would be unable to map the source problem givens onto the 
current problem (since they are unrelated) and to apply the relation between source 
problem statement and solution to the current problem. This is represented in figure 4.17 by 
the blocked lines. 
8v0000- 
I? DI 
The elaborated problem solution, represented by Be in figure 4.18, is presumed to aid the 
mapping of the givens in the source to those in the target (the rates of the two vehicles 
and the times taken). It provides a method which includes constructing a table; this is an 
intermediate representation and is represented in figure 4.18 as D'. The success rate by 
students given the elaborated solution to study was far higher than for the unelaborated 
solution. 
Wthough all practice problems presented in the experiments had an expl4nation of the solution these data 
were not providedfor the unrelated practice problem. For that reason the problem is treated as if no 
explanation had been provided. 
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application 
IB; l :I B'I :IB 
mappIng 
:: ICI: I? D 
When the elaborated solution is not available, as represented in figure 4.19, there was 
very little deterioration in results for problems which were equivalent (isomorphic), 
Constructing a table (the intermediate representation D' in the figure) has possibly 
allowed students to reconstruct more of the solution plan from memory, since the table 
provides a means of geýerating the correct equation, and of showing how the values In the 
problem can be inserted into it. That is, the elaborated explanation has possibly made it 
easier for the solver to make inferences about what subgoals are required and how the 
problem's givens and these subgoals relate to the relevant equation, 
4.3. Gaps in the explanations of the colinear algebra word problems 
In the next two subsections I will examine where there are gaps in the explanations 
provided by Reed et al. in the practice problem and how this affects the students' 
approach to solving the close and distant variants. 
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Here is the related practice problem given to the students along with the explanation of 
the solution: 
A car travelling at a speed of 30 miles per hour (mph) left 4 Certain Place at 10.00 
a. m. At 11.30 a. m. another car departed ftorn the Same place at 40 mph and 
travelled the same route. In how many hours will the second car overtake the first 
car? 
The problem is a distance-rate-time problem in which 
Distance = Rate x Time 
Because both cars travel the same distance, the distance of the first car (DI) equals 
the distance of the second car (D2), Therefore: 
Dz = D2 or RZ x T, = R2 x T2 
where RI = 30 mph, R2 = 40 mph, and T, = T2 + 312 hr. Substituting gives the 
following; 
30 x (T2 + 3/2) = 40xTz 
30T2 + 45 = 40T2 
T2 = 4.5 hr. 
4.3.1.1. ne problem givens 
Figure 4.20 shows the problem givens necessary for the solution. Each of the givens 
highlighted in the problem statement is represented by Al, A2, etc. in the order given in 
the problem. The goal (A6g) is also included as one of the problem givens. The reason for 
this wW become clear later. 
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MCODE 
A car traveling at a speed of 30 mph left a certain point at 10.00 a. m. At 
11.30 a. m., another car departed from the same place at 40 mph and traveled 
the same route. In how many hours will the second car overtake the first? 
Aýj 30 rnph 
A"I 10-00 a-m 
Al IAI A 
AL 
61 
q 19 
how many Jng 
hours... 
3111.30 a. m. A 
4140 mph 
left a certain point 
A51 departed from the same place 
overtake 
FIL-ure4.20. The l2racHce 'distance' problem givgns. 
4.3.1.2. Representing the steps In the problem 
The practice problem explains the solution procedure in a number of steps, Since it Is meant 
as a model for other problems of the same type, it should contain features that allow the 
solver to generalize to other problems. Each of the steps in the explanation win be 
discussed in turn, along with a commentary on what it fails to explain, 
The problem is a distance-rate-time problem in which 
Distance = Rate x Time 
The first step is to identify the problem type. The explanation refers to It as a 'distance- 
rate-time' problem (Be' in row a of figure 4.21) in which distance = rate x time (51 in figure 
4.21a). However, we are not told what features of the problem make this a distance-rate- 
time problem, and there is no explanation as to why distance equals rate x time. 
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Because both cars travel the same distance, the distance of the first car (DI) equals 
the distance of the second car (D2). 
There is no explicit statement of how we know both cars travel the same distance. From 
the givens in the problem (A5 in figure 4.20), the reader has to infer this in order to 
understand the explanation represented as Be2 (hence the dotted line from As to Be2 in row 
b). The second subgoal to be attained is to make the distance travelled by carl equal to the 
distance travelled by car2, as shown in 132. 
1 distance-rate- Be time problem 
ýýe2j cars travel 
same distance 
CR 
or 
Distance Ra 
a) x 71me 
dl=d2 b) 
Ri xTi C) Bj R2 x T2 
Step 3. Understanding eqUivalences mentioned. 
Therefore: D, = D2 or RjxT, = R2 X T2 
a) There is no explanation of what Ti and T2 refer to. 
b) There is no explanation of where R, x T, = R2 x T2 comes from; 
c) Students may wonder what happened to the brackets round (DI) and (D2); 
d) It is not clear whether the 'or' means that it does not matter which equation to use; 
e) There is no explanation of why Dist4nce = Rate x Time is no longer the appropriate 
equation; 
The only explanation of the relation between Dt = D2 and Ri x Ti = R2 x T2 is the word 'or' 
(13,3 in row c of figure 4,21). There is no explanation of why they are equivalent or why RI 
x Ti = R2 x T2 is the relevant equation to use, The Werences involved here are: 
if Di = Dz 
and If Di = Ri xTi 
and D2 = R2 x T2 
thon Ri x Ti = R2 x T2 
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The word 'or' as an explanation inadequately captures the essence of this chain of 
inference. The black box in the figure in row c represents the fact that it is not made clear 
where B3 Comes from. 
where R, = 30 mph, R2 = 40 mph, and Tj = Tz + 312 hr 
From the givens in the problem we know that carl travels at 30mph and car2 at 40mph (Al 
and A4 in figure 4.22 d and e). The explanation states that Ri = 30mph and R2 = 40Mph 
(W and Be5 respectively in rows d and e). The subgoals B4 and B5 involve mapping the 
givens, 30mph and 40mph, onto Ri and R2 in the equation. These are the only two 
mappings that can be made from the problem's givens directly onto the relevant equation. 
The explanation states that Ti T2 + 3/2 (Be6 in figure 4.22). It does not state what Ti and 
T2 refer to (this is represented by the dotted inference lines from A2 and A3 in rowf ). It 
does not explain where the 3/2 comes from, what operators should be applied to derive It, 
nor why Ti should be equal to T2 + 3/2. This information is derived from the departure 
times of the two cars represented as A2 and A3 respectively. The three black boxes 
represent the missing information in rowf). 
-r93 -41 B4 map d) 
ýý& 
30 mph -> Ri Eej 30mph 
R2= map Be 
40Mý:: ih 40 mph -> R2 
e) ji Eg 
1-ý 
Rý 
6 map f) IIMýRTi=T2+31ýý2-JZT2+312 
-> Til 
Fleure 4.22. Subgnals 3 to 5 In the practice distance problelm 
SteI2 5. Understanding '$ubsfituting-' gý: 
Substituting gives the following: 
a) No explanation Is given as to what should be substituted for what, 
b) Nor is there a statement about which of the 2 equations (Distance = Rate x Time or R, x 
Tj = R2 x T2 )should be used. 
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The goal (A6g) is to find how many hours it takes the second car to overtake the first but 
there is no mention of how this relates to the result of the algebraic manipulations. An 
operator - substitution - is mentioned but there is no indication of what it operates on. This 
is the reason for the dotted line from Be7 to 137 in row g. Nor are we told what has become 
of the units (mph and hr). Included in subgoal B7 are the results derived from previous 
operations: B4 and B5 where the rates were mapped onto the equation; and 136 where Ti 
T2 + 3/2 is derived. In the summary figure 4.24, the arrows in rows d, e andf show that 
they should be mapped onto the equation B3 in row c. 
The remaining steps involve the arithmetic manipulations of the terms of the equation 
(rows g to i in figure 4.23). 
30x(T2 +12 
g) 
Reý Substitute ýýB 
= 40xT2 
30T2 + 45 Rj 
40T2 
Bol T2 = 4.5 hr. I 
SlteO. Understanding first algebraic transformation. 
30 x (T2 + 31d = 40 x T2 
a) There is no explanation of what has happened to 'mph' and 'hr; 
b) There is no explanation of where the brackets have come from. 
If we look at the transformations which have taken place from a purely naive point of 
view then solvers with little or no knowledge of algebraic manipulation will have seen 
the following transformations: 
Transformation remove mph 
Transformation remove hr 
Transformation -> put brackets round last two terms on left-hand side 
There is no indication of the operators used to effect these transformations. 
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5kp, Z. Understanding second algebraic transformation. 
30 x (T2 + 312) = 40 x T2 
30T., + 45 = 40T2 
Transformation Remove multiplication signs 
Transformation Don't change + signs 
Transformation Remove brackets 
Transformation Change 312 to 45 
5-tap, 6. Understanding third algebraic transfonnation. 
30T2 + 45 = 40T2 
Tý = 4.5 hr 
Transformation -> remove 30 from T2 
Transformation -> remove + sign from left-hand side 
Transformation remove 45 from left-hand side 
Transformation change 40T2 to 4.5hr 
In this final transformation, a large number of changes have taken place, again with no 
indication of the operators that have been applied to get from the first line to the second, 
The lack of explicit explanations In the last few steps gives rise to the black boxes in rows 
h and i. 
Figure 4.24 presents a sununary of the foregoing analysis. From the figure we can predict 
that solvers using this example will have difficulties wherever there are black boxes and 
dotted inference lines. 
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eCCE)E 
A car traveling at a speed of 30 mph left a certain point at I o. oo a. m. At 11.30 
a. m., another car departed from the same place at 40 mph and traveled the same 
route. In how many hours will the second car overtake the first? 
distance-rate- I Distance Rate lj. Z: -ff ice x time problem 
Bx x Time 
cars travel ................. 2 LýBje 1 =d2 samedistance 
Ld 
I ----------- 
0 IF 13 or Be 
L2 AI Rl 
3 30mph 
A 
5 R2 Be 40mph 
6 E3e Ti =T2+ 3/2 
I In7l ............ Laej Substltute 
RESPONSF- 
time taken by second car = 4.5 hrs 
a) 
b) 
-] Ri x Ti = p3 
R2 x T2 
Y-1 
A -41 MaP 
Laj 30 mph -> Ri 
map 
40 mph -> R2 
map -e7 
T2 + 
3/ 
2 -> TI 
30x(T2 +ý2 
40xT2 
30T2 + 45 Pi 
40T2 
d) 
e) 
1) 
g) 
h) 
T2m4.5 hr. 
lII m2l mQ 
B9 B B4 
J) 
7 
L; l BIB IBS B15 
In Reed et al. 's third experiment, there is a condition in which a group of students is 
presented with an 'elaborated' solution to the problem designed to enhance performance on 
subsequent test problems, This elaborated explanation is presented below, 
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A car travelling at a speed of 30 miles per hour (mph) left a certain place at 10.00 
a. m. At 11.30 a. m. another car departed from the same place at 40 mph and 
travelled the same route. In how many hours will the second car overtake the first 
car? 
I The problem is a distance-rate-time problem in which 
Distance = Rate x Time 
We begin by constructing a table to represent the distance, rate, and time for each of 
the two cars. We want to find how long the second car travels before it overtakes the 
5 first car. We let t represent the number that we want to find and enter it into the 
table. The first car then travels t+ 3/2 hr because it left 1112 hrs earlier. The rate$ 
are 30 mph for the first car and 40 mph for the second car. Notice that the first car 
must travel at a slower rate if the second car overtakes it. We can now represent the 
distance each car travels by multiplying the rate and the time for each car. These 
10 values are shown in he following table. 
Distance Ra te Time 
Car (mile5) (m 
, 
ph) (h r) 
First 30(t+3 /2) 30 t+312 
Second 40xt 40 t 
15 Because both cars have travelled the same distance when the second car overtakes 
the first, we set the two distances equal to each other: 
30(t + 3/2) = 40t 
Solving for t yields the following: 
30t + 45 = 40t, 
20 45t = lot, 
t=4.5 hr. 
Line 1. Once again the reader has to infer why this problem is a 'distance-rate-timel 
problem. In row a of in figure 4.25 there is a statement of the type of problem this is (Bel in 
row a). Be2 in row b requires the solver to construct a table. 
Lizel The goal of the problem Is restated in the explanation: 'we want to find out how 
long the second car travels'. The explanation states that time should be represented by 
the variable, t. That Is, the goal is stated in terms of a variable whose value has to be 
found by algebraic manipulations (row c of figure 4,22). 
Line 6. The time taken by the first car is in turn related to t since it left a known number of 
hours earlier than t. This is the explanation of where the t+312 comes from, but we are 
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left to infer the origin of 3/2 . It does not explain that it comes from the times of the 
vehicles or what you have to do to derive the 11/2. This is represented by the dotted lines 
and black box between A2 and A3 in row d) 
Line 9. There is no explanation of why the distance can be represented by multiplying the 
rate by the time for each car since the reader is not referred back to the distance equation, 
nor is the relevant equation given. For this reason B7 appears as a ghost term since it is not 
explicitly stated. The fact that both cars travel the same distance is not mentioned in the 
problern statement. These inferences are shown in row g. 
Line 11. The table, Distance, rate and time can then be added to the table thereby 
providing all the values that can be fitted Into the distance equation. However, the 
equation which appears most salient is the one provided in line 2, i. e. Distance = Rate x 
Time. There are 6 values represented in the table and the student may have difficulties 
mapping them onto this equation particularly as the equation Is not the relevant one. The 
relevant equation is Rate,,, x Timecarl = Ratec,,, z x Timec,, z but it is not provided anywhere 
in the elaborated explanation. The black boxes between B7 and B'8, and B9 in figure 4.25 
indicate where this information is missing and hence where solvers are liable to 
experience difficulties. 
Line 20 An extra step has been included in the solution to the algebra problem. The 
transformations involved here are different from those in the 'unelaborated' problem 
explanation. 
30t + 45 = 40t; 
45 = lot, 
Transformation -> removi 30t from left-hand side 
Transformation change 40t to 10t 
Transformation remove plus sign from left-hand side 
Line 21. Final transformations. 
45 = lot 
= 4.5 hr. 
Transformation change 45 to t 
Transformation change 10 to 4.5 
Transformation change t to lir, on right-hand side 
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ENCCCE 
A car traveling at a speed of 30 mph left a certain point at 10.00 a. m. At 11.30 
a. m., another car departed from the same place at 40 mph and traveled the same 
route. In how many hours will the second car overtake the first? 
r 
A' I LAj A3 
4 A 
fli 
6 
ql JA' 
di stance- rate-tim B1 DistancG Ra a problem x Time 
N 
2 
construct table B1 b) e2 
3 let t represent goal t C) Be 
L. ýR 
number to be 
carl leaves 1 B4 time cart d) e hours earlier t+ 3/2 
e) 
l E : 
a,,, ca r f) 
3 0m P 4h 
j 
Ig ime for im fr 
represent distance by 
Ig 8, multiplying rate 8, time for ý7 
% rl xt I d1l = 
d2 2 t2 
g) ý 
each car 
=r X 
17--al own values sh 
car 
8 
distance Irate I timaw ý 
in table 
. 1 B 0(1 + 30 j= h 
, 40t 4O 
--- 
9 401 ------- 3 0"112) = -(B 
solve for t it + 45 = 40t 0 
45 = 10t 
t=4.5 hours II) 
RESPONSE: 
time taken by second car = 4.5 hrs 
Eigure 4.25. The elaborated practice distance problem. 
12 
B B' 
2 IB B3 
B 
B4 
13 5 
E3P E3PI E§7 
_ 
Bj 
III) 
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There was a dramatic improvement in the solution rates in the condition in which an 
elaborated practice problem was presented. Compared to the explanation of the mappings 
in the unelaborated problem the solver can rely less on inferences. However, they have 
not been entirely eliminated. 
4.4. The unrelated practice problem 
Here is the practice problem which was presented prior to the distance problems. It is 
unrelated to the distance problems in that it relies on a different equation for its solution 
and the surface features are entirely different. 
A baseball team's batting average of 0.263 is 0.004 greater than the average for the 
slugger and the pitcher. If the slugger's average is 0.192 greater than the pitcher's, 
find their averages. 
None of the surface features nor the underlying features have anything in con-anon with 
the subsequent distance problems. The goal-subgoal structure of this problem is simpler 
than that of the practice distance problems and the test problems. This problem deals 
with averages but is not a class of problem as the distance problems are since it does not 
involve a particular equation which applies to a number of examples, The equation 
necessary for its solution is relevant only to this particular problem. 
In order to solve the problem, the solver first has to generate the relevant equation (BI in 
row a of figure 4.26). Ms is not given in the problem statement and has to be inferred 
(hence the black box before subgoal 131). Once the relevant equation has been generated 
then the values have to be discovered for the variables in the equation. First, the 
pitcher's average Is assigned some variable, p in the figure below (subgoal B2). If p Is 
known then we know the average of the slugger (s) since it is 0,192 greater than p (subgoal 
B3). 7be student has to know that adding these and dividing by 2 gives the average for 
the slugger and the pitcher (subgoal 134) and adding 0.004 in turn to this result gives us the 
team average (subgoal 135). Solving for p involves algebraic manipulations which the 
solver needs to ýnow how to perform in order to find the solution. Solving for p generates 
the average of the pitcher (subgoal B8) but the question also requires the average of the 
slugger which is the solution to subgoal B9. 
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ENCODE 
A baseball team's batting average of 0.263 Is 0.004 greater than 
the average of the slugger and the pitcher. If the slugger's 
average Is 0.192 greater than the pitcher's, find their averages 
t= 
(s + p-) /2 + 0.0 0 4) 
W, Igh I 
ave. of pitcher B2p of pitcher 
) 
b) 
ave. of slugger, )_____UW p+ . 192 
C) (s) . 192 >p 
faI I= 1 p4l fn +-D+ . 19211 A of s&P J= w2- 
te am ave. . 263 . 263 = (2P + Is . 004 > ave. . 192)12 + . 004 e) of 8&p 
5A ave of pitcher 136 . 259 =p+ . 096 f) i 
6 ---7 : ýB! 
7 p, . 259 0 (9ý6 g) 
ý8 
B"I p= . 163 1 
A eve of slugger ZI s . 163+. 192 
relevant eýuatlon: 
team slugger pitcher eve + eve + 0.004 eve 2 
131 E32 E33 
-RESPONSE: B4 
average of pitcher a . 163 E39 
a 
B 5 
average of slugger a . 355 na 
[R771 
146 
B 
R6 
Mail- 4,26. Summaly figUre pf thC unrelated ; 2rzeticg VrCd2leM. - ayerngeg 
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The test problems 
This section examines how the interpretation theory can be used to illustrate how well the 
example problems described above can be mapped onto the test problems Reed et al. gave 
their subjects. If the elaborated solution provides enough information about the mappings 
and relations between the example problem givens and solution, and onto the givens in an 
equivalent test problem, we should expect there to be very few inferences required on the 
part of the solver. Furthermore, if the elaborated solution provides enough information 
about the problem type then we would expect it to enable the solver to use it to solve a 
'similar' problem of the same type. 
5.1. Mapping the unelaborated training problem onto an equivalent 
test problem. 
The following is the 'equivalent' distance problem from Reed et al.: 
A car travels south at the rate of 30 mph. Two hours later, a second car leaves to 
overtake thefirst car, using the same route and going 45 mph. In how many hours will 
the second car overtake the first car? 
The practice problem states that the first car leaves 'from a certain place' and that the 
second car leaves 'from the same place. ' This is not stated as explicitly In the test 
problem. The first car simply 'travels south' and a second car 'leaves to overtake the first 
car. ' The problem givens, highlighted in bold typeface, do not match all of those in the 
training problem. There are 4 Items in the source problem relevant to the solution, and 
only 3 in the test problem above. There Is no need to calculate the difference in departure 
times in the test problem. -The solution depends on generalizing from T, = TZ + 312 to T, = 
T2 + d, where d is the difference in departure times, and then mapping from the problem 
givens, 
2 hours later, a second car leaves 
TIO 72+ 
The other elements that can be mapped onto the equation are: 
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4 car travels at- 30m"h. a second car.. going 
RIXT, 
TI=T2 +2h 
Rix Tj =R2xT2 
45mph 
RZ x T2 
We will look first at how the givens in this problem map onto the unelaborated practice 
problem. The problem givens are represented in figure 4.27. 
ENCODE 
A car travels south at the rate of 30 mph. Two hours later, a second car 
leaves to overtake the first car, using the same route and going 45 mph. 
In how many hours will the second car overtake the first car? 
Carl travels 
at 30 m: pvh 
j 
Uý r, 
LC Ca leaves 
2 oul hours later 
- 
Car2 travelsD 
C1 C2 C3 -QC3 at 45 MEE 
rI 
4 overtake Carl using 
the U. - . --, e - 
In how many hours' 
U9 
does car2 overtake 
Figure 4.27. 'EquivalenfeXercise probleM givens 
The A and B terms in the figures that follow refer to the problem givens and subgoals, in 
the practice distance problem analysed in figure 4.24, 
Row b of figure 4.28 shows a dotted line from the A term to the B term and a black box 
Indicating that the explanation in the original problem Is incomplete (the rows are 
lettered in conformity to the summary figure 4.31). 
In the test problem (represented by the C and D terms), not only do students have to infer 
that both cars travel the same distance, but also that they both leave from the same - 
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point. In the previous explanation students are told in BC2 that the distance travelled by 
both cars is the same. 
11 Distance - 1 Distance RB 
MeRate 
x Ilme D Rate x"rime ýR r-al M-10 
0 IC41 south Fjm72 Ird I 
ýd2 FERM 
d1 Waves D b) 
mverfak 
r ----- 
mv- 
R' lb xTj 81 
-XT-21 LBl]e3 ERNxTz 
R2XT 
Three of the problem givens can be slotted into the relevant equation. The first of these, 
30mph, is Identical to the first element of the training problem (shown as Al in figure 4.29, 
row d ). B4 is the subgoal which maps 30mph onto Ri in the equation Ri x Ti = R2 x T2. This 
mapping can be imitated in the current problem to generate subgoal D4. 
map op , ato caril 30 mph 
mI [BI 
30 mph -ý, Ri 30 mph -2, Rl 
e) 
2 hours T Ts 
'T, t Ta+ 3/ 2 ,J1, 
"D 
+12 
LýB 
later 
I "i 
_- 
LEc ýr Rfl j 
Similarly, the rate of the second car can be mapped across as illustrated in row e of figure 
4,29. Both rates can now replace the variables in the equation in D3 in row C of figure 4.28. 
In rowf there Is nothing in the earlier problem to map onto the current one. This mapping 
is therefore blocked (represented by the broken line between the C term and the A terms of 
the earlier problem), In the earlier problem a number of inferences are required to 
determine where the 3/2 comes from (represented by the black boxes in rowf). This figure 
is included in the subSoal given in IV, 
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The solver has to understand how to state the time taken by one car in terms of the time 
taken by the other in order to achieve this subgoal. 
Finally, the goals in the practice and test problems are the same(A6g and C, 5g respectively 
in row g of figure 4.30). The difficulty here is that the earlier explanation does not include 
any mention of what the goal is in terms of the outcome of the algebraic manipulations. 
No explanation is given in the earlier problem about how to solve for T2, hence the black 
boxes between the subgoals B8 and B'. 
.......... " .......... 
Ox(Ti+ýS) a jalny IO(To+ 
40xTs hours. w4 
how M4 Y Lo 
- 
cm: 
. 
3OTs + 45 *OTs+4 
40T* 
L9 
.4 11 
To w 4.5 
ýhr. ýMT**4 
hýr UBI 
- 
Figure 4.31 surrunarizes the above showing how the problem givens are related to the 
solution when the previous example is accessed. 
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ecoce 
A car travels south at the rate of 30 mph. Two hours later, a second car leaves 
overtake the first car, using the same route and going 45 mph. In how many hour 
will the second car overtake the first? 
Distance -w 
13 I hsý, tance u 
te x Time ax rime 
Be Rate x Time Rate x Time 
G-21 
Lj dlmd2 D CI= d2 
C; j 
Ri xI 
CC 
3 RixTim L B R2xT2 
Tl Be T2 
g9 
JCe4 
R2 X 
MAP ar 30 mph 
4 (LBI 
30 mph -ý,, Ai 
a t"ap B( [C 3OCmph] 
ýe at F1 111 -0 Rl 
p 
map late Cal, map 5 45 mph ýA]g (FEI] 40 mph-:, A2 
1110.45 
M 
1. Ps 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
r.. 4BMWc:: ------------------- Map c2 hours Ti; T2 
later 
j Ez 
at4 Aý E306 T2.312 -,, * Tr B later 
........................... ri 
p ........... 
,, 7LZ 
30x(Ts03) Cg how many ' O(Ts+2) A6g ea 40xTo hours... -46t E )TT+l 3) 
RI I L 
: 4ý Tx#4 
(M30 
OT& 
4071 . 46 1 
7JITs m 4.5 hr. III L)- IT: u4 h 
RESRDNSE: 1<----lL0 Second car overtakes first In 4 hours I irlal 
g) 
h) 
i) 
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5.2. Mapping the elaborated training problem onto an equivalent test 
problem 
In the diagrams that follow, the A and B terms represent the earlier elaborated distance 
problem analysed in figure 4.29. Looking back to that solution explanation, the subject 
would find that the first three subgoals are: 
a) DI - classify the problem as a distance = rate x time problem. This was explained in 
subgoal BI of the earlier problem; so BI =ý DI (Where, '=*' means 'is mapped to), 
D2 - construct a table (B2 =* D2) and, 
c) D3 - generate a variable name for the goal (133 =* D3). 7bese correspond to lines a, b, and 
C in figure 4.32. 
Some of the elaborated training problem givens can be mapped , 
directly onto the 
equivalent test problem (figure 4.32 lines e andfi, T71e first car in both problems travels at 
30mph and this can be mapped onto the relevant equation (assuming the equation can be 
generated - this is a separate subgoal of the problem). By changing the rate of the second 
car in the training problem from 40mph to 45mph in the test problem the solver could also 
map this onto the rate term in the equation. (The lettering of the rows in the following 
figures correspond to the lettering in the summary figure 4.34. ) 
............. ;::::: .............. I ý4 I Ai car2 leaves D 
time carl A2 A3 fB e2 hours late) t+2 r 
rate carl map 
e) 
liff nCý 
30 mphT 30 mph 
: rate car2 " r--7 .P Cl 
45 mph 
rj 10 
45 mph -> r2) 
The goals, represented by C5g in the test problem and A6g in -the 
training problem, both ask 
for the time taken by the second car to catch up with the first one, In the training problem 
subjects are told to represent time by t. However, as figure 4.34d shows, there is no direct 
match between the 12 hours' mentioned in the test problem (C2 in the figure) and the times 
given In the training problem (A2 and A3). The mappings between the two problems are 
therefore shown as being blocked. An inference Is required to relate the times in the first 
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problem to the difference in times in the second. D4 represents the fact that the time 
taken by carl equals the time taken by car2 plus 2 hours. 
The solver must infer that both cars travel the same distance. The givens in the problem 
which allow this inference is shown as C4 in figure 4.35 row g ('leaves to overtake using 
same route'). This information is similar (but not identical) to that given in the training 
problem shown as A5. Since the descriptions are not identical, A-5 and C4 are linked by a 
dotted line. Subjects have to understand the explanation in We that distance should be 
represented in terms of rate x time for both cars in order to generate the equation given in 
D7. The inferences that were necessary to generate B7 are represented by the dotted lines 
between A5, We and B7. Those inferences have to be made in order to generate D7. The 
subgoals included in D7 represent the information derived both from the problem 
statement and from the previous subgoals. These can now be mapped onto the equations. 
The difficulty is that the equation is not explicitly stated in B7. 
The table (shown in figure 4,33h) contains six boxes, representing the distance, rate and 
time for each car. - The relevant equation has only four variables rate x time for each car. 
Students may find difficulty in relating the distance boxes to the rate and time boxes since 
all they have to go an is the statement in box 137e "represent distance by multiplying rate 
and time for each car. ' Furthermore the relevant equation is ratel x timel = rate2 x time2. 
The only equation given in the example is distance = rate x time. 
...................... 
.......... 4 f-ý'J` leaves to 4 13ý dl a r1xt1 FBje IC4 I 
overtake DD d2 = r2Xt2 
.................... 
car distance Irate time 
LBJ8,9 Dh 1 30(f . 21 30V+ 2 14 Ot 14 01 * 't --F -11, 
.......... 
PO 7w fl 2 
30 (1 +2) a 45t .. 6 1) LM 
-) 
The above analysis is summarized in figure 4.36. For clarity the processes involved in 
each row are briefly repeated below. 
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Row: 
4) The first step is to recognize the problem as an example of the same type of 
problem as BI - Distance = Speed x Time. 
b) Subjects are asked to construct a table as an intermediate representation (B'2 =4 
D, 2), 
C) The goal is the same as in the training problem and, according to the explanation 
in B3e, should be represented as t. 
d) This subgoal is to generate the time taken by carl. This involves a number of 
inferences because the problem givens do not map onto the earlier problem. Further 
inferences are required to understand the training problem in the first place. 
e) The rate of carl in the training problem is identical to the rate in the test problem 
(B5 =* D5). 
f) The rate of car2 in the training problem maps directly to the rate in the test 
problem (B5 =* D5). 
g) The next subgoal Is to represent distance by multiplying rate times time as 
explained in U7e. No equation is explicitly given in the earlier problem for the subject to 
map to the current one. 
h) This subgoal involves filling in the boxes in the table with the values from the 
problem statement and those derived fromearlier subgoals. 
i) The equation can now be generated from elements in the table, This depends on the 
subject understanding the relationships between the elements in the table and the 
explanation in row g, 7be subject has to understand that the distances travelled by both 
cars are the same. This information has to be inferred from AS and C4 
J, k, 1) These are the next stages in solving for t. No explanation is given about what 
operators to apply to get from one stage to the next. 
M) This represents the final solution with the subgoals 'nested' within it. 
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13400CE 
A car travels south at the rate of 30 mph. Two hours later, a second car 
leaves to overtake the first car, using the same route and going 45 mph, In how 
many hours will the second car overtake the first? 
[Cl C3 --&I [Distance 
CCD ELpeed x Time 
CS 
car distance Irate I time 
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5.3. Mapping the unelaborated training problem onto the similar test 
problem 
Here is the similar test problem: 
A pick-up truck leaves 3 hr after a large delivery truck but overtakes it by travelling 
15 mph faster. If it takes the pick-tip truck 7 hr to reach the delivery truck, find the 
rate of each vehicle. 
The givens in this problem are also related by the Distance = Rate x Time equation. Once 
again the distances travelled by the two trucks are the same so the first part of the 
practice solution is relevant if trucks are substituted for cars: 
Distance =, Rate x Time 
Because both cars travel the same distance, the distance of the first car (DI) equals 
the distance of the second car (D2). Therefore: 
DI = D2 or RjxT, ý R2 x T2 
However, the givens in the similar test problem are different from those in the source 
which continues: 
where R, = 30 mph, R2 = 40 mph, and Tz = T2 + 312 h 
Errors may arise when substituting the values in the target problem for the variables R, , 
R2, Tj and T2. For example, the only rate mentioned Is 15 mph. Substituting that for R in 
the equation would lead to error. The same is true of the times; should7 hr or 3 hr replace 
T2 and If so, what should be added to it? There is a further difficulty in that the first car, 
the one which leaves first in the practice problem, is mentioned first, but in the similar 
problem the truck which leaves second is mentioned first. Errors may therefore arise if 
the relevant car is not mapped onto the correct truck (see Ross, 1987). 
'Figure 4.37 presents the 'similar' problem givens with the subgoals in the solution 
enumerated. 
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MOODE 
A pick-up truck leaves3 hr aftera large delivery truck but 
owtakes It by travelling 15 mph faster. If It takes the pick-up truck 
7 hr to reach the delivery truck, f Ind the rateof each vehicle. 
I 
i r. 11 3hr after 
T2 LlSmpth 
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II 
Figure 1.3Z. 'Similar' problem givens. 
In figure 4.38, we can see that most of the A and B terms of the example problem on the left 
of the figure are not linked to the C and D terms on the right. Indeed the only information 
that the solver has is that both problems are distance-rate-time problems that involve 
the same equation. Nothing else in the training problem relates to the test problem, 
Rows: 
a, b, 0 These rows represent the matches between the test and training problem. The test 
problem also 'inherits' the inferences that have to be made to understand the explanation 
of the training problem in the first place, represented by the dotted lines and black boxes 
in rows b and c. 
d) The time taken by the first vehicle can be expressed in terms of the time taken by 
the second one. This goal is common to both problems. However, the match is not direct, 
hence the broken line from C1. Again a lot of inferences are required to understand the 
earlier problem. 
e) The time taken by the second vehicle is given in the problem statement (C3 -7 
hours), Even so, solvers may still not know what to do with it If they are imitating the 
earlier problema since no times are mentioned In the earlier problem. 
f) The problem gives a difference in rates (C2). No differences are given in the 
earlier problem. Subjects are not told they have to express the rate of one vehicle in terms 
of the rate of the other, hence the black box between C2 and D6, 
g, V The two goals of the problem Vs, and Cssa, which represent the goals of finding 
the rate of the first and second truck respectively are not the same as the goal in the source 
example. To find the rate of the second car the solver has to go back to subgoal D6 in rowf 
where the rate of the second truck is given in terms of the first. The algebraic 
transformations in rows h and i are also different from those In the example. 
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B\CODE 
A pick-up truck leaves 3 hr after a large delivery truck but overtakes It by travelling 15 mph 
faster. It It takes the pick-up truck 7 hr to reach the delivery truck, find the rate of each 
vehicle. 
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Even a brief glance at the summary figure 4.38 shows that none of the values of the earlier 
problem could be mapped onto the exercise problem (blocked lines), that a large number of 
inferences had to be generated (dotted lines), and no information about the relevant 
operators was given in this particular example (black boxes), or about what subgoals were 
necessary. 
Given that there was little difference in the success rates for problems which were either 
similar or unrelated to the practice problem (despite the fact that the similar and 
practice problems were classified by Reed et al. as being of the same type), the analyses 
presented above show thatfrom the nature of the problems themselves the students would 
have had difficulty in mapping the information given in the example problem onto the 
information in the target. That is, solvers are unable to imitate the source problern in 
order to solve the target. They were able to do this in the case of the equivalent problem 
where more mappings were possible and fewer inferences had to be made. As far as the 
subjects were concerned the practice distance problem and the similar test problem were 
scarcely more 'related' than the, unrelated practice problem. Figure 4.38 indicates 
precisely that. 
Indeed, classifying the problems as Distance = Rate x Time problems may lead to some 
confusion, because a) the problem givens should be mapped onto the equation Rate, x Time, 
= Rate2 x Time2 and not the 'distance' equation; b) solvers may not fully understand the 
relation between the 'distance' equation and the Rae, x Time, = Rate2 x Time, equation; 
and c) the 'distance' equation is prominent in the explanation. 
5.4. Mapping the elaborated training problem onto the similar test 
problem, 
If the solver uses the earlier example to solve the test problem, then the mapping$ shown 
in figure 4.39 have to be made. In line c the goals of the two problems are different. The 
solver has to infer that rate should be represented by r or something similar, Another 
inference that has to be made Is what car the r refers to. 
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In the earlier problem the subjects were not told to add the difference between the times to 
the time of cat2 (line d in figure 4.40). The time of truck2 was given in the test problem but 
not in the example (line e). Nothing in the earlier problem explained what to do when 
the rates are unknown (linefi. 
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ENCODE 
A pick-up truck leaves 3 hr after a large delivery truck but overtakes It by 
traveling 15 mph faster. It It takes the pick-up truck 7 hr to reach the delivery 
truck. find the rate ot each vehicle. 
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Figure 4.41 shows that there are difficulties in mapping and in making inferences about 
what elements in the example problem are relevant and what operators should be 
applied. Given the number of blocked access lines from the C terms to the earlier problem, 
the number of black boxes and dotted inference lines, it is apparent that there is very little 
of the earlier problem that is of any use to the solver. The practice problem and the test 
problem are therefore different problems, 
Paradoxically, where students had available to them an elaborated solution to work from 
when solving a 'similar' problem, they were obliged to make at least as many inferences as 
in the experiments where only an unelaborated solution was provided. A larger number of 
subgoals had to be generated, since a greater number of steps was required. Despite the 
fact that the equation is the same as the one In the source problem, and that the solver is 
required to construct a table to aid in instantiating the variables, only 22% of students 
successfully solved the problem. When students were presented with an unelaborated 
solution 17% successfully solved it. Although no data are available in the original paper, 
it seems unlikely that the difference between these results is statistically significant. 
Certainly the improvement is marginal. Where the elaborated solution to the previous 
problem was shown and then removed, the worst results of any in the experiments were 
obtained with only 6% correct, when the subjects were presented with an unrelated 
practice problem, the test problem was successfully solved by 14% of students. According to 
Reed et al. the low level of performance was due to students' inability to generate the 
correct equation rather than an inability to solve it when presented with similar problems 
and an elaborated solution. But then, in the condition where students were obliged to rely 
on their memory of the solution, they had to make more inferences and generate more 
subgoals from memory than in the unelaborated condition. 
It would appear from this analysis that the number of inferences that had to be made from 
the source problem caused difficulties for the students. The representations of the 
problems show exactly where no information or guidance was provided as to how 
mappings could be made from one problem type (finding the thne taken by one vehicle) to 
another (finding the rates of troo vehicles) and this despite the fact that the same 
equation is used to solve both types of problem. 
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Discussion 
According to Reed et al., the purpose of the three experiments examined here was 'to 
investigate how well students could use the solution of an algebra word problem to solve 
other problems belonging to the same category. ' The category (distance-rate-time 
problems) is one which has been imposed by the authors and not one which is necessarily 
understood by the students (see also Anderson, 1990; Hall, Kibler, Wenger, & Truxaw, 
1989). Close variants of the example problem, where the time taken by one vehicle had to 
be found, tended to be solved by most students when an elaborated solution was provided 
for study. Distant variants proved too difficult for most, Therefore, as far as the students 
are concerned, the similar and the practice problems were not in the same category. 
Indeed, from the analysis of the mappings between the example and distant variants 
given above one might reasonably predict that there was likely to be little difference in 
success rates between the unrelated problem and this particular so-called 'related' 
problem. 
When Reed et al. state that the earlier problem had to be 'slightly modified' they made 
a judgement that only a relative expert can make. No mappings can be made between the 
features of the source and those of the 'similar' target. To solve the similar problem 
subjects are obliged to make a large number of inferences and have a great deal of 
difficulty in doing so. The analysis of the tasks with which they were presented has 
identified where these inferences and blocked mappings lie. Most subjects did not have a 
representation of the earlier solution which was adequate enough to allow them to 
, 
manipulate it in order to solve the target. Instead they attempted to imitate the previous 
solution and failed because they did not have enough information to do so. 
In their experiment 4, Reed et al. also noted that a large number of matching errors 
occurred when students used a complex practice problem to solve a simple test problem, 
Solvers will have difficulty using such a source, since any variation will be a source of 
error when subjects are attempting to imitate it. The inadequacy of the explanations is 
alluded to by Reed at al. when they make the point that 'subjects had considerable 
difficulty in specifying the relations among variables'. The analysis presented here has 
demonstrated that the problems themselves did not provide enough information to relate 
the problem givens to the subgoals in the solution. 
Where the solver has an isomorphic earlier problem in view along with a complete set of 
procedures for solving problems of this particular type, the solver should be able to make 
adequate mappings between the example problem givens and its associated solution as 
222 
Chapter 4- Text and task analysis 
well as from the example problem givens and the test problem givens. However, as has 
been demonstrated, the elaborated explanations in Reed at al. 's study are incomplete and 
still leave the solver with the necessity of generating inferences. When solvers are 
required to use those incomplete explanations to try to solve a 'similar' problem then the 
solution rate drops dramatically. This suggests that the solvers' representations were 
very inflexible and that the mappings were taking place only at a surface level. That is, 
the help provided by the elaborated solution allowed the solvers to imitate the earlier 
example by mapping its surface features onto the target. Whenever the earlier solution 
method had to be 'slightly' modified, most of the students were incapable of doing so 
because they could not find the necessary correspondences between the problems. In other 
words, the practice problem was different from the one they were required to solve. 
Although much has been written about the difficulties people have in analogical problem 
solving, not enough has been written about how to improve the texts in the first place to 
increase transfer between problems, Now that we have identified the areas where 
inferences have to be made in these algebra problems, the next stage is to find out what 
happens when the inferences are removed, This is the subject of the next section. 
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Chapter 5 UNDERSTANDING, 
IMITATION, AND PROBLEM 
PRESENTATION 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I describe a number of experiments looking at problem understanding, 
imitation and the effects of different problem presentations. The first of these - problem 
understanding - was examined by comparing subjective and objective measures of 
'understanding' to see how well they correlated with each other. The studies were 
designed to find out if subjects were able to assess their own understanding of problem 
explanations and, if so, how this can help us in the design of expository text, experiments I 
and 3 examine this Issue. . 
Experiments 2 and 3 provide an empirical test of the interpretation theory as It is applied 
to the text of word problems. The analyses in Chapter 4 showed where Inferences 
remained in the distance problems used in Reed, Dempster and Ettinger (1985) and 
therefore where the solver would have difficulty when solving both a close variant of the 
problem and a distant variant. The experiments in this section are designed to justify 
those claims, 
Problem understanding: Experiment 1 
To investigate the relation betweeen understanding and problem solving, an experiment 
was carried out using problems in PROLOG. In Chapter 2, understanding was defined In 
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terms of 'flexibility' or the ability to manipulate and adapt learned material. Hiebert & 
Lefevre (1986) maintained that 'powerful problem solving is impossible without 
understanding... [which involves] ... the processing of the original problem presentation 
to construct a meaningful internal representation that can be manipulated by the solver in 
order to produce the desired result. ' 
The study presented here sought to find out whether subjects' assessment of their own 
understanding would correlate with their problem solving performance. Problem solving 
performance on a transfer task is often taken to be a measure of analogical problem solving 
ability, which in turn depends on the solver having an adequate mental representation of 
the example problem used as an analogue. If solvers do have such a mental representation 
then they can be said to 'understand' the problem in the sense defined above. However, in 
Chapter ZI argued that novices and beginners often do not have a representation of a 
source problem that is 'complete' enough to allow them to reason analogically. Instead 
they tend to use imitative problem solving. 
Previous research has shown that subjects do not always have a clear idea of what they 
understand (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Ferguson-Hessler & Jong, 1990). 
Ferguson-Hessler and Jong, for example, found that 'poor' students said 'everything is 
clear' three times more often than good students whereas their performance showed that 
this was not the case. In analysing the study processes of students studying physics texts, 
they also found that poor performers processed declarative knowledge more than good 
performers, who concentrated more on situational and procedural information, 
Hiebert & Lefevre (1986) distinguished between 'primary' and 'reflective' understanding. 
Primary understanding occurs when the subject understands the relations between elements 
in a new domain at the same level of abstractness as, or at a less abstract level than, the 
information being presented. This type of understanding is highly context specific. 
Reflective understanding is at a more abstract level. It occurs when subjects recognize the 
deeper structural features of problems. 
The distinction can be understood by looking at this PROLOG rule: 
has(_X 
-Some-feature) 
if 
lsa(-X 
-Category-member) 
& 
has(-Category-member 
_Some-feature), 
A primary understanding of the rule would involve an understanding of its declarative 
structure. 7bat Is: 'X has some feature if it belongs to a category and that category has the 
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feature in question. ' A 'reflective' understanding might include a procedural 
representation of the rule which may allow the subject to generate inferences: 'To find out 
whether X has some feature, first find out if it belongs to a category and then find out if 
that category has that feature. ' A deeper understanding of the rule might also include the 
realization that it calls itself within itself with new variables (Category-member 
instead of X), and, more importantly, that there is no halting condition; for example, it 
should have something like 'has(-X -Some-Feature). ' before the above rule, 
The experiment presented here set out to compare subjects' estimates of their own 
understanding with their performance on a task that required a fairly deep understanding 
of the examples presented. If students concentrated more on the surface features of the 
problems we would expect their understanding of the material to be at a 'primary' level. 
If they understood the new material in the sense of trying to integrate it with their prior 
knowledge, or if they made some attempt to evaluate the new material, then their 
understanding would beat a more 'reflective' level and ought to correlate with problem 
solving performance on a variant of the example problems presented. 
Method 
7be subjects were 16 adults following a Cognitive Psychology course in the Open 
University. The subjects were approaching the end of the one-year course and had 
completed a course unit on programming in PROLOG. 
Subjects were shown two ; xamples of a PROLOG database divided into FACTS and 
RULES. The RULES were labelled A, B and C, The first involved a hierarchy of animals 
(the_ full text of the questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix 1). The first part of the 
FACTS database gave examples of categories of animals such as: 
isa(mammal animal) 
isa(dog manunal) 
Isa(Butch dog) 
The second part gave features of some animals: 
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has(marnmal fur) 
has(fish gills) 
has(horse mane) 
7be PROLOG rule was designed to show Inheritance, such that, if something was an 
instance of some category, then it inherits the same features as the superordinate category: 
A 
has(-Something 
_Sorne-feature) 
if 
isa(-Something 
-Category-member) 
& 
has(-Category-member 
-Some-feature). 
(The syntax used for PROLOG was an early MacProlog variant that differed from 
'Edinburgh' syntax, ) 
The second example showed a train timetable which included the destinations and 
departure points of trains in the FACTS section using the predicates 'departs' and 
#arrives', and two RULES. The first states that two stations are directly linked if the 
same train leaves stationl and arrives at station2: 
B 
direct-link(-Stationl 
-Station2) 
if 
departs (_Train 
_Stationl) 
& 
arrives(-Train -Station2). 
The second and third rules state that two stations are connected if they are either directly 
linked or if there are directly linked stations on the way: 
C 
connected (-Station I -Station2) 
if 
direct-link(-Stationl 
-Station2). 
connected (-Station I -Station3) 
if 
direct-link(-Stationl 
-Statjon2) 
& 
connected(_Station2 _Station3). 
For the first two sheets, subjects were given the foNowing instructions: 
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Read this sheet and, In the boxes under column 1, write a number from I to 5 to 
show how well you think you have understood the statements or the PROLOG clauses 
according to the following code: 
5: Understand perfectly 4: Understand reasonably well 3: 1 think I have got the gist 
2: Don't quite understand 1: Don't understand at all 
There were boxes alongside the database and rules, and alongside the natural language 
explanations of them. The third sheet contained a database of types of food and the food 
preferences of vegetarians and carnivores. Subjects were asked to imagine that they had 
to write a rule that would represent the food preferences of omnivores: 
Food Preferences 
FACrS 
Here is a database of food facts: 
isa(meat food). 
Isa(poultry food). 
isa(vegetables food). 
isa(pulses food), 
isa(grain food). 
isaffish food). 
isa(carrot root). 
isa(potato root). 
isa(lettuce leaf), 
Isa(cabbage leaf). 
Isa(beef meat). 
isa(chicken poultry). 
isa(root vegetable). 
isa(leaf vegetable). 
isa(trout fish). 
Isa(salmon fish). 
isa(lentils pulses). 
isa(apple fruit). 
Isa(rice grain). 
Here is what vegetarians and carnivores eat. 
eat(vegetarians vegetables). 
eat(vegetarians pulses). 
eat(vegetarians fruit). 
eat(vegetarians grain). 
eat(carnivores meat). 
eat(camivores fish). 
eat(carnivores poultry). 
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1) Now suppose that you were given the problem to write a rule or rules to represent 
what it is that omnivores eat. Think about this for a few minutes and then look at 
the other two sheets with the train timetables and the hierarchy of animals and, in 
the second column of boxes, tick anything that you think would help you solve the 
problem. 
2) Choose, between rules A, B and C on the other two sheets, which one you think 
would be the most useful to you in solving the problem and write your answer in this 
box. [] 
3) Which of these do you think would be the most likely first line of your rule (tick 
the appropriate box): 
f-ý eat(-X food) if ... 
Fý eat(omnivores -X) if ; 
f-ý eat(-Onlnivores _X) if ; 
eat(o=ivores food) if 
4) Are you acquainted with Prolog or any other artificial intelligence language 
outside the D309 course? Yes / No 
5) (Optional) Try writing the rule. If you do so, could you please tick everything 
that you refer to on these sheets while solving the problem, adding a tick every time 
you do so, 
This was the subjects' first exposure to recursive functions, No attempt was made to relate 
the natural language explanations of the database and the rules (represented by Al and 
A2 in figure 5.1 for, the animal hierarchy and the train timetable respectively) to the 
PROLOG code (31 and B2). Nor was there any attempt to relate the two examples to each 
other. Since no explicit explanation is given of the relations between the statements and 
the rules, the A and B boxes are linked by dotted lines to show that the reader has to 
make inferences to understand the relations. 
m 
mi 
One solution to the test problem is structurally similar to rule C (the connected rule) they 
were shown in the examples: 
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eat(omnivores _X) 
if 
isa(-X food). 
eat(omnivores -X) 
if 
isa(-X -ýY) 
& 
eat(omnivores 
A declarative reading would be 'Omnivores either eat food or they eat some item and that 
item is an example of something that they would eat. ' The rule differs from the connected 
rule in that the variables are manipulated differently. Unlike the connected rule, 
however, it does not rely on an earlier rule the way rule C relies on rule B, the direct-link 
rule. In that sense it is simpler than the rules in the railway timetable example. The 
second part of the omnivores solution is also similar to rule A in the animal hierarchy 
example, but the latter is structurally simpler since there is only one part to it. 
2.2. Results 
Figure 5.2 shows the average rating scores under different headings for each part of the 
example explanation, as well as ratings for understanding the PROLOG facts and rules 
themselves. The headings were: 
E. DI Explanation of Database I DI PROLOG Database I 
E. D2 Explanation of Database 2 D2 PROLOG Database 2 
E. RI Explanation of Rule I RI PROLOG Rule I 
R2a The first part of Rule 2 R2b The second part of Rule 2 
sheet I sheet 2 test sheet 3 
(animals) (stations) (oninivores) 
s 
4.5 
4 
3.5 
3 
v . 2.5 
2 
1.5 
0.5 
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In general the subjects in this experiment claimed to have a high degree of understanding 
of the example problems presented with an average rating of 4-7- 7bIs was in spite of 
their being no explanation of the relation between the statements of the problem and the 
PROLOG code used; nor was there an explanation of how the examples could be used to 
solve other problems of the same type. Nevertheless, their assessment of their own 
understanding ranged from 4.00 (for the first PROLOG rule presented) 'Understand 
reasonably well', to 4.94, 'Understand perfectly. ' 
Although it was an optional activity, most subjects attempted to write the code for the 
omnivore problem. No-one managed to generate the correct code for the problem I- The 
subjects' responses are listed below (along with their comments where they made any): 
si eat(omnivores A lf 
eat(carnivore _X). 
eat(omnivores A if 
eat(vegetarians 
S2 eat(oninivores ) if 
Isa 
S3 eat(omnivores _X) 
if 
isa(_X food). 
S4 eat(omnivores -X) 
If 
isa(-X food), 
S5 none 
S6 eat(omnivores -X) 
If 
fsa(-X food). 
S7 eat(omnivores -X) 
If 
lsa(-X food). 
$8 - eat(omnivores -X) 
if 
lsa(-X food). 
I Due to a possible misinterpretation of the question, a further study was carried out in 
which 10 subjects had to write the Same rule as above. This time, however. - they were told 
to ensure that the query eat(omnivores carrot). would succeed. The results were identical 
to the study described here - no one solved the problem. 
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eat(omnivores -X) 
If 
isa(_X 
-Y) 
& 
isa(_Y food). 
eat(omnivores -X) 
if 
lsa(-X fruit). 
eat(omnivores -X) 
if 
isa(_X 
-Y) 
& 
Isa(-Y -Z) 
& 
isa(-Z food). 
S9 eat(omnivores -X) 
If 
isa(-X _food) 
& 
has(-food roots), 
SIO eat(omnivores -X) 
if 
isa(-X food). 
Sll eat(-X FOOD) IF 
ISA CARNIVORE & 
ISA VEGETARIAN 
S12 eat(on-Lnivores A if 
isa(-X food). 
'This seems too simple, but I can't think of 
anything else. ' 
S13 none 
S14 eatLX food) if 
isa(_X omnivore) & 
eat(-X omnivores food). 
SIS none 
s16 eat(omnivores _X) 
lf 
'Sorry - in theory I understand Prolog, in 
practice I do not think I dol' 
'This [code] has been tried without 
consulting any other information except 
my memory. ' 
75% of the subjects chose the correct first line of the rule: eat(omnivores _X) 
if.. _ Most 
wrote a program whose declarative meaning corresponds to their real-world knowledge; 
that is, omnivores will eat anything that is food. eat(omnivores _X) if isa(-X 
food). 
However, the query: eat(omnivores carrot), among others, would fail since there is no 
pattern matching isa(carrot food). Sl's response states that an omnivore would eat 
anything that a carnivore or vegetarian would eat. However, the query eat(omnivores 
carrot) would fail for the same reason. The subjects did not realize that the database of 
things that carnivores and vegetarians eat contained items which were 'mid-way' 
between the superordinate category 'food' and the specific examples such as 'carrot/ 
'fruit/ 'fish/ etc. The database of food preferences is therefore incomplete, since there is 
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nothing to state that carrot is an example of a category of things that vegetarians or 
carnivores eat. Subjects' solutions were therefore not based on the structure of the PROLCG 
database they were given. 
Only one subject, S8, tried to cover all possibilities. It seems likely that this subject 
realized the limitations of W(-Xfood) used by itself and tried to go through all possible 
cases -a sort of 'manual recursion'- even though both previous examples in the 
questionnaire contained a recursive procedure (which was not explained) that would have 
worked through the hierarchy. S8 and S12 could not see how any of the previous examples 
could help. 
S14 attempted a recursive solution based on rule A. Unfortunately the last line of the code 
contained three arguments and could therefore not match anything In the database. 
2.3. Discussion 
The near perfect 'understanding' claimed by the subjects did not help any of them correctly 
solve the exercise problem. There is therefore no correlation between the subjects, 
assessment of their understanding and their performance on a transfer task. One solution to 
the omnivores problem involved adapting the slightly more complex timetable solution or 
the simpler animal hierarchy one. Despite subjects' statements that they understood both 
examples almost perfectly, they did not understand them sufficiently well that they were 
able to adapt them to solve the target problem. That is, they did not see that the 
database was incomplete; it contained the information that a carrot was a root, that a root 
was a vegetable, and that a vegetable was food. It did not state explicitly that a carrot 
was food. Subjects had to write a rule that would work through the hierarchy of isa rules 
to determine that. They also seemed unaware that the point of the rules in the earlier 
problems was to allow just that. That is, the rules in the previous examples were designed 
to allow an object to 'inherit' any characteristics from higher up the hierarchy of 
relations as In the animal hierachy example, or to work through all intermediate stages, 
as in the connected rules, when there was no 'direct' route to an answer. This was the kind 
of understanding required to solve the test problem. 
Since there was no correlation between the 'subjective' and the 'objective' measures of the 
subjects' understanding, we can characterize the type of understanding that subjects have 
as 'primary'. That is, their understanding was at a superficial level. They understood the 
relations between the superficial elements of the examples but not at a level 'deep' enough 
to be able to abstract out the general principles underlying them and apply them to a new 
instance of the same type of problem. 
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It would, however, be useful if we could produce a context in which the explanation of an 
example did lead to a correlation with what students said they understood and how well 
they performed. The current experiment does highlight that we cannot rely on people's 
own estimates of how well they comprehend textbook explanations. Fergusson-Hessler 
and Jong found that 'poor' performers tended to concentrate more on declarative knowledge 
than procedural knowledge. 'Good' performers applied more 'deep' processing of 
information. In the present experiment, subjects had little to go on other than the meaning 
of the database and rules. There was no explanation of how the rules worked, for 
example. However, it would be unreasonable to label all the subjects in this experiment as 
'poor' performers; it is much more likely that the lack of correspondence between subjects' 
assessment of their understanding and their ability to manipulate an example problem 
was due to the incompleteness of the text rather than any kind of failure on the part of all 
the subjects. It may be that improving the quality of the textual explanations would lead 
to a more accurate assessment of understanding on the part of the subjects. This topic is 
addressed in experiment 3. 
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How can problems be made easier to solve? Experiment 2 
In Chapter 4, the analysis of some of the algebra problems that Reed et al. (1985) gave 
their subjects indicated areas where the student has to make a number of inferences in 
order to solve various transfer problems. Reed et al. claimed to have removed most of the 
inferences in their original problem explanation by representing the practice problem in 
the form of a table and giving more information about how the elements of the problem 
statement (30mph, 45mph, difference in departure times, etc. ) related to the solution 
equation. If the student used a table which could be filled with values derived from the 
problem statement, then it could be used to fill in the variables of an equation for thi's type 
of problem. Reed and Ettinger (1987) examined the use of tables in more detail. They 
found that subjects had difficulty filling in the table but could readily generate the 
necessary equation when given a completed table. They also found that subjects could, to 
some extent, use tables to adapt problems in order to solve more distant variants, but only 
when completed tables were provided; there was no transfer to isomorphic problems when 
the completed tables were not provided. 
Chapter 3 showed how a simple word, problem could be analysed into A and B terms and 
the relations between them. Where these relations are not completely stated the 
problem's usefulness as an exemplar of a problem category is limited. Its usefulness is 
similarly compromised If no informa tion is given about how an example relates to further 
problems of the same type (Conway & Kahney, 1987). Some aspects of the relation 
between example and test problems were examined by Novick and Holyoak (1991). Using 
algebra word problems they looked at the effects of giving subjects specific numerical 
mappings for transfer problems. For example, in the 'number mapping hint' condition 
subjects were presented with hints such as: 'the 12,8, and 3 In the band problem are like 
the 10,4, and 5 irýthe garden problem'. Transfer success was much more likely to occur with 
number mappings than if the subjects were given 'concept mappings'such as: 'your goal in 
this problem is to arrange the band members into rows or columns so that each row (or each 
column) has the same number of people in it, with no-one left over. That's like the goal 
you had In the garden problem of grouping plants into different types so that there were 
the same number of plants of each type, with no extra spaces left in the garden. ' They 
found that the numerical mappings were a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite for 
transfer. The difficulty came -when subjects had to adapt the procedure to solve a transfer 
problem. 
Problem adaptation takes a variety of forms; i4ovick and Holyoak list three of them: 
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1) Substitute numbers from the test problem into the source operators. Elements of one 
problem have to correspond to elements in the other. An example would be 
substituting, say, 30 mph in one problem for 40 mph in another in distance-speed-time 
problems, Failure to map the correct numbers led to what Reed et al. called a 
#quantity error', and using a number in a source problem without changing it in the 
target led to a 'matching error. ' This form of adaptation is not a major source of 
difficulty when the problems to be solved are 'literally similar. ' 
2) Postulate new test-problem elements not described in that problem. This occurs 
when the target is a distant variant of the source problem. If the source contains 'time 
taken' but the target does not, or if the target gives 'rates of travel' but none are given 
in the source, then the subject will have to generate new test problem elements. If 
subjects attempt to imitate a source problem to solve a distant variant, they will not 
be able to map values across since the relevant values do not exist. Subjects will fail 
to solve the target problem unless they recognize the relation between the source and 
target at a more abstract level than the level of surface features. It they can do so, 
then they can use the underlying solution structure or principle to infer new problem 
elements. 
3) Generalize source procedure in ways that preserve the essential structure of the 
procedure. If the procedure involves generating an equation, say, in an example, then 
the equation has to have the same form in any test problem. Failure to preserve the 
problem structure would lead to what Reed, Dempster & Ettinger call a 'frame error', 
where the form of the equation is wrong. 
The types of manipulation of a source described in (2) and (3) above are those which create 
the most difficulty. They can only come about if the subject understands the source well 
enough to be able to manipulate it. The type of adaptation outlined in (1) is simply one of 
mapping corresponding suxface feaures from one problem to another; it poses the least 
difficulty for IPS. 
To get round the difficulties people have with adapting a solution procedure to solve 
variants of a pr9blem type, the procedure should give as much relevant information as 
possible about how to solve problems of that type, This can only be achieved when the 
example problem Is presented at a level general enough to apply to a range of such 
problems and specific enough to show how mappings between problems can be made. 
Novick & Holyoak gave subjects the 'number mapping' with the exercise problem as a hint 
about how to use them. Exercise problems in textbooks generally don't do that. Nor will 
students find such specific information In many types of problems they will normally be 
required to solve. For this reason the examples provided should be as inclusive as 
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possible, in the sense used by Reed, Ackinclose & Voss (1990). That is, they should be more 
complex than the early test problems that students might be expected to solve. 
Novick and Holyoak also found that adapting the example was correlated with 
mathematical expertise and not analogical reasoning ability as tested by conventional IQ 
type tests. This should not really be surprising. Analogical reasoning involves the ability 
to apply knowledge which a person already has. This is Newell's definition of 
intelligence (described in Chapter 2). In a relatively new domain people will vary in the 
amount of prior knowledge they can bring to bear on a problem. Those with greater 
mathematical expertise have ipso facto more knowledge, which will help them infer the 
necessary mathematical operators. 
To summarize: novel problems can be made easier to solve if. 
a) as much relevant information as possible is provided at the outset; 
b) this information is organized at different levels from the general to the specific; 
c) the solution procedure includes information about how it can be adapted to solve 
variants of the problem type; and 
d) subjects possess enough mathematical expertise to adapt the procedure where necessary 
Empirical evidence for the usefulness of the Interpretation theory 
The interpretation theory allows for a fine-grained analysis of a text. We can therefore 
be very specific about which parts of the example's solution procedure will cause 
difficulties for solvers. The figures which follow represent parts of the solution procedure 
for the practice distance problem used by Reed et al. (1985) (for clarity some of the figures 
from Chapter 4 are reproduced in this section). They indicate specific areas where a 
solver Is likely to commit an error. From the information in those figures we can make 
some predictions . about where students are likely to have problems in using this example 
as a basis for solving other problems of the same type. 
In this subsection I will briefly review the specific areas where students are likely to 
have difficulties in understanding the example distance-sPeed-time problem. The next 
subsections deal with difficulties in mapping it to a close and distant variant. 
The analysis of the Reed et A elaborated practice problem in section 4.3.2 of'Chapter 4 
showed that there were several areas where a number of inferences had to be made, 7bese 
are shown In figures 5.3 and 5.4 (which form part of the summary figure 5.5). 
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a) The practice distance problem states: 'we let t represent the number we want to 
find and enter it into the table, The first car then travels t+ 312 hr because it left 11/2 hours 
earlier. ' The explanation does not say where the 11/2 hours came from, hence the dotted 
lines and black box from the A terms to We in figure 5-3. There is no indication why 11/2 
hours was changed to 3 /2 in B4 which is why there is a black box between the explanation 
We and the subgoal B4. 
carl leav s il time carl 0 72 M-Q RDE3 ýR hours earlier J- =t+ 3/2] 
b) The text of the example problem tells the subjects to 'represent distance by 
multiplying rate and time for each car' (box We in row g of figure 5.4). It does not say what 
this means in terms of an equation. For this reason subjects may have difficulty mapping 
from the problem givens to the relevant equation. In figure 5.4g the B is in shadow format 
because the equations referred to in the text are not explicitly stated. 
C) The table, taken from Reed et al. 's explanation, contains six boxes (row h in figure 
5.4), representing the distance, rate and time for each car. The relevant equation has only 
4 variables rate x time for each car (figure 5.4g) which are not explicitly stated in the 
explanation. Students may find difficulty in relating the distance boxes to the rate and 
time boxes in the table (figure 5.4h) since all they have to go on is the statement in box 
137e, Furtherrnore, and most importantly, the relevant equation is ratel x timel = rate2 x 
time2. The only equation given in the example is distance = rate x1time. Cenerating the 
equation in B9 (row i) will therefore be difficult for some students. 
represent distancp 
by multiplying rate & 
j dI [g ta l dI= rixti LE 9) 
c car r 
_ __ 
time for eaach ca 
d2 = r2xt2j 
-Is 
l 
values shown 
L9 CAr d1stance 4 ýB' 
1 133(t+l, 
tirn, 
Ia0t +1Z 8 h In table . 2140t 1401 t 
) 
both cars travel same 
distance - set 2 distances 001, 
9 
eclual to eactl ottler 
BO 30(t 42 )m 40t 
ii 
1) 
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We can therefore predict that students will have difficulty in 
i) understanding the or! & of the 3/2 hours 
ii) accessing the relevant equation; 
iii) mapping the six elements in the table to the four in the equation; 
iv) filling in the distance boxes in the table. 
When students attempt an exercise problem which is a close variant of the practice 
problem, we can predict that, where students do show any misunderstanding, it will be in 
those places marked by the inference lines and black boxes in figure 5.5d to i. Tbereafter, 
they are obliged to rely on their prior knowledge of mathematics to understand the 
transformations that take place to arrive at the overall solution (rows i to 1). The focus of 
this study, however, is on the students' ability to generate the equation in row i. If they 
can successfully substitute elements in the target for elements in the source to generate the 
equation, then solving a close variant should not cause much difficulty. So our first 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis I The major difficulty in solving a close variant of the problem is one of 
mapping corresponding values. Where the transfer problem is literally similar, we would 
not expect mapping to pose a particular problem when solvers are Imitating the source. 
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ENOODE 
A car traveling at a speed of 30 mph left a certain point at 10.00 a. m. At 11.30 
a. m., another car departed from the same Place at 40 mph and traveled the same 
route. In how many hours will the second car overtake the first? 
3 7ALAJ JA 
AA4 
ý001 
NA5 
distance- ratG-tim l Distance =R e 
ý_ CK 
EBe problem _______.. 
R 
! B; 
x Time 
a) 
car nistance 1 rate Iu 
construct table 
)_ 
11 
1 ýR 
b) 
1--_ 
'0 
2 
ýrepresent (FR2i let. 
- 
_49 goal =t 1 numbor to be found) 
carl leaves 1 112 
---- 
time carl 
+ 3/2 t+ hours earlier t 
r31/2 
rate carl = 
(I b el 30 mph 
rate car2 = 
Lie 1 40 mph 
represent distance by ep 7 
r ýe nEB7 
I p Y1 g rate & time fo muivplyin 
rate carl = i e) 30 mph 
rate car2 = 
j 
f) 
40 mph 
ý 
d1= ri xti I g) d2= r2xt2 
car distance rate time 
e table 
alues shown 1030 in tabl 40140 
---------- 
solve for t 
0(t 1/2 )= 40t 
45 = 40t 
45 = 10t 
h) 
i) 
j) 
k) 
I=4.5 hours II) 
RESPONSE: 
time taken by second car = 4.5 hrs 
12 
B B11 
2 B 3 B 
- TT T 'T B 
r 
B 
4 
B 
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In Reed et al. 's experiments subjects were presented with the following equivalent 
problem: 
A car travels south at the rate of 30 mph. Two hours later, a second car leaves to overtake 
the first car, using the Same route and going 45 mph. In how many hours will the second car 
overtake the first car? 
Figure 5.6 shows the problem givens. 
MOODE 
A car travels south at the rate of 30 mph. Two hours later, a second car 
leaves to overtake the first car, using the same route and going 45 mph. 
In how many hours will the second car overtake the first car? 
c, Carl travels -fgý at 30 moh 
Car2 leaves 2 
hours later 
I-I-I 
[cm, C3 
Car2 travels 
cil rC2 31 -U at 45 mph 
tho MLraufs 
= ke 01,11 1 '' C'u'l u`ý'r'g 
e ra t's 
In how many hours 
does cal overtake 
Flaurc5.6. Tquiyalent' test probleC3 givos. 
As figure 5.7 shows, there Is no direct match between the '2 hours' mentioned in the test 
problem and the times given in the training problem (represented by A2 and A3 
respectively). For this reason the access line from C2 is shown as being blocked. Subjects 
have to infer that they have to find the difference In departure times (represented by D4). 
It is at this point that the 'equivalent' problems veer away from isomorphism and the 
mappings depicted in row d are therefore a source of potential error. 
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------------------------------- 
.. 74 ................. 
...... w......... 
carIleaves 3 car2 leave 41 C2 c r2 leaves time carl 
at 10.00 
) (gat 
11.30 
113 
hours late -t+2 
I 
--i - 
MTýý 
Some of the elaborated training problem givens can be mapped directly onto the 
equivalent test problem. The first car in both problems travels at 30mph. This 
information is represented as A' and C' in row e of figure 5.8. The speeds can be mapped 
onto the variables in the relevant equation (B5 and V in row e). By changing the rate of 
the second car in the training problem from 40mph to 43mph in the test problem (A4 and C3 
in rowl) the solver could also map this onto the rate term in the equation (D6). 
When using the example to solve an equivalent problem, the solver 'inherits' all the 
difficulties mentioned in understanding the example problem. Apart from the added 
difficulty of mapping the times in row d, subjects will have difficulties where there are 
dotted lines and black boxes in figure 5.8. Those difficulties have already been described 
and represented in figure 5.5. (A more detailed description of figure 5.8 can be found in 
section 5.2 of Chapter 4. ) 
The summary figure 5.8 demonstrates where mappings are blocked and where the solver is 
still obliged to make inferences about which operators should be used in order to relate the 
problem givens to the solution. We can therefore make further predictions about the 
possible sources of difficulty for the subjects. 
Hypothesis 2: Any move away from isomorphism, however slight, will be a source of 
error. Some subjects wW therefore have difficulty at line d since the times in the example 
do not map directly onto the one in the test problem. 
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ENOCIDE 
A car travels south at the rate of 30 mph, Two hours later, a second car 
leaves to overtake the first car, using the same route and going 45 mph. In how 
many hours will the second car overtake the first? 
ýCl Lcý C3 ClIstance 
Be B Speed x Timel C 
car distance rate time 
W C5 Be B21 DI 91 21 11 
how many j LIM goal [FCjhours... 
............ 
-0 wj........... 
.... 
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r 
2 A Aý Lej Llýýj 2 hours later t 2' 
rate carl map 
30 mph 30 mph -> ri 
61 1E F"C rate car2 map "ý-3 
45 mph 45 mph -> r2 
........ I ------------ 
---- -4 j)5 leav to dl = rixti 
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...................... 
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a) 
b) 
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d) 
e) 
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Reed et al. 's 'similar' test problem was as follows: 
A pick-up truck leaves 3 hr after a large delivery truck but overtakes it by travelling 
15 mph faster. If it takes the pick-up truck 7 hr to reach the delivery truck, find the 
rate of each vehicle, 
The problem givens are shown in figure 5.9. 
ENOODE 
A pick-up truck leaves 3 hr after a large delivery truck but 
overtakes It by travelling 15 mph faster. If it takes the pick-up truck 
7 hr to reach the delivery truck, find the rate of each vehicle. 
11 3hr afte 
cj 
%4 c lSmph faste 
: 
cl, 7hr) 
leaves 
It 
C'I rate of each vehl 9 
Mapping the practice problem onto a distant variant gives a quite different picture. None 
of the values in the problem statement (CI, C2 and C3 In figure 5,9) map onto anything in 
the earlier problem. 
In figure 5.10 in rows c, d, e andf, the lines from the C terms are shown as blocked. The 
goals of the two problems are different; the procedure for finding rates is different from 
that for finding the time taken by a vehicle. This will affect the subjects' ability to 
complete the table in row Ii and generate the equation in row i. 
The summary figure 5.10 shows not only the inferences inherited from understanding the 
example problem (the A and B terms) but also specifies where subjects would have 
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difficulties making the necessary mappings. From the analysis of the problem we would 
predict that subjects will have difficulty at the following lines: 
0 since the goals of the two problems are different; 
d, e) since the problem elements do not map and the subject is not told what operator to 
apply; 
f) nothing in the earlier problem maps onto a difference in rates and the subject is not 
told what operator to apply, 
g) for the reasons already given in the discussion of the 'equivalent' problem subjects 
may have difficulty generating the two halves of the relevant equation; 
h) the types of elements in the table in the training problem do not match those in 
the test problem (there are variables in the time column in the training problem but not in 
the test, and variables in the test problem under rate but not in the training problem); 
i) subjects have to solve for r rather than t and then find the rate of the other 
vehicle In subgoal m. 
In fact very little of the original example problem is of any use at all. 
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ENOODE 
A pick-up truck leaves 3 hr after a large delivery truck but overtakes It by 
traveling 15 mph faster. If It takes the pick-up truck 7 hr to reach the delivery 
truck. find the rate of each vehicle. 
Distance 
a) Speed x Time) 
car distance I ratq time -) 
II -j-j b) 21 
r --- J ....... 
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Because of the difficulty in mapping values across from source to target, and because there 
is no general procedure presented for adapting the example problem to this distant - 
variant, we can make further predictions about the difficulties facing students attempting 
to imitate a distant variant: 
Hypothesis 3: There will be more 'quantity errors' (errors due to m1sassigning values in 
the problem to variables in the equation) in the distant variant than in the close variant, 
since some values are not given in the exercise problem which are given in the example and 
vice versa. 
Hypothesis 4: Related to hypothesis 3, we would expect that imitation would lead to 
'over-transfer' from the source problem. In particular we would expect to find subjects 
attempting to use the variable t in the solution to the distant variant because that is what 
it Says to do in the example, even though the value of t can be readily derived from the 
problem statement 
One of the predictions from IPS is that subjects attempt to map values from a source to a 
target and that, when any manipulations are required of the underlying solution, this will 
create difficulties. In the case of these algebra problems subjects have to adapt the 
equation to solve the distant variant. Specifically, this means finding a difference in 
rates and adding that to the equation as well as solving for rate instead of time, This 
difficulty will be apparent in the number of subjects who are able to generate the relevant 
equation, 
Hypothesis S., There will be more 'frame errors' (errors occurring when attempting to 
generate and adapt the relevant equation) in the distant variant when no information is 
provided about 
ýow 
to adapt the equation. 
It follows from the above analysis of the word problems that, if the inferences inherent in 
the Reed et al. explanation are removed and a more general procedure provided, then 
subjects will find it easier to map values across and adapt the procedure to more distant 
variants. Figure 5.11 represents the practice problem with the inferences removed. Row a 
represents the requirement to identify the problem as a dist4nce-r4te-time problem and 
provides the general overall equation governing such problems, Row b shows that this 
subtype involves 2 vehicles, so there are two distance-rate-time equations. Row c 
represents an explanation that the distances are the same for the two vehicles so the rates 
x times are equal, Rows d, e, andf show the mappings of values In the problem givens onto 
the equation. Row g represents the fact that the time for one vehicle can be stated in terms 
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of the time for the other, since we know the differences in times. This is mapped onto the 
equation in row h. The completed equation Is presented in row i. No information is given 
about how the solution is derived from the equation (the point of the experiment was to 
see how well subjects could understand word problems well enough to generate the correct 
equation. Its purpose was not to explain the arithmetic operators necessary to solve 
algebra equations) . 
When the example represented in figure 5.11 is presented as a specific case of a general 
procedure, it should be possible for solvers both to see how the general procedure operates 
in this example and to adapt it to fit a new problem of the same type. Hypothesis 6 is 
therefore: 
Hypothesis 6: Removing inferences and providing a more general procedure win enhance 
transfer to distant variants of a problem type. 
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ENCODE 
A car traveling at a speed of 30 mph left a certain point at 10.00 a. m. At 11.30 a. m., 
another car departed from the same place at 40 mph and travelled the same route. Both cars 
therefore travelled the same distance. In how many hours will the second car overtake the 
first? 
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For reference the hypotheses are repeated in table 5.1. 
Table 5.1. Summary of experimental hypotheses 
Hypothesis I 
The major difficulty in solving a close variant of the problem is one of mapping 
corresponding values. Where the transfer problem is literally similar, we would not 
expect mapping to pose a particular problem when they are imitating the source. 
Hypothesis 2: 
Any move away from isomorphism, however slight, will be a source of error. Some subjects 
will therefore have difficulty at line d since the times in the example do not map directly 
onto the one in the test problem. 
Hypothesis 3: 
There will be more quantity err6rs' (errors due to n-dsassigning values in the problem to 
variables in the equation) in the distant variant than in the close variant, since some 
values are not given in the exercise problem which are given in the example and vice 
versa. 
Hypothesis 4: 
Related to hypothesis 3, we would expect that imitation would lead to 'over-transfer' 
from the source problem. In particular we would expect to find subjects attempting to use 
the variable t in the solution to the distant variant because that is what it says to do in 
the example, even though the value of t can be readily derived from the problem 
statement 
Hypothesis 5. 
There will be more 'frame errors' (errors occurring when attempting to generate and adapt 
the relevant equation) in the distant variant when no information is provided about how 
to adapt the equation, 
Hypothesis 6: 
Removing Werences, and providing a more general procedure will enhance transfer to 
distant variants of a problem type. 
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3.2. Method 
The subjects were 40 Scottish secondary school students, aged between 14 and 16, who took 
part in the experiment during their normal mathematics classes. They were divided into 
four groups of 10, and randomly assigned to four conditions: Table/Close, Table/Distant, 
Mapping/Close and Mapping/Distant. 
In the Table/Close and Table/Distant conditions subjects received a training problem along 
with the explanation used by Reed et al. which Included a table as an intermediate 
representation of the solution procedure. The only difference was that the word 'rate' was 
replaced by 'speed'. In the Mapping/Close and Mapping /Distant conditions subjects 
received the same problems but the explanations were presented in more detail and the 
mappings between the elements of the problem and the equation were explicitly 
presented. The explanatory texts used are reproduced below: 
3.2.2.1. Table Condition - Practice Distance Problem 
A car travelling at a speed of 30 miles per hour (mph) left a certain place at 10.00 a, m. 
At 11.30 a. m. another car departed from the same place at 40 mph and travelled the 
same route. In how many hours will the second car overtake the first car? 
The problem is a distance-speed-time problem in which 
DiSt4nce = Speed x Time 
We begin by constructing a table to represent the distance, speed, and time for each of 
the two cars, We want to find how long the second car travels before it overtakes the 
first car. We let t represent the number that we want to find and enter It Into the table. 
The first car then travels t+ 3/2 hr because it left 11/2 hrs earlier. The speeds are 30 
mph for the first car and 40 mph for the second car. Notice that the first car must 
travel at a slower speed if the second car overtakes it. We can now represent the 
distance each car travels by multiplying the speed and the time for each car. These 
values are shown in the following table. 
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Distance Speed Time 
Car (miles) (mph) (h rs) 
First 304 +312 30 t +312 
Second 40x It 40 't 
Because both cars have travelled the same distance when the second car overtakes the 
first, we set the two distances equal to each other. 
30(t + 312) = 40t 
Solving for t yields the following: 
30t + 45 = 40t, 
45 = lot, 
4.5 hr. 
3.2.2.2. Mapping Condition - Practice Distance Problem 
The worked out problem shown below was presented to subjects in the Mapping Condition, 
To show that most of the inferences required to understand the explanation in the Table 
Condition have been removed, the letters in square brackets in the margin relate to the 
lettered rows in figure 5.11. 
A car travelling at 4 speed of 30 miles per hour (mlli) left a certain place at 10.00 a. m. 
At 11.30 a. m. another car departed from the same place at 40 m1h and travelled the 
same route. Both cars therefore travelled the same distance, In how many hours will 
the second car overtake, the first car? 
As you can see, the two cars travel at different speeds and leave at different tirnes- 
The first car leaves 11/2 hours before the second car (11.30 - 10.00); 
The second car travels 10 m/h faster than the first one (40 m/h - 30 m/h). 
Since the first car has already been travelling for 11/2 hours you can work out the 
distance it travelled, If it goes 30 miles in an hour then it will have travelled 45 miles 
in 11/2 hours (30 m/h x 11/2 hours). 
The problem now becomes: How long will it take the second car to make up " 45 
miles by travelling 10 m/h faster? 
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In I hour the second car will travel 10 miles more than the first car, so it win take 4.5 
hours to make up the 45 miles (45 h -o- 10 m/h). In other words it will take 4.5 hours for 
the second car to overtake the first car. 
I. Another way of solving this type of distance-speed-time problem is to use an 
equation: 
a] a)lf you know the speed and time of a vehicle, then you can find the distance it 
travelled by using the equation: 
Distance = Speed x Time 
For example, if a car travels at 40 m/h (Speed) for 2 hours (Time) then It goes 80 miles 
(Distance - found by multiplying 40 by 2). 
b] b) In problems like the one above there are two vehicles (let's call them vehiclel 
and vehicle2). The 'equation for each vehicle would be: 
distance = speedvehiclel x timevehiclel 
and 
distance = speedvehicle2 x timevehicle2 
C1 c) But the two vehicles travel the same distance. So the distance travelled by one 
vehicle is equal to the distance travelled by the other. If the distances are equal 
then the speed x time for each vehicle must be equal too, so the equation to use when 
there are two vehicles travelling the same distance is: 
speedve' = speed .h me hkI, j x timevehiclel icle2 X ti vehicle2 
2. We can now fiJI in some of the information that the problem gives us into this 
equation. 
d] The problem gives the speeds of both vehicles but not the time taken by either of 
el them. We want to find the time taken by vehicle2, so for the moment we will call It 
fj t. 
30 ni/h 40 nuli 
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speedvehiclel x timevehiclel = speedvehicle2 x timevehicle2 
3, The next thing to do is to look at any differences between the two vehicles which 
we can then use to fill in the blanks in the equation. 
g] We know the two cars left at different times, so that the first car travels 11/2 hours 
longer than the second one. The second car takes T hours so the first car takes t+ 11/2 
hrs. We can now add this to the equation: 
30 (t + 11/2) 40 
speedvehiclel x timevehiclel a speedvehicle2 x timevehicle2 
You end up with- 
il 30 x (t + 11/2) = 40 xt 
Solving for t gives you the time taken by vehicle2 which is what you have to find. 
30t + 45 = 40t 
45 = 40t - 30t 
45 = lot 
p 4.5 or 41/2 hours 
7be experiment used a 2x2 between-subjects design. 7he independent variable was the 
type of instruction provldiýd with the training problem. 7be subjects were asked to take 
part in a study of instructional materials and were told that the study was not a test of 
their own problem solving abilities. 7hey were then presented with three sheets 
containing the instructions, the example problem and associated solution procedure, and 
the exercise problem. 7he instructions were as follows: 
In a moment you will be asked to read the next sheet (sheet 5) which gives an example 
problem and an explanation of how to solve it. Please read it carefully. 
Once you have read sheet D, turn to the third sheet (sheet C) and write your name and 
class at the top. Then try to solve the problem which you find there. 
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Please use the example problem on sheet B to help you solve the problem on sheet C. 
Feel free to make as many rough notes as you want on the sheet. In fact it would be 
helpful if you didn't rub or Tippex out any of your notes. 
Please do your best, but don't worry if you find some of it too difficult. 
When you are sure you have understood these instructions start reading sheet D. 
There was no time limit imposed but the experiment was conducted within the normal 
lesson time of approximately 35 minutes. Subjects were allowed to consult the example 
solution throughout the experiment. At the end of the experiment subjects were also asked 
to write any comments they had about the usefulness or otherwise of the example. 
3.3. Results 
Novick and Holyoak's'study identified three levels of performance which were scored in 
the following way: a fully correct solution (score of 2), a partial solution (score of 1), and 
no transfer (score of 0). The present study identified similar levels of response but also 
included identifying the correct elements that took part in the equation as a necessary 
prerequisite of constructing a correct equation. Responses were -also analysed for the type 
of equation used, the degree to which subjects were able to map elements of the problem 
statement onto the relevant equation, and the types of errors committed. 
Correct soltition. The solution was coded as being correct if the correct equation was used 
and the correct piocedure employed. A correct solution also contains the correct values in 
all variable slots in the equation, The correct procedure here is defined as the procedure 
given in the training example. 
Correct equation. The correct equation means that the subject has filled in the values in 
the equation: speedvehiclel x tilnevelliclel ý2 Veed vehIcIe2 x tilnevehicle2. Note that 
an equation can be classified as correct even though it may contain quantity or matching 
errors. This classification is in conformity with that used by Reed et al. (1985). 
Correct answer. A correct answer can be generated without using an algebraic method. In a 
few cases the correct answer was given despite errors in the calculation and sometimes in 
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cases where it was difficult to ascertain exactly what procedure was used. (This was the 
case mainly in Experiment 3. ) 
Overall score. The overall score depends on whether: the subject used a correct solution 
(score of 3); the subject generated a correct equation as defined above (score of 2); the 
subject has identified all the elements necessary for the solution but has not mapped them 
onto the equation (score of 1); and no transfer (score of 0). This scoring scheme 
approximates that used by Novick and Holyoak (1991). 
Note that the airn of the experiment was to identify how well subjects could generate the 
correct equation using the correct procedure. It did not concern itself with the subjects' 
ability to manipulate the equation to generate the correct answer once the equation had 
been generated. 
Responses were also examined to identify the types of errors made. The errors were 
classified as follows: 
Non-algebraic soltition. In some cases subjects used both an algebraic and a non-algebraic 
solution method; In such cases the non-algebraic solution method was ignored for the 
purposes of coding. Otherwise subjects are coded as using a non-algebraic method whether 
or not the method gives the correct answer. 
Wrong equation. Subjects are coded as using the wrong equation when it appears they are 
using any equation other than the 'correct' one as defined above. 
Quantity errors. A quantitierror refers to an error produced when the subject maps the 
wrong value from a target problem to the source. An example would be mapping the 
difference between the speeds of the vehicles (e. g. 15m/h) onto the speed of one of the cars 
in the source. 
Matching errors, A matching error occurs when the subject substitutes a value in the source 
problem for a value in the target without any attempt at adapting it. 
Frame errors. A frame error Is an error in the form of the equation. If 30(t + 2) - 45t Is the 
correct equation then an equation such as 30(t + 2) = 45 would be a frame error since It does 
not preserve the form of the original speed x time equation (the time of the second vehicle 
is missing). 
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33.3. A comparison of success rates in the Table and Mapping Conditions 
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Figures 5.12 and 5.13 present the results of the four groups. Ple raw data are tabulated in 
Appendix 2. 
Success in Table and Mapping Conditions 
171 Table/C-Ios-e7 
Eigure 5.12. Success in the Table and Mappqng Condition . Ins' refers, to differenct's in adliacent 
c(_)IuMns which are not significant and 's'. to those which arr. 
According to hypotheses I and 3 we would expect a greater difficulty in mapping and more 
qUalltity errors in the Distant conditions. There should therefore be fewer elements 
identified in those conditions. 70% of subjects in the Table/Close Condition correctly 
filled out the boxes in the table for tbne and speed for the two vehicles. In the 
Table/Distant Condition only 20% correctly filled in those boxes. This difference is 
significant (z=-2.4543, p< . 008; the figures refer to a z-test 
for n< 30). In the 
Map ping/C lose condition, 90%,, identified the correct elements as opposed to 60", () iTi the 
Mapping/ Distant Condition. This difference is not significant (p > . 05). 
All subjects in the Table/Close Condition who filled in the time and speed boxes in tile 
table also correctly filled in the distatice boxes, whereas only I subject in the 
Table/Distant condition managed to do so. 
In line with hypothesis 6, that providing more information would enhance transfer in 
dvltant variants, significantly more subjects in the Mapping/Distant condition identified 
the correct element,,, than in the Table/Distant condition (z = -2.012, p< . 05). 
Significantly more correct solutions were generated in the Mapping/Distant Condition 
than in the Table/Distant Condition (z= -2.528, p< . 006). Although 4 subjects in the 
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Table/Distant Condition had used the correct equation, 3 had the wrong values in the 
equation and the 4th had confused the trucks. On the other hand, the subjects in the 
Mapping/Distant condition got the correct answer by putting the correct values in the 
equation and following the correct procedure. 
Errors in Table and Mapping Conditions 
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Hypothesis 3 predicted increases in quantity errors in the distant variant of the example 
problem. Subjects made significantly more quantity errors in the Table/Distant Condition 
compared with the Table/Close Condition (z = -3.018, p< . 002). In line with hypothesis 5, 
which predicted more frame errors when subjects were required to adapt the equation, a 
greater number of subjects gmerated the correct equation in the Mapping/Close condition 
than in the Table/Close condition (z = -1.7833, p< . 05), but there was no significant 
difference in the Distant conditions. In the Table/Close Condition there were no frame 
errors, whereas in the Table/Distant Condition there were 4 such errors. This difference is 
significant (z = -2.528, p< . 006). In the Mapping/Distant condition only one 
frarne error 
and one quantity error were made. 
Hypothesis 6 accounts for the fact that fewer errors were made in the Mapping Conditions 
than in the Table Conditions, since more information is provided about mappings and how 
to generalize the procedure. More wrong eqU a tions were generated in the Tab le /Close 
Condition than in the. Mapp ingl Close Condition (z :=1.7, p<. 05). Subjects in the Table 
Conditions attempted to use the distance = rate x time equation rather than the ratel x 
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timel = rate2 x time2 equation. In the distant variants fewer quantity errors were made by 
the Mapping group than by the Table group (z = -3.02, p< . 002), as well as fewer frame 
errors (z = -1.74, p< . 05). 
Subjects' written comments provided some indication about where they found difficulty in 
understanding the training problem. In the Table/Close Condition most subjects 
successfully solved the problem, nevertheless they did not always find the explanation 
useful. Here are some of their comments: 
S4: 'Me distance in the table was quite confusing to start with. ' 
S7: 'explain clearer' (written against t+ 312 in the instruction sheet). 
SIO: 'I don't really understand where you got the 45 from on the previous page [example 
problem]. I don't think (for an example) you have explained that well enough. ' (This 
refers to the 45 generated from multiplying 30 by 3/2. ) 
, 
3,3.5. 'Ovgrt' imitajiI213 al3d over-transfer 
In some cases subjects attempted to adapt the exercise problem in order to make it 
perceptually similar to the earlier problem. Such 'overt' imitation can take various forms 
(which are not always readily quantifiable). Examples would be: ensuring that the 
solution to the exercise problem has the same number of '='signs or same number of lines as 
the example when solving for t. Overt imitation is a form of over-transfer, where the 
solver transfers too much information from the source. 
Matching error is the most overt form of imitation where the subject copies a value from 
the source problem across to the target without any attempt at adapting it, S8 copied the 
3/2 from the example into the exercise problem. (She nevertheless managed to generate 
the correct answd*r. She wrote '30(t + 3/2) = 45t' and then on the next line '30t + ýO 45t. ' It 
is difficult to know whether she simply made a shp of the pen when filling In the table by 
Writing 3/2 instead of 2; whether she made an arithmetic error when multiplying the 3/2 
by 30; or whether she copied the 3/2 since that is what was written in the source example, 
but multiplied 2 by 30 instead because it seemed to make more sense to do so. ) 
Five subjects in Table/Close condition used overt imitation. They adapted the solution so 
that it was perceptually similar to the source example. In doing so they converted the 2 
hours difference between the departure times of the cars in the ex, ercise, problem, to 4/; so, 
that it looked the same as the example problem and yet. still yielded the correctlanswer. 
Four of these subjects generated the correct solution (correct equation and solution 
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procedure). S7 provided an example of the mapping in his rough notes when he wrote: 1 3/ 2 
= 11/2'and '4 /2 = 2'. 
Three subjects in the Table/Distant Condition used overt imitation, converting the 3 to 6/2 
and the 7 to 7/2. In the latter case the conversion led to incorrect answers. S2 copied the 
table from the example with the same figures in the boxes then erased them. The subject 
did not, however, replace them with any of the values in the target. 
Some subjects in the Table/Distant Condition continued to use t as a variable (as in the 
example) in place of the times of the vehicles even though the times were given or could 
be inferred (by adding 7 and 3). In this case the subject is copying the earlier procedure 
without adapting it. Reed and Ettinger found the same effect in their studies, where their 
subjects copied over structures from the example problem which were unnecessary In the 
target problem. Such 'structure matching errors' are 
_a 
form of over-transfer and played a 
great part in frustrating their attempts to induce transfer in their subjects. 
There was some confusion in both Distant conditions in assigning vehicle labels (vehiclel, 
vehicle2) to the correct vehicles, The pickup truck in the 'distant' problem is mentioned 
first, even though it left after the delivery truck, and was therefore assigned to the 
vehiclel role by two subjects in the Table Condition and two in the Mapping Condition. 
This misassignment led to quantity errors in the equation. In figure 5.5 the order in which 
the example problem givens are mentioned in the text is preserved in the A term box. That 
Is, At refers to the speed of the first car, which is the first of the problem givens 
mentioned in the text. Similarly, the order in which the exercise problem givens; are 
presented Is preserved in the C term box in figure 5.8. In this case, however, C' refers to 
the second vehicle since if is the first one mentioned. The order in which the givens are 
presented in the two problems Is not the same. The misassignment of vehicle labels 
should therefore have been predicted. 
Two subjects in the Mapping/Distant Condition confused the trucks. However, in one case 
the subject attached all the correct values to the vehicles. In other words the vehicle 
labels were irrelevant and did not affect the outcome. 
Three subjects tried to map the values in the table to the wrong equation, either distance = 
speed x time or speed = distanceltime. This difficulty may have arisen from two possible 
sources. The subjects may have attempted to use the speed equations which they already 
knew (some wrote the dis ta nce-speed- time triangle: 
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A 
which they had previously learned). Alternatively they may have used the distance = 
speed x time equation given in the Table conditions' explanations. In the Table/Distant 
Condition, one subject wrote: 
S18. 'I don't understand how they work out the time when they don't have the 
distance. ' 
Clearly this subject did not understand the relation between the distance and speed x time 
of the vehicles and the fact that both travel the same distance. 
In the Mapping conditions some attempted the non-algebraic solution as well as the 
algebraic one, none was successful at finding the correct answer from the former method 
(although some were successful at the latter). Some subjects attempted the non-algebraic 
solution, got confused and gave up. S39, for example commented: 
'roo hard. I don't like the way in which it is written out. The example is too long and too 
hard to understand, ' 
Some, such as S23 and S28, found the non-algebraic solution unnecessary: 
S23: 'This was easy to work out, once you knew the forrnula, but all the writing 
beforehand was confusing. ' 
S28: 'It was a yery good and full explanation but some unnecessary notes. ' 
S40: 'This explanation goes into too much detail and unless you always do It that way 
it is difficult. ' 
Filling in the table proved very difficult for almost all subjects in the Table/Distant 
Condition, as Reed and Ettinger also found, Only one subject correctly filled out the 
Distance column suggesting that the relationship between the Speed and Time boxes and 
the Distance boxes was not made clear, Four subjects out of 10 in the Table/Distant 
Condition generated the correct equation; only 2 correctly filled in the table, and of them 
only one filled in the4istance boxes. These figures suggest that the relation between the 
table and the equation was likewise not sufficiently explained. This should not be 
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surprising given that the relevant equation was not specified in the text. This result is 
contrary to that of Reed and Ettinger, who found that the equation could be readily 
generated once the values in the table were known. 
3.4. Discussion 
It was predicted in hypothesis 1 that solving a close variant of an example problem by 
imitation would not cause significant difficulties. 90% of subjects in the Mapping group 
and 70% in the Table group successfully solved the 'equivalent' problem. 
A crucial aspect of the interpretation theory is its ability to specify exactly where subjects 
would go wrong when trying to imitate an example problem. In the Table/Close Condition, 
represented in figure 5.8, two potential sources of error were identified. The first was in 
line d of the figure where the times in the source and target did not correspond; the second 
was in generating the correct equation. According to hypothesis 2, if students are imitating 
a source, then variations, however slight, may lead to error, The only source of variation 
in the close variant was in generating the difference in times between two vehicles. In the 
example problem, this difference had to be computed. In the close variant, it was given. 
One might reasonably expect that the close variant should therefore be easy to solve since 
it involves one fewer subgoal. However, if subjects were closely imitating the source then 
that is precisely where any difficulties would occur. Of the 3 subjects who failed to solve 
the problem in the Table/Close Condition, two of them copied across t+3 /2 from the 
example (this 'over-transfer' was predicted in hypothesis 4), and the third got as far as 
identifying both speeds but could not identify the times of the vehicles and failed to get 
beyond that point. Thus the analysis of the problem correctly Identified the slight 
variation as being a source of potential difficulty. 
There were a large number of quantity errors in the Table/Distant condition compared to 
the Close/Distant condition, as predicted in hypothesis 3. Subjects had difficulty 
mapping corresponding elements from one problem to another. This is because they were 
relying on the surface features of the problems to Identify the mappings, rather than being 
guided by a prihcipled understanding of the structure of the problems. 
In line with hypothesis 4, examples of over-transfer were found in all conditions. In the 
distant conditions, subjects attempted to incorporate T into the equation since that was 
the variable used in the training problem. This was despite the fact that the times for 
the vehicles were given in the problem statement. In the close conditions, over-transfer 
was apparent in subjects who converted T to 14/2, or used the t+3/2 in the equation without 
any modification. 
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There were significantly more frame errors in Table/Distant condition compared to the 
Table/Close condition. Subjects were unable to adapt the equation to solve a distant 
variant, Similarly, some subjects were unable to identify the correct equation in the first 
place. In particular they tended to use distance = rate x time or a variation of it, such as 
rate = distance / time. The latter was ususally generated by the subjects themselves from 
the distance-rate-time triangle. 
There was a significant increase in the number of quantity and frame errors in the distant 
variant, as predicted by hypotheses 3 and 5, but only in the Table conditions. Hypothesis 
6 predicts these results since more information was provided in the Mapping Conditions 
about how the problem givens should be mapped to the underlying equation, and how this 
relates to other problems of the same type. It also led to a significantly greater number of 
correct solutions in the Mapping/Distant Condition than in the Table/Distant Condition. 
It would appear, then, that the earlier analysis of the problems and of the mappings 
between them correctly predicted the areas where subjects would have difficulty. It also 
shows that attemptingto improve explanations in areas of potential difficulty, by 
removing the need for inferencing and presenting a more general procedure, produces a 
greater degree of transfer to distant variants of a problem type. 
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4. Enhancing transfer and problem understanding: 
Experiment 3 
In the Mapping/Distant Condition in experiment 2,30% of subjects attempted a non- 
algebraic solution based on the non-algebraic solution in the example problem. None was 
successful, despite finding a correct solution using the algebraic procedure. Experiment 1 
showed that subjects claimed to 'understand' example problems but were unable to adapt 
them to solve a new problem of the same type. It would be interesting to discover whether 
providing information about how to adapt the problem would produce a correlation 
between what subjects claim to understand and what they do understand based on their 
performance on a transfer problem. 
For these reasons a second experiment was carried out to investigate the effects of 
removing the non-algebraic solution, which caused some confusion In the second 
experiment, and the effects of providing information about how to adapt a problem on 
subjects' assessment of their own understanding. In the present experiment, students were 
asked to rate their understanding of the two types of explanation given. The hypothesis 
was that students' ratings for the two problems would differ since the Table explanation 
involved more inferences than the Mapping explanation. As a consequence they should 
find the Table explanation more difficult to understand than the Mapping explanation. 
This experiment was a replication of the Table/Distant and Mapping/Distant conditions 
of experiment 2 with a different sample of subjects and a simplified explanation in the 
Mapping condition. The hypothesis was therefore the same as hypothesis 6 of experiment 
2, that removing inferences and providing a more general procedure would enhance transfer 
to distant variants of a problem type. The subjects in the present study had had at least 
two years more experience-in algebra than those in experiment 2. Given their greater 
expertise it was expected that they would be better able to adapt the procedure in both 
the Table and Mapping Conditions. 
Method 
Subjects were 23 6th form students at a Secondary Comprehensive school in Milton Keynes, 
They had been successful in the GCSE exams in mathematics and were preparing for A- 
levels in mathematics. 
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The materials were similar to those used in Experiment 2 except that the mapping 
explanation was not so elaborated. For example, there was no explanation of the 
statement that it was 'a distance-speed-time problem in which distance = speed x time. ' 
This is because the subjects were well acquainted with this general problem type (but not 
with colinear problems). Both the Table and Mapping explanations contained boxes on 
the right of the sheet so that students could note down their estimate of how well they 
understood the explanations provided by giving a rating as in experiment 1 (see below for 
details). The Mapping explanation was as follows: 
A car travelling at a speed of 30 miles per hour (m/h) left a certain place at 
10.00 a. m. At 11.30 a. m. another car departedfrom the same place at 40 
m1h and travelled the same route. Both cars therefore travelled the Same 
distance. In how many hours will the second car overtake thefirst car? 
1. This is a distance-speed-rime problem In which 
distance = speed x time 
F1 
2. a) In this problem there are 2 vehicles so: 
distance = speed,, hj, jj X tinlevehiclol 
and 
distance = speed, hlrlo2 X tinlevehicW El 
b) The tNVo vehicles travel the same distance. If the distances are equal the 
speed X finie for each vehicle must be equal too, so the equation to use when 
there arenvo vehicles travelling the same distance is: 11 
speedvehlelel x timevehiglet =--SEeedvehlcle2 X timeve 
3. a) We can now rill in some of the information from the problem into this 
equation, We want to rind the time taken by vehicle2, so for the moment we 
will call it t, (If you want to rind the speed call it s. ) 
11 
265 
Chapter 5- Understandin& imitation, and problem presentation 
30 m/h 40 m1h 
speed,, hi,,., x time,, hi, le, = speed,, hi. 1.2 x time,, hi, 1,2 Fý 
4. a) Next find any differences between the two vehicles and put them in the 
equation. 
b) The cars travel at different speeds and leave at different times: All that's 
missing here is the tirnevehiclet- The second car takes T hours, so the first car 
takes t+ 11/2 hrs (since it has been travelling for 11/2 longer). Add this to 
the equation with brackets round it: El 
30 (t + 11/2) 40 t 
speedvehiclet X timevehiclet = speedvehicle2 X timevehicle2 
You end up with- 
30 x (t + 11/2) = 40 xt El 
Solving for t gives you the time taken by vehicle2 which is what you have to 
rind. 
30t + 45 40t 
45= 40t - 30t 
45= IN 
t 4. S or 41/2 hours El 
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There were only two conditions in this experiment corresponding to the Table/Distant and 
Mapping/Distant Conditions of Experiment 2. Subjects were given the following 
instructions: 
In a moment you will be asked to read the next sheet (sheet B, double sided) which 
gives an example problem and an explanation of how to solve it. Please read it 
carefully. 
You will see boxes on the right of the sheet. As you read the explanation on the sheet I 
would like you to fill in these boxes with the numbers I-5 in the following way: 
1.1 don't understand this at aU; 
2.1 don't think I understand this; 
3.1 think I have a rough Idea what it's talking about, 
4.1 think I understand this reasonably well; 
1 understand this perfectly. 
Once you have read sheet B and filled in the boxes, turn to the third sheet (sheet Q 
and write your name and class at the top, Then try to solve the problem which you find 
there. 
Please use the example problem to help you solve It. 
Feel free to make as many rough notes as you want on the sheet. In fact it would be 
helpful if you didn't rub or Tippex out any of your notes. 
When you have finished please write any comments you may have about the way the 
problem is explained. 
Pl6se do your best, but don't worry if you find some of it too difficult. 
When you are sure you have understood these instructions start reading sheet 13. 
The subjects were shown some examples on An overhead projector of how to fill in the boxes 
and asked if they had any questions. 
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4.2. Results 
The results are shown in figures 5.14 and 5,15. (The complete data are tabulated in 
Appendix 2). 
Comparison of solutions in the Table and 
Mapping Conditions 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Table Condition 
Mapping Condition 
As predicted, the Mapping Condition produced more correct solutions (where subjects used 
the correct equation with the correct values and the same procedure as in the example) 
than the Table Condition (z = -1.94, p< . 05). Subjects in the Mapping condition were better 
able to generate the correct equation (the correct form of the equation, which may include 
wrong values) than those in the Table Condition (z = -2.025, p< . 05). Subjects in the 
Mapping Condition were no better able than subjects in the Table Condition to identify or 
derive the values from the problem statement that mapped onto the variables in the 
equation. However, those"in the Table Condition were unable to constructim equation out 
of those values. These differences can be seen in figure 5.14 by comparing the heights for 
the Table Condition of the 'correct equation' and 'elements identified' columns. This 
contrasts with the Mapping Condition where there was a significantly greater number of 
correct mappings of elements from the problem onto the equation (z = -2.640, p <. 005). If 
the subjects in the Mapping Condition could identify the relevant elements, then they 
could readily derive the correct equation. 
The overall score is useful as it can be taken as a summary of all the measures taken. These 
scores were significantly higher in the Mapping than in the Table Condition, The 
differences between scores were in the predicted direction (Mann-Whitney U= 29; p <, Ol, 
one-tailed). 
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In contrast with experiment 2, there was no significant difference in the number of quantity 
errors made in the two conditions (50% of subjects in the Table Condition and 33% in the 
Mapping Condition - see figure 5.15). However, there was a significant difference in the 
number of frame errors made (z = -3-037, p< . 002). There was also a significant difference 
in the number of subjects in the Table Condition who accessed the wrong equation; 67% used 
an equation other than the relevant one (z = -3.353, p< . 0005); none in the Mapping 
Condition did so. This also contrasts with the results from experiment 2 which showed no 
such difference. 
Comparison of errors made in the F-1 Table Condition 
70 - 
Table and Mapping Conditions mapping condition 
60 - 
50 - 
s 
% 40 - 
30 - 
20 - 
10 l'- 
U 
quantity matching frame error non-algebra wrong 
error error solution equation 
Figgre 5.15. Týýes of error in the Table and Mapping Conditions (e3periment 3). Significant 
differences are marked with an 's' and n, )n-., ignificant differences are marked 'ns'. 
4.2.1. Subjects' comments 
Subjects in the Table Condition reported that they found the example relatively easy to 
follow but couldn't see how it applied to the exercise problem. Typical comments were: 
SI I understand the example but when it came to the question I got a bit confused 
rearranging the formula myself'; 
S4: 'I understood ho%v to rearrange the formula to get the speed but I could not continue as I 
did not have the distance travelled. I don't understand how to finish this. I did 
understand the question but there wasn't enough information. ' 
S5: 'I understand the explanation on [the example sheet) however I am unsure of how to 
solve the question above. Maybe more explimition was needed. ' 
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As in experiment 2 subjects commented that they didn't see how to solve the problem when 
the Distance was not mentioned. 
Comments on the effectiveness of the Mapping explanation were mixed. Subject S1 
commented: 'Having read both examples I found this was the better of the two. It made 
substituting into the formula much more clear. ' 
The discrepancy between the subjects' own assessment of their understanding of the 
example and their actual performance is dealt with in section 5 of this chapter. 
4.3. Discussion 
The better performance of subjects in the Mapping Condition once again indicates the 
beneficial effect of removing inferences when subjects are reading an example problem, and 
of providing an explanation at a level of generality sufficient to allow the subjects to 
adapt the procedure to'suit the target problem. The results clearly show exactly where 
some subjects had difficulty in adapting the source. One of the predictions from an 
analysis of Reed et al. 's text was that subjects would find problems mapping elements onto 
the relevant equation. Half of the subjects in the Table Condition managed to fill in the 
times and speeds in the table. However, fewer than 10% managed to map these values 
onto the correct equation (see figure 5.14). These results contrast with Reed and Ettinger's 
(1987) who found that their subjects were able to generate the equation from the values in 
the table when those values were given. 
Although more subjects in experiment 3 managed to fill in the, values in the table than in 
experiment 2, they were still unable to generate the equation. In fact, more subjects in 
experiment 2 managed to generate the correct equation in the Table/Distant Condition 
than in experiment 3. TFese results are perhaps surprising given the greater (presumed) 
expertise of the older subjects in Experiment 3. However, the explanations they had were 
less complete. This emphasizes yet again the importance of not making assumptions about 
the prior knowledge of the subjects. 
Another notable aspect of the behaviour of the subjects was the degree to which they tried 
to imitate the example. Although it was predicted that some subjects would have 
difficulty in understanding where the 3/2 came from in the example, and therefore that it 
would be hard to substitute the relevant value in the test problem, the lengths to which 
subjects went to adapt their solution to make it look like the example was quite marked, 
Those who saw the correspondence between the 2 in the test problem and the 3/2 in the 
example still adapted it to make it look like 3 /2, This behaviour resembles the 'magic' 
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view of recursion described by Kahney (1982) whose subjects imitated an example 
involving recursion in SOLO with no real understanding of how it worked. The subjects in 
this experiment seemed to be employing the same strategy of imitating the practice 
problem in the belief that the closer the exercise problem resembled the example 
superficially the more likely they were to get a correct answer. 
The reliance on mapping surface features is quite pronounced. Indeed, Novick and 
Holyoak (1991) fail to make the obvious point that providing subjects with 'number 
mappings, is in fact highlighting the relevant surface features of problems. Providing 
more structural aspects such as 'concept mappings' was less effective. The results from the 
present experiments, as well as those of Reed, Dempster and Ettinger, and Novick and 
Holyoak, demonstrate the need to show students as explicitly as possible how the surface 
features can be manipulated and mapped to the relevant equation; and how they can be 
adapted to fit variants of the problem type. 
271 
Chapter 5- Understanding, imitation, and problem presentation 
5. Understanding the text 
On reading the text of the example problem subjects were asked to fill In boxes to indicate 
how well they thought they understood the problem explanation. In the Table Condition 
they were asked to rate their understanding of the following items (the corresponding bar 
in figure 5.16 is given in brackets after them where necessary): 
the problem statement; 
the distance-speed-time equation Cd =sx t' in figure 5.16); 
the instruction to construct a table representing distance, speed and time for each car 
('construct table'); 
the explanation of T and 't+3/2' 0+3/21; 
the speeds for the two cars ('mapping speeds'); 
the explanation of the need to represent distance by multiplying rate and time for each car 
('represent distance in table'); 
the completed table; 
the final equation and the explanation of how it is derived ('equation'); 
solving for T to derive the final solution ('solution'). 
5 
4.5 
4 
3.5 
t4 3 
'S 2.5 to W2 cu tz 1.5 
cu 0.5 
0 
Figure5.16. Avgra ge ra fing scores for 'understanding' in the Table Condition 
(In the Table explanation there were three boxes alongside each line of the final solution. 
In the Mapping Condition only one rating was required. To make figures 5.16 and 5.17 
comparable the three scores for the 'solution' in the Table condition have been averaged. ) 
In the Mapping Condition subjects were asked to rate the following aspects of the 
explanation: 
the explanation that both cars travel the same distance so the rate x time for both will be 
equal since the distances are equal ('distances equal' in figure 5.17); 
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some values in the problem statement can be mapped to the equation ('mapped values'); 
the requirement to find any differences between the times and rates for the vehicles ('find 
differences'); 
the explanation that these derived differences can be mapped to the equation (, map 
derived values). 
5 
4.5 
4 
3.5 
3 
2.5 
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0.5 
co 0 
Eigure 5.17. Average radng scores for 'understand ing In the Mapping Condition. 
Taking all the individual scores together, the average score in both conditions is virtually 
the same: 4.3 in the Table Condition and 4.2 in the Mapping Condition, corresponding to 'I 
think I understand this reasonably well'. The scores for each subject were calculated 
separately and compared with their performance on the transfer task (see Appendix 2 for 
the raw data), In the Table Condition the correlation between the subjects' assessment of 
their understanding and their performance was low (r = 0.18). In the Mapping Condition, 
on the other hand, the correlation was high (r= 0.82). 
5.1. Problem understanding and performance 
Both groups of kubjects claimed to understand the explanations of their respective texts 
either 'reasonably well' or 'perfectly' in both the Table and Mapping conditions. The 
hypothesis that the subjects in the Table Condition would find it harder to understand the 
explanation they were given, since more Werences were involved, was not supported, 
In the Table Condition, the subjects' own perception of how well they understood the 
explanation provided bore no relation to how well they did in the transfer task. There 
was no correlation between the actual scores of the subjects and their assessment of their 
understanding. In the Mapping Condition, on the other hand, there was a significant 
correlation. This latter result is unlikely to be because the subjects were better able to 
assess their own understanding than the subjects in the Table Condition. The difference 
must reside in the type of explanation provided for the example problems. 
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When subjects say they understand something, that understanding is confined to the 
specific example presented. They understand the problem but not necessarily how to 
adapt it tinless the problem explanation provides that kind of information. If the 
example provides a strategy for dealing with problems of a particular type and subjects 
claim to understand it, then they are more likely to be able to solve a transfer problem, 
Obviously the two groups are not referring to the same things when they say they 
ounderstand perfectly'. In the Table Condition subjects are presented with declarative 
knowledge relevant to the specific example. In the Mapping Condition subjects have more 
information about the procedure and how to adapt it; their assessment of how well they 
understand refers both to the declarative information about the specific example and 
about the general procedural information it gives, which is more pertinent to transfer than 
the fonner. 
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General Discussion 
All of the predictions which were made from the analysis of the text of the distance-rate- 
time problems were confirmed in experiments 2 and 3. All areas where inferences were 
needed, where operators were not explicitly stated and where mappings were 'blocked' 
caused a significant number of errors. When those inferences were removed and the 
relation between the problem givens and their role in the solution was made explicit, 
significantly fewer errors were made. When information was provided about how to 
adapt the problem, subjects were better able to solve a 'distant' variant of the problem 
type. If subjects were using IPS, then any variation, however minor, was predicted to be a 
potential source of error, The resuts of experiments 2 and 3 showed that the particular 
kinds of error can be predicted from an analysis of the example problem and how it maps 
onto the target. IFS assumes that subjects attempt to map corresponding values from one 
problem to another. The next step is to infer what operations to apply to the mapped 
values in a step-by-step fashion by comparing the source to the target. Subjects often had 
to infer how one step was transformed into another in Reed et al. 's example and then had 
to apply that transformation in the target problem. When information was supplied 
about what transformations to apply to guide the adaptation of the problem, transfer was 
much more successful. 
When more general information was provided, for example, about the need to find 
differences between the speeds and times of the vehicles, that information could be used to 
guide their adaptation of the example problem, leading to more successful transfer. 
Other evidence for a heavy reliance on imitation as a problem solving strategy was shown 
by subjects who unnecessarily adapted the exercise problem to make it look more like the 
practice problený. The overt imitation and over-transfer exhibited by the subjects shows 
how greatly they relied on the surface features of problems. In experiment 2, even those 
subjects who successfully solved the problem had acquired only the vaguest representation 
of the solution procedure from the example problem, since most correct answers in the Table 
Condition also included the 4/2 instead of 2. Such 'superstitious' behaviour suggests that 
the subjects did not have a clear understanding of the example problem and were merely 
copying the procedure in the hope, rather than the knowledge, that it would work. 
Subjects who have only a 'primary' understanding of the problem concentrate on its surface 
features. They do not necessarily understand it at a deeper or more abstract level. Their 
understanding is context specific. 
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In the field of pedagogy, a shift is needed from labelling subjects as 'good' or 'poor' 
performers on the basis of how they process and understand explanations in textbooks. 
Ibis is not to say that individual differences do not exist. It is just more useful to shift the 
focus of attention to the structure of the expository text rather than looking at the 'failure' 
of particular subjects to understand. This shift of focus might help us advance our 
understanding of problem solving behaviour, and may help maximize the rate at which 
all students learn, 
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Chapter 6 CONCLUSIONS 
The central argument of this thesis has been that the structure of a textbook and the 
examples it provides strongly influence the behaviour of novices as they use them to solve 
exercise problems. This chapter goes over the main arguments adduced to justify regarding 
imitation as the predominant process in much of novice problem solving from textbook 
examples. I review how the interpretation theory can reveal the relationship between 
the structure of source and target problems on one hand, and the likely behaviour of the 
solver on the other. The chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the implications of 
this research and suggestions for further study. 
1. The arguments for the importance of imitation in Problem 
solving 
By virtue of their lack of domain-relevant knowledge, novices rely on, surface features of 
examples to solve test problems. The process they use in so doing has been referred to as 
Imitative Problem Solving. By using imitation, novices can map the surface features of the 
problems and apply the transformations that took place in the earlier problem to the new 
one. Where the test problem is a close variant of the example, imitation will often yield 
a successful result, The more an example has to be adapted, the less likely it is that 
novices will be able to solve the test problem, 
Several reasons were advanced as to why we should regard imitation as the prime method 
for problem solving by novices. First of all, novices have not yet developed the domain. 
specific schemas necessary to organize, interpret and integrate new information. Lacking 
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the necessary schemas for making sense of new material, novices tend to process expository 
material in a superficial manner. 
Secondly, the way novices represent problems limits their ability to make inferences and 
adapt the source problem to solve a target. 7he representations novices have of both an 
exercise problem and any relevant source example are likely to be incomplete, and 
fragmentary. When novices come to do exercise problems later, they have to rely on 
imitating the examples. It is the only information they have to go on. For this reason a 
variant of a problem type that is even slightly different from the example will cause 
difficulties for novices. 
Thirdly, I argued that the structure of problems, which may wen be analogous, may not be 
known to, or understood by, the novice. This seems to fly in the face of the evidence that 
analogies are powerful lean-dng devices (e. g. Gentner, 1983; Anderson & Thompson, 1989), 
However, the argument depends on the purpose of the analogy and its nature. For 
example, analogies in texts can often be very useful pedagogical devices. Expository 
analogies have been shown to enhance subjects' ability to generate inferences in anew 
domain (e. g. Donnelly & McDaniel, 1993; Gentner & Gentner, 1983). However, they work 
only when the subject already has the relevant prior knowledge of the base domain. The 
studies into the processes involved in APS carried out by Gick & Holyoak (1980; 1983) went 
one step further in the sense that both the base domain and the target were unknown to the 
subject prior to the studies. That is, the base domain had to be taught before subjects were 
presented with the target. This is also the case in scientific domains where new concepts, 
and examples are first taught before exercise problems are presented, Nevertheless, 
problems such as the Fortress and Radiation problems have a relatively simple structure 
which is easy to recall. The relations involved are ones we already know; that is, we can 
understand the motivations of the protagonists, we know what it means to divide an army 
into groups, we can see that simultaneously converging on the fortress means that the 
whole of the original strong force is brought to bear, and so on. In scientific domains the 
nature of the relations between the elements of a problem may not be well known or 
understood. 
When the base problem contains novel concepts and there is a complex network of relations 
between them, as Is the case in most science texts, we cannot assume that novices can 
readily understand the explanation of example solutions. They may not be aware of the 
underlying structure of the example problem. If this is the case they cannot use structural 
analogy to solve a new problem of the same kind. Successfully solving a new problem 
which is a close variant of the example can be accomplished by imitating it. This does not 
require an understanding of the underlying structure. 
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A fourth argument concerned the nature of in-dtation as a 'useful' cognitive process. In 
solving problems, human beings will tend to take a path that involves the least cognitive 
effort. Very often the simplest way of solving a problem Is to think of a similar one we 
have solved in the past and use that solution. Repeating a sequence of actions which was 
successful in achieving one's goals is a rational strategy, as long as the context remains 
more or less the same. Imitating a sequence of actions performed by others is likewise a 
useful strategy. So imitating a textbook example should normally result in a successful 
solution, if the target problem and source are seen as similar. 
By relying on the perceptually similar features of problems novices make the reasonable 
assumption that the underlying structural or conceptual features are likely to be similar 
also. Solving a problem from an understanding of the structure of the problem is 
computationally demanding, it is simpler to imitate an earlier one. In terms of cognitive 
effort, imitation is thus an economical strategy. 
A fifth argument adduced was that induction is conservative. Novices are sensitive to the 
specific contexts in which the examples are embedded. Their ability to generalize from 
those contexts is often limited because they may not know what inferences are justified or 
appropriate in a different context. This is the principle of 'conservative induction' (Medin 
& Ross, 1989). 
2. Imitative Problem Solving and the interpretation theory 
If novices imitate an example without fully understanding Its structure, this has 
important consequences for how we investigate the processes they use. The interpretation 
theory introduced in Chapter 3 described a methodology that allows us to see both the 
structure of textbook examples and how they map onto test problems. The degree to which 
they map is predlctive of the difficulty that novices have in imitating examples to solve 
a test problem. It also provides a metric of transfer. We can simply count the places where 
inferences have to be made, either because the explanation is not comprehensive, or 
because the two problems do not map directly. The more inferences that have to be made, 
the more difficult it is to adapt the problem to solve a targetl . The interpretation theory, 
I It goes without saying that some inferences are easier to make than others. In any 
particular area the relative difficulty of generating inferences is an empirical question. 
The research presented here emphasizes that wherever there are inferences there is 
likely to be a source of difficulty. 
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when used to describe the relations between a problem statement and its solution and 
between an example problem and a test problem, provides an explanation for many of the 
findings in the literature about the difficulties of transfer between problems. Even though 
problems may have the same underlying principle or equation, novices are often asked to 
solve exercise problems which are different from what they were taught to solve. 
Textbooks in formal domains such as mathematics, science and computer programming -, 
have a particular stereotypical layout (Beck & McKeown, 1989; Kieras, 1983; Sweller & 
Cooper, 1985). The interpretation theory provides a way of examining such texts at a 
coarse grain to illuminate the overall structure of the text and to indicate where the text 
may deviate from the structure that expository texts are presumed to have. Students come 
to such textbooks with certain expectations about how the material in the book will be 
presented. They are likely to have a scheM4 for how such textbooks are organized. Each 
chapter usually contains information about novel concepts, rules and relations which are 
then illustrated using example problems and solutions. These are then followed by a 
number of exercise problems. When reading training texts and attempting subsequent, 
problems, students are likely to assume that all the information relevant to the solution of 
the test problem has been presented. That is, the students may not expect to have to make 
many inferences when studying the training material for the first time. One of the uses to 
which the interpretation theory can be put is to examine how successfully a text conforms 
to this schema, and, as a corollary, where violation of the schema is likely to lead to error 
and misapprehension., 
3. Implications for textbook design and suggestions for future 
research 
The research reported here has concentrated - on 
the structure of texts in formal domains 
such as science, mathematics and computer programming, It is not within the scope of the 
thesis to deal with specific aspects of text structure such as the use of summaries, advance 
organizers, headingS2, or the like (see Newton, 1990). It has not dealt with how the 
Interpretation theory can be extended to cover other domains that have a less well 
defined structure, such as texts in the social sciences or the arts. The kinds of examples 
found in other areas are often much less well defined, It remains to be seen how far the 
2ThIs does not mean that it is impossible for these aspects of text structure to be coded 
using the interpretation theory. 
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theory can be 'stretched' to deal with less formal but nonetheless 'knowledge-rich' 
domains. 
The studies reported in chapter 5 have shown that subjects' understanding of new material 
is often superficial, even though they claim to understand it 'perfectly'. 7bey have also 
shown how the verbal explanations of certain problem types can be improved by removing 
the need to make inferences, and by adding more information about how the example 
relates to a range of problems of the same type. This does not mean that the 'improved' 
explanations were in any sense 'optimal', merely that they were better than the original 
ones. Nevertheless, this research underlines the fact that the relations between a 
problem statement and its solution should be presented as comprehensively as possible. 
Similarly, the relation between the example and a range of problems of the same type 
should also be explained. That is, the underlying scherna or principle and how it relates 
to a range of problems should be explained as clearly as possible. For the same reason, the 
use of hints to refer to earlier problem should be given, since novices have often great 
difficulty in making the necessary text-reinstatement inferences. We cannot assume that 
the novices have learned or understood everything in earlier sections, 
Much has been written about people's understanding of narrative texts. Yet given the vast 
body of technical prose that exists, probably outnumbering narrative prose in its variety, 
it is strange that it should have been relatively neglected until recently. The range of 
such technical prose is wide, from manuals on how to operate a VCR to textbooks on 
quantum field theory. A technological society demands a highly trained workforce. Since 
much of this training comes from textbooks, it is important we get them right. This thesis 
has shown that by improving the quality of textbook explanations and examples, we can 
increase the likelihood that students will learn from them and apply their leaming to 
new contexts. Much of the onus is on the writer, 
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Appendix 1 Experiment 1 
A. M. Instructions for experiment 1 
Sheet-1. Read this sheet and In the boxes under column I write a number from 1 to 
5 to show how well you think you have understood the statements or the PROLOG 
clauses according to the following code: 
5: Understand perfectly 4: Understand reasonably well 3: 1 think I have got the 
gist 2: Don't quite understand 1: Don't understand at 
all 
A hierarchy of animals 
FACrS 
This part states which categories of things are animals, 
examples of category members and more specific examples: 
isa(mammal animal) 
isa(bird animal). 
isa(fish animal). 
isa(trout fish). 
isa(Trigger horse). 
isa(Butch dog). 
isa(jaws fish). 
isa(dog mammal). 
isa(bat mammal), 
isa(shark fish). 
isa(albatross bird). 
This part gives the features of categories mentioned 
above and some features of some specific examples: 
has(mammal milk). 
has(mammal fur). 
has(bird feathers). 
has(bird wings), 
has(fish gills). 
has(fish fins). 
has(dog tail). 
has(dog teeth). 
has(shark dorsal-fin). 
has(horse hooves). 
has(horse mane). 
has(albatross big-wings), 
RULE 
This rule states that if something is an example of a category 
(for instance Trigger is an example of a horse) then it has the 
Same features as other members of that category (that is, if 
Trigger is a horse then Trigger has hooves and a mane and has 
fi1r, etc) 
A 
has(_Something 
-Some-feature) 
If 
isa(-Something 
-Category-member) 
& 
has(-Category-member 
_Some-feature). 
Col. I Col. 2 
0 
o 
00 
0 Fl 
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SheetA. Read this sheet and In the boxes under column 1 write a number from 1 to 
5 to show how well you think you have understood the statements or the PROLOG 
clauses according to the following code: 
5: Understand perfectly 4: Understand reasonably well 3: 1 think I have got the 
gist 2: Don't quite understand 1: Don't understand at 
all 
A Train Timetable 
FACTS Col. I Col. 2 
This part states which trains leave from which stations, 
departs(Trainl GLASGOW). 
departs(Train. 2 DUNDEE). 
departs(Train3 ABERDEEN). 
departs(Train4 BIRMINGHAM). 
departs(Train5 LONDON). 
This part states which trains arrive at which stations: 
arrives(Trainl BIRMINGHAM). 
arrives(Train2 GLASGOW). 
arrives(Train3 DUNDEE). 
arrives(Train4 LONDON). 
arrives(Train5 DOVER). 
RULES 
This rule states that if the same train leaves Stationl and arrives 
at Station2 then St4tionl and Station2 are directly linked: 
B 
direct-link(_Stationl -Station2) if departsLTrain 
-Stationl) & 
arrives(-Train -Statign2). 
This rule states that you can getfrom one station to another if 
these stations are linked either directly or there are other 
linked stations on the way, 
C 
connected (_Sta tionl, _Station2) 
if 
direct-link(-Stationl 
-Station2). connected(_Stationl _Station3) 
if 
direct-link(_Stationl -Station2) & 
connected(_Station2 -Station3). 
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Sheet 3. Read this sheet and In the boxes write a number from 1 to 5 to show how 
well you think you have understood the statements or the PROLOG clauses according 
to the following code: 
6: Understand perfectly 4: Understand reasonably well 3: 1 think I have got the 
gist 2: Don't quite understand 1: Don't understand at 
all 
Food Preferences 
FACTS Col. I 
Here iS 4 d4t4b4Se of food f4cts': 
1: 1 
isa(meat food). isa(beef meat). 
isa(poultry food). isa(chicken poultry). 
isa(vegetables food). isa(root vegetable). 
isa(pulses food). isa(leaf vegetable). 
isa(grain food), isa(trout fish). 
isa(fish food). isa(salmon fish). 
isa(carrot root). isa(lentils pulses). 
isa(potato root). isa(apple fruit). 
isa(lettuce leaf). isa(rice grain). 
isa(cabbage leaf), F7 
Here is what vegetarians and carnivores eat: 
[: ] 
eat(vegetarians vegetables). 
eat(vegetarians pulses). 
eat(vegetarians fruit), 
eat(vegetarians grain). 
eat(camivores meat). 
eat(carnivores fish). 
eat(camivores poultry). 
1) Now suppose that you were given the problem to write a rule or rules to represent 
what it is that omnivores eat. Think about this for a few minutes and then look at the 
other two sheets with the train timetables and the hierarchy of animals and, in the 
second column of boxes, tick anything that you think would help you solve the problem, 
2) Choose between rules A, B and C on the other two sheets which one you think 
would be the most useful to you in solving the problem and write your answer in this box, 
3) Which of these do you think would be the most likely first line of your rule (tick 
the appropriate box). 
eat(-X food) if ...; 
[] eat(-Omnivores _X) If 
eat(omnivores -X) 
If [] eat(omnivores food) if ... 
4) Are you acquainted with Prolog or any other artificial intelligence language 
outside the D309 course? (delete which does not apply) Yes / No 
5) (Optional) Try writing the rule. If you do so, could you please tick everything 
that you refer to on these sheets while solving the problem adding a tick every time you 
do so. 
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A. 1.2 Tabulation of results (experiment 1) 
E. D1 Explanation of Database I D1 Database I 
E. RI Explanation of Rule I RI Rule I 
R2a The first part of Rule 2 R2b The second part of Rule 2 
Mod The rule chosen as a model for the omnivore problem 
Ist I The first line chosen for the omnivore problem 
AI Acquaintance with Al language outside the D309 course 
I SHEET I SHEET 2 SHEET 3 TEST 
7u-b i R. D DI I ED I D2 I ER I RI LD 
1 
I DI ED 
2 2 
L I D2 I ll, R 
1 
I El I E. R 
2 
I R24 -D 1 R2b E 1 
I DI T-E-D- 
12 
T D2 
1 
Mo Istl Al 
S2 4555545555555565565 A 
454543555545555545 C 3 
7gr 
4545555555456555555 
5555625555555555555 
A 
A 
3 
3 
86 3545445555554545525 A 3 
37- 
- - 
4444435656433435455 B 3 
9 8 5555555655555555555 n/a 3 
555555555555555555,5 A 2 
SIO 5555555555555555555 
' 
A 3 
7gTT 5454555555555 555555 C 1 y 
55555455444,4 555 's n/a 2 
565655555556555555 B 3 
-TI-4 55554 .45555555555555 A i 
VI 5- 5456545555544435556 A 3 
M16 4444324444442224444 3 
TOT 
1 
7 21 7 61 7 01 7 71 7 31 641 791 74 79 741 711 74 7 21 7 41 65 17 91 7 31 75 7 i9 
4.50 4,751 4.671 4.811 4,561 4,001 4,941 4.931 4,941 4.931 4.731 4.631 4.501 4,631 4.331 4,941 4.871 ý± . 60 ile ,d 4 4, Q 
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Appendix 2. Experiments 2 and 3 
A. M. Results tables for experiment 2 
A. ZI. I. Codings for results in experiments 2 and 3 
Table -> equation. In the Table Conditions the subjects' solutions are coded depending on 
whether the table has been completely and correctly filled, partially filled (usually the 
time and speed columns only), and whether the values in the boxes have been mapped on 
to the correct equation. 7bey are coded according to the foUowing scheme: 
f means that the table was correctly filled; 
pf means that the table was partially filled (i. e. the 'distance' column-was 
incorreqly filled or was not completed); 
wf - means that the table was filled incorrectly or boxes were not filled; 
m- means that the elements were correctly mapped to the equation; 
rM - means that the elements were not mapped to the equation; 
er means that the subject erased a correct answer. 
Mapped elements. In the Mapping Conditions subjects' responses were coded for the number 
of elements correctly Identified. For example, in the distant condition if a subject has 
written 7,10 and 9, this would be coded as 3 elements. If the subject has written 7,10 and (s 
+ 15), this would be coded as 4 elements, since the s is taken as evidence that the subject 
has called the speed of the other vehicle s. Examples of the coding would be: 
4e-m -4 elements correctly mapped to equation; 
le-nm -I element identified but not mapped to equation. 
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Table/Close Condition 
Subject 
Overall 
score 
correct 
solution 
correct 
equation 
correct 
answer 
quantity 
error 
inatctung 
error 
frame 
error 
non-algeb 
solution 
wrong 
equation 
table -> 
equation 
S1 3 1 1 1 f/M 
S2 0 0 0 0 1 1 wf/run 
S3 3 1 f/M 
S4 3 1 f/M 
S5 3 1 f/M 
S6 3 1 f/M 
S7 3 1 f/M 
S8 0 0 1 0 Wf1m 
S9 0 0 0 0 1 wf/run 
sio 2 1 1 0 -1 f/M-1 
Table/Distant condition 
Subject 
Overall 
score 
corTect 
solution 
correct 
equation 
correct 
answer 
quantity 
error 
matching 
error 
frame 
error 
non-algeb 
solution 
wrong 
equation 
table -> 
equation 
Sil 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 wf/run 
S12 1 0 0 0 4pf/run 
S13 2 0 1 1 1 Wf/M 
S14 0 0 0 0 1 1 wf/run 
sis 2 0 1 0 1 1 4f/M 
S16 0 0 0 0 1 1? wf/ran 
S17 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 Wf/run 
S18 0 0 0 0 wf/nn 
S19 2 0 1 0 1 Wf/M 
S20 2 0 1 0 Wf/M 
JibleA. 2.2. Summary of responses in TabjC /Distant Condition. 
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Mappingiclose condition 
Subject 
Overall 
score 
correct 
solution 
correct 
equation 
Correct 
answer 
quantity 
error 
matclung 
error 
ffa-me 
error 
non-algeb- 
solution 
wrong 
equation 
rmvpidd 
elements 
S21 3 1 1 1 4e-m 
S22 3 1 1 1 4e-m 
S23 3 1 4e-m 
S24 3 1 4e-m 
S25 2 1 1 0 4e-m 
S26 3 1 1 0 4e-m 
S27 3 1 1 1 4e-m 
S28 3 1 1 1 4e-m 
S29 0 0 0 0 
S30 2 1 1 0 
7 4e-rn 
Mapping/distant condition, 
Subject 
Overall 
score 
correct 
solution 
correct 
equation 
correct 
answer 
quantity 
error 
matching 
error 
frame 
error 
non-algeb 
solution 
wrong 
equation 
mapped 
elements 
S31 3 1 1 1 1 4e-ra 
S32 3 1 1 1 4e-m 
S33 1 0 0 0 -4ýn-m 
S34 2 0 1 0 1 4e-m 
S35 0 0 0 0 le-m 
S36 2 1 1 0 4e-m 
S37 3 1 1 1 4e-m 
S38 0 0 0 0 1 le-m 
S39 0 0 0 0 
S40 0 0 0 
Table A, 2.4, SumMaX of regults in Ma pl2ing /Distant Condition. 
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A. 2.2. Results tables for experiment 3 
Table/Distant Condition 
Subject 
overall 
score 
correct 
solution 
correct 
equation 
correct 
answer 
quantity 
error 
matching 
error 
frame 
error 
non-algeb 
solution 
wrong 
equation 
table -> 
equation 
S1 1 0 0 1 x x x x pf/run 
S2 0 0 0 1 x x x 
S3 1 0 0 0 1 x X? Ix f/rim 
S4 1 0 0 0 x x f/rwn 
S5 0 0 0 0 x wf/run 
56 2 0 1 1 x WUM 
S7 0 0 0 1 x x x wf/run 
S8 0 0 0 0 x x wf/run 
S9 1 0 0 0 x x x pf/run 
SO 1 0 0 0 x x (t) pf/rIM 
Sil 0 0 0 0 f/m -er 
S12 1 0 0 0 x x x pf/ran 
Mapping/distant condition 
Subject 
overall 
$core 
correct 
solution 
correct 
equation 
correct 
answer 
quanttty 
error 
matclung 
error 
non-algeb 
solution 
frame 
error 
wrong 
equation 
mapped 
elements 
S13 3 1 1 1 4e-m 
S14 2 0 1 0 4e-m 
SIS 0 0 0 0 x le-m 
S16 3 1 1 1 4e-m 
S17 3 1 1 1 4e-m 
S18 0 0 0 1 X? 3e-m 
S19 1 0 0 1 x X? 4e-m 
S20 2 0 1 1 xI I 3e-m 
S21 1 0 0 1 xI X? 4e-m 
S22 2 0 1 0 4e-m 
S23 2 0 1 0 x 3e-m 
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A. 2.3. Subjects' understanding ratings in experiment 3 
Table Condition: 
Subj Qu. d=sxt goal 3/2 speeds rep -D table Equ. Sol, Tot 
Overall 
S1 55 5 5 5 5 4 44 42 1 
S2 55 4 5 5 5 4 5 4.5 42.5 0 
S3 45 5 4 5 5 5 53 41 1 
S4 55 4 3 5 4 4 4 2.5 36.5 1 
S5 45 5 4 5 5 4 33 38 0 
S6 35 3 3 5 4 5 23 33 2 
S7 34 3 3 3 3 5 22 28 0 
S8 45 5 4 5 4 3 2 2,5 34.5 0 
S9 55 5 5 5 5 5 54 44 1 
S10 55 5 4 5 5 5 5 4.5 41.5 1 
S11 44 5 4 5 5 5 5 4.5 41.5 0 
S12 55 5 4 5 5 5 5 4.5 43,5 0 
Total. 466 
Average: 38.83 
Mean score: 4.3 
Table A. 2.7 Summary of 'UnderStanding'scoles fgr the lable Condition 
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Mapping Condition: 
Sub! Qu. d=sxt dl=d2 equat, mapl diffs. map2 Equ. Sol. Tot 
Overall 
Score 
S13 45 4 4 5 4 5 55 41 3 
S14 55 5 4 5 4 3 44 39 2 
S15 35 4 1 3 4 2 34 29 0 
S16 45 5 5 5 5 4 55 43 3 
S17 55 5 5 5 5 5 55 45 3 
S18 45 3 3 4 3 4 33 32 0 
S19 35 5 4 5 3 4 52 36 1 
S20 55 5 5 5 5 4 55 44 2 
S21 44 4 2 4 3 4 42 31 1 
S22 55 5 4 5 5 5 55 44 2 
S23 45 4 4 5 4 4 43 37 2 
Total: 421 
Average: 38.27 
Mean score: 4.2 
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Appendix 3 Think-aloud protocols for subject in SOLO task 
A. 3.1 Think aloud protocol from SI: Reading the main text of the SOLO 
training manual 
Page 8, under the heading 'Objectives', I'm given under paragraph 2a list of terms which I 
am advised I will be able to define and whose relevance I will be able to state to models of 
cognitive processing. It then goes on to give me various other objectives which I will be 
able to achieve under paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 which are OK Paragraph 5 says I 
will be able to explain why 'representation' is a problem. I would have thought if I was to 
be discussing representation it should be a term that's included in the list of terms I would 
be able to define and whose relevance I will be able to state, but it's not. 
On various pages I have to keep looking back to find out what the definition of symbol, or 
symbol structure, or procedure, or basic operation is, Page 15 start of the second line in the 
second paragraph -I don't know what a 'construct' is. What I mean by that is I've never 
come across the word in this context before, so I've got to try to figure out from the context 
exactly what it means therefore my interpretation of it may or may not be correct 
OK, this is page 27, and I am typing in NOTE ROVER LIKES FIDO. It's taken me four goes 
to get it because I didn't notice there were spaces between the end of the first node and 
dashes, and the beginning of the relation, and then after the relation and before the 
second node. But I finally got it. 
This is still the same page. I am being somewhat scuppered in my understanding here by 
the fact that page 26 in the middle says 'the actual number of the dashes we type to draw 
the arrows is unimportant. One or more on each side of the relation name will work, 
whereas according to the program I'm working, it seems one won't work - it has to be three 
or elsel 
Yes, that definitely seems to be the case. I've tried typing it in with one dash, which 
doesn't work, with three dashes which does work, and with four dashes which doeswt 
work. So the instructions in my book are contrary to the instructions on this machine. 
This is still page 27, and it's SAQ 3. In order to get this FOO BAZ GORT thing, I've put in 
the FOO BAZ GORT and FOO XLIBRIJK because I don't suppose it's in this program, 
already. In order 
, 
to get the rest in, I have to type in NOTE space FOO space dash dash 
dash LOON space dash dash dash, the arrow thing, space FUNG. I missed a space there 
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before the LOON but there is one. And then I have to do NOTE space FOO space dash 
dash dash space MXLPLTZ space dash dash dash, a space, GLURTO. I'll just check my 
answer. pause Mich seems to be correct as I'd already worked out because the computer 
has accepted it. Goody. Next page. 
Page 28. to end up with ZOG BLORT GRONK and ZOB FI FUM, we would have to type in 
FORGET ZOG space dash dash dash space GZORN space dash dash dash, a space FOO, 
and ZOG, sorry, FORGET space ZOG space dash dash dash space BAZ space dash dash 
dash, a space PLRT. 
Page 29. It would have been just slightly handier if the description of which key was used 
for the arrow head came a couple of pages earlier. 
Page 30. I'm omitting SAQ 4 because it doesn't appear to apply, most of it doesn't appear 
to apply with the particular program of SOLO I'm using. 
The question at the bottom of page 30. The second structure is OK because each first node 
has only one relation name coming from it, whereas in the first structure the first node has 
the same relation name coming from it twice which isn't allowable. 
SAQ 5. You would have to type in FORGET JOHN ISA MAN, FORGET JOHN BREEDS 
SHEEP, FORGET JOHN MAKE MONEY, and type in JOHN BREEDS ANIMALS, JOHN 
MAKES PAINTINGS, JOHN HAS PNEUMONIA. 
SAQ6 a ABSENT. b ABSENT. c ABSENT dash OOPS - THE PROCEDURE FOR CHECK 
IS CHECK dash dash etc etc etc. Yes!. 
Ibis is page 34. It's a few Idays since I last did this and I've just tried the CHECK 
procedure. I've had difficulty because I forgot I had to have a space after the object and 
before the first set of dashes and after the dashes and... after the relation and before the 
value. 
This is SAQ7. The answers are as foUows: a PRESENT MAN, b PRESENT, c ABSENT, d 
puse OOPS - THE FORMATS FOR CHECK ARE etc. Yes, that seems to be right. 
I'm on page 38 here, and just for fun I've typed in the TO GRUMBLE instructions on my 
machine. It doesn't make it particularly clear on the page whether I have to type in the 
three dots and the colon between numbers one two three and the final instruction DONE. I 
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didn't put them in and I notice the machine put them in for me. I don't know if that's 
standard or what I would help if the page said something. 
Pages 40 and 4L 1 hate this automated telephone directory example. I don't think it 
makes anything clear at all. I can understand the automated telephone directory analogy 
only because I understand throughout the whole book what I'm required to do, and 
therefore I can understand the example. But it works that way round and not the other 
way round, which is presumably the intention. 
OK, we're on page 40 now, and I'm reading the instructions about defining procedures and 
about parameters. I'm probably getting a bit ahead of the instructions here, and I'm going 
to find out the answers to this question on the next page, but anyway here It is: I've been 
told, for instance, that to define an INSULT procedure I would type TO INSULT X with 
the X in slant brackets and then go on and define the INSULT procedure. Page 40 then goes 
on to say that the program will apply the INSULT procedure to anything within the 
parameter slot, which seems to make sense, but according to the example it gives at the 
top of page 40, it will apply it to single names such as HARRY or MARCIA but it won't 
apply it to FRED, HARRY and SOPHIA, However, there's nothing on the rest of page 40 
to explain why the parameter can't be three words plus spaces plus commas, So although I 
know, for instance, that if I try to apply the DESCRIBE procedure to say FIDO and MARY 
it won't be accepted because it can only describe one thing at a time. The description of 
parameters on page 40 doesn't actually make this clear. It might, for instance, have been 
more straightforward instead of putting an X in the example for the parameter to put in 
the word NODE because presumably that's going to be all that can ever go within the 
parameter box. That is one particular node at a time. Although, on reflection, I suppose 
putting in the word NODE inside the parameter brackets would be slightly confusing too, 
because presumably it doesn't have to relate only to nodes which are already within the 
system, Why doh't I read page 42 and see if it helps, 
Yes I'm right. Half way down page 42 it tells me that parameter names have the same 
constraints as other names within SOLO, It would have helped really if that had been on 
page 40,1 think. 
Page 40 again. Not fairl I just tried to make the think list describe after reading the LIST 
thing and It won't list DESCRIBE because Ian says that DESCRIBE isn't a procedure like 
all the other procedures, It's something built Into SOLO itself. 
SAQ8 on page 44. "a SOLO would respond by printing LET ME SAY THAT FIDO IS 
REALLY GREAT IN FACT I WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT FIDO IS SUPER. Answer to b. 
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TO PRAISE /X/ I PRINT inverted commas LET ME SAY THAT inverted commas brackets X 
brackets inverted commas IS REALLY GREAT inverted commas 2 PRINT inverted commas 
YES inverted commas brackets X brackets inverted commas IS TOO MUCH inverted 
commas 3 PRINT inverted commas I'M SOLD ON inverted commas X in brackets the X bit 
(? ). Answer to c. if we typed in PRAISE FIDO, SOLO would print LET ME SAY THAT 
FIDO IS REALLY GREAT, YES, FIDO IS TOO MUCH, IM SOLD ON FIDO. 
AM I'm wrong! I didn't realize that the blank spaces after 3 and I would eliminate steps 3 
and 1, so, I'm wrong. 
This is page 45, and it's study activity... study centre activity 3. And I'm having problems 
with number 1. I've just put in my definition of the PRAISE procedure, and I'm trying to get 
it listed, and it's saying it can't find the definition of it to list. So I must have done 
something wrong somewhere like a... space or something, so let's try it all again, OK, got 
it at last. The problem was I didn! t have a space between the PRAISE and the first 
bracket of the parameter in my definition of the description, and that was because I didn't 
think there was one in the book on page 44, which was where I was looking, and I think 
there may be, it's just not terribly clear. 
Right, here we are at SAQ 9 on page 51. The answer to a), JUDGE FIDO, would be FIDO IS 
A FINE DOG, AND THAT'S ALL I HAVE TO SAY. The answer to b), JUDGE JOHN, is 
HERE'S MY OPINION OF JOHNý pause, JOHN IS ALL RIGHT pause, AND THAT'S ALL 
I HAVE TO SAY. The answer to c) Is, pause, HERE'S MY OPINION OF MARY, MARY IS 
VERY THOUGHTFUL, AND THAT'S ALL I HAVE TO SAY. pause,. And that seems to be 
correct according to the back of the book. 
This is page 56. STUDY CENTRE ACTIVITY 4 which says 'Define your own procedure 
called ASSESS which prints out UNHEALTHY if someone either drinks whisky or that 
person both smokes cigarettes and drinks beer. ' The instruction only asks me to have 
printing out UNHEALTHY if certain conditions are met. But I suppose that means if the 
conditions aren't met I'm going to have something else printed out, like... HEALTHY, 
Right. Well. It's got to be something like... TO ASSESS /X/, 1 CHECK /X/ DRINKS 
WHISKY, 1A IF PRESENT: PRINT 'UNHEALTHY; pause EXIT, 113 IF ABSENT, pause 
CONTINUE. pause. Now the problem with the having to smoke cigarettes and drinking 
beer in order to be unhealthy is: I'm going to have to have It continuing on to the next 
condition after the first, to make sure that I have both conditions met before printing out 
UNHEALTHY. So 2 has got to be ... what? OK 2 has got to be CHECK /X/ DR24KS 
BEER, 2A IF PRESENT CONTINUE pause 2B IF ABSENT PRINT HEALTHY, - EXIT, then 
3 CHECK X SMOKES CIGARETTES, 3A IF PRESENT PRINT UNHEALTHY... 
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CONTINUE. No, not CONTRSJUE. I can have EXIT there, can't I. Then'313 IF ABSENT 
PRINT HEALTHY pause EXIT then DONE. Right. 
Right, since that was just made up off the top of my head without actually writing it down 
and trying it, what I'm going to do now is play all that back what I just said and type it 
into the computer and see if that works. pause. Right. Several minutes later... and, yes, it 
does work. Good for me. Gold star. Pat on the head. 
(Checking program at back of the book the subject discovers that there is a bug in the 
SOLO program, The next part of the protocol begins five weeks later. ) 
I'm on pages 56 and 57 which is the hierarchical programming starting. This is where the 
program went wrong before. So I'm reading it again, and I'll try to see if it can.. if It works 
this time. (reads) It seems reasonably straightforward. I should imagine I'm going to 
have problems with where I'm supposed to have spaces and where I'm not supposed to 
have spaces, so we'll just try and have a see. I have a hangover today, so I'm not going to 
be particularly intelligible or articulate, I should think. pause 
I'm in the middle of shoving in some information to the database so that I can do the 
exercise on page 58. It's a real nuisance with this program that it doesn't retain what I put 
into the database.. from the previous time. 
Page 58. I've just put in all the things from the database and I've started typing in the 
JUDGE procedure. I've got to JUDGE /X/ I PRINT 'HERE'S WHAT I THINJ< OF" and I 
can't remember whether I'm supposed to have the inverted commas outside the /X/ which 
is in slanting brackets or if I'm supposed to have them enclosed within the inverted 
commas. So I've had to look at the previous page to discover that I'm supposed to have 
the X in slanting brackets outside the inverted commas. 
Yes, of course, I'm half way through it, and of course I reach the problem... which is that I 
have to have the machine at some Stage... distinguish between a rnale X and a female X so 
that it can print out either HE or SHE... whatever. 
pause 
Right, I've'typed in my JUDGE procedure and my PRAISE procedure. This is SAQ 10 on 
page 58. and I'm now trying the examples JUDGE FRED, JUDGE MARY, JUDGE JOHN and 
JUDGE JOAN. JUDGE FRED and JUDGE MARY have worked properly, JUDGE JOHN 
hasn't because... um... the... the error message says LINE 2 WITHIN CHECK MUST END 
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WITH CONTINUE OR EXIT. Which I have to say is something I've forgotten already 
once but I... I noticed it and remembered to correct it. This is obviously one I've missed so 
I'm going to have to go back correct it before I see urn... whether the thing wiU carry on 
working. pause 
Right, my problem is something which I thought might possibly happen which is that 
I'm trying to get too many procedures within one step, and I ... As far as I can make out I can 
only have... pause, For instance, under 2, if I have a CHECK procedure I can only have 2A 
and 25, and my method has got 2A and 2B, and then 2BA and 2BB. Um... I wondered 
whether this pause was correct or not when I was in the middle of defining the JUDGE 
procedure, but because the machine accepted it and carried on printing 2BA and 2BB I 
thought it was going to accept it, but it... I don't think it's going to work, 
pause 
Right, I've altered it now, so that the second subprocedure of line 2 now is 2B CONDEMN 
/X/, so of course now I'm going to have to... um... define a CONDEMN procedure, which 
should be reasonably straightforward. pause 
I'm trying again to JUDGE FRED with my new JUDGE procedure complete with 
CONDEMN, and of course my previous amendment of line 2 of my JUDGE procedure was 
wrong because I forgot the dashes, another common mistake. So here we go, yet another 
EDIT JUDGE procedure. 
pause 
At last I've had it JUDGE FRED, JUDGE MARY, JUDGE JOHN, and JUDGE JOAN, and 
I've got the correct answers' My JUDGE procedure is as follows (subject LISTs procedure on 
screen and reads it out) 
TO JUDGE /X/ 
I PRINT "HERE'S WHAT I THINK OF" /X/ 
2 CHECK /X/ VOTES INDEPENDENT 
2A PRAISE /X/; CONTINUE 
2B CONDEMN /X/; CONTINUE 
3 PRINT "AND THAT'S ALL I HAVE TO SAY" 
DONE 
My PRAISE PROCEDURE is (subject LISTs procedure on screen and reads it out): 
316 
Appendices 
TO PRAISE /X/ 
1 PRINT "I REALLY RESPECT " /X/ 
2 CHECK /X/ ISA WOMAN 
2A PRINT "SHE IS AN INDEPENDENT THINKER"; EXIT 
2B PRINT "HE IS AN INDEPENDENT THINKER"; EXIT 
DONE 
And my CONDEMN procedure is... very similar. It is: 
TO CONDEMN /X/ 
I CHECK /X/ ISA WOMAN 
1A PRINT "SHE CAN'T THINK FOR HERSELF"; EXIT 
IB PRINT "HE CAN'T THINK FOR HIMSELF"; EXIT 
DONE 
pause 
I'm now reading the answer to SAQ10 on page 100 which is... pretty... useful. It er... it 
mentions at the bottom of the page that the control statement EXIT was used in the 
definitions of PRAISE and CONDEMN, although of course, CONT11-41M could also have 
been used. I did think of that while I was printing in my ... definitions. I... I didn't ' 
mention it on the tape though. EXIT simply seemed to be ... more... logical in terms of how I 
was thinking about it. Although I did appreciate that CONTTNTJE would work just as 
well, because it would just... it would... it would simply continue out of the subprocedure 
back into the main procedure whether you used EXIT or CONTINUE anyway. pause. But 
EXIT seemed to finish the thing off more elegantly, I think. 
I've read PROGRESS BOX 5 AND it seems to make sense, although I... It's doubtful 
whether I could actually... explain the concepts of flow of control quite'as neatly. I mean 
all the concepts flow of control , unconditional branching, and hierarchical structuring of 
programs quite as'neatly as the box does. But I think I've grasped the concepts now, urn. 
I'm going to leave it there and continue with page 60 and making inferences later. 'Bye. 
I'm on page 60 now doing ? naking inferences, and I've just gone back to section 4.2 to remind 
myself about wild card pattern matching which I'd completely forgotten about. pause 
The example in section 4.2 patise uses MARY LIKES FRED and uses the wild card symbol 
in the this node position to check what MARY LIKES. I've been typing It into the 
computer just because I find that's a much easier way of getting it into my head. go if you 
put in CHECK MARY ... LIKES --> ? it says PRESENT FRED. just for my own interest 
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and edification I've got CHECK MARY -- ? --> FRED and it just comes up with the 
answer PRESENT. It doesn't say PRESENT LIKES or something like that. It does, of 
course, tell me all that in section 4.2 anyway, but this is just a way of reinforcing my 
learning of it. Again I'm finding it most annoying that the database I put in yesterday 
isn't still there today, the computer having been switched off, but there you go. 
The information on page 61 doesn't seem to me to be entirely complete, because I think I'll 
have problems with the particular SOLO program I'm working with. It"s explaining that 
the value of the variable can only be one thing at one time and that 'any value which the 
variable * might previously have had is discarded to make room for a new value which 
the asterisk might require as a result of a successful match. That's fair enough. And it 
says 'if the match is successful the node which matches the question mark in the given 
pattern becomes the value of [the] *' That all makes reasonable sense except that the 
SOLO program I'm working accepts... more than one triple with the same middle node 
which I don't think it's supposed to, is it? For example, I've just typed in MARY LIKES 
FRED and MARY LIKES FIDO, you know NOTE MARY - LIKES -> FRED, NOTE 
MARY - LIKES -> FIDO, and'the machine, of course, has accepted it. But if I now try 
CHECK MARY - LIKES -> ? it only comes back with the answer FRED. Presumably 
because that's the first one. So the wild card variable thing is only going to go through 
the information in the database until it finds one thing which matches, the first thing 
which matches. It's not apparently not going to go through all the information in the 
database to find everything that matches, it's only going to go for the first one it comes 
across. 
The little picture 'figure 8' on page 61 is as amusing as all the other little pictures in the 
book but I don't know if it's a particularly brilliant analogy because it tends to suggest, to 
me at least, that... someone who wasn't understanding this particularly might look at the 
little box and say 'well, FRED's inside the variable thing therefore the variable's always 
going to mean FRED'. Whereas of course it means anything that happens to fit whatever 
the particular query is, So... something like a... a- fishing net, or something, would be 
better. Sort of flying around and can pick anything out of a whole bunch of possible 
variables, and only one will fit in the fishing net, or something like that. Shut up, 
Kathryn. 
Page 62, the example right at the top of the. page, It gives FRED LIKES MARY and 
SALLY PLAYS SQUASH 'follow carefully through the definition of SUSS' to see what's 
going to happen. What's going to... what's going to happen is it's going to say. 
HERE'S WHAT FRED LIKES 
MARY IS THE ONE 
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And if you try to SUSS SALLY it's just going to say... em, 
HERE'S WHAT SALLY LIKES, 
I GIVE UP 
This is now SAQ 11 on page 64 . I'm just typing the information into the database SUSAN 
ISA WOMAN and SUSAN LIKES CARPENTRY. And now I've got to redefine SUSS so 
that if I type in SUSS SUSAN, SOLO will respond I KNOW SUSAN IS FOND OF 
CARPENTRY. It says 'The answer to this problem will require you to be clear about the 
difference between a parameter and a variable. ' Well, clearly SUSAN is going to be the 
parameter that fits in the.. the... em. - X in-slanted-brackets box, and CARPENTRY is 
going to be the particular variable which is going to fit in the SUSAN LIKES kind of 
thing. So I'm just going to attempt to type my new definition of SUSS into the computer. 
It's going to start off with TO SUSS /X/, of course, the X being in the slanted brackets. 1 
pause There don't seem to be terribly many sort of procedures here so it's going to be 
I CHECK /X/X - LIKES --- > and then ? thing 
1A IF PRESENT PRINT "I KNOW oh no, I've got a space in there after the inverted 
commas which I don't need OK "I KNOW " /X/ "IS... "IS FOND OF" Now first of all Im 
going to have to extend this box or I'm going to run out of space. Right, done that. OK. I 
KNOW /X/ IS FOND OF, now do I have to have the inverted commas before the asterisk 
or after the asterisk, I should know this but I'm just checking back on the previous pages. 
pause. Well, outside the inverted commas by the looks of it. I have IS FOND OF" em... 
asterisk, and if that doesn't work Q) going to tell me anyway, isn't it? IS FOND Of 
asterisk. Where the heck's the asterisk? Right. OK. 
la IF PRESENT "I KNOW" /X/ 'IS FOND OF" * 
113 IF ABSENT em, well it doesn't have to print anything else out, does it, so it's just going 
to be EXIT. And then DONE. Right, OK, 'I NOW KNOW HOW TO SUSS /X/' Right 
Let's see if It works. SUSS SUSAN. (types) SUSS SUSAN. 'I KNOW SUSAN IS FOND 
OF CARPENTRY" but then It says 'OOPS... LINE I WITHIN CHECK MUST END WITH 
CONTINUE OR EXIT' Of course It must. Em... That's interesting, actually, it still comes 
up with the correct answer, and then tells me about the error message. That's presumably 
because it's not then exiting from the thing properly. I need a CON... well, I need an EXIT 
don't I? at the end of 1A, so I'll just stick that in. EDIT SUSS Em... (types). 
Right that was it, The only problem of course about me having to edit anything Is that 
em... I always have so many typing mistakes in it that I've got to abort the thing twice, 
start again with SOLO from top level, and by the time I've done that I've forgotten what 
the problem is I'm supposed to be editing in the first place. But I finally got there. We 
have... em... edited SUSS We have got 
CHECK /X/ LIKES 7 
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IF PRESENT PRINT I KNOW /X/ IS FOND OF, EXIT 
113 IF ABSENT, EXIT 
DONE 
And it SUSSes out SUSAN and says **I KNOW SUSAN IS FOND OF CARPENTRY'so 
there we are. SAQ 11. Brilliant. And the answer on page 102 just emphasises the point, 
Em... the important point being that at step la... em 'we use the parameter / x/ to refer to 
the particular individual to whom we happen to be applying the SUSS procedure, 
whereas we use the variable * to refer to some entity which SOLO has found as a result of 
searching through its data base. ' Yeah. Fine. 
I'm now reading 7.2 on 64, 'Searching through the data base'. SAQ 12 on page 65. The 
description on page 64 seems reasonably straightforward and most of page 65 is taken up by 
the database which I haven't yet typed into the computer. I'm just going to try SAQ12 
without typing it aU in, em, so that I can work out what's happening of course and then IT 
(? ) how I'm getting on. IT maybe try typing it in just to see. Anyway. Er. - 130OZETEST 
FRED. Now we have in the database 'FRED ISA MAN'and 'RED DRINKS BEER'and we 
have 'BEER ISA BEVERAGE, BEER CONTAINS ALCOHOL', so SOLO's going to do: I 
CHECK FRED DRINKS ?, because FRED of course, is, em, filling in the parameter box /X/, 
so CHECK FRED DRINKS ? and... and it's going to come up with FRED DRINKS BEER so 
that's going to satisfy the 1A IF PRESENT: CONTINUE, so it'll then continue on to 2 
CHECK BEER, BEER's the variable which has fulfilled the, em, question mark thing in 
the first CHECK problem. So it's going to have CHECK BEER CONTAINS ALCOHOL 
and, of course, according to the database, BEER does CONTAIN ALCOHOL so that's then 
going to satisfy the 2A IF PRESENT CONTINUE thing so it's going to continue again. So it 
will then going on to 3 and will print AHA FRED IS A REAL BOOZER. Em, b) 
BOOZETEST MARY. 'MARY ISA WOMAN, MARY DRINKS WINE'. Em, Well it... it 
has WINE CONTAINS ALCOHOL too in the database, so it is going to print AHA MARY 
IS A REAL BOOZER. The'BOOZETEST SAM. Em, the BOOZETEST MARY one is going to 
print out the same because basically the same steps will be followed as for BOOZETEST 
FRED. c) BOOZETEST SAM will go through the following steps. I CHECK SAM - SAM 
being the thing in the parameter box here - CHECK SAM DRINKS ? IF PRESENT, 
CONTINUE. Now it does say 'SAM DRINKS MILK' so that's going to satisfy the IA 
condition and will then continue on to 2 CHECK MILK - MILK being the answer which was 
arrived at from the question CHECK /X/ DRINKS ?- CHECK MILK CONTAINS 
ALCOHOL. According to the database MILK doesn't contain ALCOHOL, at least it 
doesn't say -that 
it does, so that's not going to satisfy the IF PRESENT CONTINUE thing, 
so it's going to go on to 21) IF ABSENT and then will print NON-ALCOHOLIC and will 
exit, and that's it done. So the answer to BOOZETEST SAM will be NONALCOHOLIC. 
And d) BOOZETEST FIDO. The database has TIDO ISA DOG, FIDO CHASES CATS. ' 
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So it will be CHECK FIDO DRINKS ? and it won't continue this time because according to 
the database FIDO doesn't drink anything. So it'll be IF ABSENT: NO INFORMATION. 
Ern so the answer to SAQ 12 will be: 
AHA FRED IS A REAL BOOZER 
AHA MARY IS A REAL BOOZER 
NON-ALCOHOLIC 
and NO INFORMATION. 
And I don't really think I can be bothered typing all that into the computer just to check 
that it's right, so I'll just look up the answer at the back. patise. And of course it's correct, 
Page 66. This is really interesting, this is making inferences. 
[protocol ends here] 
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A. 3.2 Think aloud protocol from SI: Reading the appendix of the SOLO 
training manual 
Session 1 
Sl reads page 78 Eisenstadt (1978) 
E: When you come to do the problems can you talk out loud while you're thinking about 
it. 
SI: Yes I was actually going to do that. Right. Okay. 
Reads aloud from page 78 
'Given the above description of HARRY, and the most recent definition of INFECT, how 
would SOLO respond if we typed in SOLO: INFECT HARRY'. 
So what it would do is, it would go through to INFECT /X/. Well, in this case HARRY is 
/X/ so it would go 
I NOTE HARRY HAS FLU 
2 CHECK HARRY KISSES 
And at that stage it would CHECK HARRY's description to see if he KISSES anyone, and 
it does have HARRY KISSES JOAN; so JOAN fills in the variable in the question mark 
and becomes the asterisk in 2A which would be 
2A IF PRESENT: NOTE JOAN HAS FLU; EXIT. 
Em ... it would then EXIT at that point It wouldn't go on to 2B, then 
DONE. So it would, 
em .. the answer that SOLO would come up with if we typed in 
INFECT HARRY would be 
OK JOAN HAS FLU. 
That's right isn't it? Yes it does say 'OK' when it's got... when you've NOTEd the thing. 
It's such a long time since I've looked at this I can't remember what the response is when 
you ask it to NOTE something, I'm just going to play around with that on this little 
machine here just to remind myself of, em, of how it responds once you have NOTEs. Em, 
let's have it in capital letters, shall we? 
NOTE JOAN ISA WOMAN: ENTER. 
OK JOAN ISA WOMAN, 
So the answer to INFECT HARRY would be OK, em... well in fact it would have two 
things wouldn't it? 
Because I suppose it would come up with NOTE HARRY HAS FLU and NOTE JOAN HAS 
FLU, too, wouldn't it? 
So it would have two different things. 
I wonder If that actually works, Yes, 
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E-. You're reading page 79. 
SI: Yes, I amreading page 79 now. 
Yes, em... 
My response wasn't taking all the other information that's already in the database, em 
like HARRY ISA MAN, HARRY HAS FLU, and things like that, but that's already 
there. 
I'm still reading page 79. 
'Step 2 of INFECT essentially captures the following inference "if s omeone gets the flu, 
_ then whomever they kiss gets it as well. "' 
Middle of page 79. 
I'm suddenly being thrown a diagonal line LIZ KISSES JOE KISSES JANE. I don't why 
they've been drawn diagonally and I don't know if that has any significance particularly. 
But what it seems to be saying is if we type in INFECT LIZ then, because LIZ KISSES JOE, 
JOE will end up having flu but It doesn't seem to take another step to have JANE having 
flu as well because JOE KISSES her. 
Page 80 'but what abouf JANE surely our inference should give her the flu as well!, 
reads paragraph I on page 80 
Yes, in other words only one node can complete the asterisk variable thing so we really 
need a loop of some sort so it keeps on coming back and adding on and not exiting until its 
been through everybody that's been kissed by whatever person has been infected in the 
chain, 
reads 
this wiH be recursion, is it? 
E: Could be. 
SI: reads aloud IRFECT program on page 80 
In other words it loops. 
I don't find the big paragraph right in the middle of page 80 any help at all. Mainly I 
should think because it doesn't seem strange that a procedure can activate its elf. And the 
whole of that big paragraph starts off 'If it seems somewhat strange that a procedure can 
activate itself'. It doesn't seem any stranger than the explanation that's given. Generally 
speaking I haven't found any of the analogies anywhere in this book any use at all. 
Including the 'passing of a baton from one runner to the other in a relay race' for flow of 
control, 
Okay this little question here In page 81 
'Given the latest definition of INFECT, how would SOLO respond if we typed In INFECT 
LIZ, 
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We have LIZ KISSES JOE, JOE KISSES JANE, JANE KISSES HENRY, and HENRY 
SMOKES CIGARS, So we're going to have... 
I suppose you want me to go through the entire thing, don't you? 
Okay. INFECT LIZ. We start of at the beginning TO INFECT /X/. 
Well LIZ is /X/, 
So we have NOTE LIZ HAS FLU 
CHECK LIZ KISSES ? 
Well, LIZ KISSES JOE so 
IF PRESENT INFECT JOE, 
so then you go right back to the beginning to INFECT JOE, You have NOTE JOE HASFLU 
CHECK JOE KISSES ? 
So JOE KISSES JANE. 
Em... so again we're into 
2A IF PRESENT INFECT the asterisk. 
That's the asterisk that fills the question mark in the previous line, so it's going to be 
INFECT JANE; EXIT. 
Em... TO INFECT JANE, of coursd, you've got to go right back to the beginning again. 
TOINFECTJANE 
NOTE JANE HAS FLU 
CHECK JANE KISSES ? 
Well that's HENRY 
2A IF PRESENT: INFECT HENRY. 
So again we go back to 
INFECT HENRY 
NOTE HENRY HAS FLU 
CHECK HENRY KISSES 
Well HENRY doesn't actually kiss anybody 
so we go to 2B rather than 2A and EXIT 
and then DONE. 
So then SOLO Is going to respond with all the various NOTEs that have been made in the 
first step, 
So wefre going to have, 
starting off with LIZ, 
NOTE LIZ HAS FLU in addition to any other descriptions that exist of LIZ in the data 
base 
but I'm not going to be bothered going back to the previous page, 
but it's going to be NOTE LIZ ISA WOMAN or just whatever else LIZ does, it's going to be 
as well as that NOTE LIZ HAS FLU. And then because of all the various loops that we've 
gone through we're also going to have NOTE JANE em NOTE JOE HAS FLU in addition to 
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anything else in JOE's data base and then NOTE JANE HAS FLU. 
We're not going... 
and NOTE HENRY HAS FLU, and em, 
as well as HENRY having flu, of course, he SMOKES CIGARS. 
That's obviously going to show up in his description. 
So everybody's description in addition to anything they have in them already 
will have NOTE whoever HAS FLU 
reads on 
And that seems to be pretty much the reply that's given on page 81. 
I take it I'm getting away with the fact that I'm not listing everything... all the 
descriptions that exist in everybody's data base? 
Because I can't be bothered doing that. 
E: It doesn't bother me. It's just to make sure you understand what's going on in the 
INFECT procedure that's important. 
Sl: reads bottom of page 81 
'In fact each particular "expert" received control from some preceding "'expert" with the 
exception of the first one, who received control from us when we us when we originally 
typed in INFECT LIZ'. 
Okay. How long does this go on for? 
E: Page 82? 
SI. Page 82. Hey, guess what'the use of a procedure within its own definition is 
known as recursion. ' 
(from page 82) 
reads page 82 
I like recursion, it's good fun. 
Sorry, you want me to sit back, I know. 
E: It's Just so the camera can see where you are. 
SI* I take it nobody else is going to be looking at this, 
I hope not. 
SI: God, I don't want anyone else to see my wife, ugh! 
Page 82 A. 2. 'Eliminating the restriction that FIDO LIKES only one thing at a time: 
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iteration. ' Em, which, of course, I haven't actually been restricted to, because, as far as I 
can remember, this machine... this program... this... this SOLO thing we have in here 
will accept as many LIKES as I want to shove in. Can I just test that to remind myself. 
This has really got nothing to do with what I'm looking at. It's just so I can remember 
what's going on. 
tYpes 
What does FIDO like? FIDO LIKES CHUM. 
Yes, my memory serves me correctly. 
We don't actually have this restriction. 
Anyway, Okay. 
I'm just staring at this without reading it. 
'Given the restriction to one use of the relation LIKES per node, then only one node could 
possibly match the wild-card symbol (? ) at step 2, and this node became the value of the 
variable *. ' So obviously we're going to need some sort of recursion to deal with multiple 
LIKES on page 83. 
Page 84. 
The main problem with this is that I'm not really being encouraged to think terribly 
creatively. Because on page 84 it's telling me... em, a new, a new SUSS thing which... 
involves a bit of recursion. 
And if I were concentrating on this properly and having to actually think creatively 
I would have thought it out for myself and identified on about page 82, if not about 50 
pages earlier, that something like this was going to be necessary. 
That's all probably because I'm, well, not quite as interested as I might have been 
because I haven't got any particular motivation to be desperately interested in it. 
Well, like, I haven't, 
It's not something that I'm having to use daily. 
There's no sort of end goal and therefore I'm finding it perfectly straightforward just to 
read through everything ahd understand it perfectly well and deal with it very easily 
and not actually involving much in the way of active thought. 
You know what I mean? 
E: What would you... what do you think you'd like to do then? What do you mean by 
active thought? 
SI: Well, em... 
Well, like what for instance? 
Well, if you're talking in terms of writing this textbook, 
It would have been much easier... 
well, no, I mean not much easier, 
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it would have been possible, say, on page 
where does it start describing recursion? 
Yes, em before it's 
somewhere anyway before we get to paragraph A-2, 
which talks about 'eliminating the restriction that FIDO LIKES only one thing at a time' 
it would have been possible to put in some sort of sentence... question to encourage me to 
think about it. Like, say, something like, can you think of a problem that arises given 
what you've been told so far? 
Because given the information that I've been given so far it should be possible to make a 
connection about what's necessary to avoid iteration. Because I do have an the 
information to allow me to arrive at the knowledge that.. that a problem exists, 
and, in fact I would have thought, the knowledge to solve it without having to read page 
83, page 84, page 85, and all that as well. 
E: What do you understand by iteration so far? 
1: Em. 
I don't know. What does it mean? 
E: WeU, read on. You haven't finished the chapter yet. 
$I: No, I know I haven't finished the chapter yet, But what I mean is, It would be 
easler 
You think this has been a lot of rubbish everything I've said 
E: No. 
SI: ... but what [mean is I would learn a lot faster If the thing were encouraging me to, er, 
to see problems rather than pointing the problems out to me. 
I know it's because I'm not thinking about this, because I'm not 
I see what you mean. 
SI: -interested enough in It. I mean it could have said something fairly simple in this, 
this, this page 
- that's In the middle of 82 before A-2 - 
like "Can you think of, em, something this might help with. ' 
And you may be wrong in your answer 
but it's still encouraging you to think. 
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Anyway I've lost where I was now. 
I know just above the middle of page 84 
It has step 2 FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ LIKES 
and I know it's about to go on and explain this FOR EACH CASE OF business, 
I'm assuming it's a, a specific sort of tool that's recognized by SOLO like NOTE or 
DESCRIBE or whatever. 
Which I suppose makes this a reasonably high level language, doesn't it? If it can 
understand things like FOR EACH CASE OF. Yes? 
E: (7) 
Sl: I don't know anything at all about computer languages but I just would have thought 
that having a computer understand something like FOR EACH CASE OF then it must be 
fairly sophisticated. 
E: Well, it's not really different from things like NOTE. 
S 1: Well, I suppose not, Okay. 
Page 85. We've got the thing 'suppose SOLO's data base contained the following 
descriptions' and there's the JOHN and MARY bit and then the question how many times 
the print procedure at sub-step ZA of SUSS would be activated if you're asking it to SUSS 
JOHN and then SUSS MARY. 
E: What are you doing now? 
SI: I'm looking back on page 84 to see what the SUSS procedure says. And then looking 
back on page 85 to see what the question is again. And at substep 2A they're asking me to 
look at... I 
So to SUSS /X/ is 
I PRINT "HERE ARE THE THINGS /X/ LIKES 
2 FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ LIKES 
I like the way the program can step in and out of the Inverted commas, the quotation 
marks, in 1 and isn't... 
confused by them in Z 
E: What are you thinking about? 
S 1: No. I'm not, I'm not... em, I'm not thinking about anything. 
That doesn't make sense, any of that. 
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Never mind. Ignore that statement. 
But, of course, the 2 isn't referring to I 
it's referring to the data base. 
So that's rubbish. Okay. 
Okay, em... 
So let's have a look at this question. 
SUSS JOHN. 
And we have in JOHN's description 
JOHN LIKES MUSIC and JOHN LIKES MARY. 
So the PRINT procedure at sub-step 2A of the SUSS thing 
is going to be activated twice for JOHN. 
And it's not going to be activated any times for MARY 
because MARY doesn't like anything. 
Although the PRINT procedure is going to be activated at a different time, not at sub-step 
2A but it's going to activated at sub-step 1 or both. 
I can't understand why this SUSS procedure on page 84 hasn't got any EXITs anywhere, 
Or any CONTINUE. Surely at 2A it would have to have either EXIT or CONTINUE at 
the end. Wouldn't it? 
E: Why do you think that? 
S I: Because I thought you had to have either EXIT or CONTINUE at the end of any 
substeps. 
Is that just my memory failing me? 
just let me look back on this. 
See, on page 82, for instance, you have sub-step 2A and 2B, and they both have to be 
followed by EXIT. 
And again on page SO. 
I just want to look back, just to see where it gives you substeps, 
Because I want to see why it hasn't got them. 
(looks back through book) 
E: Could you say which pages you are looking at by the way. 
Sl: - Yes, I'm looking at page 49, which has control statements. 
I understood from that that I had to have either CONTINUE or EXIT after any sub-step, 
So, I'm not terribly sure why there Isn't one on sub-step 2 on page 84. 
Tell me 
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E: Can you see a difference between this (? ) and what you looked at Q) the control 
statements? 
Sl: Well, of course, there isn't a sub-step under 2, there's only one sub-step. I would have 
thought if there had been any at all there would be a thingy. 
E: Are there any other differences? 
Sl: No. There are none. There are no other differences. Wen I mean that is a difference, 
isn't there? There isn't another sub-step. 
E: There isn't another sub-step, no. 
Sl: And is that why there isn't a CONTINUE or an EXIT? 
E: Part of the reason. 
SI. Well what's the rest of the reason, then? 
E: Em, 
S1- I just can't remember this quite well enough, so I'm just going to type this thing into 
see exactly what happens when you're putting In this procedure. 
E. The SUSS? 
SI: Yes this particular one on page 84. 
tYpes 
What's wrong with that. Oh I haven't got the blasted thingy. What a bloody nuisance, 
tYpes 
Oh God I can't be bothered doing this 
E: You could copy and paste it. 
S I: Well that's not going to be any faster than typing it in, is it? 
E: No. 
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SI: types 
What am I doing? 
Right. Two. 
So this has obviously got something to do with the FOR EACH CASE OF construct, 
construct, tool, thing, gimmick, hasn't it? 
E: Yeah. 
SI: What's it for? That's It going, Okay. 
Oh, em, the battery's run out. 
The battery probably ran out ten minutes ago. 
E: That one's working so we'll just finish this off. 
Sl: Okay. Em. 
types 
This is completely unne'cessary, isn't it? 
Right, well that hasn't got me very far at all. 
I still don't know why there doesn't have to be a CONTINUE after 2A, but I have to 
assume it's because there isn't a 2B and it's got something to do with this FOR EACH 
CASE OF stuff. Yeah? 
E: Yeah, if that's what you think, carry on. 
SI- Why dont you just tell me, it would save me a hell of a lot of time. Or is the book 
going to tell me somewhere? 
E- The book oujht to have told you. 
Sl: I know the book ought to have told me, but it hasn't, has It? 
E: I don't want to er, 
SI: No, no, all right. Okay. Am I being very stupid about this? 
At least I noticed. Don't you think that's really brilliant that I noticed there wasn't a 
CONTINUE there? 
You don't care, do you? 
E., What are you doing now? 
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Sl: I'm reading the rest of page 85, which is what I said anyway before I started pissing 
around trying to get this lot in. 
God, it really does drag that out, at all. I mean, for half a page it goes on about how it's 
going to activate the print procedure at sub-step 2A for JOHN twice and none for MARY, 
which seems so completely basic as to be insulting, and yet it doesn't explain why it 
doesn't have a CONTTNUE at the end of sub-step 2A. 
But this is the person who was complaining only ten minutes ago that I wasn't allowed 
any creative thought. 
So at least I've had a wee bit of creative though now, even though I haven't reached any 
conclusions. 
Stop laughing at me. 
Right. 
So this repeated activation is called iteration. 
Now wait a minute. 'This printout may not sound very clever. ' Correct. 'But the important 
point is that the main flow of control, as always, proceeds sequentially step by step in 
numerical order through the definition of a procedure. Within a step involving FOR 
EACH, the sub-step is activated iepeatedly until no more cases of an appropriate pattern- 
match can be found. This repeated activation is called iteration. ' 
So there you are. I said it was something to do with the FOR EACH procedure, isn't it. It 
just keeps... Presumably the computer knows, if you've got this FOR EACH procedure that 
you're using, then the sub-step is just going to keep on being activated repeatedly, So - 
that's it, Isn't it? You don't have to have CONTINUE because the FOR EACH thing sort 
of has the CONTINUE built in. Which is called iteratioril Can I stop now? 
E: 8th February, second session. 
51: Poserl Okay We're on page 86 and A. 3 FOR EACH WITHIN FOR EACH. So this is 
sort of like the recursion within iteration. Is that right? Okay, Right, I'm reading page 
86 right now. There's a huge temptation when one's sitting in front of this machine to do 
the whole lot out loud, but I don't suppose that's the best way to do it is it? 
Okay. Well, this is brilliant. We're on page 86 now, and it's explaining all the answers to 
the questions on page 84, which was: why was there only one sub-step, and why doesn't it 
have a CONTINUE after it. 
That was a brief break to take my coffee and take my jersey off. 
I'm on page 86. 'Only one substep may be specified within a given usage of FOR EACH'em, 
it refers me to section 6.6 about the hierarchical structure of programs. 
I can't remember exactly what 6.6 says so I'm going to look back and see. 
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I can't even remember where to find 6.6. 
Ah here we are, page 56. 
Yes that's quite straightforward then. 
It's em, simply saying, 'any given step or sub-step can only specify one procedure to be 
activated. If there's an occasion when you want to specify that many things have to be 
done at a given step or sub-step, then you must first define a new procedure whose 
definition consists of the many things you want donel' 
That's fair enough. Right so back to page 86. 
reads 
Ah this is interesting; sub-sub-steps which are 1A, 1AA, 1AAA, and I seem to recall this is 
something I've tried and failed with at some stage earlier in the book. Again it's referring 
me to the CRAVETEST procedure which is in section 7.4 so I'm just going to go back to that 
to see what the original one was. So page 7.4, no, page 69,7.4. 
Yep, that's fair enough. 
reads page 86. 
Back to page 69. Page 70. 
I was only looking back 'there because it says 'remember CRAVETEST was designed to infer 
that someone craves the contents of whatever they drink'and I couldn't quite remember 
what the different characteristics of the different drinks were. I know that, em, BOOZE 
contained ALCOHOL and certainly that was one of the things that was a feature of the 
CRAVETEST, but I couldn't remember, for instance, NULK containing anything which 
people craved, and I was really just looking back for interest. 
reads page 86, 
I'm just rereading this new definition of CRAVETEST several times just to make sure I've 
grasped exactly what it's doing and how it's going to work. I do remember somewhere 
earlier in the book it had variables *B and *C. I just can't quite remember exactly how and 
when they were used. I mean obviously they were used when there's more than one 
variable. 
I do remember somewhere earlier in the book it had variables *B and *C, I just can't quite 
remember exactly how and when they were used. I mean, obviously, they were used when 
there is more than one variable. I'm not quite sure why the book is using B and C rather 
than A. I would have thought A would have been the obvious first one to use. And I can't 
remember also whether you use * by itself and then *A, *13 and *C. So again I'm going to 
look back in the book to see If I can refresh my memory a bit, because it's a while since I 
saw this. This is again on page 69 which explains... Yes, it does say that there is *A, *B, 
*C, up to *Z. It's not anything particularly difficult. It isn't anything that I didn't 
particularly understand. I think the variables used in this example on page 86 are quite 
clear. It was just I couldn't understand why B and C were being used instead'of * by itself 
and *A but It really doesn't matter. 
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reads 
Page 87, SAQ 16, which I'm going to read through first of all. Okay, right, I'm going to 
have to work through this thing in steps to see how I get on and to see if I understand it. 
Em, my immediate thought, on looking at SAQ 16 without actually trying to answer it, is 
that the potential problems will be that both MILK and BEER which FRED drinks have 
more than one contents. MILK CONTAINS CALCIUM and FAT, BEER CONTAINS 
ALCOHOL and WATER. Ern, but anyway let's go through the thing. TO CRAVETEST 
FRED 
FOR EACH CASE OF FRED DRINKS the variable 
Now let's just get the order right here, 
FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ DRINKS BEER 
OKAY, FRED DRINKS... We'll start of with FRED DRINKS BEER, because that's the 
first thing that comes up on the data base, FOR EACH CASE OF FRED DRINKS a 
variable 
FOR EACH CASE OF the variable contains another variable 
NOTE /X/ CRAVES the other variable. So FOR EACH CASE OF FRED DRINKS BEER 
E: If you don't mind, could you move slightly back just a little bit so the camera can see. 
S1, Right, we're still in the middle of SAQ 16. And we're still sort of going through it, 
but at the same time trying to work out how... how it's going to work before I actually try 
to make it work, which is probably a bit cock-eyed. It would be far more sensible If I just 
got down and tried it step by step. But I like to figure out first of all where the potential 
problems are going to be. I... I've already mentioned one problem and the other one is, I 
don't quite know exactly in which order the thing will work, * Because I don't know if it's 
got to go through the whole test for BEEM,. Yes, it will of course. Okay. Shut up 
FOR EACH CASE OF FRED DRINKS thingy. Okay. So it will look at all the data base 
things and FRED DRINKS13EER will be the first to come out and FOR EACH CASE OF 
BEER CONTAINS something else NOTE FRED CRAVES whatever the something else is. 
So, it's going to go through it and it's going to find out that FRED DRINKS BEER because 
that's the first thing in the data base, and then it's going to say Okay and, in addition to 
all the rest of the things that are already in the data base for FRED which are listed on 
page 87 and which Im not going to go through, it will say, Okay FRED CRAVES em... first 
of all FRED CRAVES ALCOHOL. 
second BEER thing because that's step... sub-step 1A FOR EACH CASE OF the BEER. It's 
then going to have, FRED CRAVES WATER and that's it dealt with all the beer stuff, so 
then it'll go on to FRED DRINKS MILK which is bacý at step 1 FOR EACH CASE Of /X/ 
DRINKS thingy, and it'll then have OKAY: FRED CRAVES CALCIUM because that's 
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the first item listed as contained by MILK and then OKAY FRED CRAVES PAT because 
that's the second thing that's contained by milk. So it's going to be 
OKAY: FRED CRAVES ALCOHOL 
OKAY: FRED CRAVES WATER 
OKAY: FRED CRAVES CALCIUM 
OKAY, FRED CRAVES FAT 
and that'll be it. And then it"s... Yes, that.. that'll be it done. That's all it prints out. it 
doesn't print out anything else. Em... I'm now going to look at the answers just to see what 
I've done. SAQ 16. The answers it gives here OKAY: FRED ISA MAN, FRED DRINKS 
BEER, FRED DRINKS MILK, which is what's already in the data base as I said, and then 
FRED CRAVES ALCOHOL 
FRED CRAVES WATER 
OKAY: FRED CRAVES CALCIUM 
OKAY: FRED CRAVES FAT 
which was what I said I think. I'm sure my experimenter will be able to confirm once he 
goes through the tape that that was the order I said them in. 
E: Indeed. 
Sl: I don't actually know if I need to have this computer on. I'm not testing It on the 
computer. Em.... we've been discussing whether or not we should in fact be typing all this 
lot and doing it like that, but I've come to the conclusion that that wouldn't be much help 
because I could quite easily type in the data base on page 87, type in the definition of 
CRAVETEST and apply it to FRED for /X/, and, although the computer would presumably 
come up with the right answer, it's not going to show my particular thought processes. it 
might give me the answers and I could work back from the answers to say why it had 
listed the items in that particular order, but it's... it em... I don't think it would help at 
all in trying to esfablish my thought processes. Although why anybody wants to check my 
thought processes I don't really know, but... Right, I'm now looking to see how many pages 
I've got left before I'm finished because... I'm like that, Okay. This is now the bottom of 
page 87, 'AA CHECK node-relation> ? is now obsolete'. Well there you go. Poor old 
CHECK procedure. 
E: For this particular version of SOLO that's actually Irrelevant. 
SI: Yes, it is. just out of complete Interest, though, for this particular version of SOLO, I 
want to see that, as far as I can remember, I can still use the CHECK format. I'm sure I've 
done this before. No, I'm not sure, I think I may have done this before, typed in two nodes 
in the third position in the triple with the same second position node, and tried a CHECK. 
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I just want to see what happens because em 
types data base on page 87 then 
CHECK FRED LIKES ? 
SOLO cr4shes 
So has that crashed because of what it's saying here? 
E: Not because of what it's saying there, it's because of the way the em... the program 
works. It doesn't like that at the top level like that., 
Si: What top level? 
E: Well, going straight in after the SOLO prompt. It would only work in the middle of a 
program. 
SI: Really? Really? 
E: Well, if you typed something else Ue CHECK FRED LIKES WHISKY. 
SI: types CHECK FRED LIKES WHISKY 
I know this has got absolutely nothing to do with anything but it's more fun isn't it? 
'PRESENT'. 
Okay. That was completely irrelevant, 
Yes. 'You may of course still use the format CHECK NODE - RELATION -> NODE'. 
Which of course we've just established here. 'You may use a CHECK within a FOR 
EACH, ' Okay. Here's a new definition of the old BOOZETEST procedure from section 7S. 
Right I'm just going to look up 7.3 again. I don't suppose it's necessary at all but I'm going to 
do it anyway just to remind myself. Em... 7.3 page 67. Right, this is the craving business. 
reads example on page 88 
That looks nice, 
E: What looks nice? 
SI: Oh, sorry. It's elegant. I mean rather more elegant than the earlier examples 
anyway. The way it appears to be making inferences, that's all, I like it. Em. -, first of all 
checking to see if em. - someone drinking something which contains alcohol and if so then... 
then they crave alcohol then... Oh, NEXT CASE that"s a new control statement, That's 
rather nice. 
I'm... I'm reading page 88 now. 
How do you write SOLO. I mean how was SOLO written in the first place. I mean how do 
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you get a machine that doesn't understand SOLO in the first place to recognize SOLO as a 
language? 
E: Well, it's written in Lisp which in turn... LISP is interpreting this, if you like.. 
SI: Right. 
E: and in turn there's a machine code which is interptreting LISP. 
SI: Right, I understand that now. Okay. Okay. 
reads page 88 
reads screen saver on computer screen 
'A. 44 Magnum beats four aces. ' I do hope that's going to be in your protocol. You're not 
allowed to fudge your results, Ian. 
'When you use CHECK within a FOR EACH, the control statement you use after the IF 
PRESENT and IF ABSENT alternatives must be either EXIT or NEXT CASE. ' In other 
words not CONTINUE. 'That's fair enough. 'When you use CHECK normally... the 
control-statements are the usual EXIT or CONTINUE. ' 
Okay page 89. It's got this little example thing here, BOOZETEST MARTHA and 
BOCIZETEST MARY - according to the data base descriptions contained on page 88. 
And this would be what would happen: Okay, BOOZETEST MARTHA. FOR EACH 
CASE OF MARTHA DRINKS something or other. 
Right, so we're going to go through it, and it says.. 
and first of all MARTHA DRINKS BEER. That's the first thing that's going to come out. 
FOR EACH CASE OF MARTHA DRINKS something or other, 
BEER is going to lead us on to 1A because MARTHA'S drinking something. 
CHECK the 0, that's 13EER in this first case, CONTAINS ALCOHOL. 
So we're going to, (vhip through the data base and we're going to find out that BEER does 
CONTAIN ALCOHOL, 
1AA If PRESENT: well It is PRESENT. It Is fulfilled. So It's going to NOTE /X/ CRAVES 
ALCOHOL: EXIT. 
So we're going to... PRINT. No it's not going to PRINT, it's going to say MARTHA 
CRAVES ALCOHOL. 
And it's going to EXIT there and that'll be it done. 
Now Is that right? Does it EXIT from the whole thing there? Or does it simply EXIT from 
I? 
FOR EACH CASE OF /X/... No, it must EXIT from the whole thing, mustn't it? 
reads text on page 8ý 
It does say 'EXIT, as always, means "irrunediately relinquish control from whomever you 
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got it from. "' I don't find that statement particularly helpful. 'When that happens, of 
course, no other steps would be carried out within this particular procedure. ' Yes, okay. If 
I'd read that properly in the first place I wouldn't have asked the question, would I? But 
it's useful 
(7) because it means I can go back and check. 
Okay, so if we're BOOZETESTing MARTHA, we're going to have 
MARTHA CRAVES ALCOHOL. 
Then I'm going to BOOZETEST MARY. MARY DRINKS MILK 
FOR EACH CASE OF MARY DRINKS something it's going to go through CHECK thingy, 
whatever, CONTAINS ALCOHOL. 
So CHECK MILK CONTAINS ALCOHOL, of course we're going to go through the data 
base and find out that MILK doesn't contain ALCOHOL. So lAA doesn't work. 
1AB 'IF ABSENT PRINT "IS NON-ALCOHOLIC"' is going to work. 
Em,.. So the machine here, in the middle of BOOZETESTING MARY, will print MILK IS 
NON-ALCOHOLIC then moves on to the NEXT CASE. 
This is the NEXT CASE of FOR EACH CASE OF MARY DRINKing whatever. 
So if we're going to go on to MARY DRINKS WATER, CHECK WATER CONTAINS 
ALCOHOL. No, it doesn't. 
So 1AA doesn't work, so again we're on 1AB, IF ABSENT PRINT WATER IS NON- 
ALCOHOLIC; NEXT CASE 
and there it's a NEXT CASE so that... we're done, then. 
So, for BOOZETEST MARY we're going to have MILK IS NON-ALCOHOLIC WATER IS 
NON-ALCOHOLIC I GUESS MARY IS NOT A BOOZER. 
Okay, is that what happens here? Yep, MARTHA. It's got: OK, MARTHA DRINKS 
BEER, MARTHA DRINKS MILK, MARTHA CRAVES ALCOHOL. 
And it does explain, just in case I was in any doubt at all, which I wasn't actually by this 
stage, 'immediately after that, the control-statement EXIT says to relinquish control so 
the BOOZETEST procedure has finished. ' 
That's immediately before answer (b). And that seems to be okay too. 
I'll just read them.. read the rest of page 89 just to make sure I've got the right answers for 
the right reasons... again, 
Page 90. 'A. 5 Scope, ' I'm reading the page. 
This is explaining a little problem so that, em... where you have a variable, it can only be 
used in the line immediately following.,. the previous step which was referred to. And 
that makes perfect sense given this..., ern... example that's there. 
Ibis book is very helpful in that it does things like this. It points out problems before I've 
thought about them. This is probably something similar to what I was saying earlier on in 
page 83 -4 sort of thing, when I was complaining about the fact that it wasn't encouraging 
creative thought. 
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I still wonder if it might have, sort of , forced the message in slightly more quickly If it 
had... if it had given me a problem to solve, or at least to attempt to solve which brought 
out this anomaly. So that I discovered it, as it were, for myself rather than simply 
having the anomaly pointed out to me. I don't know, anyway... Obviously this... this way 
works because it's given me this problem and I understand what it's saying. 
A restriction of scope. 'A variable may only appear within the scope of the FOR EACH 
construct which originally determines its value. ' Well, that seems extremely reasonable, 
doesn ,t it? 
Right, I'm... I'm still on A. 5 and it's this bit which says... which starts off by saying 
'related to the issue of "scope" is the fact that when we use the control-statement' etc. 
That bit there. I'm reading the... I've read it through once. I'm now going to read it 
through another couple of times till I see exactly what it's meaning. Em... it always 
refers.. ' 'when we use the control-statement NEXT CASE within a CHECK, it always 
refers to the most deeply nested FOR EACH construct within which that CHECK 
procedure immediately appears. ' 
Yes, that does really make sense. Em.... Yes, and, of course, it makes sense if you think in 
terms of an example anyway. 
'A. 6 Editing within a sub-step' I am reading this and I'm thinking meanwhile... really I 
wonder if I were trying to construct... a construct... I got terrible semantics there. If I were 
trying to define a construct which had a whole nesting of FOR EACH cases, like the 
example about three quarters of the way down page 90, whether I would actually 
remember which sub-step I was on. But, of course, SOLO does bring up a sub-step anyway. 
You don't actually have to remember which sub-step number it is; whether it's 1A, or 1AA 
or 1AAAB or whatever, because SOLO actually brings up the correct number anyway, 
doesn't it? So that's a complete waste of thought process, wasn't it? 
Page 91 now. 
It occurs to me also, at the em... the beginning of page 91, I'm going through this 
CRAVETEST thing that it's got, and it does occur to me that the book's been pretty good so 
far about explaining all this FOR EACH CASE OF business, the EACH CASE construct, 
em... and the CHECKing procedure within the EACH CASE thing, and the NEXT CASE 
instead of CONTINUE. 
That... that's fine. I mean it has all seemed to make perfect sense when I've done It, I just 
wonder If it mightn't have been more useful again... if it wouldn't have made me 
understand what was going on a bit better, if I had actually had to design my own 
construct... define my own construct - let's get the word right - define my own construct 
which contained... ern.. each... no, not... no, okay. Sorry, start again, 
I wonder if it would have been better to have me define my own procedure, which 
contained EACH CASE constructs, so that I could really make sure I understood exactly 
how they worked and that I wasn't going to have any errors in them. I think having to 
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define my own procedures would make it just that bit more thumped in. 
reads page 91 
Well that little bit was reasonably straightforward, wasn't it? A. 6. 
We're now on 'A. 7 Iteration versus recursion. ' 
Before I start reading this, I do recall making some comments somewhere a few pages ago, 
about what I seemed to think iteration was. 
looks back 
I can't remember where I said it. It does have it at the bottom of page 85. I've looked back 
to the bottom of page 85 now. 'Within a step involving FOR EACH, the sub-step is 
activated repeatedly until no more cases of an appropriate pattern-match can be found. 
This repeated activation is called iteration. ' 
That seems straightforward enough. 
I wonder if I can remember what recursion is now. 
You see, I... I know I could just go on to page 92, because I know it's going to tell me what 
recursion is on page 92, but it helps me figure out whether I understand it or not if I can 
remember for myself what recursion is. 
And it's the looping thing rather than the sort of repeating thing, 
That sounds really technical, doesn't it? 
Again, I'm going to look back 
Looking back to page 78 'Propagating inferences through the data base. ' Reads page 78 
Yes. Okay. 
Read page 91 
In case It's not clear, I'm still reading A. 7 on page 91. I'm not terribly sure these little 
diagrams are being very useful to me, 
It's saying that iteration is fanning out through the network ands it's got this little picture 
of relations going to node 1, node 2, and all this. 
Em... ern... and recursion is propagating or going in depth through a sequence of relations. 
I can remember obviously 
; 
vhat each of the things did through the examples in the book, 
but I think probably I would find it difficult to explain what iteration meant versus what 
recursion meant. 
'Iteration applies in breadth ... to a fan of nodes all exactly one relation away 
from the 
starting node. ' Yes, I mean, that's the FOR EACH thing obviously, fair enough, where 
recursion applies in depth. 
So, instead of FOR EACH, you're going for one thing then something different for... from 
that. 
Yes. I think I sort of understand it inside my head but again I would find it very difficult 
to explain it. 
reads page 92 
Page 92 now. 
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That is nice isn't it? This little example here TO INFECT /X/, NOTE /X/ HAS FLU, FOR 
EACH CASE OF /X/ KISSES thingy, that's the iteration, obviously. Whereas the 
INFECT in the sub-step 2A is taking you into recursion. 
Reads explanation 
Yes, that's what it says. 'The FOR EACH construct allows us to "fan out" to discover 
everyone whom /X/ happens to kiss, while the recursive use of INFECT at sub-step 2A 
allows us to propagate the "contagious" flu to everyone along a chain of KISSES relations. ' 
Good example. I mean the KISSES and INFECT things for recursion. 
SAQ 17 now. 
Quarter to nine. I'm reading it first. 
This is nice. Okay. 'Given the latest definition of INFECT, how would SOLO respond if 
we typed in INFECT JOE'. 
Okay. TO INFECT JOE. Okay. TO INFECT /X/, I NOTE /X/ HAS FLU. Right, so JOE IS 
It's going to say then 'NOTE JOE HAS FLU, So, SOLO's going to come out with OK, JOE 
KISSES MARY, JOE KISSES SUE, JOE HAS FLU. Straightforward enough. 
Step 2. FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ KISSES wild-card 2A INFECT the variable. Step 2 
FOR EACH CASE OF JOE KISSES someone, INFECT that someone. 
So it's going to take us first of all to JOE KISSES MARY, which takes us into INFECT 
MARY. And SOLO is then going to come out with TO INFECT MARY, NOTE.., MARY 
HAS FLU. So it's then going to come out with MARY KISSES FRED, MARY KISSES TOM, 
MARY HAS FLU. This is where we're really getting into depth here, and how are we 
going to do it? Ern... I mean, which order is It going to come in. Presumably it's still on JOE. 
Then we have to go through JOE's hierarchy first and then MARY's hierarchy, So, we're 
still on JOE. We've been through JOE KISSES MARY. We... we're now on JOE KISSES SUE 
because we're back at sub-step 1 in.. in JOE's... JOE's... Okay. 
So the first... the first case at step 2 of JOE kissing someone. We're now onto the second 
case of JOE kissing someone. 
So, JOE KISSES SUE. It's going to come out with then, SUE SMOKES... OK, SUE SMOKES 
CIGARETTES, SUE HAS FLU. 
Now, the first case of JOE kissing someone was JOE KISSES MARY. So, MARY has been 
Infected, And it's then going to run through the same process for MARY. 
So, FOR EACH CASE OF MARY KISSES someone, we have MARY KISSES FRED. FRED 
will then be infected at sub-step 2A, 
It will come out with OK, FRED SMOKES CIGARETTES, FRED HAS FLU, And the second 
case of MARY kissing someone will be MARY KISSES TOM, The reply to which is 
INFECT TOM. So. that will be ... SOLO will then say TOM HAS FLEAS, TOM HAS FLU, 
And... with both MARY... KISSES... the... the recursion will still check to see whether 
the recipients of MARY's KISSES and in fact the JOE's KISSing of SUE will go on to trigger 
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another series of infections at a sort of third level, because neither SUE nor FRED nor TOM 
KISSES anyone. There are no further infections. So that will be the latest result. 
I'll now go and look at the answer to that. 
I can't actually remember what my rely was to the various order... Right, I don't think I 
actually have the order right here. In fact, I think I went through JOE one step too soon, I 
went back to JOE after he kissed MARY. I should in fact have gone through MARY's... the 
whole of MARY's em... hierarchy first before relinquishing that and going back to JOE. 
So, I didn't actually get that right. I think my... my order was wrong. Again that'U be 
clear from whatever I've said into here. 
indicates tape recorder 
Let me read through this on page 106 and 107, just to make sure. Yep. Fair enough. 
Okay, finished. 
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A. 3.3 SOLO test problems 
A. 3.3.1. Problem I 
Imagine a rambling four-storey house with a basement. A SOLO database describing part 
of the house looks like this: 
ATTIC 
I 
I- OVER -> BEDROOMI 
BEDROOM1 
I 
I ISA -> ROOM 
I 
I OVER -> LANDING 
LANDING 
ISA -> PLATF6RM 
I --OVER ... >CUPBOARD 
CUPBOARD 
I 
I -- OVER ... >LOUNGE 
LOUNGE 
I 
I -- ISA ->I ROOM 
I 
I --- OVER --> KITCHEN 
KITCHEN 
I 
I ISA --> ROOM 
I 
OVER --- > BASEMENT 
BASEMENT 
I 
I- HAS ---> CONCRETEFLOOR 
Now imagine that, after a severe frost, the water tank in the attic bursts. 
Write a SOLO program called FLOOD to represent the fact that when the water tank in 
the attic bursts then the attic and anything below it get flooded. 
Once the program has run the items in the database should contain the description 
overleaf: 
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ATTIC 
I 
I OVER --> BEDROOMI 
I 
I IS --> FLOODED 
BEDROOM1 
I- ISA -> ROOM 
I 
I- OVER --> LANDING 
I 
I -- IS -> FLOODED 
LANDING 
I 
I- ISA -> PLATFORM 
I 
I- OVER --> CUPBOARD 
I 
I- IS -> FLOODED 
CUPBOARD 
I 
I OVER -> LOUNGE 
I IS -> FLOODED 
LOUNGE 
I 
I ISA -> ROOM 
I 
I OVER --> KITCHEN 
I 
I IS --> FLOODED 
KITCHEN 
I 
I ISA --> ROOM 
I 
I OVER -> BASEMENT 
I 
I IS --> FLOODED 
BASEMENT 
I 
I HAS -> CONCRETEFLOOR 
I 
I IS -> FLOODED 
POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
SOLO: TO FLOOD IXI 
1 NOTE /X/ ... IS ---> FLOODED 
2 CHECK IXI ... OVER ... >? 
... 2A IF PRESENT- FLOOD *; EXIT 
..... 2B IF ABSENT: EXIT 
..: DONE 
344 
Appendices 
A. 3.3.2 Problem 2 
You are an incompetent detective investigating ALEC, a known criminal. Here is a 
database of the information you have: 
ALEC 
I 
I ... KNOWS ... > PETE 
I 
I ... KNOWS ... > DAVE 
I 
I --- KNOWS ... > MARY 
I 
I ... KNOWS ... > BILL 
PETE 
I 
I ... SELLS CARS 
I 
I ... SELLS VIDEOS 
I 
I .. HAS --- >LOTSOFMONEY 
DAVE 
I ... LIKES ... > CATS 
I 
I --- HAS ---> LOTSOFMONEY 
MARY 
I 
I ... HAS --- > COMPUTERS 
I 
I ... IS ... > BROKE 
BILL 
I 
I --- SELLS ... > VIDEOS 
I 
I ... IS ... > BROKE 
Write a program called INVESTIGATE which goes through all the people ALEC knows to 
check whether they sell videos, If they don't, the program should print that they are 
eliminated from your enquiries. if they do then they should also be checked to see if they 
have lots of money, if so they should be NOTEd as a suspect, otherwise the program 
should print that they are eliminated from your enquiries, (See overleaf for what SOLO 
should print out. ), 
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OK... 
PETE 
I --- SELLS CARS 
I --- SELLS VIDEOS 
I 
I --- HAS ... > LOTSOFMONEY 
I 
I ... ISA --- > SUSPECT 
DAVE IS ELIMINATED FROM OUR ENQUIRIES 
MARY IS ELIMINATED FROM OUR ENQUIRIES 
BILL IS ELIMINATED FROM OUR ENQUIRIES 
POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE f1J 
... :1 FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ ... KNOWS ... >? 
..... IA: CHECK * ... SELLS ... > VIDEOS 
....... 1 AA IF PRESENT: IMPLICATE *; NEXT CASE 
....... IAB IFABSENT: PRINT*"IS ELIMINATED FROMOUR ENQUIRIES"; NEXTCASE 
..: DONE 
OK... I NOW KNOW HOW TO'INVESTIGATE/Xt 
SOLO: TO IMPLICATE /X/ 
... :1 CHECK /X/ --- HAS ... > LOTSOFMONEY 
..... IA IF PRESENT: NOTE /X/ --- ISA ---> SUSPECT; EXIT 
..... 1B IF ABSENT: PRINT /X/" IS ELIMINATED FROM OUR ENQUIRIES"; EXIT 
... : DONE 
OK... I NOW KNOW HOW TO'IMPLICATE'/X/ 
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A. 3.3.3 Problem 3 
First of all create a database containing the following information: 
AVRIL 
I 
I LIKES BILL 
I 
I LIKES ILONA 
I 
I LIKES JOHN 
BILL 
I 
I LIKES CAROL 
I 
I LIKES ISOBEL 
JOHN 
1 
1- LIKES -> LOTM 
CAROL 
I 
I LIKES -> EMMA 
I 
I LIKES -> FRANK 
I 
I -- LIKES --> GRAHAM 
FRANK 
I 
I- LIKES ... > GRAHAM 
ISOBEL 
I LIKES HANNAH 
Now write a program called TNITE' which NOTEs that AVRIL has an invitation to a 
party and that if AVRIL LIKES someone, BILL for example, then that person also gets 
invited, as does anybody that BILL likes, and so on. For example: 
OK... 
AVRIL 
I 
I --- LIKES BILL 
I --- LIKES ILONA 
I -- LIKES ... > JOHN 
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BILL 
etc 
- LIKES -> KAREN 
HAS -> INVITATION 
LIKES CAROL 
LIKES ISOBEL 
HAS --> INVITATION 
POSSIBLESOUMON 
SOLO: TO INVITE DU 
:I NOTE /X/ --- HAS ... > INVITATION 
:2 FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ --- LIKES ... >? 2A: INVITE 
DONE 
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A. 3.3 Think aloud protocol from Sl: Solving the first SOLO problem 
E: OK This is the 12th of February and 
this is Problem 1. 
Sl: Reads problem 
E: And if you look back over the problem 
question could you say which bits you're 
looking at. 
S 1: Yeah. Well, I'm going to read 
the whole lot over again. 
Reads database out loud. 
How do I get to do this? 
Do I get to write things down with a pencil 
first? 
or do you want me to do it all on here? 
E: You can if you like, yes. Either way. 
S 1: Can I not do it both ways? 
E. Both ways. 
rereads problem 
S 1: This Is recursion 
rather than iteration. 
If that helps at all. 
E: Why do you say that? 
Sl: Well, because it's not the fan-shaped 
thing, 
it's the line-shaped thing 
on page 91 of the book. 
(SI gives this page number from memory - 
she does not refer to the book) 
What is it? 
E: What are you looking at? 
S1. I'm looking at this again. 
I'm looking at the second page (of problem) 
Well, the first thing that 
I'm going to have to do is define a FLOOD 
procedure. , 
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Em... and the thing that's sort of causing me 
immediate thoughts is: 
does my FLOOD procedure actually have to 
mention the fact 
that the water tank in the attic bursts, 
and I suppose it does. 
Em. So I'm going to jot down a few notes. 
OK. just the... just... 
the jotting down a few notes is just to sort of 
aid my thought processes. 
writes 
TOFLOOD/X/ 
Em, well, first of all... 
rereads problem 
I'm not quite sure exactly 
how much depth the program needs me to 
have. 
I mean does it need me to have somewhere in 
the database 
the fact that there is a tank in the attic, 
for instance? 
E: That's the database you start with. 
SI: Yeah, that's the database I start with 
but, I mean, there's nothing to prevent me 
adding things in to the database. 
E. No. 
SI: Well, my problem is that, at the 
moment, 
the database doesn't contain the fact 
that there is a watertank in the attic, 
and therefore it's difficult to have... 
I mean, I was thinking, you see, 
of starting something like 
CHECK WATERTANK IN ATTIC BURSTS. 
Well, I mean, obviously it wouldn't say that, 
but, I mean, something that would check 
that sort of thing. 
But since the database at the moment 
doesn't actually have the fact that 
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there is a watertank in the attic, 
then, em, that makes it a wee bit difficult, 
doesn't it? 
It doesn't have it, does it? 
That there's a watertank in the attic? 
E: It doesn't have It in the database 
Sl: So does that mean that I have to 
add it? 
E: You don't have to, you can add it 
if you want. 
rereads problem 
SI: OK, I'm going to lookback atmy little 
book 
to see if it can give me any ideas. 
E: Which page are you looking at? 
Sl: I'm not looking at any particular page, 
I'm looking at page 90 
but not for any particular reason 
because there's nothing on it 
that's of any particular use at the moment. 
Maybe it would help 
if I sort of worked backwards, 
Maybe it would help 
if I read the bit about recursion. 
That seems sensible, doesn't it? 
OK. I don't have to have the fact... 
I'm looking on page 80, em, 
which has given a new definition of the 
INFECT procedure 
so that it keeps on recurring through it. 
So I probably... 
Right, OK 
It was just to make... 
you see, em, I just thought it would be 
a bit clearer, 
not from the SOLO point of view, 
but simply clearer from the point of view 
of someone looking at it if.. 
if the water tank was in it, 
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but that doesn't really matter an awful lot, 
does it? 
So it's going to start off with, 
em, stepl NOTE AITIC IS FLOODED 
without actually going a step behind that 
to explain why the attic is flooded 
in the first place. 
I think that's the only way I can start really, 
isn't it? 
OK Right, this is all just sort of thinkin& 
We're gong to sort of write it down 
and then NOTE AT71C IS FLOODED 
and then we're going to go through it all 
and look at it 
and see why it's not going to work. 
Em, and I'm still looking at page 80 because... 
why not? 
OK Then it's going to be now... 
reads page 80 
now I can see already 
that I'm gong to be putting in 
CHECK A711C is... 
OK. So it's not going to be NOTE ATTIC 
it's going to be NOTE /X/. 
writes 
and checks with example in book 
I might as well get to there. 
Em, right NOTE IXI IS Fl: 
ýODED 
CHECK /X/ OVER? 
2a IF PRESENT... 
IF PRESENT FLOOD 
writes 
Now this little thing I'm jotting down 
initially 
is simply copying what's on page 80 
for the new INFECT procedure 
then I'm going to have to read it 
and discover that I've got to, sort of.. 
well anyway.. 
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writes 
Right so far what I've written down is 
TO FLOOD /X/ 
1 NOTE IXI IS FLOODED 
2 CHECK /X/ OVER? 
2a IF PRESENT: FLOOD *; EXIT 
2B IF ABSENT: EXIT 
DONE 
Now I just simply can't remember from the 
last time I did this 
whether that will take us right through 
everything, 
or whether that will simply take us 
through one case of it; 
so I'm just going to read my book 
a wee bit further on. 
reads 
Anyway probably the best thing to do 
is type the whole lot in to start with, 
isn't it? 
To actually put the database in 
so that I can just see-what happens. 
Em, and I'm annoyed that I can't remember 
if that takes us right through everything 
or just.. 
reads 
E., Which pagý is this? 
S1,7bls is page 82. - 
skims quickly over pages 82,83 
And I'm looking on to the iteration, 
but that doesn't matter. 
I've decided that doesn't matter 
because we're not doing a fan thing here 
we're doing a line thing, 
but I may be wrong. 
In fact I may be seriously wrong. 
reads p92. 
In fact, I'm now looking at page 92 
and I suspect that 
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what I want is something rather more 
like the INFECT thing on there 
which is NOTE /X/ IS FLOODED 
refers continually to example 
and then have a 
FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ OVER? 
INFECT *. 
Right that's probably what I need, 
isn't it? 
Right, scrap... 
Em. OK. FLOOD procedure mark II. 
writes 
TO FLOOD /X/ 
E: Why don't write your database into 
the computer then you can check it as you write. 
SI: Right. OK. That sounds fair enough. 
Types database into computer 
E: Arrowhead. 
SI: Arrowhead. 
types 
NOTE LOUNGE ISA ROOM. 
types 
So do you want me to check the one 
I've just scrubbed out? 
E: That's up to you. 
SI: Is it? 
types 
TO FLOOD /X/ 
Right, I'm thinking. I'm thinking. 
E: Can you say what it is you're thinking? 
SI: Yes. Yes, I mean I'm... 
I'm sort of looking... 
I'm... I'm just basically, as you've gathered, 
copying the examples in the book, 
and the one on page 92, em... is.. 
E: What are you looking at now? 
SI: -I'm looking at the first page of 
the problem 
just to see exactly what the question's asking 
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reads: 
"If the watertank in the attic bursts and 
everything below it gets flooded" 
So the attic itself doesn't have to get 
flooded? 
Is that correct? 
Or does the attic too get flooded? 
Well, I mean, it... it implies 
that the rooms below it get flooded 
but the attic doesn't necessarily. 
E: You can assume the attic gets flooded 
as well. 
Sl: Right OK I'm going to try my first 
problem and see what happens. 
This is because I really haven't a clue. 
types: 
2 CHECK /X/ - OVER -> ? 
No. no this won't do. 
I'm typing in the first thing. 
E: Could you say what it is you're typing? 
SI: Yes. Yes, I'm typing the problem 
that I wrote down which is 
CHECK /X/ IS OVER something or other. 
E: You've missed a step... 
(from the subject's written version of problem) 
SI- Yes. Yes I know. I know I have. 
So I have, 
That's what makes things entirely 
different, in fact. 
Em... NOTE /X/ IS FLOODED. 
Back. Back to... what page was I on, 
page 82 or something? 
Page 80, I'm on page 80. 
reads 
Yeah, OK I think the first example 
is probably going to work, yes. 
OK. 
types in program she has already written: 
Do I need a space there? 
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Yes, I do, don't I? 
Where's the asterisk? 
types 
[The program now is: 
TO FLOOD /X/ 
... 1 NOTE /X/ - IS -> FLOODED 
..... 2A IF PRESENT- FLOOD *; EXIT 
..... 2B IF ABSENT: EXIT 
... : DONE] 
[SOLO responds 
OK... I NOW KNOW HOW TO'FLOOD'/X/ 
SOLO: I 
Sl: OK 
types: 
FLOOD ATTIC 
(SOLO responds: 
OK- 
ATMC 
I 
I OVER -> 13EDROOM 
I 
I IS -> FLOODED 
OK- 
BEDROOM 
I ISA --> ROOM 
I OVER -> LANDING 
I IS -> FLOODED 
OK... 
LANDING 
I ISA --> PLATFORM 
I 
I OVER --> CUPBOARD 
I 
I IS --> FLOODED 
OK... 
CUPBOARD 
I 
I -- OVER -> LOUNGE 
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I 
I- IS --> FLOODED 
OK... 
LOUNGE 
I 
I ISA -> ROOM 
I 
I OVER -> KITCHEN 
I 
I -IS --- > FLOODED 
OK... 
KITCHEN 
ISA -> ROOM 
OVER --> BASEMENT 
IS --> FLOODED 
OK... 
13ASEMENT 
I 
I HAS -> CONCRETEFLOOR 
I 
I IS -> FLOODED] 
SI: That looks not bad, eh? evaluate solution 
Is that right? query: checking 
E: That's right. 
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A. M. Think aloud protocol from Sl: Solving the second SOLO problem 
E: This is problem 2. 
Sl: This is still the 12th of February. 
(reads problem aloud) 
'You are an incompetent detective 
investigating ALEC a known criminal. Here is 
a database of the information you have. ' 
Right, this time I'm actually going 
to type this lot straight off into the database 
and that's going to have it in the database, 
and I'll be reading it at the same time, 
which seems to be intelligent, doesn't it? 
(reads database aloud as it is typed) 
Right, we've got a database. 
OK, problem. 
(reads problem aloud) 
OK. Right. I'm just reading the problem again 
and thinking. 
(re-reads problem) 
OK, so we're going to have to start with a 
FOR EACH CASE OF ALEC KNOWS 
somebody or other. 
I'm just going to check in the book, em, 
to make sure I've got the exact wording 
of FOR EACH. 
I think it's FOR EACH CASE OF /X/, 
but I just want to make sure that's exactly 
what the wording of the thing is. 
Em, if I can find it. 
I'm looking for the right page now. 
That's the blasted answers, 
reads page 91 CRAVETEST example 
'FOR EACH CASE OF'yes, 
it says 'FOR EACH CASE OP. 
(reads) 
Now, what am I going to do? 
We want to start off with 
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TO INVESTIGATE /X/; I 
and presumably what we want to do here 
is investigate ALEC, 
yes. Em.... 
So we're going to start of with 
FOR EACH CASE OF ALEC KNOWS 
whatshisname 
(types) 
That's not actually what I'm going to type in. 
Not word for word. 
FOR EACH CASE OF /X/. 
Now, how do I do this? 
Dot, dot, dot, I suppose. 
I'm looking at page 91 
because it's got an example of one of these, 
em, FOR EACH CASE OF. 
Right, FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ KNOWS. 
Now what do we need? 
A question mark. 
Now I'm thinking... 
on page 91 I'm looking at the CRAVETEST 
thing in the middle 
which is just simply the first example I 
came across, 
which had the an example of the FOR EACH 
thing in it, 
because, as you recall, I was looking to see 
what the exact wording of the FOR EACH 
construct was. 
Or was it a procedure? 
I can't remember. 
I should know that, 
Was it a procedure or a construct? 
The INVESTIGATE is a procedure 
so the FOR EACH is a construct, yeah? 
E: That'll do, yeah. FOR EACH is a 
construct 
S1, Does it matter, anyway? 
No. Right. 
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So I've got some idea. 
Anyway, now I'm just sort of looking 
because on page 91 the particular example 
I'm looking at 
has got ?B and ?Q and stuff like that. 
So I'm still thinking: 
well do I actually need, well, just a 
question mark? 
Or do I need a question mark 
something-or-other else? 
Em, And this serves me right for 
just dipping into the book 
and looking at the first possible example of it 
that I come across 
without actually reading what Im doing, 
doesn't it? 
So why don't I go back a little bit? 
Well, I mean, the whole Idea about page 91 is 
that it's just shoving... 
shoving the different letter.. 
letters in after the question mark 
to simply demonstrate to You 
how the thing can be edited anyway. 
(reads page 91) 
IB CHECK *. 
Now what am I doing? 
Back, 
I'm looking back at the question, 
OK, 'Go through all the people ALEC 
knows to check whether they sell videos', 
OK, CHECK * SELLS... 
now, hang on, what do I need? 
Dash thingy, don't I? 
Dash, dash, dash, SELLS VIDEOS. 
Now... I just want to remind myself 
how I continue after I've had a CHECK 
procedure within a for EACH CASE OF thing. 
(reads - finds page 88) 
I'm looking back to page 88, 
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and it's just going to come up... 
(reads BOOZETEST example) 
So it's... It's just going to come up 
1AA IF PRESENT: 
OK, now, what's this going to do? 
It's going to... 
Right let me just think about this. 
If I continue... 
reads screen 
CHECK * SELLS VIDEOS, IF PRESENT 
I can't remember if I can have a CHECK 
procedure within a CHECK procedure. 
Can I? 
You're not going to tell me are you? 
(reads) 
This is trying to remember 
all the embedded steps. 
Yes, em, no, it's not. 
OK, I'm still thinking about this. 
reads screen 
OK. CHECK * SELLS VIDEOS; 
1AA IF PRESENT%.. 
Certainly 1AB is going to be IF ABSENT 
and then I've got to print... em, you know, 
reads problem 
'they are eliminated from the enquiries' 
sort of bit. 
Em, so that's... 
the ABSENT is actually straightforward 
enough. - 
If it's PRESENT, and they do sell videos, 
I've then got to go on and CHECK 
whether or not they have lots of money. 
It's Just quite how I get into that. 
reads screen 
Anyway. At the moment the only thing 
I can think of Is having another CHECK 
procedure in here too. 
I just thought I couldn't do that for some 
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reason, 
but I can't remember it. 
flicks through book 
The answer is in here somewhere 
but I've no idea how far back it is, 
which is a right nuisance. 
I'm looking all over the place 
because I've got no idea where I should be 
looking, 
I'm on page 90 now. 
Aha! I want a NEXT CASE thing, perhaps. 
Do I? 
reads text on page 90 
Right, I'm on page 90 'related to the 
issue of "scope" is the fact that when we use 
the control-statement NEXT CASE within a 
CHECK, it always refers to the most deeply 
"nested" FOR EACH construct within which 
that CHECK procedure immediately appears. ' 
Now, is that going to work in here? 
reads screen 
OK. FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ KNOWS... 
CHECK /X/ SELLS VIDEOS; IF PRESENT... 
Now is that right? 
Because if I put in NEXT CASE 
it's gong to take me right back to... 
reads text on page 90 
the FOR EACH thing. 
(reads) 
E. This is page 90 you're reading. 
SI: Yes, I said that. 89.88.1 haven't read 89 yet. 
E -. Mat is it you're looking at on 88 is it the, 
em, example or the text? 
SI: I'm looking at the example, 
the BOOZETEST example on page 88. 
But it's not going quite far enough, 
that example on page 88, 
because, em, it's only got one variable, 
which is the alcohol, 
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the... the thingy contains alcohol, 
whereas I've got two, 
which is both that they sell videos 
and that they have lots of money. 
OK, FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ KNOWS 
thingy; 
CHECK /X/ SELLS VIDEOS; 
1AA IF PRESENT... 
I can't remember if this works. 
OK, em, because I have in my head at the 
moment this, sort of.. 
that I can get round it by having another 
CHECK thingy here, 
which I can't remember if I can actually do 
or not, 
and I can't remember where to find the 
answer, 
although I'm sure it's in here somewhere, 
I'm just going to try it and see what happens 
and it"s probably going to tell me I can't. 
No. Anyway. 
Because what's the variable going to be called? 
Is it going to be called just asterisk again? 
reads screen 
I'm going on. 
I'm reading page 92 the INFECT thingy here 
because it tells me how to do... 
or it tells me... 
It gives an example of Iteration and 
recursion being used together. 
(reads INFECT example 
So... 
reads screen 
E: What... Are you just reading through the 
thing on the screen at the moment? 
Sl: Yes. At least I'm staring at it blankly. 
(latighs) 
I'm still- I'm looking back at the book again 
because I still want to see what I can do with 
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this, em.... 
flicks backward and forward through book 
CHECK thing within a CHECK thing 
because I know I can't do it 
but I just want to see somewhere it tells me 
I can't do it. 
What I really need is some sort of procedure 
that will do wee loops. 
E: What do you mean by loops? 
Sl: Don't know. 
(types) 
reads screen 
reads problem 
Oh, now I'm trying to remember 
where I 've got to have the blasted s 
semi-colons here. 
Is that where I have to have the semi-colons, 
the... I mean the inverted commas? 
Or do I have to have them before the /X/? 
E: Anything you want printed that's not a 
variable should be in inverted commas. 
Sl: Yeah, I know that 
but the variable /X/ doesn't go within the 
inverted commas, 
that's what I mean, does it? 
E: Yeah. 
S1- Yeah it doesn't? 
E: It doesn't. 
SI- Yes, it doesn't. OK, thank you. Ern, 
(E tries to adjust window on screen. Some of 
the S's code has overflowed to the next line 
causing SOLO to abort. ) 
OK. I FOR EACH CASE OF thingy. 
Right, hang on, Think about this. 
FOR EACH CASE OF somebody KNOWS 
somebody else 
CHECK that somebody sells VIDEOS; 
IF PRESENT: CONTINUE; IF ABSENT... 
[Sl's program so far is 
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SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE /X/ 
... :I FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ --- KNOWS ---> 
? 
..... IA: CHECK * ... SELLS ... > VIDEOS 
....... 1AA IF PRESENT: CONTINUE 
....... I AB IF ABSENT: PRINT 1X/"IS ELIMINATED FROM OUR ENQUIRIES9% EXIT] 
OK. Right 113 
I can't do that can I? 
I can't have a 113 within a FOR EACH 
construct, can I? 
I want two CHECK procedures within the 
FOR EACH thing 
and I can only have a IA, can't I? 
E: Yes. 
SI: It's not fair. 
(reads screen) 
No, got it. 
Right, what I'm going to do here 
is type DONE 
just so I can get out of this one I'm typing in here 
and start the whole thing again. 
Do I have to go in through an 
EDIT INVESTIGATE 
or can I just start off and type 
TO INVESTIGATE again? 
E: Start TO INVESTIGATE again, it'll 
probably be quicker. 
SI: Yes. 
(types) 
I've probably forgotten now 
what I was going to do. 
(types) 
(first program now looks like this: 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE 1W 
...: I FOR EACH CASE 
OF IXI ... KNOWS ... >? 
..... 1A: CHECK * ... SELLS --> 
VIDEOS 
....... 1AA IF PRESENT: CONTINUE 
....... 1AB IF ABSENT: PF31NT IXI "IS 
ELIMINATED FROM OUR ENQUIRIES"; EXIT 
DONE 
OK... I NOW KNOW HOW TO'INVESTIGATE'/X/ 
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Sl retypes: 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE 1XJ 
:1 FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ --- KNOWS >? 
..... 1A: I 
Right I'm going to try something else here. 
And the problem I'm now going to have 
is that I'm probably going to start having 
too many variables. 
I'm going to have to call them different things 
like ?B and stuff like that 
and it's not going to help if I don't put all the 
letters in either, does it? 
(corrects what she has typed). 
And that's where my problems are going to 
arise. 
But that, at least, is something I can probably 
sort out. 
FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ KNOWS thingy 
FOR EACH CASE... - 
(types) 
and I don't know if this is will work - 
OF * being the answer to the question mark... 
OK. FOR EACH CASE OF * SELLS... 
OK this is getting too late at night. 
EACH CASE OF * SELLS VIDEOS 
Right 1A CHECK.. 
Now, this is where I'm going to have to start 
putting in different letters, isn't it? 
CHECK *A HAS LOTSOFMONEY. 
That's what I'm going to need now, Isn't it? 
CHECK the asterisk A. 
Or is that not right? 
Well, why don't I... 
E: That's a different variable? 
SI: Yeah, well that's what I... 
Yes, do I need a different variable? 
CHECK... 
OK. * HAS... 
[types- 
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1AA: CHECK * -- HAS 
LOTSOFMONEYI) 
Right now I've got to have a 
NEXT CASE here, 
don't I? 
1AA IF PRESENT... 
My problem is the numbers of my variables, 
isn't It? 
flicks through book 
Here I... I mean. 
indicates asterisk and question mark 
How many A's or whatever I need after them 
all. 
Or if I ever need a variable after them all, 
or if they're all the same variable. 
I know I should be able to work this out. 
NOTE * 
[types: 
NOTE 0- ISA --> SUSPECT] 
reads screen 
I'm not terribly sure 
If I can do substep 1A after substep 1 
and the whole thing to make sense 
but, never mind we'll see, won't we? 
and if I can't finish this tonight 
then I'll go to bed and think about it all day 
tomorrow. 
IF PRESENT NOýE thingy ISA SUSPECT. 
Now I suppose... 
I can't remember... 
I just can't think any more. 
E: I think I should point out, you've got this 
in the wrong place. 
Sl: What the NEXT CASE? 
-E- You don't have that immediately after 
the CHECK 
[SI has written: 
....... 1AA: CHECK * .. HAS ... > 
LOTSOFMONE'ý- NEXr CASE 
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E assumes that S1 has made a slip) 
Sl: Oh, I've got it... 
I've got it after now, haven't... 
yes, that's right. 
OK, em, I can't get rid of all that now, can I? 
E: You could try. 
[S1 deletes the NEXT CASE from line 1AA] 
S1. I don't think that works though. 
E: No I don't think so either. 
Sl- Onceyou'veputitin it's in. 
Em, so... Why's it doing that? 
E: You haven't got (? ) 
Sl: Oh aye right. 
Can I not just put DONE now. 
Em, this isn't going to work is It? 
I'm just going to put EXIT and DONE now 
and then mend that 
because it's not going to accept it. 
I know it's not. 
[program now is: 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE /X1 
... :1 FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ ... KNOWS ... >? 
..... IA: FOR EACH CASE OF * ... SELLS ---> VIDEOS 
....... 1AA: CHECK * --- HAS --- > LOTSOFMONEY 
......... 1AAA IF PRESENT: NOTE * --- ISA ... > SUSPECT; -NEXT CASE 
......... 1 AAB IF ABSENT: EXIT 
... : DONE) 
OK here we go again. - Mark III. 
(types) 
I'm just looking to see about this NEXT CASE 
thing. 
The little explanation it gives you. 
(reads middle page 88) 
CK. 
[types: 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE /X/ 
... :1 FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ --- KNOWS --> ? 
.. -lk FOR EACH CASE OF --- SELLS ... > VIDEOS 
....... IAA: CHECK* ... HAS ---> LOTSOFMONEY 
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......... 1AAA IF PRESENT: NOTE * --- ISA ... > SUSPECT; NEXT CASE 
......... 1AAB IF ABSENT: PRINT DU "IS ELIMINATED FROM OUR ENQUIRIES"; NEXT 
... : CASE 
Si: is that as far as I can do? 
Will It not work, then? 
(line 1AAB has spilled over to the next line 
which will cause SOLO to abort. 
E: Try it. Hit the ENTER and see. 
[SOLO responds; 
ERROR: OOPS.. - FOUND CASE INSTEAD 
OF A LINE NUMBER OR DONE] 
Sl: What do I do? 
Which one do I press? 
E: Abort. 
SI: Now, what do I do now? 
Em, start again, 
Do have to start all that again? 
Can you copy all that for me please? 
E: Yeah. 
SI: Well, I mean we can have the 
'FROM OUR ENQUIRIES' bit out 
if necessary. 
You can just have /X/ 'IS ELIMINATED. 
/X/ IS EXTERMINATED as far as I'm 
concerned. 
[E copies and pastes tip to 1AAB in the last code] 
S I: I'll be lost now, 
(There is some trouble with SOLO which 
aborts since ENTER was accidentally 
pressed twice) 
S 1: So I can't remember where I am now. 
This isn't fair. 
E: I think you're on 2 or DONE or 
whichever you are on to. 
[program now reads: 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE /X/ 
I FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ --- KNOWS ? 
..... IA: FOR EACH CASE 
OF * ... SELLS ... > VIDEOS 
....... 1AA: CHECK * ... HAS ... > 
LOTSOFMONEY 
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......... 1AAA IF PRESENT: 
NOTE * ... ISA ... > SUSPECT; NEXT CASE 
......... 1 AAB IF ABSENT: PRINT 
/X/ "IS ELIMINATED"; NEXT CASE 
SI: FOR EACH CASE Of /X/ KNOWS 
something or other. 
I can't remember what the problem is. 
(reads problem). 
Right, wait a minute. 
FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ KNOWS 
(reads through what has been written on 
screen) 
because it's also got to eliminate things 
from the enquiries 
if they don't sell videos. 
At the moment I haven't got anything to 
check to see if it sells videos. 
Em, because I want something to print... 
if it doesn't sell videos 
I want something to print that it's also 
eliminated... 
also to print that it's eliminated from the 
enquiries and... 
at the moment it's not going to do that 
because what the thing's prompting me to put 
in now is 2 
Hang on, let's see what we've got here. 
See ALEC actually knows all the people 
DAVE, MARY and BILL. 
And at the moment I can't 
; 
ee what I can do to 
print that somebody's eliminated 
if they don't sell videos. 
Because the 2 that I'm putting in at the 
moment 
isn't within the FOR EACH CASE in step 1. 
Have you done this? 
You've solved it so it is possible? 
E. Yes. 
SI: (reads screen) 
I'm going to look back at my little book here 
to see. 
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E: Page 86. 
Sl: So it is. 
E: Which part are you reading? All of it? 
S 1. Yes. Yes, this must... 
reads text 
Right, 'only substep may be specified within a 
given usage of FOR EACH. This means that if 
you wanted to have, say, five different 
procedures activated within a given substep', 
I'd have 'to define a single new procedure 
which Itself specified the activation of all 
of these five procedures as part of its own 
definition. ' 
That's what I really have to do. 
So let's just... 
E: Do you want to try to see what happens 
if you try out your program or are you going 
to forget about it entirely and do a different 
one? 
Sl: Oh, yes OK. Ill try it if you like. 
types: 
SOLO: NVESTICATE PETE 
[SOLO responds: 
OK.. 
PETE 
I 
I --- SELLS ... > CARS 
I 
I ... SELLS --- > VIDEOS 
I 
I .. HAS ... > LOTSOFMONEY 
I 
I ... ISA ... > SUSPECT 
OOPS ... I DONT HAVE A PROCEDURE CALLED 
'NIL' 
S1, Where did this NIL come from? 
E. I haven't the faintest Idea. 
Sl: I've got half way there so far, 
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"ads screen 
but as I said I didn't have the, em... 
What is this, what is this I mean what is 
this? 
(referring to the NIL) 
E: I don't know it must have been the double 
hit of the ENTER button that did that. 
SI: Yes. 
E: NIL is what LISP calls an empty list. 
S 1: Yes, but anyway, this is exactly what 
I thought was going to happen 
because I didn't... 
I wasn't able to get into the, em... 
I couldn't include the PRINT ELIMINATE 
thing FROM MY ENQUIRIES as a next step. 
reads screen 
Right, well, OK, I mean, I can... 
I can see ways round this 
but I think they might... 
may be going without... 
outwith the, em, the limits of the question, 
but I'm going to do them anyway, so there. 
E: What, er, do you mean by that? 
What ways do you see? 
Sl: Ah well, you're just about to find out, 
aren't you? 
Well, it involves having adifferent procedure 
within the INVESTIGATE procedure. 
E: Do you want to save time by cutting and 
pasting from the previous procedure or are 
you just going to start from scratch? 
S I: I'm not very sure. 
No, I'm starting from scratch. 
Because I'm going to have to start 
by defining my other procedure 
that I'm going to have In the middle of it. 
Am I allowed to do that within the 
(? ) of the question? 
E- Yes. You don't have to do it first, 
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you can do it second it doesn't matter which 
order they're in. 
SI: Yes, that's right. 
Oh well, OK, em. 
(types : 
TO INVESTIGATE /X/ 
I FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ - KNOWS -> ?] 
But the way I'm doing it isn't going to have 
the whole lot within one definition, 
is that all right? 
E: Uhuh. 
SI: Oh, Isee, right. OK. 
TYPES: 
CHECK /X/ - IS -> DODGY 
E: CHECK /X/ IS DODGY? 
S I: * IS DODGY. 
replaces IXI with 
And then I'm going to have to define a 
procedure called DODGY. 
E: But that (referring to screen) is not a 
procedure, 
SI: Not yet. I can design another a little 
program. 
E: I can see your point but that can't be a 
procedure. Sorry, carry on, do what you want. 
S I: Well, what I was going to do was you see, 
was after I finish the INVESTIGATE thingy, 
is define another procedure 
which results in /X/ being DODGY 
If /X/ both sells videos and has lots of money. 
E: OK 
$I: Will that not work? 
E: Yes, there's no reason why that 
shouldn't work. 
E: But that's not what you wanted me to do? 
E: You can do it anyway you like. 
That will work. 
Sl: But it's not the neatest way of doing it, 
is it? 
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E: It probably is. 
Sl: But it's probably not. It's not neat. 
I mean, it's not elegant, is it? 
(reads screen) 
But you don't like it that way, do you? 
E: I do like it that way, yes. 
Sl: But it's not a good way. 
E: Can you think of a better one? 
Sl: Not right at the moment, 
because I'm in the middle of thinking about 
this one. 
E: Do this one. 
Sl: types: 
SOLO., TO INVESTIGATE /X/ 
... :I FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ --- KNOWS ... >? 
..... IA: CHECK * --- IS --- > D9DGY 
....... 1AA IF PRESENT: NOTE - ... ISA ... > SUSPECT; NEXT CASE 
....... 1 AB IF ABSENT: PRINT /X/ "IS ELIMINATED"; NEXT CASE 
SI: Am I right in having that thing there? 
E: What? The /X/? 
SI: Yes. 
E: Well, what would the /X/ refer back to? 
Sl: Well... so it should be an asterisk, then. 
Yes. Shouldn't it? 
Let me just check on that. 
flicks through book 
(reads screen) 
I'm still checking my NEXT CASEs things. 
flicks through book 
I can't remember what page It's on. 
Oh yes, 88. 
Where are we? 
reads screen 
types 
E: It's just DONE, 
S1, Ah. Em, will that not all work then. 
E: I don't know try it. You could edit it and 
just... 
374 
Appendices 
Sl: and just exit to the 2. 
E: Get the 2 out. 
SI: types 
(program is now: 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE W 
... :1 FOR EACH CASE OF DU ... KNOWS ... >? 
..... 1A: CHECK * --- IS ... > DODGY 
....... 1AA IF PRESENT: NOTE * --- ISA ... > SUSPECT; NEXT CASE 
....... 1AB IF ABSENT: PRINT * "IS ELIMINATED"; NEXT CASE 
2 DONE 
DONE 
OK... I NOW KNOW HOW TO'INVESTIGATE'/)U 
SOLO: EDIT INVESTIGATE 
2 
DONE 
OK... I HAVE RE-DEFINED HOW TO'INVESTIGATE'fXJ 
Now. 
E: So your plan is to have this procedure 
called INVESTIGATE and another one. 
S I: Another one. 
Which results in putting this... 
I mean... 
E: You'd run it first, would you? 
Sl: No, em no. 
I'm just sort of thinking through all this. 
I don't actually, em... 
Yes, obviously, I would... 
I mean, obviously 
i 
would sort of 
run the DODGY thing first, 
But I don't actually want to do that. 
Because I want the whole thing to simply 
to run with what's in the database, 
At the moment. 
So, really... 
reads her solution 
Right, we'll do it again. 
E: The INVESTIGATE? 
Sl: Yeah, but I want to have... 
I've figured out what sort of thing I want in 
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there (indicating DODGY) 
and, I mean, you're right 
that's not the sort of thing. 
I want another procedure in there, don't I? 
Em... something like 
something called SUSS /X/ 
where the procedure called SUSS /X/ 
checks to see whether /X/ was both selling 
videos 
and having lots of money 
and if... 
E: Uhuh, Right. 
SI: So was some sort of thing... 
So, em, oh Godl 
E: You've been at it for over an hour. 
Do you want to stop for a bit? 
Sl: No I want to finish it. Stop for a bit? 
Stop for a bit. 
S1 has half hour break 
Sl: I'm looking through the iteration bit 
on page 82 and 83 to try and remember it, 
The problem I'm having her is that, 
although on page 83 82 and 83 the book 
tells me how to do Iteration there, 
the first node and the third node on the triple 
are related by the same second node 
whereas in this case 
what I'm trying to do is something where 
the second nodes are also varying. 
At least I've got two variable lines going down 
instead of just the one. 
I'll draw a diagram of what I'm trying to do. 
The ordinary iteration Is this fanning out thing 
and the recursion is this thing here. 
What I'm trying to do 
what the problem is... 
is first of all Im doing the iteration thing 
for the FOR EACH 
What I'm trying to do Is FOR EACH person 
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that ALEC knows, ALEC here, 
to each of the different variables here, 
and then looking at different things from 
each variable as well. 
Now I'm going further up the screen 
to remind myself what I've already done. 
I also want to go back in the book 
to find out where I can't- 
whether I can have a check within a check 
procedure 
because I don't think I can, 
flicks through book 
I'm not finding the answer. 
types 
I'm still just sort of thinking here 
and trying all sorts of ideas 
that go through my head, 
That's not going to work. 
I probably shouldn't be starting this way. 
I should try to think of a different way 
to start 
but it doesn't seem to make any difference. 
Sl has typed: 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE /X/ 
... :I FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ --- 
KNOWS >? 
..... IA: CHECK * --- SELLS ... > 
VIDEOS 
....... DONE 
....... IAB IF ABSIiNT: EXIT 
... : DONE 
reads screen 
types 
OK Back in the book. 
types 
I've made a mistake here. CHECK... 
I'll just write DONE (? ) the thing again 
S1 has written: 
SOLO, TO INVESTIGATE X 
...: I FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ ... 
KNOWS >? 
.,.., lA: FOR EACH CASE 
OF * --- SELLS -.. > ?B 
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....... lAA: *13 ... SELLS --- > VIDEOS 
... - DONE 
Sl types: 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE /X/ 
1 FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ --- KNOWS --- >? 
1 A, FOR EACH CASE OF * --- SELLS --- > ?A 
....... 1AA: CHECK* --- SELLS ---> VIDEOS 
......... 1 AAA IF PRESENT: FOR EACH CASE OF * --- SELLS --- > VIDEOS 
........... 1AAAA: CHECK* ... HAS ... >LOTSOFMONEY 
............. IAAAAA IF PRESENT: NOTE * --- ISA --> SUSPECT 
............. 1AAAAB IF ABSENT: PRINT* "IS ELIMINATED"; EXIT 
......... 1 AAB IF ABSENT: PRINT *"IS ELIMINATED"; EXIT] 
I'm just reading what I've got on the screen 
to see if it makes any sort of sense at all. 
(reads screen) 
Now I'm looking at what I've got here 
and I think I've got confused with my asterisks 
and my asterisks and suffixes. 
OK... And I have done in fact.., 
My substep 1AA is incorrect 
because it's got an A in it too many. 
So I just want to have DONE 
and then and then I'm going to edit it. 
OK EDIT INVESTTGATE 
and then I'm going to say 1AA 
OK, let me just check, Asterisk. 
OK, So we just CHECK 
types 
OK. I don't know why it's done this 
(editing fails S7 retypes INVESTIGATE) 
SOLO: EDIT` INVESTIGATE 
... : lAA: CHECK* ... SELLS ... > VIDEM 
;;; ERROR: Is not an external symbol of package 1AA found by reader, 
I'm just going to copy it, in that case. 
(SI tries copying and pasting but makes a 
number of errors ) 
Right at the moment I'm just having problems 
making the thing work again. 
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[SI has typed: 
SOLO: EDIT INVESTIGATE 
... : lAA: CHECK* ... SELLS ... > VIDEOS 
ERROR: Is not an external symbol of package 1 AA found by reader, 
> (solo-top-level) 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE IYJ 
I FOR EACH CASE OF IXI --- KNOWS ... > 
1 A: FOR EACH CASE OF * ... SELLS ... > ?A 
....... 1AA: CHECK* ... 
SELLS --- > VIDEOS 
;;; ERROR: OOPS... FOUND NIL INSTEAD OF A LINE NUMBER OR DONE 
> (solo-top-level) 
SOLO: to Investigate /x/ 
... :I FOR EA 
..... 1A: EXIT 
DONE 
OK... I NOW KNOW HOW TO'INVESTIGATE/Xl 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE /X/ 
... :I FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ ... 
KNOWS ---> ? 
..... 1A: FOR EACH CASE OF * ... SELLS ... > 
?A 
....... 1AA. CHECK* ... SELLS ... > 
VIDEOS 
lAAA IF PRESENT: FOR EACH CASE OF * ... SELLS ... > VIDEOS 
........... 1AAAA: CHECK* ... HAS ... > LOTSOFMONEY 
............. IAAAAA IF PRESENT: NOTE * --- ISA ... >SUSPECT 
............. IAAAAB IF ABSENT: PRINT "IS 
ELIMINATED"; EXIT 
1AAB IF ABSENT: PRINT * "IS ELIMINATED"; EXIT 
DONE 
ERROR: Attempt to read past end of stream. 
> (solo-top-level) 
SOLO: to InvestIgate /X/ 
... :1 FOR EACH CASE OF IXI --- KNOWS ... >? 
1A: FOR EACH CASE OF * --- SELLS -.. > ?A 
....... IAA: CHECK* .. SELLS ... > 
VIDEOS 
......... 1AAA IF PRESENT: FOR 
EACH CASE OF * ... SELLS ... > VIDEOS 
........... IAAAA: CHECK* ... HAS ... > LOTSOFMONEY 
............. 1AAAAA IF PRESENT: 
NOTE * ... ISA ... > SUSPECT; EXIT 
............. 1AAAAS IF ABSENT: PRINT * "IS 
ELIMINATED"; EXIT 
......... IAAB IF ASSENT: PRINT* 
"IS ELIMINATED"; EXIT 
: DONE 
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OK... I NOW KNOW HOW TO'INVESTIGATE'/Xt 
SOLO: INVESTIGATE ALEC 
OK... (I ALREADY KNEW PETE --- ISA --- > SUSPECT) 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE /X1 
...: I FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ --- KNOWS ---> ? 
..... 1A: CHECK * --- 
SELLS ... > VIDEOS 
....... 1AA IF 
PRESENT: FOR EACH CASE OF SELLS ... > VIDEOS 
......... 1AAA: CHECK* ... HAS ... > LOTSOFMONEY 
........... 1AAAA IF PRESENT: NOTE * --- ISA --- > SUSPECT; NEXT CASE 
........... I AAAB IF ABSENT: PRINT *"IS ELIMINATED"; EXIT 
....... 1AB IF ABSENT: PRINT * "IS ELIMINATED"; EXIT 
... : DONE 
OK... I NOW KNOW HOW TO'INVESTIGATE/X/ 
SOLO: EDIT INVESTIGATE 
1AAA: CHECK * --- HAS ... > LOTSOFMONEY 
ERROR: Package I AAA does not exist. 
TO INVESTIGATE /X/ 
1 FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ .. KNOWS --- >? 
IA-, CHECK * ... SELLS ---> VIDEOS 
....... 1AA IF PRESENT: FOR EACH CASE OF * ... SELLS ... > VIDEOS 
......... 1AAA: CHECK * --- HAS ... > LOTSOFMONEY 
........... 1AAAA IF PRESENT: NOTE * . -- ISA --- > 
SUSPECT; NEXT CASE 
........... 1AAAB IF ABSENT: PRINT *"IS ELIMINATED"; EXIT 
....... I AB IF ABSENT: PRINT *"IS ELIMINATED"; EXIT 
... : DONE 
ERROR: Unbound variable to In eval 
> (solo-top- level) 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE X 
... : ... :1 FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ --- KNOWS ... >? 
..... IA: CHECK* ... SELLS ... > VIDEOS 
....... 1AA IF PRESENT: FOR EACH CASE OF * ... SELLS ... > VIDEOS 
... 1AAA: CHECK * --- HAS ... > LOTSOFMONEY 
........... 1AAAA IF PRESENT: NOTE * ... ISA ... > SUSPECT; NEXT CASE 
........... 1AAAB IF ABSENT: PRINT * "IS ELIMINATED"; EXIT 
....... I AB IF ABSENT: PRINT * "IS ELIMINATED"; EXIT 
.... DONE 
;;: ERROR: Token composed solely of dots found by reader: 
> (solo-top- level) 
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SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE 1XJ 
:1 FOR EACH CASE OF DU .. KNOWS -.. > ? 
..... IA: CHECK * ... SELLS ... > VIDEOS 
;;; ERROR: Attempt to read past end of stream. 
> (solo-top-level) 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE IXI 
:1 FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ ... KNOWS ---> ? 
;;; ERROR: Attempt to read past end of stream. 
> (solo-top-level) 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE[& 
:I FOR EACH CASE OF IXI --- KNOWS >? 
MCHECK * ... SELLS ... > VIDEOS 
;;; ERROR: Attempt to read past end of stream. 
> (solo-top-level) 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE/X/ 
... :1 FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ ... KNOWS ... >? 
IA: CHECK * ... SELLS --- > VIDEOS 
1AA IF PRESENT: FOR EACH CASE OF * --- SELLS --> VIDEOS 
......... lAAA: CHECK * -- HAS ... > LOTSOFMONEY 
........... IAAAA IF PRESENT: NOTE * ... ISA ... > SUSPECT; NEXT CASE 
........... I AAAB IF ABSENT: PRINT *"IS ELIMINATED"; EXIT 
I AB IF ABSENT: PRINT *"IS ELIMINATED"; EXIT 
... : done 
OK... I NOW KNOW HOW TO'INVESTIGATE'/X/ 
SOLO: INVESTlGATE ALEC 
OK... (I ALREADY KNEW PETE --- ISA ... > SUSPECT) 
OOPS... Line 1A within CHECK must end with CONTINUE or EXIT 
SOLO: TO INVESilGATE /X/ 
... :I FOR EACH CASE OF IXI .. KNOWS ... >? 
..... IA: FOR EACH CASE OF * ... SELLS ---> VIDEOS 
....... lAA: CHECK* ... HAS ... >LOTSOFMONEY 
......... 1AAA IF PRESENT: NOTE * ... ISA ... >SUSPECT; NEXT CASE 
......... 1AAS IF ABSENT: PRINT "IS ELIMINATED"; NEXT CASE 
... : DONE 
OK... I NOW KNOW HOW TOINVESTIGATE' /)q 
Now I'm just reading what I've got on the 
screen 
to see if it will Work so far. 
reads sobition 
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And I'm looking now... back at the book 
for the NEXT CASE thing still. 
I'm looking at page 88 at the example, 
the BOOZETEST example. 
reads Mmple 
No this has just got me right back to where 
I started from at the beginning.. 
recursing. 
reads 
I assumed in the last examnle z--- 
that I couldn't have a substep which said 
IF PRESENT FOR EACH CASE OF whatever, 
blah, blah, blah, blah, semi-colon, 
and either a control statement. 
I'm assuming I can't have a control statement 
after a FOR EACH construct within a sub-step. 
Although I don't actually know if that's true 
becauseit... it doesn't say so anywhere. 
re4ds solution 
Is it going to make any difference If I have a 
CONTINUE? 
(? ) for the moment just to get out of it. 
I'm just keeping on going in circles. 
My last thing that I did worked to the same 
extent 
as the one before that did, 
in other words it noted PETE is a SUSPECT 
but it didn't do any of the printing of the rest 
of the things business. 
Because, I'll show you why, will I? 
See, here's what it was: 
FOR EACH CASE OF that 
CHECK * SELLS VIDEOS IF PRESENT, 
and then I had a FOR EACH THING 
after an IF PRESENT, right? 
And it didn't accept it, 
because, of course, I have to have a control 
statement after it 
if there's an IF PRESENT. 
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And I'm assuming that I can't have a control 
statement after a FOR EACH construct. 
Is that a correct assumption to be making. 
E: (? ) Well, you ought to have it down 
about here. Because that's the end of the 
IF PRESENT (indicates end of 1AAAB) 
Sl: Where would I have to have it? 
Here? 
E: You've got IF PRESENT blah, blah, blah 
Sl: It would have to be here. EXIT, EXIT. 
E: I don't think that would work at all. 
It wouldn't make sense. 
SI: I thought that something like this 
was going to be the way into solving it 
and that's really what I've been working on 
for the past hour. 
Forgetting... 
well not... not at all taking account of the fact 
that I was going to have a control statement 
at the end of this IF PRESENT thing. 
So none of that's going to work. 
It accepts an awful lot of things 
and then it doesn't actually tell you 
until you try to run the procedure 
that it hasn't accepted them. 
I found this quite often, I mean, 
in... in the whole of my way through the 
SOLO thing 
that it accepts things that are entirely wrong 
and doesn't tell you that they're wrong 
until you try to run the procedure. 
I'm really annoyed that I can't do this. 
E: Do you want to give up for the moment? 
SI: Uhuh. 
In informal discussion after this episode the experimenter asked why the subject gave tip 
on the idea of using a procedure within a procedure. The subject again claimed that such a 
method did not seem 'elegant' and was determined tofind a way to solve tile problem 
within one procedure. The subject then proceeded to solve the problem with paper and 
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pencil, writing down a solution immediately without reference to any prior solution or the 
textbook. The solution produced was. 
SOLO: TO INVESTIGATE /XI 
... :1 FOR EACH CASE OF /X/ ... KNOWS --- > 
..... 1A: CHECK * ... SELLS ... > VIDEOS 
....... 1AA IF PRESENT: SUSS *; NEXT CASE 
....... IAB IF ABSENT: PRINT* "IS ELIMINATED"; EXIT 
... : DONE 
OK... I NOW KNOW HOW TOINVESTIGATE/W 
SOLO: TO SUSS W 
:I CHECK DU ... HAS ... > LOTSOFMONEY 
..... IA IF PRESENT: NOTE /X/ ... ISA ... > SUSPECT; EXIT 
1B IF ABSENT: PRINT /X/ "IS ELIMINATED"; EXIT 
DONE 
This solution would not go through the whole database since the subject has written 'EXIT' 
at the end of line 1AB in the INVESTIGATE procedure, The subject was aware of this, 
however, pointed out to the experimenter that she was unsure whether it should be EXIT 
or NEXT CASE then changed it to NEXT CASE. 
Sl'S DRAWINGS: 
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0000 
ALEC 
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A. 3.5 Think aloud protocol from Sl: Solving the third SOLO problem 
E: 14th February. Problem 3. 
Sl: How to spend your Valentine's Day. 
(reads first line of problem) 
'Create a database containing the following 
information. ' 
Right, well, I'll just go ahead and do that. 
types in database 
OK. The problem, 'Now write a problem 
called INVITE which NOTEs that.... ' 
This is nice. What a nice sociable sort of 
problem. 
Right. 
Re-reads problem 
So BILL LIKES ISOBEL but ISOBEL doesn't 
like BILL? Is that right? 
E: That's the only database you've got. 
Sl: Yes, OK. Yes, OK, 
but I mean that... those... 
I mean, for instance, AVRIL LIKES BILL 
but BILL doesn't like AVRIL 
but these things aren't necessarily important 
for the thing. 
I mean, they're not some sort of deliberate 
things? 
OK. Em, Right. 
Well I'm just checking back to the SOLO 
book here. 
Em, just for fim 
Page 91. Page 92. 
And I think this is going to be pretty similar 
to the INFECT thing on page 92, really, 
isn't it? 
So the way I'm going to deal with this.... 
I'm looking back to page 91. 
I'm looking back at the bit called A, 7 
'Iteration versus Recursion' and again this 
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little fan-shaped diagram indicating 
iteration 
and the line-shaped thing for recursion 
just... because I like them. 
OK, so I think the easiest way to do this is 
just to start typing things 
and figure out where they're not going to 
find... and... 
em, what did I just say there? 
I'm going to start typing and find out 
once I'm sort of half way through it 
why it's not going to work. OK? 
So we start off.. 
(to E) Well I've got to say something. 
E: That's fine. 
SI: types 
SOLO: TO INVITE IXI 
1 NOTE /X/ ... HAS ... > INVITATION 
2 FOR EACH CASE OF IXI --- LIKES ... >? 
..... 2A: INVITE * 
Right, I'm just thinking now. 
Reads out what she has just typed 
Now, is that going to work? 
Why don't I type it in and find out? 
So, that it's got iteration and recursion in it. 
E: Are you reading through it again to see 
if it's going to work? 
Sl: No, I'm just reading through it again. 
I can't be bothered going through... 
What I should really do if I had any sense 
em, is actually pick one of these names 
and stick it in as an example. 
But I caWt be bothered 
so I'm just going to type it in 
and see what it comes up with. 
types DONE 
[program now is: 
SOLO: TO INVITE IXI 
... :I NOTE IXI ... HAS ... > INVITATION 
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.,.: 2 FOR EACH CASE OF 1XI --- LIKES >? 
..... 2A: INVITE 
... : DONE 
OK... I NOW KNOW HOW TO'INVITE'/X/ 
Sl now types: 
SOLO: INVITE AVRIL 
SOLO responds: 
OK... 
AVRIL 
I 
I ... LIKES ... > BILL 
I 
I ... LIKES ---> ILONA 
I 
I ... LIKES --- > JOHN 
I ... LIKES ---> KAREN 
I 
I --- HAS --- > INVITATION 
OOPS... THE FORMAT FOR'FOR'IS: 
FOR EACH CASE OF FROM - 
RELATION --> VALUE] 
S1 - Right, I've obviously just... 
I've obviously, em, missed... 
E: Go back up to your... 
S1, I've missed a space between the end of 
the arrowhead and the question mark. 
That's what It is, isn't it? 
E: Yes, that's it. You can... 
That's easy to edit at least. 
[SI types: 
SOLO: EDIT INVITE 
... :2 FOR EACH CASE OF IXI --- LIKES ... >? 
..... 2A: INVITE 
... : DONE 
SOLO responds: 
OK... I HAVE RE-DEFINED HOW TO'INVITE'/)(/ 
SI types: 
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SOLO: INVITE AVRIL 
SOLO responds: 
OK ... (I ALREADY KNEW AVRIL --- HAS --- > INVITATION) 
OK ... 
BILL 
I 
I ... LIKES ... > CAROL 
I 
I --- LIKES ... > ISOBEL 
I 
I --- HAS ... > INVITATION 
OK 
LIKES ... > EMMA 
LIKES --- > FRANK 
LIKES ... > GRAHAM 
HAS ... > INVITATION 
OK.. 
EMMA 
II 
I ... HAS ... > INVITATION 
OK... 
FRANK 
I ... LIKES ... > GRAHAM 
I 
I ... HAS ---> INVITATION 
OK.. 
GRAHAM 
I 
I ... HAS ---> INVITATION 
OK... (I ALREADY KNEW GRAHAM --- HAS ---> INVITATION) 
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OK... 
ISOBEL 
I 
I --- LIKES ... > HANNAH 
I 
I --- HAS --- > INVITATION 
OK.. 
HANNAH 
I 
I --- HAS --- > INVITATION 
OK... 
ILONA 
I 
I ... HAS ... > INVITATION 
OK... 
JOHN 
I 
I --- LIKES ... > LOTTE 
I 
I ... HAS ... > INVITATION 
OK... 
LOTTE 
I 
I --- HAS ... > INVITATION 
OK.. - 
KAREN 
I 
I ... HAS ... > INVITATION] 
Sl: Is that it ? 
E: That's it. 
SI: I'm finished? 
E: Yes. 
SI: Gosh. 
Sl: Right we're discussing why this one wasn't harder than the previous one, yeah? 
E: Yes, this one involves both recursion and iteration. 
SI- Yeah, it's exactly the same as the example on page 92. 
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E: Yes, but you had to find that out. 
Sl: Yes, I know, but I had done the example on page 92 and I remembered it, and, I mean, I 
read through the thing before I did the exercise, although I remembered it anyway, I 
could have done that without looking at page 92. The difficulty with the second problem 
was that I was having to do things that hadn't ever come out in the book. Em, well I mean, 
I wasn't really, because, I mean, the thing was solved quite simply by having two 
constructs, no, two procedures. Yes, that's it. By having two procedures running 
simultaneously. Well, actually not running simultaneously but one running inside the 
other. 
E: Yeah, one calling the other. 
SJ: Yes, but that wasn't something that was ever particularly used in the book as an 
example. Well, I mean that's a silly sort of thing to say, because it was very 
straightforward. The reason it took me so long was because we discussed this as well after 
it. Do you want me to say all this now? 
E: Yes, yes. 
Sl: Well, as we discussed after I had actually solved the second one, I said quite early on 
in my solving of it, or my attempts to solve it, that it would work perfectly well very 
easily with two procedures going. But the reason I didn't go ahead and solve it then, was 
because I wondered... I though it might be possible to solve It by just having one procedure 
which would, of course, be more complicated than having two ones. It would be a more 
complicated procedure than either of the two that were required to solve It. But I thought 
It would be quite fun... or something... 
E: You said you thought it would be more elegant do it in one. 
Sl: Yes, something like that. I thought it would be neater if it were possible to have 
simply one procedure. And I wanted to see exactly how all the deeply embedded things 
worked, and, of course, I found eventually that I couldn't do it, and once I decided to go 
back and do it using two procedures, as you recall, I basically sat down and wrote them 
down immediately without even thinking about it, and it was very straightforward, 
E: Right this is the only... this is the section of the book that has the... that calls 
another one. (indicates page 56) 
Sl: Yes, I know, It does. 
E: It's just that it's quite a bit back, this is page 56. 
SI: Yes, I mean, I do remember that. It was just... yes I mean... I mean, as I think we,.. we 
established as I was doing the thing, I did work out that it would be possible to do it with 
two procedures. it's just that I wanted to see if I could do it with one. 
E. Stubbornness. 
SI; Something like that. 
E. OK. Thanks very much. 
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A. 3.6 Think aloud protocol from S2: Solving the first SOLO problem 
E: Session 1, problem 1. 
This is the problem. [hands sheets to S21 
52: All right. 
E; If you could just read it through then... 
solve it. 
S2: reads problem. 
E: Also, if you re-read any of it, could 
you say which bits you're re-reading, 
S2: Rereading the first page. 
reads first page 
Reading second page. 
reads second page 
E: Can I ask you what are you're 
immediate thoughts? 
S2: Em... First off the problem looks 
relatively... 
when I say relatively... it looks fairly easy. 
Em... but on reflection to that, 
you obviously... 
you've got to go through and work out 
exactly what the problem's asking you... 
em ... in respects of solving it. 
Em ... So I believe... 
to go through it and 
check all the actual, ern... database entries 
for the, em... em... the node of OVER.. 
If... if it finds OVER 
then to include IS FLOODED on it. 
E: Right. 
rereads problem statement 
S2. Where's the book? 
flicks through book 
E: Which... have you found a page yet? 
S2: Not yet. 
reads problem statement 
E: Are you able to say what it is that 
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you're thinking about? 
S2: Em... I'm just trying to work out 
how the actual program's gonna start 
working through 
and how to branch it out. 
Em.. So I think the first thing I want to do 
is probably to, em ... 
write FLOOD 
and first off to, em ... FLOOD ATTIC, em... 
Then do a CHECK to 
check that is OVER, em... a particular room, 
and work that through 
and FLOOD all those various rooms. 
flicks through book 
I trying to work out the best... thing to do. 
reads problem statement 
flicks through book 
E: If you actually read anything from the 
book, just say which one you're reading. 
The name of the example will do. 
$2: Right. Okay. Em... 
There are going to be a few ways 
of doing this, 
Do you want the quickest, longest, or any 
other, or just to solve the problem?... 
E: Any way that'll give you that in the 
database. 
7 [referring to final database after program has run] 
S2: Right. Okay. 
Reading page 67, top right hand example. 
reads example and refers to problem 
statement several times 
E: Can I ask you to tell me how you think 
the example is going to help you? Or if it is? 
S2, Em... Just trying to see if I can, ern... 
this is just using CHECK statements. 
Em... 
U: So at the moment you're Just looking at 
the CHECK statements. 
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S2: Yeah, yeah, em... 
seeing if it's going to help me at all. 
This probably will work, 
it's going to be incredibly long. 
EM... It might be better to do FOR EACH 
CASE statements... 
check to see if I can fit the problem to it. 
Probably a quicker solution. 
Reading page 88 top left hand example. 
reads example 
reads problem statement 
It's probably not going to work 
So go back to the CHECK statements. 
On 67 again. 
Okay, I can probably get this to work. 
Look at the, em... results. 
reads page 2 of problem statement 
He says hoping. 
Em... Right... 
types 
spell FLOOD. 
Subject has written: 
TO FLOOD IXI 
I CHECK IXI OVER ? 
rereads problem statement 
E: What are you ... ? 
S2: I'm just... 
the first one. 
Gonna put in CHECK statements 
to check If the em... 
ATTIC is OVER statement. 
EM... obviously, If I do that, 
it's not going to come up with the, ern... 
database of ATTIC IS FLOODED. 
reads partial solution 
Em... or will it? 
E: Can I ask you if you're thinking of a way 
of getting round it, or whether you're thinking of 
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S2: I'm thinking of scrapping this 
and doing it again. 
types return. 
[SOLO crashes and asks whether to abort] 
E: It's probably best to... abort in this case. 
it's not a very friendly program. 
Solo-top-level. 
S2: restarts SOLO 
rereads problem statement and example 
several times 
E: Are you reading the problem statement? 
S2: Yeah. 
E: I'm going to make comments like that 
every now and again. 
S2: Right, right. 
Seeing if I can think this over. 
If my inspiration comes to life. 
rere4ds problem statement 
E: What is it Youre thinking about? 
How to get ... ? 
S2: Getting past... 
Trying to work out the structure of FLOOD. 
E: Right. 
S2: Em... 
rere4ds problem statement 
E: Can you say what it is you think FLOOD 
needs? 
S2: Em... Probaýly CHECK statements 
to check, em... 
the first one is FLOOD the ATTIC, 
so I'd CHECK the ATTIC. 
First I want to FLOOD the ATTIC 
so I can put an inclusion 
on the ATTIC IS FLOODED. 
Then CHECK the ATTIC is OVER a room, 
then FLOOD those various rooms. 
E: Right. 
S2: types 
E -, So You've written NOTE /X/ -- IS --> 
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FLOODED; 2 CHECK /X/ OVER?. 
S2: Uhuh. 
rereads problem statement and solution 
E: Can I ask you what you're thinking now? 
S2: I'm thinking now... 
It's obviously going to come up with 
I've FLOODED the ATMC, 
now I'm checking whether the AMC is OVER. 
Trying to then work out, ern... 
to then FLOOD that. 
E: So in other words you're going through 
what you've written with ATTIC in the place 
of /X/ at the moment, just to see how it works. 
Right? 
S2. Yeah. 
reads solution 
types 
E: So you've got '2a IF PRESENT: NOTE 
IS FLOODED' 
S2. Yeah. 
E: Can I ask you what you're thinking? 
S2: Just trying to work out how (? ) ... 
I'm trying now to do a CHECK on (? ) one, 
which I can't do. 
rereads problem statement 
E: Can I ask you if you can recognize what 
kind of problem this is? 
S2: Em... A hard one. 
Em- I don't know. 
I'm not doing very well on the first one. 
Reading page 70 at the moment 
E: Is that the new CRAVETEST? 
S2: Yeah. 
E: Could you say which bits, em.. you're 
reading? Is it the text or the example? 
S2: The example. 
E- Are you looking for anything specifically? 
S2: I'm just trying to remember an example 
I've already done 
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- 
which I can then... tie this into. 
Ern... If I can find it. 
E. Can you remember the name of the 
example? 
S2: Ern... 
E: Or something about it? 
S2: I believe it's the one where, em... 
I think it's the INSULT one. 
You define two programs, ern... 
E: I think INSULT is (? ). (looks up book) 39? 
S2: I think, if that's the case, 
I think it's the INSULT and PRAISE. 
They're em.... 
It's em- 
E: Page 57 is it? 
S2: Yeah. 
E: To JUDGE? 
S2: Yeah. 
reads solution 
reads example 
E: Are you trying to see how that one would 
help? 
S2: Yeah, I'm just trying to see 
If this one would help. 
EM... 
I was trying to... 
make it very simpler, 
would be simply t6 say NOTE ern... 
it's FLOODED. 
Would make it something like a subprogram, 
Something like FLOODI... 
ern... X or something, 
and then FLOOD the various rooms (? ) em... 
lots of fun doing that. 
reads manual 
E: Page 80. 
S2: Yeah. INFECT. 
reads example 
skims through book 
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reads new version of INFECT (page 92) 
E: And this is page 92. And what do you 
think about that one? 
SZ: Em... Looks like it may... well... do it. 
Ern... 
E: Can you say why you think it might do? 
S2: EM... Not at the moment. 
Em... 
E: Can I ask you also, did you read the text 
round about it? Or just... 
S2- Yeah. I'm reading the text now. 
I'm referring back to the example 
reads example 
'the INFECT procedure is defined in section 
A. 1 can now be defined as follows' 
E: Page8O 
S2: Right. 
I'm going back to that. 
E; And you're reading the text here as well, 
I see. 
S2: Yeah. 
reads text 
just going to, ern... 
types 
Oops. Abort. 
types 
E Probably be simpler typing it again, 
to be honest, 
S2, reads problem 
types 
E: EM... Arrowhead. 
S2,. Oops, 
E: Is there a space there. 
S2: Can I use'DONE'now to get out of that? 
E: No. Not there. EXIT 
S2, types 
E. So you've got. TO FLOOD /X/ NOTE /X/ 
IS FLOODED, 2 CHECK /X/ OVER?; 
2A IF PRESENT, FLOOD *; EXIT, - 
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213; EXIT, DONE. 
S2: Let's try. 
types: 
FLOOD ATTIC 
[SOLO responds: 
OK... 
ATTIC 
I- OVER -> BEDROOM 
I- IS -> FLOODED 
OK... 
BEDROOM 
I 
I -- ISA -> ROOM 
I- OVER -> LANDING 
IS -> FLOODED 
OK... 
LANDING 
I- ISA -> PLATFORM 
I -OVER-> CUP130ARD 
I -- IS -> FLOODED 
OK... 
CUPBOARD 
I- OVER -> LOUNGE 
I- IS --> FLOODED 
OK... 
LOUNGE 
ISA --> ROOM 
--- OVER KITCHEN 
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I- IS FLOODED 
OK... 
KITCHEN 
I 
I -- ISA -> ROOM 
I- OVER -> BASEMENT 
I 
I- IS -> FLOODED 
OK... 
BASEMENT 
I 
I- HAS -> CONCRETEFLOOR . 
I 
I- IS --> FLOODED] 
E: Right. 
S2: What a nightmare. 
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